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A NOTE ON REFERENCES
The history behind the œuvre of Johan (1620–1660) and Pieter de la Court 
(1618–1685) is a complex tale of brotherly collaboration, sudden death, 
and endless revisions. This tale, told in full in chapter 1 below, requires 
some preliminary remarks.
The lack of historical evidence makes it in many cases impossible to 
assert with utter certainty who of the two brothers wrote what exactly. 
Therefore, I consistently speak of ‘the De la Courts’ in plural, and only of 
‘De la Court’ in singular when there is actual proof that the author was 
Pieter de la Court. This means that all references to the original argument 
from the Politike Weeg-schaal, to the Politike Discoursen, and to Welvaren 
speak of the two De la Courts as authors, whereas all references to the 
revisions in the Politike Weeg-schaal and to the treatises Interest van 
Holland, Aanwysing, and Sinryke Fabulen speak of a single De la Court.
Besides, for the sake of clarity I refer always to the most complete edi-
tions of the brothers’ works, or, in the case of manuscripts, to the available 
published editions. This means that all short references to their treatises 
stand for the following:
–  Politike Weeg-schaal refers to the fourth, revised edition of Consideratien 
van Staat, ofte Politike Weeg-schaal (Amsterdam: Dirk Dirksz, 1662), 
with the respective part, book, and chapter.
–  Politike Discoursen refers to the second, revised edition of Politike 
Discoursen, handelende in Ses onderscheide Boeken van Steeden, Landen, 
Oorlogen, Kerken, Regeeringen en Zeeden (Amsterdam: ‘Ciprianus 
vander Gracht’, 1662), with the respective part, book, and chapter.
–  Interest van Holland refers to Interest van Holland, ofte gronden van 
Hollands-welvaren (Amsterdam: ‘Cyprianus vander Gracht’, 1662), with 
the respective chapter.
–  Aanwysing refers to the first edition of Aanwysing der heilsame politike 
Gronden en Maximen van de Republike van Holland en West-Vriesland 
(Leiden and Rotterdam: Hakkens, 1669), with the respective part and 
chapter.
–  Sinryke Fabulen refers to Sinryke Fabulen, verklaart en toegepast tot 
alderley zeede-lessen, dienstig om waargenoomen te werden in het men-
schelijke en burgerlijke leeven (Amsterdam: Hieronymus Sweerts, 1685).
xiv a note on references
–  Welvaren refers to Het welvaren van Leiden. Handschrift uit het jaar 1659, 
ed. F. Driessen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1911), with the respective 
chapter.
When quoting from these works I maintain in translation the typography, 
including capitals and italics, of the original Dutch version that appears in 
full in the footnotes; unless stated otherwise, translations are mine. Full 
details of the entire oeuvre of the brothers De la Court are listed in the 
bibliography.
1 Pieter de la Court, “Consideratiën over den gevreesden oorlog, die de koningen van 
Engeland ende Vrankrijk souden mogen ofte konnen aandoen,” addressed to James 
Harrington, written on 31 December 1671 and signed on 1 January 1672. The original draft of 
this letter is in the The Hague Royal Library, Ms 75 C37, fols. 273–282. Apparently, De la 
Court wrote the letter at the explicit request of Harrington, but there is no evidence of any 
other correspondence. The letter is published in J.H. Kernkamp (ed.), “Twee ‘niet ter druk-
perse bereide’ geschriften van Pieter de la Court,” Bijdragen en mededelingen van het his-
torisch genootschap 56 (1935), 195–214, 198–199: “… veel liever den koning van Vrankrijk als 
de staten der Vereenigde Neederlanden verminderd sagen … met kleine geldmiddelen, 
door grotere spaarsaam-, wijs- en standvastigheid – die gemeenelik in alle republiken 
gevonden werden – die merkelik meerdere subsidiën en magt des konings van Engeland 
verduurd ende te schande gemaakt hebben.”
2 Ibidem, 205: “Want vermits Engeland geregeerd werd van eenen koning ende alle 
magtige koningryken den meesten tijd onderworpen zijn binnenlandse oorlogen, ofte ook 
INTRoDuCTIoN
New Year’s Eve 1672. on the threshold of what would become the most 
disastrous year in the Dutch Golden Age, Pieter de la Court, a textile 
entrepreneur from Leiden, was in Hamburg. Business had brought him 
there, but De la Court’s expertise went well beyond the intricacies of the 
market: in the wee hours of the night he took up his pen and wrote a long 
letter to a like-minded author on the other side of the North Sea, the 
English republican James Harrington. De la Court told Harrington that 
the plans being laid for a future French-English attack against the Dutch 
Republic were unlikely to be successful. War, he argued, would only serve 
the hegemonic cause of Louis XIV, and the English people would there-
fore “rather see the king of France reduced than the states of the united 
Netherlands”. Moreover, even if England did attack, its armies would be 
no match for the Dutch, who had “with small means, but because of 
greater frugality, wisdom and resolution – which are generally to be found 
in all republics – endured and humiliated the remarkably larger resources 
and power of the king of England.”1
With these words De la Court claimed the superiority of the Dutch 
Republic, which was prospering because of its commerce, liberty and con-
cord, qualities not to be found in England: “Since England is ruled by a 
king and all powerful kingdoms are mostly restrained by interior or for-
eign wars that their kings deliberately wage against neighbours, therefore 
it is apparent that during those times trade and navigation could not be 
maintained there at all.”2 In short, the English, subjected to the arbitrary 
2 introduction
buitenlandse, die hunne koningen teegen de naburen moedwilliglik voeren, soo is ken-
nelik, dat gedurende denselven tijd de koopmanschap ende zeevaart aldaar gansch niet 
gehanteerd soude kunnen warden.”
3 Ibidem, 213: “… dat volgens het interest des konings van Engeland ende syner onder-
danen gansch ongeraden is met den koninge van Vrankrijk een verbond aan te gaan ter 
verdrukkinge der Vrye Neederlanden. Ende dat het in teegendeel met des konings van 
Engeland ende syner onderdanen interessen seer wel overeenkomt met andere 
omleggende naburen ende insonderheid met den Staat der Vrye Neederlanden te maken 
verbonden ter gemeene bescherminge teegen dat oovermagtige ende andersins alles 
inslokken willende Vrankrijk.” De la Court’s argument is strikingly similar to a pamphlet of 
the English republican Slingsby Bethel, written almost exactly a year before, The Present 
Interest of England Stated (London, 1671), which in turn explicitly refers to De la Court’s 
Interest van Holland (1662).
greed of a monarch, would never be able to achieve the same commercial 
splendour as the united Provinces. And therefore, as De la Court went on 
to explain to Harrington, England should not try to subdue the Dutch 
but rather join them in a coalition against France, a state with a compara-
ble outlook and therefore England’s real adversary. As De la Court 
concluded:
According to the interest of the king of England and his subjects it is totally 
unadvisable to form an alliance with the king of France to subdue the Free 
Netherlands. on the contrary, it very well suits the interests of the king of 
England and his subjects to form with other close neighbours and especially 
with the State of the Free Netherlands an alliance for mutual protection 
against that all-powerful and otherwise all-swallowing France.3
The further events of the following year would prove that De la Court had 
been far too optimistic in his assumptions. England (or at least its king) 
did find it in its interest to join the French in their assault on the united 
Provinces, eventually with catastrophic results for the Dutch. That sum-
mer, when almost the whole country was occupied by the invading troops 
and only the province of Holland could stand firm by flooding part of the 
land as a natural barrier against the enemy armies, the republican govern-
ment of ‘True Liberty’ collapsed and the Prince of orange was called back 
to power by an outraged populace. Four days after Grand Pensionary 
Johan de Witt survived a first assault on his life (only to be massacred in 
an orgy of violence two months later), De la Court started to make safe his 
belongings and fled for Antwerp. He did so for good reason: according to 
legend, on one of those hot days of the summer of 1672 an unruly group of 
orangists gathered in front of De la Court’s former house in Leiden. When 
they did not find who they were looking for, the aggressors bound a dog 
with its belly cut-open to the tree in front of the house, put a candle in its 
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4 “La Court zoo je niet snoert uw mond, Doen we je als deezen hond.” The story is told 
in B.W. Wttewaall, Proeve uit een onuitgegeven staathuishoudkundig geschrift, het Welvaren 
der stad Leyden (Leiden, 1845), xxiv–xxv, but its sources are unclear.
5 Haeghs Hof-Praetje, ofte ’t samen-spraeck tusschen een Hagenaer, Amsterdammer, 
ende Leyenaar. Op ende tegens de valsche calumnien ende versierde leugenen van Pieter la 
Court, gestelt in sijn alsoo genoemde Intrest van Holland ende gronden van ’t Hollands wel-
varen (Leiden, 1662); Een onverwelckbare kroon, gevlochten op het noyt-genoegh verachte 
boeck, genaemt de Hollantsche Intrest, door Pieter la Court [1662]; Op de op-roerige schriften 
van Pieter la Court, door hem uyt-gegeven onder de naem van V.D.H. en D.C. [1662]; De gan-
sche distructie van den nieuw-gebooren Hollantschen Cromwel alias Leydtschen Quaker; 
genaemt t’Intrest van Hollandt, ofte gronden van ‘s Hollants welvaren (Schiedam, [1663]); 
Helle-vreucht over den herbooren, ende nieu-regeerende Hollantschen Cromwel alias 
s’Hollandts Intrest ende Stadthouders Regeringh Beschrijver [1662].
cloven body and left a note saying “De la Court, if you won’t shut your 
mouth, we’ll treat you as we did this dog”.4 Not eager to verify the truth of 
this menace, De la Court chose the surest way out.
De la Court’s reputation as a spokesman of the previous regime, which 
so firmly discredited him in the eyes of the orangist populace, dated back 
to the 1660s. At the beginning of that decade, he had published a series of 
political treatises about the nature of good government and its practical 
implications for the situation in Holland, treatises that were partly writ-
ten by his younger brother Johan, who died in 1660 before any of them 
had been published, and partly by Pieter de la Court himself. Together, 
the brothers De la Court had thus constructed an œuvre that was highly 
contested and debated throughout the Republic. With their radical plea 
for a truly republican government devoid of any monarchical element 
such as a Stadholder, for far-reaching religious toleration and comprehen-
sive economic liberty, the brothers were seen by many as advocates of the 
disputed government in power, the oligarchic regime of regents gathered 
around De Witt. In the heated political debate of the period, a stream of 
pamphlets followed which denounced the “false calumnies and adorned 
lies”, the “never sufficiently despised”, “rebellious” writings of De la Court, 
this “new born Dutch Cromwell alias Leiden Quaker”.5 Such insinuations 
were particularly powerful in 1672 when the country, on the brink of total 
collapse, needed a scapegoat to blame for its downfall.
Yet the works of the brothers De la Court are not only of interest in the 
context of this turbulent era. Above all, they stand out as a highly signifi-
cant contribution to early-modern European political thought in general. 
Merging various elements from natural law theory, reason of state litera-
ture, the ‘new philosophy’ of the age and classical and contemporary his-
torical writing, their œuvre provides a distinct argument for a republican 
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society in which liberty and commerce intertwine. Their ideal republic is 
a commonwealth of free citizens who engage in virtuous trade, harness-
ing their self-love to the common good in a harmony of public and private 
interests – a harmony that is not constrained by the arbitrary powers of 
others (as happened, according to De la Court, in Harrington’s England) 
but rationally regulated by the rule of law. In a highly rhetorical style, 
crammed with popular expressions and jokes, vivid historical examples 
and Aesopian fables, the brothers De la Court set out their theory in the 
vernacular, clearly addressing a broad contemporary audience. Nonethe-
less, the appeal of their works has reached wider horizons. Though obvi-
ously being a product of the time and place in which it was formulated, 
the political thought of the De la Courts transcends its relevance within 
this context as it amounts to the most passionate republican theory in all 
of Dutch history – and one of the most radical critiques of monarchy in 
Ancien Régime Europe.
This book provides a comprehensive, strongly contextualized analysis 
and interpretation of the political thought of the brothers De la Court. 
Starting from the letter to Harrington in which De la Court emphasized 
the intrinsic link between republican liberty and commercial splendour, 
it argues that their œuvre pivots on the unconditional embrace of 
commerce as the mainstay of republican politics. Through their self- 
representation as ‘wise merchants’, outspoken truth-tellers schooled in 
political insight and mercantile expertise, the De la Courts maintained 
that a true republic could only be a commercial commonwealth, and that 
trade could only prosper under a truly republican government. As the let-
ter to Harrington reveals, this commercial republicanism originated from 
the mercantile culture of the Dutch Republic, yet within a context of 
international comparison, collaboration and competition, crossing the 
North Sea from Hamburg to London, discussing the combined fate of 
England, France and the Netherlands, employing the international con-
cept of ‘interest’ as the general measure of the res publica, the common 
good. Accordingly, the republican thought of the De la Courts must be 
studied by looking at the interaction between the Dutch and European 
contexts of their intellectual endeavour.
The general purpose of this book is therefore twofold. First, I intend to 
show how the brothers De la Court, armed with a large theoretical arsenal 
of international political languages, engaged in a wide-ranging critique of 
the Dutch republican experience during the seventeenth century. The 
rhetorical characteristics of this critique reveal in particular the impor-
tance of rhetoric and ideological conflict in the political culture of the 
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Dutch Golden Age. Secondly, I aim to argue that the commercial core of 
the republican thought of the De la Courts, formulated in the most suc-
cessful early-modern republic at the height of its power, is of fundamental 
significance for our understanding of the development of republicanism 
in Europe at large between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. As 
an ideology of active civic participation in politics, free of any form of 
arbitrary domination, seventeenth-century republicanism was strongly 
informed by the rise of commercial society.
Republicanism: The Debate
Was there ever a single unitary tradition of republican thought in early-
modern Europe? Whoever considers the recent historiographical debate 
on the ‘republican heritage’ should hesitate to answer this question in the 
affirmative. on the one hand, grand-scale attempts to give an all-encom-
passing overview of the republican tradition have been rightly disputed 
because of their one-sidedness and lack of attention to geographical vari-
ety. on the other, fruitful research of the diverse and dispersed aspects of 
this tradition has apparently fragmented an unequivocal concept of what 
republicanism then actually means. Therefore, one may wonder whether 
it still makes sense to speak about early-modern republicanism at all. This 
introductory section argues that the answer to this last question is a far 
more straightforward ‘yes’.
By far the most important and influential representative of the idea 
that one large tradition of republican thought can be excavated from 
below the surface of early-modern political thought is John Pocock. In 
his epoch-making study The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political 
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, first published in 1975, 
Pocock gives a grand-scale overview of a paradigmatic language of 
republicanism that originated in classical antiquity, was revived in the 
Florentine Renaissance, transported to Civil War England and ultimately 
came to a close with the American Revolution. It has often been remarked 
that Pocock’s dense argument defies any attempt to summarization, but 
given the absolute predominance of the work in the historiographical 
debate, such a short synopsis is nonetheless indispensable.
According to Pocock, the republican tradition dates back to the 
Aristotelian portrayal of man as a zoon politikon, a political animal that 
actively participates in the public life of the city-state. This characteriza-
tion of the good life as a vita activa civile was revived in the Florentine 
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6 In Pocock’s own words: “on the one hand virtú is that by which we innovate, and so 
let loose sequences of contingency beyond our prediction or control so that we become 
prey to fortuna; on the other hand, virtú is that internal to ourselves by which we resist 
fortuna and impose upon her patterns of order, which may even become patterns of moral 
order. … It was the virtue, as it was the end, of man to be a political animal; the polity was 
the form in which human matter developed its proper virtue, and it was the function of 
virtue to impose form on the matter of fortuna. The republic or polity was in yet another 
sense a structure of virtue: it was a structure in which every citizen’s ability to place the 
common good before his own was the precondition of every other’s, so that every man’s 
virtue saved every other’s from that corrupt part of whose time-dimension was fortuna. … 
[S]uccess was a function of virtú and virtú was a matter of the autonomy of personalities 
mobilized for the public good. only in republics could it be mobilized, and every republic 
was a finite particular in which only a finite number of individuals could be trained and 
assembled to display virtú. However defined, the virtú of every individual depended on the 
virtú of every other; its decline was impossible to arrest once it was well started; and it 
must be manifested in arms as well as in citizenship, in the external world of war as well 
as in the civic world of justice.” J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine 
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, 2d. ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
university Press, 2003), 167, 184, 213.
7 Ibidem, 462.
Renaissance, in particular by Niccolò Machiavelli, for whom the virtù of 
the free citizen who engages in the defence and expansion of liberty, 
formed the foundation upon which a republic can confront unpredictable 
fortuna.6 This Machiavellian republicanism, Pocock insists, did not entail 
a political program with a clearly defined objective but rather a political 
language that survived the downfall of the Florentine republic. Lingering 
on as an alternative discourse amidst natural law and reason of state the-
ory, it re-emerged in England in the mid-seventeenth century. James 
Harrington is the central character in Pocock’s analysis of this English 
resurgence and adaptation of the language of republican virtue. In his 
major work, The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), Harrington argued 
as an English Machiavelli for an expansionist republic of land-owning 
citizens who participate actively in politics and are thus empowered to 
confront the corruptive sirens of commercial wealth. From Harrington 
on, the republican discourse of virtue would continue to dominate politi-
cal debate in the Anglophone world until it reached its apogee across 
the Atlantic with the American Constitution – in Pocock’s famous 
remark “the last act of the civic Renaissance”.7 With this portrayal of 
a longue durée republican tradition, Pocock clearly challenged the 
hegemonic position of liberalism as the dominant force in seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century political thought. Indeed, Pocock sees liberal-
ism,  rooted in a jurisdictional language that emphasizes the rights of 
the citizen, as diametrically opposed to the republican language of 
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History 79 (1992), 11–38: 11.
civic virtue.8 By highlighting the importance of this republican language 
for the ideological origins of the American Revolution, Pocock deliber-
ately downplayed the role of liberalism in the creation of the modern 
world.
Like all great books, Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment was not only 
highly influential but also much debated and passionately criticized – 
and this remains the case to this day. As Pocock remarks in the afterword 
to a recent new edition of his masterpiece: “I notice in the historical pro-
fession generally, and among historians of political thought in particular, 
a low level of tolerance, even after thirty years, toward the notion that 
civic virtue as studied in The Machiavellian Moment enjoys a history of its 
own; there is a fairly constant desire to diminish or dismiss its presence.”9 
This desire has appeared in various guises, and importantly, much of the 
resulting debate has been, like Pocock’s own position, intensely politi-
cally coloured.10 All in all, though it was argued in 1992 that the study of 
republicanism was by then “perceptibly thinning out, like a nova entering 
its red giant phase”,11 this prophecy has proved far too hasty. Twenty years 
later the study of republicanism is still at the forefront of discussions of 
early-modern political thought, and it does not seem very close to becom-
ing a black hole of past memories.
The historiographical criticism of Pocock’s sweeping overview of 
the Atlantic republican tradition has, very generally, deviated into two 
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12 For an overview of the various critiques of John Pocock and of the concept of ‘civic 
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14 Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 
1998), and Idem, Hobbes and Republican Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 2008).
15 See Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern, 3 vols. (Chapel Hill: university of 
North Carolina Press, 1992). Rahe’s interpretation of Machiavelli is summarized in Idem, 
“Situating Machiavelli,” in Hankins (ed.), Renaissance Civic Humanism, 270–308.
16 Rahe (ed.), Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican Legacy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 2006); Idem, Against Throne and Altar. Machiavelli and Political Theory 
under the English Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2008). See also the 
comparable argument of Vickie B. Sullivan, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a 
Liberal Republicanism in England (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2004).
different directions.12 The first direction, notably pursued by Quentin 
Skinner, maintains the emphasis on one long-standing republican tradi-
tion from antiquity to the modern age, but with some important adjust-
ments. These adjustments entail in particular the claim that the roots of 
the humanist plea for an active civic life and participatory politics do not 
stem principally from Aristotle, but rather from Roman theories of virtue, 
justice and liberty that had remained current throughout the Middle 
Ages.13 Above all, Skinner stresses the republican ideal of liberty in the 
sense of non-domination as the central characteristic of this Roman leg-
acy, which amounted to a grand tradition of European political thought 
that offers a historical alternative to contemporary liberalism.14 While Skin-
ner thus continues along the lines set by Pocock, a second line of critique, 
especially associated with Paul Rahe, has sought to disclaim Pocock’s 
entire project. Rahe contends that there is an almost complete rupture 
between classical and Renaissance republicanism, a rupture exemplified 
by Machiavelli who radically departed from his classical predecessors.15 
Moreover, he argues that Machiavelli’s ambiguous legacy within the 
Anglophone Atlantic disproves the existence of a single paradigmatic lan-
guage of early-modern republicanism as opposed to liberalism.16
The increasing attention over the past two decades to the role of rheto-
ric in political thought has resulted in a further blurring of Pocock’s uni-
tary republican tradition. one particularly important exponent of this 
‘rhetorical turn’ is Victoria Kahn’s Machiavellian Rhetoric, which again 
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18 David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic. Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627–1660 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1999), 13. See also Markku Peltonen, Classical 
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highlights the ambivalence of Machiavelli’s early-modern legacy. Arguing 
directly against Pocock, Kahn maintains that the “Machiavellian moment 
of Renaissance culture is a rhetorical moment”: a moment that involved 
the claim that politics is all about contingency, and that contingency can 
only be mastered by the art of persuasion. Machiavelli, according to Kahn, 
“offered a rhetoric for dealing with the realm of de facto political power, 
rather than a political theory with a coherent thematic content”. Accord-
ingly, Machiavellianism did not primarily entail a republican language of 
virtù, but rather a way of writing about politics that emphasized the pre-
dominance of fortuna, of de facto power and the unsettling potential of 
language. In particular in seventeenth-century England, so Kahn main-
tains, this Machiavellian politics “offered a rhetoric not only for constitut-
ing but also for challenging the status quo” – a combination of political 
commitment and ideological critique which, with its attention for dissim-
ulation and fraud, disconcertingly merged republicanism and tyranny.17
Following Kahn, the study of the role of rhetoric in politics has led to 
different appraisals of English republicanism in the seventeenth century. 
Thus, David Norbrook contends that the English republican experience 
did not suddenly come about with the beheading of Charles I, but that it 
was deeply rooted in the humanist rhetorical culture of earlier decades 
which poetically imagined republican practice. For Norbrook, therefore, 
republicanism already enjoyed a powerful presence before the actual 
establishment of the English Commonwealth. In an elegant move to rec-
oncile Pocock and his critics, he states: “Republicanism before the 1640s 
may not have had the practical option of being a programme rather than 
a language; but a distinctively republican emphasis on language could 
become a programme.”18 At the other side of the debate, Kevin Sharpe 
powerfully maintains that English republicanism failed precisely because 
of this relation between ideology and aesthetics. Both as a language and 
as a programme, Sharpe argues, English republicanism did not offer a 
coherent alternative for the powerful set of representative images that 
constituted the Stuart monarchy.19
10 introduction
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2000), 38–123; and Idem, “ ‘An Image 
Doting Rabble’: The Failure of Republican Culture in Seventeenth-Century England,” in 
Idem and Steven N. Zwicker (eds.), Refiguring Revolutions. Aesthetics and Politics from the 
English Revolution to the Romantic Revolution (Berkeley etc.: university of California Press, 
1998), 25–56.
20 Pocock, “Virtues, Rights, and Manners,” 48. Cf. also Idem, The Machiavellian Moment, 
460–461, 463–464: “We have found that a ‘bourgeois ideology,’ a paradigm for capitalist 
man as a zoon politikon, was immensely hampered in its development by the omnipres-
ence of Aristotelian and civic humanist values which virtually defined rentier and entre-
preneur as corrupt, and that if indeed capitalist thought ended by privatizing the individual, 
this may have been because it was unable to find an appropriate way of presenting him as 
citizen. … [R]eal, inheritable, and, so to speak, natural property in land was the paradig-
matic case [within republican theory]. … The landed man, successor to the master of the 
classical oikos, was permitted the leisure and autonomy to consider what was to others’ 
good as well as his own; but the individual engaged in exchange could discern only particu-
lar values – that of the commodity which was his, that of the commodity for which he 
exchanged it. His activity did not oblige or even permit him to contemplate the universal 
good as he acted upon it, and he consequently continued to lack classical rationality.”
21 See esp. David Wootton (ed.), Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649–
1776 (Stanford: Stanford university Press, 1994). Cf. as well Hiram Caton, The Politics of 
Progress. The Origins and Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600–1835 (Gainesville: 
university of California Press, 1988). For a wholly different argument against Pocock focus-
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Tradition in Republican Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2004).
22 Steven Pincus, “Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: 
Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth,” The American 
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The issue of rhetoric has thus opened up different vistas that deviate 
from the path set out by Pocock. In contrast, another dominant topic in 
the historiographical debate on early-modern republicanism follows 
directly in Pocock’s footsteps. This is the issue of commerce. Pocock char-
acterizes the republican tradition as highly critical of, if not openly antag-
onistic to, the rise of commercial society and its capacity to distract the 
virtuous citizen with the temptations of private wealth and luxury. For 
Pocock, republican virtue was intrinsically linked to ownership of land, 
and ‘the ideals of virtue and commerce could not therefore be reconciled 
to one another’.20 Nonetheless, other historians have claimed in reply that 
the relation between republican ideology and commercial society was 
not necessarily antagonistic.21 In a particularly important article, Steve 
Pincus has argued that many seventeenth-century English republicans 
merged a commitment to the common good with an embrace of commer-
cial society. While Pocock’s role model Harrington fiercely opposed 
commercialization, a range of other supporters of the English Common-
wealth, according to Pincus, came to see “the creation and increase of 
commercial wealth as an unequivocal social good”.22 These authors 
pleaded for a republic based on trade and an “economics of abundance”, 
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with commercial Athens as the primary classical example. Within this 
new political economy, the concept of interest partly displaced that of 
civic virtue: as Marchamont Nedham, one of its most prominent 
 representatives, observed, “Interest is the true zenith of every state and 
person”.23 Mercantile interests and commercial activity as the basis of 
active political participation became the central elements of this strand 
of republican thought, which, as Pincus contends against Pocock, lay at 
the roots of liberal political philosophy.
overall, then, Pocock’s notion of a unitary republican language of 
Machiavellian virtù has been criticized and revised from many different 
angles. Yet for all their disagreements, these angles of critique share one 
important common feature: a fairly restricted geographical focus on the 
Italian Renaissance and the Anglophone Atlantic. In particular the period 
of the English Commonwealth dominates the scholarly debate on early-
modern republicanism. However broad or narrow one envisages the 
republican tradition to be, the focus is often purely English. Thus, Blair 
Worden, who claims that there were only a few true republicans in the 
seventeenth century, also states that these republicans are first and fore-
most to be found in England. “It was in England”, Worden writes, “that the 
classical vision of Italian Renaissance humanists was preserved (and 
adapted) in the seventeenth century, and it was from there that it subse-
quently reentered political thought elsewhere.”24 other scholars like 
Skinner or Norbrook, who perceive republicanism to be present on a 
much larger scale, deeply rooted in humanist culture and rhetoric, also 
focus predominantly on the English case.
There is, however, an alternative and more international approach that 
does not only concentrate on republican theory but also on actual repub-
lican practice in early-modern Europe. This approach, arguably initiated 
by Franco Venturi’s elegant series of lectures from the early 1970s,25 
has recently been developed further, for example in Thomas Maissen’s 
exceptionally comprehensive overview of the early-modern republican 
Werdegang of the Swiss Confederation.26 In line with Maissen’s impres-
sive and successful attempt to situate the local Swiss experience within a 
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broad international framework, the republican tradition might be defined 
as a ‘shared European heritage’, as a set of ideals and practices that 
spread throughout the continent. This consciously pan-European focus is 
central to an important two-volume collection of essays, edited by Martin 
van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, which discusses early-modern repub-
licanism over a wide continental scale, paying attention to the various 
local contexts in which republican ideals were formulated, from the 
Castilian monarchy to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.27 This 
broad, international approach has thus opened up a range of republican 
perspectives – yet not without risks. As David Wootton argues with par-
ticularly pertinent criticism, a too inclusive approach to republicanism 
can easily result in conceptual vagueness and erode the meaning and sig-
nificance of the term ‘republican’.28 In the words of Johann Sommerville: 
“The wider the definition of republicanism we employ, the easier we will 
find it to discover early modern republicans. But there is a price to pay for 
this, since if we are too liberal in giving recognition to our republican fore-
bears, we are in danger of granting undue acknowledgment to some other 
dubious characters.”29
A diversified approach to republicanism, then, involves the risk of 
incoherence. Among the most successful and rewarding attempts to over-
come that risk is the work of Jonathan Scott.30 Focusing on seventeenth- 
century republicanism in England from a comparative perspective, with 
particular attention to the Dutch Republic, Scott establishes a convincing 
synthesis of republican thought that highlights its eclectic moral and 
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political contents. “No seventeenth-century republican”, he argues, “wrote 
in one political language only, and most combined several, spanning 
the intellectual terrains of humanism, Christianity, science and law.”31 
These different languages mutually established the programmatic core of 
republicanism as a reformation of manners, a moral philosophy of self-
government within the commonwealth and the individual soul. Given 
their connected yet divergent backgrounds, English and Dutch republi-
cans stressed different aspects of this philosophy but shared its underly-
ing principle that such a moral reformation is only possible in a free 
society where no man is enslaved by the arbitrary rule of a king.
The main merit of Scott’s synthesis is that he has kept the child of 
republicanism while throwing away the lukewarm bathwater of Pocock’s 
approach. By emphasizing the moral core of republican thought, Scott 
moves beyond the narrow confines of republicanism as a unitary lan-
guage, yet without succumbing to the conceptual vagueness that a broad 
definition has occasionally brought about. Moreover, Scott’s analysis has 
another merit for turning attention to the experience of the seventeenth-
century Dutch Republic, after all the only genuine and long-lasting repub-
lic in the Atlantic world before the American Revolution. As the most 
powerful republican polity in an essentially monarchical age, the united 
Provinces played a pivotal role in keeping the republican heritage alive 
between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Throughout the seven-
teenth century, the Dutch ‘republican alternative’ had a significant impact 
on republican thought throughout Europe, including Switzerland, Italy 
and England,32 while its highly successful but decentralized political sys-
tem has recently been heralded “as a refutation of the assumption that a 
‘modern’ or effective state must necessarily be a centralized state”.33 How 
did seventeenth-century Dutch political thinkers theorize about this 
republican prominence?
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The Dutch Experience & The Brothers De la Court
Dutch historiography has traditionally paid relatively little attention to 
the intellectual and ideological dimensions of politics. Consequently, the 
history of political thought has, unlike in the Anglophone world or in 
Italy, never been a thriving discipline in Dutch academia. It should there-
fore not come as a surprise that Pocock himself was the first to ask how 
Dutch republicanism could fit into the overall picture of The Machiavellian 
Moment. In a lecture of 1981, Pocock addressed this question fairly straight-
forwardly: Dutch republicanism, he argued, was dominated by jurisdic-
tional language, it centred on sovereignty rather than virtue, and therefore 
it should be judged as fundamentally different from the ‘Atlantic’ republi-
can tradition – if it was to be judged as republicanism at all.34 Indeed, in a 
later article Pocock argued that Spinoza, as the most important represent-
ative of seventeenth-century Dutch political thought, was hardly a true 
republican since he employed the language of rights, thus unable to stand 
the comparison with the virtuous republicanism of Harrington.35
In reaction to Pocock’s claims, a number of Dutch intellectual histori-
ans have reassessed this rigid dichotomy between the republican thought 
at either side of the North Sea. The first to reply, Eco Haitsma Mulier, 
underlined that seventeenth-century Dutch republicans like the brothers 
De la Court and Spinoza used elements of both natural law discourse and 
the Machiavellian language of virtue at the same time, thus discrediting 
Pocock’s paradigm of two conflicting political languages.36 Hans Blom, 
another specialist on Dutch early-modern political thought, equally 
argued against Pocock that juristic vocabularies and the language of vir-
tue went hand in hand in the work of the De la Courts and Spinoza.37 
Finally, the most extensive reply to Pocock came from the hand of Ernst 
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Kossmann. In a broad overview of Dutch republican thought in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Kossmann maintained that the 
particular Dutch republican experience hardly matched Pocock’s characteri- 
zation. However, he also warned that this should not to lead to the con-
clusion that there existed a uniquely Dutch intellectual tradition. As 
Kossmann stressed, “the theoretical explanation and justification of 
Dutch republicanism was in fact firmly based on conceptions developed 
outside the Netherlands and deeply influenced by foreign intellectual 
innovation”.38 Dutch republicans, in short, were not constrained by their 
narrow national borders but made an eclectic use of a range of interna-
tionally constituted political languages.39
In the past two decades, research on Dutch republican thought within 
this international framework has been developed further, often clearly 
inspired by (though not necessarily following) the path set out by Pocock. 
As a result, certain key figures and periods have received the attention 
they deserve, particularly the period of the Dutch Revolt, the towering 
figure of Spinoza, and the later eighteenth century.40 Yet surprisingly, 
when it comes to the brothers De la Court, the historical research to date 
has been somewhat meagre, inconclusive, and one-sided. In particular, 
the few existing studies on the De la Courts all share a comparable focus 
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on the institutional aspects of their thought, without paying attention to 
the central issues of rhetoric, commerce, and republican morals which 
are not only of most relevance in the historiographical debate on early-
modern republicanism, but arguably also the most distinctive character-
istics of the brothers’ republican endeavour.
The main existing interpretations of the work of the brothers De la 
Court are those of the three Dutch historians mentioned above: Kossmann, 
Haitsma Mulier, and Blom. Kossmann’s pioneering contribution, dating 
back to 1960, broke new ground with a general overview of the develop-
ment of Dutch political thought in the seventeenth century.41 After half a 
century Kossmann’s study is still inspiring, but also rather superficial and 
dated. In particular, it lacks Kossmann’s later insight that Dutch political 
thought should be studied against its international background, and 
hence it offers no coherent discussion of the way in which the brothers De 
la Court employed international languages in a Dutch context. This 
neglect of contextualization arguably informs Kossmann’s awkward 
remarks about the ‘modernity’ of the thought of the De la Courts. Search-
ing for a Dutch tradition of political thought in evolutionary terms, for a 
Dutch way of thinking about politics that in the end necessarily had to 
lead to democratic modernity, Kossmann was tempted to do away with 
anyone who seemed to lack such modernizing intentions. The De la 
Courts, for Kossmann, could not pass this test. According to his interpre-
tation, they were in fact “reactionary” political theorists who “took a step 
backward in the evolution of political theory” because they did not 
envisage the establishment of a “democratic-liberal government”.42 In 
Kossmann’s eyes, this amounted to a cardinal sin, but it goes without say-
ing that his was a highly anachronistic interpretation.
In the late 1970s, the issue of Dutch seventeenth-century political 
thought was taken up by Haitsma Mulier in his important dissertation on 
The Myth of Venice and Dutch Republican Thought in the Seventeenth 
Century. A major chapter of this book, which in general deals with the 
reception of the Venetian republican example in the Dutch Republic, is 
dedicated to the case of the brothers De la Court.43 Haitsma Mulier focuses 
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on the way the brothers adopted the legacy of Italian Renaissance politi-
cal thought and practice: he accurately discusses their extensive discus-
sion of the institutional structures of Venice and Genoa, he highlights the 
influence of Machiavelli, points to the similarities with Harrington and 
also refers to the importance of neo-stoicism for the development of their 
ideas. Yet in spite of this careful contextualization, Haitsma Mulier’s 
perspective, confined to only a part of the works of the De la Courts, has 
very little to say about how the brothers employed this international 
intellectual framework in the lively Dutch political debate of their day.44 
In short, though Haitsma Mulier’s interpretation is far more balanced and 
sophisticated than Kossmann’s, it is a long way from offering the last word 
on the subject.
The same applies to the work of Blom. over the last three decades, 
Blom has published a vast number of articles on Dutch seventeenth-cen-
tury political thought which from the outset have sought to reveal, as he 
says, an “affinity between seventeenth and twentieth century political 
thought”.45 An important consequence of this approach is that the histori-
cal context of the work of the brothers De la Court does not receive its due 
share in Blom’s work. That said, Blom convincingly characterizes the core 
of their thought as the “interdependence of passions and institutions” or 
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of “private and public interest”: the De la Courts constructed a political 
theory which, on the basis of the passionate human condition, arrives at a 
plea for republican government where efficiency is the main standard. 
As Blom summarizes their endeavour: “Political effectiveness lies in the 
evolutionary development of an institutional structure in which the ‘right’ 
passions are promoted, rather than in the accidental and uncertain pres-
ence of virtue.”46
on the whole, each of these three interpretations has their own 
 distinctive value – Kossmann’s vivid characterizations, Haitsma Mulier’s 
contextual sophistication, Blom’s theoretical profundity. Yet they all 
share certain crucial shortcomings. First and foremost, they focus on 
the institutional dimension of the thought of the brothers De la Court. 
Republicanism, so all three seem to argue, involves primarily an institu-
tional concern, and the De la Courts are therefore of specific importance 
for their theory of government. However, the historiographical debate to 
date has shown that early-modern republicanism entailed much more 
than mere institutionalism: republicans envisaged a reformation of man-
ners, they discussed personal virtue, common liberty and the role of com-
merce, they rhetorically engaged in political debate and ideological 
criticism. Clearly, then, the most fruitful way to reveal the international 
relevance of the brothers De la Court is to look at their thought through 
this prism of morals, commerce and rhetoric, a prism that thus far has 
been largely neglected.
Moreover, the interpretations by Kossmann, Haitsma Mulier and Blom 
suffer from being part of a teleological narrative of seventeenth-century 
Dutch political thought. Instead of being dealt with as valuable authors in 
themselves, the brothers De la Court figure in all three interpretations as 
mere pawns in a larger development, paving the way for later authors, in 
particular for Spinoza, who is seen as the culmination of a long century of 
republican writing in the Dutch Republic. This teleological approach has 
been largely adopted by the few scholars outside of the Netherlands who 
have discussed the De la Courts, in particular Noel Malcolm, who ana-
lyzes the brothers’ intermediary position between Hobbes and Spinoza,47 
and Stefano Visentin, who focuses on their reading of Machiavelli in the 
light of Spinoza.48 obviously, the De la Courts did not publish their 
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treatises to supply Spinoza with a source of inspiration, yet the existing 
narratives suggest that they did, that their significance lies primarily in 
their impact on Spinoza’s politics.
Spinoza is also the central character of Jonathan Israel’s recent work 
on the ‘Radical Enlightenment’, which dominates much of the debate 
on early-modern political philosophy since the start of this century. 
According to Israel, the mainstream tradition of moderate Enlightened 
thought is of only secondary importance when compared to a far more 
significant and radical strand of philosophy that, mainly originating in the 
Dutch Republic, spread throughout Europe as a largely underground 
movement. It was this radical tradition, Israel argues, that would ulti-
mately cause the revolutionary epoch at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury and thus shape modernity. At its roots stood the towering figure of 
Spinoza, but also a range of other authors, including the brothers De la 
Court. Highlighting their essentially urban and commercial concerns, 
Israel claims that the republicanism of the De la Courts and Spinoza, 
“with its uncompromising anti-monarchism and egalitarian tendency … 
leads in direct line of descent to the revolutionary rhetoric of Robespierre 
and the French Jacobins”.49 Their thought, he stresses, was “totally at odds 
with, and inherently unlikely to influence, any generally approved and 
received moderate mainstream tradition of political thought anywhere in 
early modern Europe”. Highly anti-establishment, egalitarian and “funda-
mentally incompatible with Christianity and all forms of revealed reli-
gion”, this Dutch republican strand offered something “dramatically new 
in the history of European and wider western thought” and would in the 
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end have lasting consequences for the outlook of modern-day societies.50 
Israel’s decidedly polemical argument, clearly directed against Pocock 
and his followers, opens up a very important field, namely the impact of 
the brothers De la Court and their controversial Dutch contemporaries 
throughout eighteenth-century Europe. However, given the fairly rudi-
mentary existing interpretations of the De la Courts, Israel has arguably 
raised this issue a bit too early. For how can we fully assess the reception 
of a body of thought when its roots and range have not yet been analyzed 
comprehensively?
Approach & Contents
This book, as the first comprehensive study of the republicanism of the 
brothers De la Court, aims to provide such an analysis. Following the 
sharpening focus in the historiography on republican rhetoric, morals 
and commerce, it uncovers the commercial foundation of the brothers’ 
republican endeavour, dissecting the different facets of their central claim 
that commerce and republicanism are intrinsically correlated. I will not 
start from the assumption that theirs was an inherently radical theory, 
intended to anticipate the democratic constitutionalism of a later age. 
Instead, my aim is to show what was conventional in their thought and 
what was not, to reveal how the De la Courts employed existing vocabu-
laries to arrive at an innovative argument that can only be explained in 
the context of their own times, the context of late humanist European 
culture and the seventeenth-century Dutch political debate.
In general, the approach that underlies this attempt can be subdivided 
into two related elements of contextualization. The first is the context of 
the various languages that shaped early-modern political thought, from 
late humanist rhetoric to religious discourse, from natural law to reason 
of state theory, from Renaissance republicanism to the ‘new philosophy’ 
of the age. Regarding these various, partly overlapping, languages, it is 
useful to stress what Annabel Brett has felicitously called the “intellectual 
promiscuity” of the author, the unscrupulous eclecticism of any writer, 
unbound by marital fidelity to one distinctive Pocockian language. 
 introduction 21
51 Annabel Brett, “What is Intellectual History Now?” in David Cannadine (ed.), What is 
History Now? (Basingstoke etc.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 113–131: 123.
52 Stephen Greenblatt, “Racial Memory and Literary History,” PMLA 116 (2001), 
48–63: 62.
53 on rhetoric as the core of contextualized intellectual history, see Anthony J. La Vopa, 
“Doing Fichte. Reflections of a Sobered (But unrepentant) Contextual Biographer,” 
This promiscuity, as Brett emphasizes, does not so much result from 
deliberate authorial intentions as it is a necessary consequence of lan-
guage-use as such. “Words”, she states, “do not limit themselves to partic-
ular language games: they travel, carrying their semantic baggage with 
them, undermining the closure of language games and thus of linguistic 
context”.51 This opening up of linguistic contexts implies that these con-
texts are by definition international. In another eloquent phrase that pro-
longs the metaphor, now by Stephen Greenblatt: “Language is the 
slipperiest of human creations; like its speakers, it does not respect bor-
ders.”52 In line with this dictum, I will highlight the eclecticism with which 
the brothers De la Court moved across various internationally constituted 
discursive terrains. The crucial question, of course, is what the De la 
Courts did with this broad horizon, a horizon that set the borders of their 
intellectual enterprise while leaving room for new roads to explore.
A main assumption of this book is that the answer to this question lies 
in the brothers’ participation in the contemporary political debate of the 
Dutch Republic, the undisputed centre of seventeenth-century global 
trade. This second contextual element might be defined as that of prac-
tice: it entails the rhetoric with which the De la Courts engaged in the 
controversies of their day, and the civic, mercantile and religious prac-
tices that shaped the framework in which they conceived and published 
their works – from the advent of commercial society to the challenges of 
religious pluralism and the rise of absolutist state power. Ideas matter 
because they adopt and apply various normative languages to such a 
social, political and economic framework. This does not mean that the 
content of ideas can be traced back directly to a non-textual background, 
for such a form of reductionism would imply a far too simplistic, one-
directional relation of influence between practice and theory. Instead, it 
means that ideas are not articulated in the thin air of a reified, self-con-
tained linguistic realm, but rather that they attain meaning in relation to, 
and interaction with, a much denser sphere of various contexts. With 
regard to the brothers De la Court, this sphere includes, first of all, 
the underlying norms of participation in the public debate, set by the 
 prescripts of late humanist rhetoric;53 and secondly, the civic politics, 
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corporatist economy and religious diversity that characterized the urban 
centres of the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic.
overall, this double contextualization results in a narrative that 
explores the commercial republicanism of the De la Courts on four differ-
ent levels: rhetoric, citizenship, commercial society and religious tolera-
tion. After a first chapter that introduces the brothers’ early life, academic 
education and the making of their œuvre within the Dutch political 
debate of the mid-seventeenth century, chapters two to five each focus on 
one of these four levels of analysis. Chapter two discusses the issue of 
rhetoric. Starting from the prominence of the passions in late humanist 
rhetoric, this chapter examines the De la Courts’ ideas about human 
nature and speech, and then continues to analyze in detail the different 
features of their rhetorical practice, in particular their employment of 
emblematic fables. The core of this rhetorical practice, so the chapter 
argues, is the embrace of outspokenness, of frank and honest speech to 
counter courtly and clerical demagogy: a rhetoric of the market that 
merges commercial candour with anti-monarchical criticism.
Following this analysis of the way in which the De la Courts partici-
pated in the public debate, the third chapter turns to the nucleus of their 
republican politics, the citizen. It starts by analyzing how the brothers De 
la Court appropriated Hobbesian contract theory for their idiosyncratic 
claim that a true civil society is necessarily non-monarchical. It then con-
tinues to show how exclusivist civic practices in the Dutch Golden Age 
informed the De la Courts’ critical account of the citizen as an independ-
ent adult male who, recipient of rights and performer of duties, is capable 
of free speech. The ethics that underlie this concept of citizenship follow 
from a notion of well-understood self-interest as the disciplined pursuit of 
honour, the prime characteristic of the ‘wise merchants’ who embody the 
De la Courts’ mercantile reformation of manners.
Chapter four moves from the individual level of the citizen to the gen-
eral level of society al large – the commercial commonwealth. Focusing 
on the brothers’ criticism of the economic policies of their hometown, 
Leiden, the centre of Europe’s textile industry, this chapter examines 
their republican model of an open and free society, mirrored by the clas-
sical paragon of Ancient Athens. The notion of liberty that underlies 
this model merges freedom of trade with the ‘True Liberty’ of republican 
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independence. Accordingly, the ideal republic of the brothers De la Court 
is a polity where self-interested commerce fosters the common good, 
unadulterated by arbitrary domination. Any form of monarchical govern-
ment amounts to tyranny, the brothers argued, and they combined this 
radical anti-monarchism with a tentative plea for democratic govern-
ment – a move that is particularly important in comparison with their 
English republican contemporaries. The fifth and last chapter focuses on 
the way in which this commercial commonwealth can persist through the 
maintenance of social concord and religious toleration. Rejecting revolu-
tionary change and clerical interference in politics, the brothers De la 
Court adhered to the ideal of a broad public church that is supervised by 
the secular authorities. on account of both moral necessity and political 
expediency, this public church leaves room for the dissent of private con-
gregations, which amounts to an inclusive notion of religious toleration, 
especially as regards Catholicism, for the sake of economic prosperity, 
social concord, and the purity of faith.
Finally, the conclusion assesses the significance of the thought of the 
brothers De la Court for the development of early-modern republicanism, 
followed by a short and rudimentary overview of the international recep-
tion of their ideas throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries. The De la Courts maintained that the Dutch republican experience 
was part of a long-standing tradition that originated in antiquity, yet they 
gave a distinctive commercial twist to this tradition, championing the 
mercantile model of Athens and Holland over the militant model of Rome 
and England. This commercial twist would become an important element 
of political thought in Europe and beyond during the Enlightenment. 
Thus, the focus of this thesis significantly expands our knowledge of what 
early-modern republicanism was all about. It offers a glance at the fault 
line where humanist rhetoric began its gradual demise, where the classi-
cal notion of honour merged with the modern language of interest, where 
free trade meant the safeguarding of self-reliance, and where toleration 
implied an evangelical pursuit to impose secular control over the church. 
The commercial republic of the brothers De la Court stood at these cross-
roads between old and new, with one foot firmly set in the past, yet the 
other tentatively moving into a different direction.
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CHaPTEr ONE
THE makiNg OF aN œuVrE
From the beginning, Johan and Pieter de la Court were outsiders. 
Their father, Pieter de la Court senior, was born near Ypres in the south-
ern Netherlands, and migrated in his early twenties to the Dutch republic. 
He settled in Leiden, Holland’s second biggest town, and within a few 
years he became a successful independent entrepreneur in Leiden’s thriv-
ing textile business. as a result, not long after his marriage with Jeanne de 
Plancke, also of southern origin, De la Court sr. was able to purchase citi-
zenship rights of the city in 1618.1 in that same year, their son Pieter was 
born, and four years later came Johan.2 The two brothers would become 
the most prolific children of the family, and echoes of their origins would 
resonate throughout their lives and work. as the sons of a self-made man, 
they would plead for unrestricted immigration and economic freedom; as 
members of a successful but much despised minority within the Dutch 
republic, they continually behaved like uninvited guests with a certain 
aversion to conformity. in the eyes of resentful critics, they were basically 
“garlic eaters”, the scornful term applied to anyone from the south, an 
inference that definitely did not leave the brothers unaffected.3 as a pas-
sage in their work notes, doubtless reflecting the brothers’ own experi-
ence: “The separation between Flemish and Hollanders is a too large and 
well-known rupture that should be healed, for truly to make someone a 
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stranger in his own birthplace is a great offence against the right 
of nature.”4 Strangers in their own country: this is how the De la Courts 
must have felt until the very end.
This first chapter introduces the life and works of the brothers De la 
Court by analyzing how their common œuvre came about in the context 
of late humanist culture and Dutch political debate around 1650. it does 
not entail a comprehensive biographical overview of their entire life or 
an exhaustive critical bibliography of their works.5 rather, my aim in 
this chapter is to shed light on those aspects of their education and of 
seventeenth-century Dutch debating culture that are essential for under-
standing the various dimensions of their thought. The chapter discusses 
not only what the brothers De la Court published and when, but espe-
cially why and how they entered the public debate and how their contem-
poraries reacted to their writings. it will show that the making of the 
brothers’ œuvre involved an attempt to move Dutch republican politics in 




Thanks to the economic success of their father, who was by 1630 one of 
the main entrepreneurs in the Leiden textile industry, the brothers De la 
Court enjoyed a thorough humanist education that was a privilege of the 
elite. in his early teens, Pieter de la Court was enrolled at the Latin School 
in Leiden, the institution that prepared young adolescents for university. 
He entered school on the same day as Nicolaas Heinsius,6 whose father, 
the famous poet and philologist Daniel Heinsius, taught greek and his-
tory at Leiden university. Heinsius was the editor of, among many other 
works, an influential edition of aristotle’s Politics, and his son Nicolaas 
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later became a prolific poet in the service of the Swedish Court.7 De la 
Court and Nicolaas remained friends for some time, and so, from an early 
age, the De la Courts came into close contact with the humanist culture 
that dominated Dutch intellectual society, particularly in Leiden, the bul-
wark of Protestant late humanism.8 indeed, De la Court senior envisaged 
a more prestigious and dignified future for his youngest sons than the tex-
tile business. as an elder of the Walloon church in Leiden, he persuaded 
them to study theology in order to become preachers, one of the means 
for the moneyed classes to gain further social mobility. Hence, in the 
autumn of 1641, Johan de la Court enrolled at Leiden university as a stu-
dent in theology.9
Pieter de la Court’s destiny, for the moment, lay elsewhere. Some days 
before Johan entered university, Pieter had left the harbour of Brielle, 
near rotterdam, to set sail to Yarmouth. This was the beginning of his 
grand Tour, the study trip that was a standard element of a true humanist 
education.10 De la Court’s trip would last for more than two years, taking 
him to England, France, Switzerland, the rhine cities and the soil where 
his roots lay, the southern Netherlands. During his voyage, he kept a diary, 
which makes it possible to follow his journey in some detail.11 after his 
arrival in England, De la Court went on to London, where he would stay 
for over five months. He took English classes, bought a number of books 
in St. Paul’s Churchyard to enrich his small library and wondered at local 
peculiarities such as the exceptional preference, especially among 
women, “for sweets and Spanish wine”, the enjoyment of “many perilous 
exercises” such as wrestling and football, and the strange habit of drinking 
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14 See Frijhoff, “reisjournaal,” note 35.
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16 in the winter of 1642, Comenius was working on the treatise that later would be pub-
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royal Society. See also Comenius, Pforte der Dinge/Janua rerum, ed. and trans. Erwin 
Schadel (Hamburg: Felix meiner Verlag, 1989), esp. xxix–xli. The library of De la Court’s 
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works, the Opera omnia didactica (amsterdam, 1657), as well as the 1645 Leiden edition of 
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beer with breakfast.12 With friends, among them his schoolmate Nicolaas 
Heinsius, De la Court visited the important sights, and he attentively 
observed all the latest political developments. at the end of November 
1641, when Charles i entered London, De la Court could hardly hide his 
surprise when he saw how the king turned once to “laugh at the quarrel-
ling rabble, doing their best to get at the wine, both white and red, that 
was poured through three leaden pipes out of the fountain”.13 it was the 
first time that this young son of a sober Calvinist merchant was con-
fronted with these consequences of monarchical rule. arguably, De la 
Court’s visit to England, on the brink of the Civil War, thus left a signifi-
cant mark on his later radical republican engagement.
a number of important meetings during his grand Tour are also likely 
to have impressed De la Court. The first of these took place in January 
1642, when De la Court, still in London, met several times with the famous 
Czech philosopher Jan amos Comenius. The initiative for this contact 
had come from adriaan Heereboord, a young professor of philosophy and 
rhetoric at Leiden university who had possibly taught Pieter before.14 
Heereboord, an important member of Cartesian circles in Dutch aca-
demia, showed a deep interest in Comenius’ writings and had instructed 
De la Court to get in touch with the Czech philosopher. De la Court visited 
Comenius at his home, and, clearly impressed by this “very friendly and 
talkative man”,15 he scrutinized Comenius’s latest work, in particular his 
‘pansophic’ treatises which aimed for a universal pedagogical and scien-
tific reform, developed together with Samuel Hartlib from Francis Bacon’s 
Instauratio magna.16 The contact would prove to be fruitful since 
 the making of an œuvre 29
17 See Willem Frijhoff, “Pieter de la Court and Comenius’ Third Visit to Holland (1642),” 
Acta Comeniana. Revue Internationale des Études Coméniologiques 7 (1987), 183–192, which 
includes the letters that De la Court sent from London to inform Heereboord about his 
meetings with Comenius. On Comenius’ later stay in the Dutch republic, see Wilhelmus 
rood, Comenius and the Low Countries (amsterdam: Van gendt & Co., 1970).
18 See Frijhoff (ed.), “reisnotities,” 42–45. For the teaching of theology at Saumur, see 
Brian g. armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy. Protestant Scholasticism and 
Humanism in Seventeenth-Century France (madison etc.: university of Wisconsin Press, 
1969), and F.P. van Stam, The Controversy over the Theology of Saumur, 1635–1650. Disrupting 
Debates among the Huguenots in Complicated Circumstances (amsterdam and maarssen: 
aPa-Holland university Press, 1988). For Cappel, see also François Laplanche, L’écriture, le 
sacré et l’histoire. Érudits et politiques protestants devant la bible en France au XVIIe siécle 
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Schepping, 1575–1715 (Leiden: Primavera Pers, 2007), esp. 386–405; and H.J. Zuidervaart, 
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Wetenschappen 99 (2001), 1–40.
Comenius went on to visit the Dutch republic later that year, meeting, 
among many others, Heereboord and Descartes.17
By then, De la Court had continued his journey to France, passing 
through rouen, Paris and Orléans to descend along the Loire, with as 
eventual destination the famous Protestant academy in Saumur. This was 
the location of some further important meetings, in particular with the 
local professors of theology, among whom Louis Cappel, expert in Hebrew 
textual criticism, and the famous theologians Josué de la Place and moyse 
amyraut, whose teachings on predestination and original sin challenged 
Huguenot orthodoxy.18 De la Court paid a great deal of attention to all 
aspects of daily religious life in Saumur, on which he left extensive notes 
in his diary.19 arguably, this experience and the irenicist theology taught 
at Saumur had a significant influence on his later tolerationist stance. One 
of De la Court’s travel companions in France was the young controversial 
preacher Johannes de mey, who later became an important representa-
tive of the Dutch Calvinist endeavour to integrate the study of the Bible 
with the newest developments in natural philosophy.20 De mey’s treatise 
Euzooia, written around 1675 and explicitly inspired by Thomas more’s 
Utopia, argues among much else for the secular control over the church, 
the unity of Christianity on the basis of a few fundamental articles of faith, 
and the freedom of private worship – issues also prominent in the writ-
ings of the brothers De la Court (see chapter 5 below). in his treatise, De 
mey refers to an unidentified author from Saumur as the source of his 
statements, and it is likely that his and De la Court’s shared view on these 
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21 Johannes de mey, Euarchia of tweede vervolg van Euzooia, in Al de Nederduistche wer-
cken (middelburg, 1681), esp. 782–783.
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matters stemmed from the period they spent together at the Protestant 
academy in Saumur.21
De la Court left Saumur in the summer of 1642 and continued his trip 
through the rhone valley towards marseille, and from there to geneva. 
again, as earlier during his voyage, he was clearly fascinated (and at times 
horrified) by all the peculiarities of local confessional religious practice – 
from the execution of an “atheist and ridiculer of Scripture” to the burning 
of various witches and of a “Jew who feigned being Christian”. in an 
English side note in his diary, De la Court revealed his sceptical attitude as 
regards such enforced dogmatism, asking “The divel [sic] was he ever 
seene?”22 Possibly, De la Court’s ongoing engagements with all the diverse 
manifestations of Catholic, Huguenot and Calvinist confessional culture 
along his grand Tour laid at the origin of this rising scepticism about the 
possibility of confessional unity, elaborated in his later writings. more in 
general, De la Court’s diary testifies to a levelheaded mind with a great 
affection for practicalities, numbers and measures, textiles and colours. 
Of course, this was not surprising for the son of a cloth entrepreneur, but 
it also shows that the prospect of being a preacher was not reserved for 
this future merchant. in the end, when returning to Leiden via the rhine 
cities and the Southern Netherlands, De la Court must have made up his 
mind about his future. as Willem Frijhoff concludes in his lucid and sug-
gestive analysis of the diary: “From a theologian in the making he has 
become a prospective cloth entrepreneur and political thinker. His grand 
tour has assisted him to find his way. He has set himself rules for life and 
rules for work: his education is fulfilled.”23
Academic Politics at Leiden University
Nonetheless, one further essential element of De la Court’s humanist 
upbringing was still lacking: a university education. immediately after his 
homecoming, in the autumn of 1643, De la Court therefore joined his 
younger brother Johan and enrolled as a student in theology at Leiden 
university, shortly before his twenty-fifth birthday. Eventually, Johan and 
Pieter would follow the same educational path, but vice versa: when 
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Johan graduated from university around the end of 1645, he left for his 
own grand Tour, which also brought him to geneva.24
in the 1640s, Leiden was the largest and most important university in 
the Protestant world, characterized by a distinctively international stu-
dent population.25 as students in theology, the brothers De la Court first 
had to follow a preliminary propaedeusis in the faculty of arts, a prepara-
tory curriculum that included courses in rhetoric, Classical languages, his-
tory and philosophy. it was during this first stage of their studies that the 
De la Courts were introduced to politics as an academic subject. in par-
ticular, politica was an important element of the study of rhetoric and of 
the field of moral philosophy, which was subdivided into three categories, 
ethics, economics (literally the ‘study of the household’), and politics.26 it 
is thus to rhetoric and philosophy that we must turn to understand the 
scope of the education in politics that the De la Courts received.
During the first decades of the seventeenth century, the dominating 
shadow of aristotle continued to colour the philosophical scene at Leiden, 
although the first Cartesian cracks in the wall became visible exactly in 
those years when the brothers De la Court spent their days in the class-
room.27 a particularly influential representative of Dutch neo-aristoteli-
anism in this period was Franco Burgersdijk, whose textbooks on logic, 
moral philosophy and politics long remained the standard material for 
students in the Dutch republic and abroad.28 Burgersdijk had died in 1635, 
but his legacy was continued by the two most important teachers of the 
brothers De la Court, adriaan Heereboord and marcus Zuerius Boxhorn. 
Heereboord, the man who had brought Pieter de la Court into contact 
with Comenius, became professor of philosophy at Leiden in 1641. 
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Spinoza, 48–49.
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His teachings, based on the method of disputations according to which 
the students had to defend different theses, largely followed Burgersdijk’s 
textbook Idea philosophia moralis, sive compendiosa instititutio, a fairly 
conventional compendium in moral philosophy first published in 1623.29 
Though clearly aristotelian in inspiration, Burgersdijk’s account used 
diverse authorities to construct a philosophical system independent 
from theology.30 Heereboord followed this neo-aristotelian attempt to 
separate philosophy and theology, publicly defending the freedom to 
philosophize. importantly, this stance brought him close to Descartes, 
whose con troversial writings, following the Discours de la méthode 
(1637), enjoyed an immediate and heated reception in Dutch academic 
circles.31 Heereboord openly supported Descartes in the Leiden academic 
community, although this support was not so much based on a rigorous 
acceptance of the Cartesian ‘new philosophy’ as on the endeavour to con-
struct an eclectic philosophia novantiqua unrestrained by theological 
interference.32
Heereboord would play an important role in the life of the De la Court 
family (see chapter 2 below), but more significant for the study of politics 
at Leiden was Boxhorn, professor of rhetoric and, from 1648, the successor 
to Heinsius as the chair of history. around 1643, Boxhorn’s students asked 
him to give a series of private lectures on Dutch politics, outside of the 
official curriculum. Possibly, one of these students was Johan de la Court, 
for a copy of the notes of these lectures later ended up in the possession of 
his brother Pieter, then still on his grand Tour.33 in any case, Boxhorn’s 
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teachings and writings in politics and history were to be very influential, 
from his stress on the empirical use of contemporary political examples to 
his popularization of Tacitism and reason of state. Following the ground-
work by Burgersdijk, Boxhorn developed an elaborate academic politica 
in connection with a practical commentary on the actual political situa-
tion in the Dutch republic and abroad.34
Boxhorn’s series of private lectures from 1643, later published as 
Commentariolus de statu Confoederatorum Provinciarum Belgii and also 
translated into Dutch, entails an almost purely descriptive rationaliza-
tion  of the administrative and economic complexities of the united 
Provinces.35 as such it evidently answered to a large demand in Dutch 
society for a comprehensible analysis of the obscure political constella-
tion of this newly born European anomaly. Boxhorn explained to his stu-
dents the intricacies of Dutch provincial sovereignty, following grotius 
with the claim that the summum imperium lied with the States of each 
individual province and not with the States-general, the central assembly 
of representatives of the different provinces. He also clarified the role of 
the Stadholder, the monarchical element in the Dutch republican consti-
tution fulfilled by a member of the House of Orange, whose powers as a 
supremus gubernator were in Boxhorn’s account clearly restricted. most 
importantly, Boxhorn entered into direct debate with the italian Cardinal 
guido Bentivoglio, who had argued in his famous Relationi (1630) that the 
republic’s chances of survival were small. For Bentivoglio, Dutch republi-
can liberty and concord were compromised by the large authority of the 
Stadholder and the overall “diversity of interests”, especially the animos-
ity between the different provinces and the unsettling religious pluralism. 
These seeds of conflict meant that the republic would “eventually be put 
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tegentium.” See the extensive analysis in Blom, Morality and Causality, 89–100.
once more under the government of one man”.36 Boxhorn countered with 
the fundamental claim that since the Dutch were no romans, they had 
taken care that the power of the Stadholder was duly subordinated to the 
authority of the provincial States. moreover, thanks to its commercial 
prosperity the republic would continue to thrive in concord and liberty.37 
Bentivoglio’s assessment of the Dutch fate would continue to obsess the 
brothers De la Court (see chapter 5 below), who doubtless studied 
Boxhorn’s text closely and must have been highly receptive to his opti-
mistic counterargument.
apart from these considerations on the current situation in and future 
of the united Provinces, Boxhorn also taught his students the contours of 
a more abstract political theory in the tradition of political aristotelianism. 
During the first decades of the seventeenth century, politics became 
increasingly identified as an independent academic discipline with its 
own methodology. in particular at german universities numerous trea-
tises were published that systematically analyzed the origin, goal and 
functioning of political societies.38 Burgersdijk had also contributed to 
this development with the uncharacteristically short textbook Idea oeco-
nomicae et politicae doctrinae, published posthumously in 1644. This trea-
tise, part of the teaching material at Leiden, neatly divided economics, the 
subject of which was the domus or household, from politics, which con-
cerned the constitution and the government of the respublica, “a society 
of many families living under the same magistrate and the same laws”.39 
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in a conventional aristotelian way, Burgersdijk argued that man is by 
nature a political animal, and he claimed that a mixed government of the 
three classical forms, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, is the best. 
more significantly, one of the few authors mentioned by Burgersdijk apart 
from aristotle was machiavelli. Burgersdijk refuted machiavelli’s Principe, 
which he read as an immoral advice for monarchs not to take care of their 
subjects.40 But in spite of this refutation, young students at Leiden were, 
when reading Burgersdijk’s textbook, obliquely introduced to the disqui-
eting writings of machiavelli.
Boxhorn followed in Burgersdijk’s footsteps, yet eventually he departed 
from the latter’s essentially aristotelian trail. His key work is the 
Institutiones politicae, first published in 1657 but probably largely based 
on Boxhorn’s teachings from the early 1640s onwards.41 Subdivided into 
two books, the Institutiones first discuss the origin and goal of political 
society and then the three classical forms of government. This structure 
was typical for the politica genre, but on a couple of important issues 
Boxhorn entered into a less conventional direction. First of all, the notion 
of human sociability as the foundation of society, prominent in Burgersdijk 
and also, for instance, in the political thought of Hugo grotius, is entirely 
absent from Boxhorn’s work. instead, Boxhorn emphasized the free, self-
interested yet needy natural state of human beings, and therefore main-
tained that the commonwealth does not find its origin in sociability, but 
in necessity and fear (i.2–3). as a result, the maintenance of obedience 
becomes the main pillar of good government. One particularly forceful 
means to establish such civil obedience is religion – in Boxhorn’s words, 
echoing his predecessor at Leiden Justus Lipsius, “the bond, the tie, and 
indeed the foundation of the republic”.42 another means is the upholding 
of the rule of law, a third a broad level of political participation (i.8, ii.1). 
This last claim leads to the fundamental question of which form of gov-
ernment should be considered best. Here again, Boxhorn departed from 
the conventional preference, such as that of Burgersdijk, for the mixed 
36 chapter one
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regime. He argued that a perfect balance between a monarchical, an aris-
tocratic and a democratic element would be utterly unachievable, since 
one of these three elements would inevitably come to dominate over the 
other two. in particular, one man could easily seize all powers and thus 
establish tyranny (ii.4). at the same time, an aristocracy would lapse into 
the tyranny of a few, Tacitus’s paucorum dominatio,43 while a democracy 
meant for Boxhorn the eventual triumph of licence and anarchy (i.5, ii.8–
10). Boxhorn’s model of good government was therefore a broad, open 
aristocratic regime where the wealthy ruled – a clear allusion to the cur-
rent situation in the Dutch republic. The keyword of this model was con-
cord, the fundamental link between rulers and ruled based on the rule of 
law and the pursuit of mutual interests (ii.5).
Overall, Boxhorn’s teachings in politics were fairly traditional, but 
with his denial of natural sociability and of the feasibility of a balanced 
mixed regime, he clearly contributed to what has been called “the crisis of 
political aristotelianism”.44 it remains an open question whether Boxhorn 
thus paved the way for the radicalization of Dutch political thinking later 
in the century. in any case, his possible influence on the brothers De la 
Court should not be overlooked, for key notions in their work at times 
echo Boxhorn’s teachings, from their view on the foundation of the com-
monwealth to their argument for a broad aristocratic government (see 
below, chapters 3 and 4). it is beyond doubt that the De la Courts were 
first introduced to these issues during the 1640s in Boxhorn’s classes 
at Leiden, where they also must have been schooled thoroughly in the 
reading of other representatives of early seventeenth-century politica, 
from the sweeping treatises by Henning arnisaeus, Christoph Besold 
and adam Contzen to the idiosyncratic Politica generalis by Johannes 
Werdenhagen.45 Later, Pieter de la Court would loudly expound his dis-
gust of all these academic Latin treatises, “boasting with high-flown 
Titles such as Politica, Systema Politicum, Doctrina Civilis, Prudentia 
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(munich: r. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004), 1–12.
Politica, de Republica, Arcana Rerumpublicarum, Aphorismi Politici, 
Axiomata Politica, &c, written by some Germanic Professors, Doctors, 
Preachers and Schoolteachers”. These works, De la Court insisted, are “so 
Pedantically cowardly, tasteless, scholastic, full of ignorance and of wrong 
or harmful and seditious Opinions, that all those Germanic writers seem 
to have practised their judgment nowhere less than in matters of State”.46 
Yet in spite of this flamboyant rebuttal of the conventional politics as 
taught at Leiden, the writings of the brothers De la Court were, as this 
book will show throughout, rooted much more firmly in the tradition of 
academic politica than they themselves were willing to acknowledge.47
 The Dutch Debate
Between the Academy and the Agora
Following De la Court’s own colourful judgment, it is tempting to con-
sider the academic teaching at Leiden as far removed from the daily con-
cerns of Dutch political and institutional practice. However, such a 
characterization would not do justice to the breadth and extent of the 
public debate in the republic.48 in fact, Boxhorn himself is a case in point 
of an academic who actively participated in the political debate, not only 
with his Commentariolus on the Dutch constitution, but also, for instance, 
by commenting on the turbulent political developments across the North 
Sea. in reaction to the execution of Charles i in 1649, Boxhorn wrote a 
pamphlet in defence of the royalist cause. a few years later he also pub-
lished a compendium on English history which portrayed England as a 
country plagued by incessant upheavals, now subdued under the yoke of 
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49 Boxhorn, De successione et iure primogenitorum in adeundo principatu dissertatio 
(Leiden, 1649); idem, Metamorphosis Anglorum, sive mutationes variae regum, regni, 
rerumque Angliae (s.l., 1653). See the extensive analysis in Nieuwstraten, History and 
Politics, ch. 5.
50 See Craig E. Harline, Pamphlets, Printing and Political Culture in the Early Dutch 
Republic (Dordrecht etc.: martinus Nijhoff, 1987), and Femke Deen, David Onnekink and 
michel reinders (eds.), Pamphlets and Politics in the Dutch Republic (Leiden and Boston: 
Brill, 2011).
51 israel, Dutch Republic, 686–690.
52 See Jeroen Salman, “Het nieuws op straat. actueel drukwerk in het vroegmoderne 
distributienetwerk,” in: José de kruif et al. (eds.), Het lange leven van het pamflet. 
Boekhistorische, iconografische, literaire en politieke aspecten van pamfletten, 1600–1900 
(Hilversum: Verloren, 2006), 56–67. Cf. for the English case Joad raymond, Pamphlets and 
Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2003), 
which also sporadically refers to the importance of the Dutch printing and distribution 
networks.
53 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer 
Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, 2d. ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1990). after its trans-
lation into English in 1989, Habermas’s work has enjoyed much influence in English histo-
riography. For an illustrative example, see T.C.W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the 
Power of Culture. Old Regime Europe, 1660–1789 (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2002).
an illegitimate and treacherous republican regime.49 Other professors at 
Leiden, most prominently the French scholar Claudius Salmasius (who 
soon fell victim to the sharp pen of John milton), similarly chose sides 
in the English debate. in short, Leiden university was anything but an 
ivory tower.
This academic concern with current political issues reveals the broad 
nature of the Dutch public debate, as well as its international impact. 
Since the early days of the revolt against Spain, the cities of the 
Netherlands had nurtured a fervent debating culture where all sorts of 
pressing questions were constantly discussed in an endless stream of 
pamphlets, poems, songs, petitions, pasquilles and the occasional elabo-
rate treatise.50 Dutch literacy was relatively very high,51 the republic 
enjoyed a thriving publishing industry, and the cheap prices of print and 
the numerous peddlers in the urban centres enabled large segments of 
society to participate in the political debate.52 in recent years, this vibrant 
discussion culture has at times been characterized as an early instance of 
a Habermasian ‘public sphere’, the roots of which are commonly located 
in the late seventeenth-century republic of Letters, where all participants 
allegedly contributed to a shared endeavour of rational, disinterested 
critical inquiry.53 Numerous historians have tried to situate the rise of 
such an Enlightened public sphere in an earlier age, in particular in the 
Netherlands. For example, an authoritative analysis of the political cul-
ture of the Dutch golden age portrays the Dutch discussion culture of 
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more sensitive to the difficulties of using the Habermasian concept are Judith Pollmann 
and andrew Spicer, “introduction,” in idem (eds.), Public Opinion and Changing Identities 
in the Early Modern Netherlands (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1–9. Cf. also Jason Peacey, Politicians 
and Pamphleteers. Propaganda During the English Civil Wars and Interregnum (aldershot: 
ashgate, 2004), esp. 303–332; and Peter Lake and Steve Pincus, “rethinking the Public 
Sphere in Early modern England,” Journal of British Studies 45 (2006), 270–292.
55 See esp. michel reinders, Printed Pandemonium. The Power of the Public and 
the Market for Popular Political Publications in the Early Modern Dutch Republic (PhD dis-
sertation Erasmus university rotterdam, 2008); and Freya Sierhuis, “A Babel Full of 
Confusion”. Politics, Literature and the Stage During the Arminian Controversy, 1610–1630 
(PhD dissertation European university institute, Florence, 2009).
56 Den Arminiaenschen dreck-waghen (amsterdam, 1618).
57 Hugo grotius, Annales et historiae de rebus Belgicis (amsterdam, 1657), 549: 
“et quotidie novi libelli aderant, fomenta discordiae”, a remark in the context of the debate 
on the proposals for peace with Spain in 1608.
58 See J.J. Woltjer, Tussen vrijheidsstrijd en burgeroorlog (amsterdam: Balans, 1994), esp. 
58–63, 87–88.
around 1650 as a “neutral” public sphere with “respect for everyone’s opin-
ion”, where “everybody was welcome, and all remained debatable”.54
Such a classification of the Dutch debate is overly idealistic, as has been 
pointed out by more recent studies that emphasize conflict instead of 
compromise as the main characteristic of seventeenth-century Dutch 
political culture.55 instead of being neutral and value-free, the Dutch pub-
lic debate was dominated by partisan propaganda and irrational libel, an 
untameable many-headed monster beyond the control of the authorities. 
in times of particular political or religious turbulence, such as the dénoue-
ment of the arminian controversy in 1618–19, polemics and biting satire 
proliferated, with results like Den Arminiaenschen dreck-waghen [“The 
arminian Shitcar”], an infamous caricature with a message as unsubtle as 
its title.56 Confronted with these excrescences of the public debate, many 
distinguished publicists could hardly hide their anxiety and openly pro-
claimed their preference for a much more effective policy of censorship. 
as for instance grotius remarked, all the pasquilles and libels that over-
flowed the Dutch market were merely fomenta discordiae, the “fomenters 
of discord”.57
The crucial question for an aspiring author in the Dutch political 
debate was therefore how to manœuvre in this pulsating arena, how 
to engage the public while avoiding instant refutation or even slander. 
Consequently, the essential objective since the start of the revolt was to 
appeal to the middle ground in society, the large ‘middle groups’ who, 
cherishing common norms and values, shunned an extremist minority 
position.58 Political success depended on the ability to address these 
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59 Tim Harris, “Propaganda and Public Opinion in Seventeenth-Century England,” in 
Jeremy D. Popkin (ed.), Media and Revolution. Comparative Perspectives (Lexington: 
university Press of kentucky, 1995), 48–73, esp. 52.
60 For an overview of the series, see J.a. gruys, “De reeks ‘republieken’ van de Elzeviers 
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61 See for a suggestive analysis Vittorio Conti, Consociatio Civitatum. Le Repubbliche nei 
testi elzeviriani (1625–1649) (Florence: Centro Editoriale Toscano, 1997). On the impact of 
Contarini and gianotti in the Dutch republic, see also Haitsma mulier, Myth of Venice.
62 Library, fol. 31. On the international dissemination of the publications by Elzevier, 
see e.g. Frans korsten, “The Elzeviers and England,” in Lotte Hellinga et al. (eds.), 
shared principles effectively, to make the middle groups believe that the 
general public opinion was identical to one’s own particular cause. as a 
result, rhetorical self-presentation was absolutely decisive, while a too 
radical argumentation often proved to be counterproductive. Yet as in 
England, the ultimate consequence of both sides of the debate trying to 
win over the middle groups was merely a further politicization of com-
monly held values and thus, the eventual  polarization of the public 
realm.59 in this sense, the attempt to appeal to the middle ground argua-
bly fomented political discord still further.
at the same time, the extent and capriciousness of the Dutch pub-
lic  debate also proved to be a lucrative asset for authors and publish-
ers  alike, who could play upon the impulses of the market to sell 
their ideas and products to as large an audience as possible. a particularly 
successful example of this strategy was the large series of ‘republics’ pub-
lished by the famous editorial house of Elzevier in Leiden in the course of 
the 1620s-1640s. These treatises, descriptive surveys of the geography, his-
tory and politics of various countries, were prepared in close cooperation 
with the scholar Johannes de Laet, one of the governors of the Dutch West 
india Company. Some of the treatises were written by De Laet himself, 
others were merely new editions of already existing texts. Overall the 
series entailed a comprehensive overview of all polities of any impor-
tance, from classical antiquity to contemporary Europe and the exotic 
world overseas.60 Some of the texts contained significant political con-
tents, such as the two works on Venice by gasparo Contarini and Donato 
gianotti – important propagators of the ‘myth’ that portrayed Venice as 
the ultimate republican regime.61 Published in Latin and in cheap, handy 
duodecimo format, the series proved to be a huge success, both in the 
Dutch republic and abroad. Pieter de la Court van der Voort, the son of 
Pieter de la Court, still owned the entire series (possibly inherited from 
his father) at the time of his death in 1739.62 The ‘republics’ of Elzevier 
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thus show how the Dutch discussion and printing culture opened up a 
market for political works that combined theoretical insight with practi-
cal concerns, alluring the curiosity of a large audience in between the 
academy and the agora. moreover, the series reveals the international 
inspiration and impact of the Dutch political debate. The Elzevier 
‘republics’ not only introduced many foreign authors to the Dutch mar-
ket, but also circulated throughout Europe at large. The importance of the 
Dutch debate went far beyond the narrow Dutch borders.
Debating True Liberty: The Sovereignty & The Interest of the Republic
Fuelled by the range of historical and international examples from 
the Elzevier series, the political debate in the Dutch republic throughout 
the seventeenth century concentrated largely on two fundamental issues: 
the issue of the origin and location of sovereignty, and the issue of the 
country’s true interest. in other words, the Dutch debate was taken hos-
tage by the combined legacy of Jean Bodin and the  heterogeneous tradi-
tion of reason of state.63 in order to situate the writings of the brothers De 
la Court within the shared assumptions of their day, this section will give 
a short overview of the way in which this double legacy dominated the 
debate in the republic. Far from aiming to give a comprehensive analysis 
of all seventeenth-century Dutch theories of sovereignty and reason of 
state, this overview concentrates on the way in which these abstract theo-
retical notions and concrete political developments shaped the main-
stream debate during the 1650s, as exemplified by pamphlets and other 
popular publications that formed the core of the vibrant Dutch debating 
culture.64
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65 Hugo grotius, The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic, ed. and trans. Jan Waszink 
(assen: Van gorcum, 2000) i.4, ii.4, ii.14, p. 54, 58, 64. grotius’s early republicanism is ana-
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Republic (Los angeles: Clark Library, 1985), 3–31.
67 grotius, Antiquity ii.3, p. 58.
The central author in the appropriation of Bodin’s theory of sover-
eignty to the Dutch context was grotius. in his De antiquitate reipublicae 
Batavicae (1610), grotius made the forceful and influential claim that ever 
since roman antiquity, sovereignty in Holland had remained with the 
States – a representative council of noblemen and magistrates elected 
from the common people. This Batavian imperium optimatium, a truly 
aristocratic government, was ‘tempered’ by a primus optimatium, an indi-
vidual authority who, unlike a monarch, was subjected to the rule of law.65 
in this way, grotius tried to ground the current political situation in 
Holland and the Dutch republic at large on a well-established and glori-
ous historical foundation. His argument was clear: sovereignty, originat-
ing from the common people, had always resided with the States, who 
shared the government with a principate. Like Boxhorn after him, grotius 
thus attempted to come to terms with the complex political reality of the 
united Provinces, in particular with the crucial role of the Stadholder. 
This institutional remnant from the times before the revolt was, in the-
ory, merely a public servant for the various provincial States by which he 
was appointed, yet in practice he played a much more influential part in 
Dutch politics. On the basis of an opaque set of old privileges and infor-
mal influences, the Stadholder could exercise a strong hold on Dutch 
political life, embodying one of the few ‘national’ elements within the 
highly decentralized confederation of provinces that had formed a defen-
sive union against Spain.66 Through his historical overview, grotius 
explained that the Stadholder was an essential element of this political 
amalgam, yet he also insisted that sovereignty remained at all times with 
the provincial States. moreover, a principate would turn into monarchy if 
not demarcated by the rule of law. Quoting from Tacitus’s Annals, grotius 
defined monarchy as the direct opposite of republican liberty, the most 
significant asset of the legacy of the ancient Batavians.67
grotius’s elaboration of the ‘Batavian myth’ celebrated the province of 
Holland and the Dutch republic as a time-honoured example of good 
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government, and as such it greatly influenced the way in which the Dutch 
defined their anomalous republican polity throughout the seventeenth 
century. However, two crucial historical episodes revealed that grotius’s 
carefully constructed account of provincial sovereignty hardly corre-
sponded to the harsh political reality on the ground. The first of these 
episodes was the climax of the arminian controversy in 1618/19, when the 
Stadholder, Prince maurice of Orange, openly defied the authority of 
the States of Holland and thus directly disclaimed grotius’s defence of 
the Batavian republican model.68 indeed, grotius was himself imprisoned 
by the Stadholder for his role in the entire controversy and his outspoken 
political stance (see chapter 5 below). grotius escaped, went into exile, 
and continued to dominate the debate, yet a first strong blow had been 
delivered not only to his account of sovereignty, but to the precarious 
Dutch political system as such. The crisis of 1618/19 entailed a trauma 
that would continue to haunt the Dutch political debate for the rest of 
the century.
The second blow, after decades of relative tranquillity, came in 1650. in 
that year, the new Stadholder William ii, the grandson of the pater patriae 
William the Silent, staged what was seen by many as a monarchical coup 
d’état against the States of Holland. again, the grotian republican model 
trembled. The public debate was inundated with an endless stream of 
pamphlets that argued for and against the actions of the Prince of 
Orange.69 One characteristic pamphlet, which represented the heated 
general debate by staging a spirited discussion between four people, 
invoked grotius to argue that there was no authority above the States, 
and that the Stadholder, unlike the late English king, therefore did not 
enjoy any sovereign powers.70 On the other side, many supporters of the 
Stadholder maintained, pace grotius, that the Dutch republic at large 
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had one ‘supreme sovereign’, namely the States-general together with the 
Stadholder. according to this view, all the Dutch provinces had entered a 
political covenant with the 1576 union of utrecht by which they relin-
quished their sovereign rights, not unlike the agreement between various 
individuals to form a civil society. Just as citizens were not permitted 
to rebel against the lawful government, so the States of Holland had no 
right to claim any special authority above the Stadholder.71 Numerous 
refutations followed back and forth, and before long, the Dutch political 
debate became deeply polarized.
Both sides appropriated the same historical and contemporary exam-
ples of republican government to substantiate their particular cause. 
Doubtless informed by the successful ‘republics’ of Elzevier, the  oppo-
nents as well as the supporters of the Stadholder’s coup contended that 
their interpretation of the Dutch institutional framework wholly corre-
sponded to the republican paradigms of classical greece, renaissance 
italy, or the Swiss Cantons. a particularly popular strategy among those 
who defended provincial sovereignty was to compare the Dutch republic 
with the Delian League or the Swiss Eidgenossenschaft as a purely defen-
sive union of sovereign entities.72 in contrast, supporters of the Stadholder 
insisted that the mainstay of true republican government, as in the 
Hebrew republic, Sparta, or Venice, was a primus in Republica who per-
fected the mixed regime by balancing aristocratic preponderance with a 
monarchical element.73 as with the theoretical notion of sovereignty, the 
abstract vocabulary from the aristotelian politica thus entered main-
stream public debate, lending academic lustre to an increasingly perverse 
pamphlet war.
at the same time, the polarized attempts to win over the middle ground 
resulted in a gradual radicalization of republican principles. given the 
Stadholder’s coup, the grotian middle way between provincial sover-
eignty and princely dignity had lost its persuasiveness. Little by little the 
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Batavian model started to collapse. Was a Stadholder really an essential 
element of a true republican government? One noteworthy pamphlet 
from 1650 argued that the experience of other republics, like the italian 
city-states, the german imperial Towns, and now also England, revealed 
that in a republic individual servants to the state could always be dis-
missed. “That is Liberty! Of which we have had here nothing but a shadow”, 
the pamphlet exclaimed. “it is an absurdity and it goes against nature and 
natural reason that we have Stadholders here. all Nations, in particular 
republics, laugh at us like at Children and fools who knowingly walk into 
servitude.”74 With this highly rhetorical remark, the pamphlet insisted 
that true republican liberty as opposed to servitude entails the absence of 
any monarchical element in the state. moreover, its author argued that 
the principle of a Stadholder opposed the country’s general interest, since 
the Princes of Orange only pursued their own “particular interest … as 
happens in all Courts” under the monarchical motto semper augustus. 
a political role for the House of Orange would imply that their family’s 
interests “will be altogether preferred above those of our State, our 
Commerce … and our own welfare”.75
This language of ‘interest’, a key concept of the reason of state literature 
from the middle decades of the century, had recently entered the Dutch 
debate during the negotiations that resulted in the Peace of Westphalia. 
Confronted with numerous French and Spanish diplomats and docu-
ments infused with the terminology of the ‘true interests’ of states, the 
Dutch political discourse gradually adopted this vocabulary.76 as a result, 
in the wake of the Stadholder’s attempted coup from 1650, the debate on 
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the sovereignty in the republic merged with a debate on the country’s 
general interest, the indisputable main concern of the united Provinces 
irrespective of their constitutional complexities. The key question was 
whether the Dutch should engage in further war to advance their republi-
can cause against Spanish domination, and the related issue of how to 
promote the country’s welfare. Were the liberty, safety and the commer-
cial success of the republic best safeguarded by an aggressive foreign 
policy, strengthened by a large standing army? Or would peace and a 
strong navy promote the further enhancement of the republic in the 
European balance of power and trade?
again, these issues were fundamentally linked to the figure of the 
Stadholder. Since William the Silent had assumed the military command 
in the revolt against Philip ii, warfare had been one of the major sources 
of the authority and standing of the successive Princes of Orange, who, as 
Stadholders, also obtained the office of Captain-general over the Dutch 
troops. accordingly, the Stadholder and many of his supporters generally 
favoured the resumption of war, while their opponents, particularly in the 
cities of Holland, where most of the taxes were raised to pay for the army, 
pleaded for peace. With the Peace of Westphalia, the latter prevailed. The 
Stadholder’s warlike designs were now painted in the black terms of self-
interest at the cost of the public interest, the main threat to republican 
liberty. in contrast, the ‘Orangists’ insisted that the interest of the united 
Provinces could only be furthered by the Stadholder, “the Scourge of 
Spain, the gate to our Liberty, the Support of our State, the Pride of all our 
Friends, and the fear for all our Enemies”.77
Both sides of the debate hence claimed that they were defending true 
republican liberty. While Orangists argued that the majesty and military 
experience of the Stadholder were necessary to protect Dutch liberty and 
independence against foreign domination, the counterargument was that 
there is not much difference between “a Spaniard, a Barbarian, or a Native 
when i lose my Liberty and become enslaved”: domination, either foreign 
or internal, is and remains domination.78 The debate thus revolved around 
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79 See in particular Jonathan israel, Monarchy, Orangism, and Republicanism in the 
Later Dutch Golden Age, Second golden age Lecture (amsterdam: amsterdams Centrum 
voor de Studie van de gouden Eeuw, 2004); Charles-Edouard Levillain, “William iii’s 
military and Political Career in Neo-roman Context, 1672–1702,” The Historical Journal 48, 
2 (2005), 213–350; Jill Stern, “The rhetoric of Popular Orangism, 1650–72,” Historical 
Research 77 (2004), 202–224; and idem, Orangism.
80 See israel, Dutch Republic, 700–726.
81 Ontdeckinghe van den Nederlantschen cancker. Waer mede ’t gehele lichaem van onsen 
staet deerlijck is besmet (‘Heyl-Stadt’, 1653).
the pivotal question of how to define true liberty, phrased in the charac-
teristic roman idiom of liberty as independence in opposition to servi-
tude. The antagonism between the two blocs arguing for and against the 
Stadholder should therefore not be mistaken as an ideological struggle 
between Orangist ‘monarchists’ on the one hand and ‘true’ republicans on 
the other. as several recent studies have made clear, such a rigid, dualistic 
view collapses in view of the shared vocabularies and the common goal 
of republican liberty that both Orangists and their adversaries pretended 
to pursue.79 Far from constituting an anti-republican ‘party’, the miscel-
laneous front of Orangists merely envisaged a republican polity of sorts, a 
perfectly balanced, mixed regime fulfilled by the figure of the Stadholder. 
unlike across the North Sea, the main adversaries in the Dutch political 
arena did not clash over royalist versus commonwealth rule; instead, the 
Dutch debate was one between two different republicanisms.
Yet like 1649 in England, where the execution of Charles i prompted a 
wave of republican writings that sought to legitimize the new political 
order, 1650 was a watershed in the ideological history of the Dutch 
republic. Shortly after his attempted coup d’état, William ii suddenly 
died from smallpox, leaving no direct adult heirs. Terrified by his exam-
ple, the States of Holland seized the opportunity and, soon followed by 
other provinces, they decided not to appoint a new Stadholder. Thus 
began a period heralded by some as an epoch of ‘True Liberty’ (known in 
the historiography, somewhat less empathically, as the ‘First Stadholder-
less Era’) – a new political framework that asked for a reformulation of 
republican principles.80 amidst a devastating war with England and vehe-
ment Orangist resistance, which characterized the recent developments 
as a ‘cancer’ that infected the entire Dutch body politic,81 the powerful 
regents of Holland’s towns decided to formalize the absence of a Prince 
of Orange as Stadholder with the 1654 act of Exclusion. Sealed on 
Cromwell’s instigation as a secret annexe to the peace treaty with England, 
this act officially excluded all members of the House of Orange from any 
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82 [Johan de Witt], Deductie, ofte declaratie van de Staten van Hollandt ende West-
Vrieslandt (The Hague, 1654), 48: “…dat in eene republijcque soodanighe charges niet 
sonder merckelijck perijckel vande vryheydt konnen werden gheconfereert op die geene 
welckers Ouders de selve charges daer bevoorens hebben bekleedt … dat alle de 
republijcquen vande gantsche Werelt, geene uytghesondert, die oyt tot soodanige maxi-
mes, ofte gewoonten zijn vervallen … daer door onder subjectie ghebracht, ende tot een 
monarchicquen staet ghereduceert zijn.”
83 Ibidem, 52–64. Cf. J.C. Boogman, “De raison d’état-politicus Johan de Witt,” in idem, 
Van spel en spelers (The Hague: martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 162–189.
high political office. a theoretical justification of the act followed soon 
with the elaborate Deductie, ofte declaratie van de Staten van Hollandt 
ende West-Vrieslandt [“Deduction or Declaration of the States of Holland 
and West-Friesland”], written by the most powerful man in the new 
political constellation: the grand Pensionary of the States of Holland, 
Johan de Witt.
De Witt’s Deductie directly challenged the central Orangist claim that 
the united Provinces had lost their truly balanced republican liberty and 
splendour now that no member of the House of Orange occupied the 
offices of Stadholder and Captain-general. referring to the gruesome fate 
of other republics such as rome under Caesar and augustus, Florence 
under the De medici and milan under the Visconti, De Witt insisted that 
“in a republic, such offices cannot be assigned to those whose ancestors 
held these posts before, without considerable peril to liberty”. indeed, so 
De Witt continued, “all republics in the entire world, not one excluded, 
who have ever fallen into such maxims or habits … have thereby been 
brought under subjection and been reduced into a monarchical state”.82 
in short, to safeguard republican liberty, political and military power 
should not be made hereditary. De Witt asserted that this stance was sub-
stantiated by the experience of a range of shining republican examples, 
from Venice, genoa, Lucca and ragusa to the Swiss Cantons and the 
Hebrew republic – standard references employed by both sides of the 
Dutch political debate. Stressing provincial sovereignty, De Witt also 
appropriated the fashionable language of reason of state to maintain that 
the united Provinces were no formal constitutional unity but rather a 
confederation of different republics, connected through a mutual con-
nection of commercial and military interests. This delicate harmony 
could only be torn apart by the preponderance of an “eminent Head”, De 
Witt warned.83 Yet overall, the Deductie remained within the boundaries 
of the Batavian model: De Witt carefully sought not to deride the 
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84 Bedenckingen op de Deductie van de Ed. Gr. Mog. Staten van Hollandt (s.l., 1654), 71–73: 
“… de acte van Seclusie, strijt tegen de diergekochte vryheydt des Landts … onse vryheyt 
niet anders als met den Oorloge is behouden. Wat aengaet de vryheydt van Negotie, dat’s 
maer een particuliere ende slaefachtige vryheydt, die wel profijtelijck is, maer niet 
genereus.”
85 Korte aenteeckeninge, dienende tot antwoort op seker libel, genoemt Bedenckingen op 
de Deductie (s.l., 1655), esp. 36–39.
86 Noodig bericht aan alle oprechte patriotten en beminders van de duer-gekochte vryheyt 
(amsterdam, 1654), sig. B: “De Staten representeren de gemeente of ’t geheele Landt; en 
indien de Prins dan meerder als sy waren, of dat sijn gesag daar boven strekte, soo was hy 
immers Souverayn, en wy niet vry, als we nu zijn, maar onvry.”
Stadholdership as such, but only to justify the exclusion of the family of 
the reviled William ii from the office.
This principle of non-hereditary political and military power entailed 
the core of the official claim that the republic had entered a stage of True 
Liberty which overshadowed the earlier republican achievements. Yet, 
for all its bombast, it was a rather weak assertion, precisely because it did 
not offer a compelling theoretical alternative to the ideal of the balanced 
mixed regime. in the absence of a persuasive vindication of the status 
quo, the debate continued. an Orangist rebuttal of the Deductie insisted 
that “the act of Exclusion violates the dearly bought freedom of the 
Country”, for true republican liberty would entail the possibility to 
appoint a Prince of Orange as Stadholder. The self-proclaimed successes 
of the De Witt regime were in fact highly detrimental, so the pamphlet 
maintained: the peace with England did not further the republic’s cause 
“because our liberty can only be maintained by War”, and “as regards 
liberty of Commerce, that is just a private and slavish liberty, which is 
profitable but not generous”.84 a subsequent reaction in turn defended 
the act of Exclusion, extensively discussing how free republics of the past 
had lost their liberty because of a hereditary military command.85 another 
pamphlet challenged the Orangists with the grotian argument that “the 
States represent the Community of the entire Country”; if the Prince of 
Orange would have more authority than the States, “then he would be 
Sovereign, and we would not be free, as we are now, but unfree”.86 But 
the authority of grotius was also appropriated by the other side. in the 
province of Zeeland, in particular, there was much resentment about 
Holland’s self-centred ideological course. adriaan Veth, the Pensionary of 
Zeeland, forcefully substantiated this criticism with a lengthy quote from 
grotius’s De antiquitate in favour of the ‘moderation’ of the mixed regime. 
in the absence of a Stadholder and Captain-general as monarchical 
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87 adriaan Veth, Propositie door den Heer Raedt Pensionaris, der Heeren Staten van 
Zeelandt … Aengaende de designatie van den Heere Prince van Orangien, tot Capiteyn, en 
Admirael, der Vereenighde Nederlanden, mitsgaders Stadhouder (middelburg, 1660), sig. 
a4. See also the earlier pamphlet Copia van de resolutie ende motiven der Ed. Moog. Heeren 
Staten van Zeelandt teghens d’Acte van Seclusie (s.l., 1654).
88 Politike Discoursen, “Voor-reeden,” sig. *2v.: “… maar dat warelik alle de regeerders, 
ende Onderdanen, als meede alle de gedagten, Tongen, Schrijf-pennen, ende Druk-persen, 
seederd de dood des laatsten Stad-houders en kapitains generaal in Holland, hebben 
bekoomen meer vryheids.”
 counterweight, Veth prophesied, the united Provinces gradually degener-
ated into a nepotistic oligarchy, utterly powerless to preserve republican 
independence.87
accordingly, at the close of the decade of the 1650s, the debate on the 
political order of the Dutch republic remained fundamentally undecided. 
The ideal of the mixed regime still dominated as the most powerful ideo-
logical framework to rationalize the Dutch political constellation, yet it 
hardly corresponded to the reality of the oligarchic government in power. 
Was this new phase in Dutch history really an era of True Liberty? The 
issues of provincial sovereignty and the interest of the state, of war and 
peace and the extent of free trade, continued to rouse fervent public 
debate. meanwhile, the united Provinces were anything but independent 
of the outside world. When the Stuarts were restored to the English throne 
in 1660, the act of Exclusion was revoked, and in an attempt to offset a 
new Orangist revival, the States of Holland agreed to undertake the edu-
cation of the young Prince of Orange, the future William iii. For those 
haunted by the traumas of 1618 and 1650, this was not a promising sign. 
They required an alternative, more radical approach to authenticate the 
claim that this Stadholderless era was an epoch of True Liberty.
 The making of an œuvre
From Ideological Testament to Political Campaign
From the outset, the brothers De la Court were deeply aware that 1650 
and its aftermath necessitated a new foundation of republican principles. 
With the death of the Stadholder, they contended, “Rulers and Subjects, as 
well as all thoughts, Tongues, Writing pens, and Printing presses” were 
free again. This enticing sense of freedom not only enabled the brothers 
to write down and publish their thoughts, but also required a fresh theo-
retical elaboration of what was at stake in the republic.88 and this was 
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89 Ibidem, sig. *3: “… naademaal onse autheur sig bevond in soodaanige gelegentheid, 
dat hy niet seer behoefde bekommerd te zijn, ofte sijn tijd te besteeden, om sijn goederen te 
vermeerderen … sijn overtollige tijd, die veelen in ligtvaardige geselschappen quisten, te bes-
teeden … sonder haat, en liefde, vreese, ende hoope, opregtelik sijn binnenste gedagten van 
alle voorkomende Politike, en morale saken op het papier te stellen.”
90 J.H. kernkamp (ed.), “Brieven uit de correspondentie van Pieter de la Court en zijn 
verwanten (1667–1685), met bijlagen (1657–1685),” Bijdragen en mededelingen van het his-
torisch genootschap 72 (1958), 3–195: 160–161, note 2.
91 The publisher concealed behind ‘ian iacobsz Dommekracht’ [= ‘hulk’] was Jan 
Jacobsz Schipper, active between 1637 and 1669. See m.m. kleerkooper and W.P. van 
Stockum, De boekhandel te Amsterdam, voornamelijk in de 17e eeuw, 2 vols. (The Hague: 
martinus Nijhoff, 1914–16), vol. i: 188–189. For a detailed bibliographical description of 
this work, see Wildenberg, Bibliografie, nr. 1031.
exactly what the De la Courts attempted to bring about. Worldly-wise 
after their grand Tour, schooled in the intricacies of academic politics 
at Leiden, and by now deeply involved in the Leiden textile industry 
with their own successful firm, Johan and Pieter de la Court decided to 
try their luck in what was by far the most challenging public arena: the 
political debate.
The first steps in this ambitious project were taken by Johan. as his 
brother would later explain, around 1654, the year of the act of Exclusion, 
Johan no longer needed to “spend his time to accumulate his goods” and 
instead decided to use “his superfluous time, which many waste in shal-
low company”, for putting “without hate, love, fear, and hope, sincerely his 
inner thoughts of all occurring Political and Moral matters on the paper”.89 
But after a few productive years and at a time when he was still actively 
engaged in writing, Johan fell ill. at the start of 1660, he made his testa-
ment and authorized his brother Pieter to take over all his property should 
he fail to recover. Nearly a month later, Johan died. The bequest that he 
left to his brother consisted not only of a large number of printed books, 
but also of his own unfinished manuscripts, which ought to remain 
unpublished.90
Yet Pieter de la Court was to disregard this last wish, deciding instead 
to disclose his brother’s ideological testament. That same year, he pre-
pared an edition of a part of Johan’s papers that together comprised a 
more or less finished work, eventually published in 1660 under the title 
Consideratien en exempelen van staat, omtrent de fundamenten van aller-
ley regeringe [“Considerations and Examples of State, Concerning the 
Foundations of all Sorts of governments”]. given the provocative poten-
tial of the work, De la Court clearly trod carefully: the book was printed in 
amsterdam under a fake editorial name and according to the title page 
written by a certain ‘V.H.’91 as contemporaries were quick to find out, 
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92 Politike Weeg-schaal iii.i.6, p. 577: “Ende dienvolgende dunkt my, ik nu wel zoude 
mogen besluiten, dat alles wel overwogen zijnde, de Populare Regeering de naturelikste, 
reedelikste, vreedsamighste, en voordeeligste voor de Ingeseetenen is.”
93 Published in amsterdam by iacob Volckertsz Zinbreker, active between 1654 and 
1672. See Wildenberg, Bibliografie, nr. 1032.
‘V.H.’ stood for ‘Van Hove’, the literal Dutch translation of ‘De la Court’. 
apparently, De la Court hesitated to divulge his brother’s identity, but he 
was equally unwilling to maintain total silence about the author’s name. 
using his initials in Dutch as a pseudonym appeared to be a convenient 
middle way.
This first work of the brothers De la Court comprises an outwardly con-
ventional examination, in the tradition of the neo-aristotelian politica, of 
the three classical forms of government, monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy. it discusses the details of these governmental structures, and 
extensively analyzes three prototypical cases: the Ottoman Empire, 
employed to prove that all monarchical rule is necessarily tyrannical, the 
Venetian republic, an example of a thriving yet conservative aristocracy, 
and classical athens, the flourishing, commercial city-state where law 
and liberty ruled. Of these three examples, the latter is heralded as the 
best form of government, and the work concludes accordingly that “the 
Popular government is the most natural, rational, peaceful, and advanta-
geous for the Inhabitants”.92 This unequivocal conclusion, explicitly con-
nected to the political situation in the Dutch republic, entailed a clear 
departure from the aristotelian conventions and the ideal of the mixed 
regime. However, the principal aspect that set the work apart from more 
traditional treatises was its use of the vernacular and distinctive rhetoric: 
crammed with jokes, fables and vivid metaphors, the work merged its aca-
demic background with a popular, lay discourse, thus manifestly trying to 
intervene in the public debate.
it remains unknown whether this first work enjoyed any success, 
but the next year, De la Court decided to bring out a second edition, with 
a new publisher and under a new title: Consideratien van staat ofte Polityke 
Weeg-schaal [“Considerations of State or Political Balance”], again by 
‘V.H.’93 De la Court changed more than the title and the publisher though. 
adding around a hundred pages and adjusting the order of some chap-
ters, he revised the whole work, and, importantly, modified its main con-
clusions. Where the first edition had ended with its explicit defence of 
popular government, De la Court appended some chapters to explain the 
“reasons why the Popular Government has been depicted so favourably 
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94 Politike Weeg-schaal iii.iii.3, iii.iii.5, p. 652, 661: “reedenen waarom de Populare 
Regeering voor desen zo gunstig is voorgestelt geweest; hoewel die warelik de beste 
niet zy … Dat een Aristokratie, die allernaast aan de Populare komt, gewisselik de beste 
regeering is.”
95 The third, modified, edition of the Politike Weeg-schaal was published by Dirk 
Dirksz., and another copy of this edition, probably unauthorized, appeared with a ficti-
tious place and publisher given (‘Ysselmonde, voor Querinus Overal, alias: Dwaal-star’). 
a fourth, further modified edition, to which i refer, was published again by Dirk Dirksz, 
and a next one (also called the fourth edition, but slightly different from the latter), by 
abraham and Jan van Wees. another copy of this edition, again probably unauthorized, 
was issued by Jacob Vinckel, and a fifth edition, with only very few modifications, by the 
publisher called ‘Joan. Cyprianus vander gracht’, probably a pseudonym of a publisher 
close to the famous editorial house of Johannes Blaeu (see below). See Wildenberg, 
Bibliografie, nrs. 1033–1038.
96 This copy, preserved in the amsterdam university Library as ms XXV C41, is the 
fourth edition by Dirk Dirksz, with marginal notes which are unmistakeably by Pieter de 
la Court, as a comparison with his autographic letters in the amsterdam Stadsarchief has 
confirmed. it is arguably the most extensive and therefore most definitive copy of the 
Politike Weeg-schaal since the amount of additions makes it much larger than the fifth 
edition. i refer to these additions whenever appropriate.
until now; although it is truly not the best one”. instead, this second edi-
tion argued “that an Aristocracy that is closest to the Popular government 
is surely the best government”.94 De la Court continued to add new pas-
sages to subsequent editions of the work, which was issued another six 
times during the following year, 1662. again, different publishers were 
involved, all from amsterdam, though two of these editions might have 
been brought out without De la Court’s consent and cooperation – pirated 
copies issued with the intention to profit from the book’s apparent suc-
cess.95 all in all, the work was enlarged with another hundred pages, and 
there still exists a copy in which De la Court made further amendments 
and additions for another re-edition which, however, would never be 
published.96 in comparison to the first edition, the book eventually almost 
doubled in size. For the ultimate result De la Court’s modifications had 
therefore been at least as important as his brother Johan’s groundwork. 
However, since the original manuscript of the first edition is lost, it is 
impossible to determine with utter certitude the exact contributions of 
each of the two brothers.
Thanks to his brother’s bequest, 1662 proved to be a highly productive 
year for Pieter de la Court. apart from the six different editions of the 
Politike Weeg-schaal, he would also publish fifteen editions of three other 
works. First, he edited a collection of essays out of the documents left 
by Johan as Politike Discoursen, handelende in ses onderscheide boeken 
van steeden, landen, oorlogen, kerken, regeeringen, en zeeden [“Political 
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97 The library of Pieter de la Court van der Voort had a copy of both works. 
See Library, fols. 19, 32.
98 The Leiden edition was by Pieter Hackius and the amsterdam one by 
‘i. Ciprianus vander gracht’, the same editor of the fifth edition of the Politike Weeg-schaal. 
The 1663 edition was by Jacob Venkel or Vinckel, notorious for his disputed reprints. See 
Wildenberg, Bibliografie, nrs. 1061–1063, and Paul van Heck, “in het spoor van machiavelli: 
de Politike Discoursen, 1662, van Johan en Pieter de la Court,” LIAS. Sources and Documents 
Relating to the Early Modern History of Ideas 27 (2000), 277–318: 278–279, notes 5–7.
99 Jan Lucassen, “Het Welvaren van Leiden (1659–1662): de wording van een economis-
che theorie over gilden en ondernemerschap,” in B. de Vries et al. (eds.), De kracht 
der zwakken. Studies over arbeid en arbeidersbeweging in het verleden (amsterdam: iiSg, 
1992), 13–48.
Discourses, Dealing in Six Different Books with Cities, Countries, Wars, 
Churches, governments and morals”]. This title clearly reveals the influ-
ence of reason of state literature, from the Discorsi politici (1599) by Paolo 
Paruta to the Discours politiques (1646) by the Duke of rohan.97 a first 
edition of the Politike Discoursen, written by ‘D.C.’, De la Court’s original 
initials, was published in Leiden, followed by a slightly modified version 
in amsterdam that was published again the next year, probably in an 
unauthorized edition.98 The work, subdivided into six different books all 
loosely centred on an equal number of themes, comprises a large number 
of divergent topics, from an analysis of urban economics and a clearly 
machiavellian-inspired discussion of power politics and warfare, to a pro-
vocative and highly anti-clerical part on religious and ecclesiastical affairs 
and a concluding section on moral philosophy. as in the case of the 
Politike Weeg-schaal, the manuscript of the work has not survived, which 
again makes it difficult to decipher its conception. However, according to 
the preface, which gives some details about the story behind the making 
of the work, the text was all Johan’s, while Pieter only structured the work 
and gave it its title. in any case, it seems that De la Court saw no reason to 
carry out large amendments as in the Politike Weeg-schaal, and appar-
ently he largely concurred with its contents.
The other papers that De la Court inherited from his brother included 
an unfinished manuscript on the economic and political situation in 
Leiden, the brothers’ hometown. Ten different versions exist of this man-
uscript, none of which is in De la Court’s hand, so the attribution of 
this work is rather difficult. Yet following the analysis of all these manu-
scripts by Jan Lucassen, it is possible to reconstruct the work’s forma-
tion.99 The principal part of the text, a fairly radical plea for economic 
de-regularization and a sharp critique of the monopolist conduct of 
Leiden university, clearly the work of a well-informed mind with inside 
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100 The manuscript of this first version is now in the amsterdam university Library, ms 
XV B3. i have also consulted the later manuscripts in the libraries of groningen university, 
ms 233, Leiden university, ms LTk 784–785, and the royal Library in The Hague, ms 75 J65.
101 it was eventually published by F. Driessen as Het Welvaren van Leiden. Handschift uit 
het jaar 1659 (The Hague: martinus Nijhoff, 1911).
102 This interference is analyzed in detail in an unpublished ma-thesis by Leo van 
rossum, “Het aandeel van Johan de Witt aan het Interest van Holland” (utrecht university, 
1964). Van rossum has carefully examined the printer’s copy of the work in the The Hague 
royal Library, ms 73 B17, in which he has retrieved a total of five different hands. a copy of 
this thesis can be consulted in the Netherlands Economic Historical archive, amsterdam, 
Bijzondere collecties 542.
knowledge of such matters, was most probably written by Johan, perhaps 
assisted by his brother. it bears the title Aenmerkinge op het welvaren en 
Intrest der Stad Leyden [“Comments on the Welfare and interest of the 
City of Leiden”] and was finished around august 1659.100 after Johan’s 
death, Pieter would continue working on the text for about two years, 
adding chapters on politics, defence, religious freedom and the history of 
the city. He dedicated the work to the Leiden regent Johannes Eleman, 
explicitly referring to their close friendship since De la Court’s marriage 
with Eleman’s sister-in-law, Elisabeth Tollenaar, in 1657. Yet when the 
final version of the work was ready, titled Het welvaren der stad Leyden 
[“The Welfare of the City of Leiden”], De la Court left it in his desk, unpub-
lished.101 By then, De la Court had decided to extend the ideological testa-
ment of his late brother into a full-fledged political campaign.
Probably at the instigation of Eleman, the manuscript of Het welvaren 
had been circulated among the members of the Leiden political establish-
ment. as a result, De la Court’s writings entered the inner governing cir-
cles of the republic and eventually attracted the attention of Johan de 
Witt himself. Persuaded by this new powerful audience, De la Court 
developed the work on Leiden into a more general study, applied to the 
case of the entire province of Holland. a first draft of this work-in-pro-
gress was consulted by De Witt in July 1661. From then on, De la Court’s 
writings were subjected to the interference of a number of important 
regents, who intended to use the work as propaganda for the policies of 
the States of Holland, in particular vis-à-vis the opposition of Zeeland.102 
apart from De Witt, those involved were above all Pieter de groot, the 
son of Hugo grotius and by then Pensionary of amsterdam, and the 
Leiden regent Hendrick van Willighen. all three paid meticulous atten-
tion to the work, suggesting modifications and enlargements. Epecially 
De Witt meddled heavily in the matter, carrying out a large number of 
corrections in line with his own ideas. in particular, De la Court’s frequent 
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103 The deleted passage is published in D. Veegens, “Johan de Witt als publicist,” in 
Veegens, Historische Studien, 2 vols. (The Hague: Van Stockum, 1884), vol. ii: 54–56. as Van 
rossum has argued, the chapters that took its place, 29 and 30 of the published work, are 
most probably based on a concept written by De Witt himself. For the contacts between 
De la Court and De Witt, see Herbert H. rowen, John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 
1625–1672 (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1978), 391–398; and Luc Panhuysen, De 
Ware Vrijheid. De levens van Johan en Cornelis de Witt (amsterdam: atlas, 2005), 296–298.
104 See the letter of De groot to De Witt, d.d. 2 June 1662, published in Brieven aan Johan 
de Witt, ed. N. Japikse, 2 vols. (amsterdam, 1910–1922), vol. ii: 107–109. De groot’s proposed 
additions would form chapters 39–43 of the work.
105 This assumption is based on the testimony of De la Court’s friend, the lawyer Simon 
van Leeuwen, who said he had seen the work under Blaeu’s presses. See Wildenberg, 
Bibliografie, 39.
106 Ibidem, nrs. 1041–1049.
criticism of the existing oligarchy that was in power – De Witt’s own 
regime – was toned down by the statesman, who even deleted an entire 
passage, too critical in his eyes, and replaced it with two chapters that 
vindicated his rule.103
The resulting work comprises a lengthy discussion of the economic 
situation in Holland and a passionate attack on the Stadholder’s rule in 
line with the Politike Weeg-schaal, though now stated more explicitly and, 
thanks to De Witt’s interference, clearly defending the existing powers. 
Shortly before publication, De groot suggested carrying out yet a further 
addition, focusing on Holland’s sovereignty and independence from the 
other provinces and on its foreign policy.104 De la Court complied with this 
proposal and when the work was finally ready, it was published by ‘Joan. 
Cyprianus van der gracht’, a pseudonym of an unknown printer who used 
the presses of the famous amsterdam editor Johannes Blaeu.105 issued in 
the summer of 1662 as Interest van Holland, ofte gronden van Hollands-
welvaren [“interest of Holland, or Foundations of Holland’s Welfare”], 
written by ‘V.D.H.’ (i.e. Van den Hove), the book proved to be a huge and 
immediate success, and it went through at least eight further editions 
dated in the same year.106
Profiting from this success, De la Court, perhaps at the suggestion of his 
publisher, decided to issue some new editions of the Politike Weeg-schaal 
and the Politike Discoursen, of which respectively the fifth and the second 
reprint were by the same ‘Cyprianus van der gracht’. But this was not all. 
He also published yet another work that year, the Historie der Gravelike 
Regering in Holland [“History of the Count’s government in Holland”], a 
long historical overview of the rule of the various Counts of Holland up to 
the start of the Dutch revolt, which served as a historiographical founda-
tion of the anti-Stadholder argument. This work, again by ‘V.H.’, went 
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107 Three of these editions do not mention a publisher, the fourth, probably unauthor-
ized, edition was by Jacob Vinkel. See Ibidem, nrs. 1051–1054. in one of his own copies, De 
la Court made extensive notes: see Leiden university Library ms LTk 679.
108 See E.O.g. Haitsma mulier, “De Naeuwkeurige consideratie van staet van de gebroed-
ers De la Court. Een nadere beschouwing,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de 
Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 99 (1984), 396–407. The possible influences of this work on 
the De la Courts are further analyzed in Blom, Morality and Causality, 168–173.
109 Franciscus van den Enden, Kort verhael van Nieuw-Nederlants gelegentheit (1662), 
ed. F. mertens, from http://users.telenet.be/fvde/WorksP/kortVerhael.pdf [retrieved may 
13, 2011], “Voor-reeden,” p. iv: “… ziende hun goet succes in der Gemeintens en niet min 
Hooge stants Personen gretigh ontfangen haerder schriften, ook al meede dear toe aenlei-
dingh gegeven, en te meer aengemoedicht om hare nodingh of aenlokkingh ter baan van 
bescheide Vryheits-betrachting niet geheel Vruchteloos te laten passeren.” Ibidem, 
“Na-reeden,” p. 69: “… zoo en hebben wy niet en minder als de hedendaeghze losse 
through four editions.107 Surprising, furthermore, was the publication of a 
book called Nauwkeurige consideratie van staet, wegens de heerschappye 
van een vrye en geheymen staets-regering over de gantsche aertbodem 
[“Careful Consideration of State, on account of the Dominion of a Free 
and Secret State-government over the Entire Earth”], again with 
‘Cyprianus van der gracht’ under the name ‘V.D.H.’ This text was an 
almost completely identical reprint of a work published in 1657 by the 
jurist gerard van Wassenaer, a member of the utrecht political and intel-
lectual establishment. apparently, De la Court, or at least his publisher, 
found it worthwhile or lucrative to publish this book again under his now-
famous pseudonym.108
In the Maelstrom of the Debate
The works of the brothers De la Court spread among large groups within 
Dutch society, and they caused a vigorous political controversy that trig-
gered a new, radical phase in the public debate. Franciscus van den 
Enden, Latin teacher to Spinoza, revealed in October 1662, just months 
after the first publication of the Interest van Holland, that the different 
books of the De la Courts had enjoyed “large success among the Common 
people and not less among Persons of High standing”. Van den Enden 
emphasized that he did not know the authors of these works and fre-
quently he expressed his disagreement with the “contemporary writers of 
loose Discourses and mutilated Holland’s interest”. However, “encour-
aged by their invitation or seduction on the way of a modest exercise of 
Freedom”, he decided to entrust his own political opinions to the printing 
press.109 The writings of the brothers De la Court thus prompted the first 
political publication of the group of freethinkers around Spinoza.
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Discourse, en verminkte Hollandtze interest-schrijvers, enz. de vrymoedigheit derven 
nemen.” For Van den Enden, see israel, Radical Enlightenment, 175–184.
110 Haeghs Hof-Praetje, ofte ’t samen-spraeck tusschen een Hagenaer, Amsterdammer, 
ende Leyenaar. Op ende tegens de valsche calumnien ende versierde leugenen van Pieter la 
Court, gestelt in sijn alsoo genoemde Intrest van Holland ende gronden van ’t Hollands wel-
varen (Leiden, 1662). This pamphlet was countered by a reaction that repudiated De la 
Court as much as his opponents: ’t Afgeruckte masker van den Haegsen Hofprater (Leiden, 
1663).
111 De gansche distructie van den nieuw-gebooren Hollantschen Cromwel alias Leydtschen 
Quaker; genaemt t’Intrest van Hollandt, ofte gronden van ‘s Hollants welvaren (Schiedam, 
[1663]); Helle-vreucht over den herbooren, ende nieu-regeerende Hollantschen Cromwel 
alias s’Hollandts Intrest ende Stadthouders Regeringh beschrijver [1662].
112 Een onverwelckbare kroon, gevlochten op het noyt-genoegh verachte boeck, genaemt de 
Hollantsche Intrest, door Pieter la Court [1662]: “gaat dan gy Rotsack, gaat in Plutoos duyster 
wooning/misschien dat Pluto u wel maakt de Helsche Coning,/gaat Neros broeder, gaat in 
Aetneas bergspelonck,/Ontfanckt daar eeuwiglijck de noyt verkoude vonck.” Surprisingly, 
this pamphlet, as another anonymous pasquille rebuking De la Court, Op de op-roerige 
schriften van Pieter la Court, door hem uyt-gegeven onder de naem van V.D.H. en D.C. [1662], 
were published by De la Court’s own publisher, ‘Cyprianus van der gracht’. These two 
pamphlets were countered by one vindicating De la Court, also anonymously: Den rechten 
Hollander, tegen de twee pasquillen op de heer Pieter la Court, of syn boeck genaemt 
Hollantsche Intrest [1662].
Van den Enden did not exaggerate, for the treatises of the De la Courts, 
and especially the Interest van Holland, proved to be true bestsellers, 
widely diffused among the urban populace and said to be read and dis-
cussed even on canal boats. Pamphlets such as the 1662 Haeghs Hof-
Praetje [“The Hague’s Court Talk”] critically dramatized such discussions 
by staging a debate between diverse opponents of Pieter de la Court, 
already mentioned by his true name.110 Other Orangist pasquilles fol-
lowed, defaming in much harsher language this devilish “new-born Dutch 
Cromwell alias Leiden Quaker”.111 With the odd blend of vulgar yet human-
ist reproach that was typical for such libels, De la Court was scorned for 
his alien origins and his riches, and admonished to
go, you Bastard, go to Pluto’s dark dwelling
maybe Pluto will make you the king of Hell
go, Nero’s brother, go to Aeneas’s cavern
receive there forever the fire that never chills.112
Such opposition to De la Court did not remain limited to anonymous 
pamphlets. Shortly after the publication of the Interest van Holland, the 
fervently orthodox Leiden consistory decided to investigate the contents 
of this work and of the Politike Discoursen since it was rumoured that they 
were “offensive”, a claim fully confirmed after a closer examination. The 
consistory temporarily excluded the alleged author from the Lord’s 
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113 See the excerpts from the 1662–1663 meetings of the Leiden consistory and magis-
trate in Brieven aan Johan de Witt, ed. Japikse, vol. ii: 110–111: “… verklarende, dat hy al de 
dingen, die in de uitgegeven boeken hem werden ten laste gelegd, niet approbeerde.”
114 De Stadhouderlijcke Regeeringe in Hollandt ende West-Vrieslant (amsterdam, 1662), 
soon followed by a rebuttal: Toetze op het laster-schrift, ’t onrecht genaamt Stadhouderlyke 
Regeeringe van Holland en West-Vriesland (Leiden, 1662).
115 Den Herstelden Prins tot Stad-houder ende Capiteyn Generaal … tegens de boekjens 
onlangs uyt gegeven met den naem van Interest van Hollandt, ende Stadthouderlijcke 
Regeringe in Hollandt (amsterdam, 1663), dedicated to William iii by a certain ‘D.C.’
116 Pieter de la Court to the brothers Van der Voort, 9 march 1663, in J.H kernkamp (ed.), 
“Brieven uit de correspondentie van Pieter de la Court en zijn verwanten (1661–1666),” 
Bijdragen en mededelingen van het historisch genootschap 70 (1956), 82–156: 98: “De 
autheur laat meer blijken sijn goeden aard of wil ten voordeele der prinsen, alswel eenige 
bequaamheid om soodaanige sake wel te defenderen.”
117 ‘aesopus Stomachatus’, Apologie ofte verantwoordinge van den ondienst der 
stadthouderlyke regeeringe (amsterdam, 1663), published again by ‘Cyprianus van der 
gracht’. See Wildenberg, Bibliografie, nr. 1091. a year earlier, another pamphlet had been 
published under the title Aesopus Defensor sig erbarmende over de diepe sugten van den 
Klagenden Veenboer (The Hague, 1662). it has been argued that De la Court himself was 
this ‘aesopus’, but this assumption is not based on any convincing evidence. See for a 
discussion of the authorship: Wildenberg, Bibliografie, 29–30.
Supper and called upon the urban magistracy to take further measures. 
De la Court admitted that he was the author of the Interest van Holland, 
though not of its offensive passages, nor of the at least as scandalous 
Politike Discoursen. Yet, when the second edition of the Politike Discoursen 
was issued around December 1662, the further distribution of the work 
was prohibited and De la Court’s exclusion from the Lord’s Supper was 
reconfirmed. To overcome this situation, De la Court tried to obtain the 
backing of De Witt, but in vain. Having lost his powerful patronage, he 
had to grovel before the ecclesiastical authorities. Only when he had 
declared “that he did not approve all the things in the published books of 
which he was charged”, was De la Court again accepted at the Lord’s 
Supper, that prime locus of early-modern social life.113
Yet De la Court also encountered support. a notably like-minded and 
equally productive author was the The Hague jurist Johan uytenhage de 
mist, who in 1662 published five editions of a provocative anti-Stadholder 
treatise with ‘Cyprianus vander gracht’, De la Court’s publisher in 
amsterdam.114 The next year, a refutation, directed against both this work 
and the Interest, appeared with the same publisher under the title Den 
Herstelden Prins [“The restored Prince”].115 De la Court was happy to find 
that its author “shows more his good disposition or will in favour of the 
prince, than any competence to defend such matters well”.116 He also wel-
comed a subsequent rebuttal by a certain ‘aesopus Stomachatus’, per-
haps a pseudonym of uytenhage,117 as well as another large pamphlet that 
60 chapter one
118 Pieter de la Court to the brothers Van der Voort, 6 may 1663, in kernkamp (ed.), 
“Brieven (1661–1666),” 107–108: “Het spreekt ronder voor de vrijheid ende teegen het inter-
est der princen van Oranjen, als door eenige privee pennen tot heeden is geschiet.” De la 
Court refers to De gulde legenden van de Stadthouders in Hollant ende West-Vrieslandt 
(amsterdam, 1663). See also ‘H. van V.’, Hollandse Vrijheid verdedigt tegen de usurpatie der 
Stadhouders (‘Loevestein’, 1663).
119 See e.g. ‘F.J.a.’, Wederleggingh tegens eenige poincten, de welcke soo lasterlijck verhaelt 
worden in het boeck genaemt de Hollandtsche Intrest (amsterdam, 1662); [Jean Nicolas de 
Parival], Le vray l’interêt de la Hollande, elevé sur les ruines de celuy qui voit les jour sous le 
nom de V.D.H. ([amsterdam], 1662); Tafel-praetje … over de schendige boecken genaemt den 
Intrest van Hollandt, mitsgaders de Consideratien van Staet, ende Politijcque Discourssen 
(Dordrecht, [1662]); a. Van den Berg, Verdediging, of antwoort op het schandaleuze en mon-
streuze boek, genaamt Hollandts Intrest (Dordrecht, 1663).
120 See De la Court’s large manuscript of loose notes, amsterdam university Library ms 
XiV E16.
121 “kort Begrijp van eene Hollandse Chronik,” part of a large manuscript titled 
“Hollandse Chronijk,” amsterdam university Library ms XVi B1.
122 Ibidem, fols. 91–632; fols. 633–634. See also the various copies of resolutions of the 
States of Holland, some in De la Court’s hand, compiled in ms 75 C37 in the royal Library 
in The Hague.
123 For uytenhage’s assistance, see the unpublished chapter “Wat goede vrugten de 
beginselen eener Vrye regeeringe albereids gebaard hebben sedert den jare 1662 tot den 
he characterized as “speaking more straightforwardly in favour of liberty 
and against the particular interest of the Princes of Orange, than has been 
done by any private pens until today”.118 all in all, De la Court had become 
the centre of the public debate and he and his allies were besieged by a 
virtually endless stream of further poems, pamphlets and pasquilles that 
flooded the Dutch market for the next two years.119 De la Court had clearly 
unleashed the untameable beast of Dutch public opinion.
The intensity of the debate and the forceful opposition of the 
church made De la Court decide to maintain silence for a while. Yet he 
still engaged in a continuous rethinking of his conclusions, he fur-
ther  adjusted his copies of the Politike Weeg-schaal and the Gravelike 
Regeeringe for possible re-editions in the future, and he made numerous 
notes of historical documents that contained relevant information.120 He 
also initiated (and quickly abandoned) a new work entitled Hollandse 
Chronijk [“Dutch Chronicle”], a geographical, social, religious and politi-
cal description of Holland during the times of Charlemagne, to be based 
on a historical survey from the classical period onwards.121 another of his 
manuscripts comprises a huge series of loose historical data, ranging from 
the year 691 to 1583, followed by some notes of financial and military reso-
lutions taken between 1664 and 1667.122 in the end, having collected new 
information and references with the assistance of his friend uytenhage de 
mist, De la Court decided to try again and prepare a new publication.123 
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jare 1669,” in J.H. kernkamp (ed.), ‘Twee “niet ter drukperse bereide” geschriften van 
Pieter de la Court’, Bijdragen en mededelingen van het historisch genootschap 56 (1935), 
160–195.
124 Aanwysing, “Voor-reeden des aucteurs,” *3v.: “… de baatsugtige Drukkers gemeld 
gansch onvolmaakt Werk, welk door sijnen Schryver ter Drukkerye niet bescheyden was … 
te meermalen sonder mijn weten, en teegen mijne genegentheid, herdrukt hebben.”
125 On the Hackius printing house, see Paul g. Hoftijzer, “Sic Transit gloria … The End 
of the Officina Hackiana,” Quaerendo 26, 4 (1996), 258–273.
126 See Wildenberg, Bibliografie, nr. 1111, and for the distribution Ibidem, 37.
in 1667,  following the resounding triumph over England in the Second 
anglo-Dutch war, De Witt cum suis had enforced the signing of the 
Perpetual Edict whereby the States of Holland formally abolished the 
office of the Stadholder. Confident that his message would now encoun-
ter a more favourable response, De la Court again dived into the mael-
strom of the public debate.
His new contribution to the debate entailed an adjusted and exten-
sively enlarged re-edition of the Interest van Holland, with a new preface, 
a different chapter sequence and some up-to-date information to actual-
ize the contents. Yet before the work was issued, De la Court attempted to 
tread very carefully, since the memory of what had happened in 1662 was 
still fresh. First, he sought to obtain the permission of the States of Holland 
to publish the book, a request which was granted in December 1668. Then, 
in the preface to the work, he excused himself for the publication of the 
Interest van Holland with the argument that “the acquisitive Printers had 
reprinted this wholly imperfect Work, which was by its Writer never 
designed for the Press … repeatedly without my knowledge and against 
my wishes”.124 in short, De la Court claimed that he was not to blame for 
the public outcry in the wake of 1662.
The treatise was eventually issued in the spring of 1669 with the Leiden 
editor Hackius, who had also published the first edition of the Politike 
Discoursen back in 1662.125 under the new, resounding title of Aanwysing 
der heilsame politike Gronden en Maximen van de Republike van Holland 
en West-Vriesland [“Demonstration of the Beneficial Political Foundations 
and maxims of the republic of Holland and West-Friesland”], but with 
no mention of any author, it ran to a total of 2500 copies, of which 1500 
had already been sold by the beginning of June.126 However, despite or 
maybe because of this success, the precautionary measures that De la 
Court had taken proved to be useless. immediately after the publication, 
the ecclesiastical authorities approached the States of Holland to com-
plain about its contents, arguing that De la Court’s tolerationist stance 
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127 See J.H. kernkamp, “De “aanwysing” op de lijst van verboden boeken,” Bijdragen 
voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde 7, 6 (1935), 102–110; quotes on 105–106.
128 See Wildenberg, Bibliografie, 1112. De la Court also prepared yet another edition of 
the work, rewriting the first and fifteenth chapters of the first part. The manuscript of 
these revisions, inserted within a copy of the first edition of the Aanwysing, is preserved in 
the royal Library in The Hague, ms 393 C22. Probably due to the events of 1672, this new 
edition would never be published.
129 The title page mentions no author, but the work is signed by ‘P.C.P’ (i.e. Pieter de la 
Court Pieterszoon). See Wildenberg, Bibliografie, nr. 1131.
undermined religious stability. after discussing the work, the States of 
Holland declared it to be “injurious, libellous and highly detestable”, with-
drew the granted permission for publication and prohibited its further 
sale and distribution.127 Nonetheless, this ban did not really obtain the 
intended results, for a new edition of the work was published with the 
same publisher and under the same title in 1671.128
given the events of the following year, when the regime of True Liberty 
collapsed and the Prince of Orange, William iii, was installed as 
Stadholder, De la Court was ultimately forced to desist from publishing 
further. Only years later, towards the end of his life, did he decide to 
entrust his views to paper again. His opinions had remained the same, yet 
the form in which he now couched them was new: the emblematic fable. 
This popular literary subgenre, consisting of a small image and corre-
sponding allegorical story, followed by an explanation of its meaning, 
offered De la Court the appropriate means to expose his opinions one 
more time under a thin, almost transparent veil of metaphors and para-
bles. in hundred different emblematic fables, explicitly employed for 
their rhetorical value in combining word and image, he enunciated once 
more his views on the human condition and the ideal organization of 
society. De la Court died at the end of april 1685, and shortly after, the 
Sinryke Fabulen, verklaart en toegepast tot alderley zeede-lessen, dienstig 
om waargenoomen te werden in het menschelijke en burgerlijke leeven 
[“Significant Fables, Explained and applied to all Sorts of moral Lessons, 
useful to be Observed in Human and Civil Life”] was published by the 
amsterdam printer Hieronymus Sweerts. it is likely that the work was 
deliberately kept unpublished during its author’s life since the concealed 
references to the Stadholder’s regime were much too blatant and, need-
less to say, unlikely to please the existing powers.129 Even from the grave, 
De la Court continued to intervene in the political debate.
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130 Aanwysing i.ii., p. 16: “… Rempublicam Platonis, Aristotelis; Eutopiam Mori, in de lugt 
eene Philosophise republijk.”
131 Ibidem, 17–18: “… dat men in de Politie nooit vermag, gelijk wel somtijds in het kolf-
spel, den bal schoon naar wensch te setten, maar dat men die altijds soo als hy legd moet 
slaan.”
132 Politike Weeg-schaal iii.i.6, p. 561.
133 Niccolò machiavelli, Il Principe, ed. giorgio inglese (Turin: Einaudi, 1995) XV, 
p. 102–103; Pierre Charron, Of Wisdome (amsterdam and New York: Da Capo Press, 1971) 
i.51, p. 197.
134 Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, in The Political Works, ed. and trans. a.g. Wernham 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1958) i.1, p. 261.
 Conclusion: Politics as a Ballgame
The core of the provocative attempt of the brothers De la Court to estab-
lish a new foundation for Dutch republican politics in the wake of 1650 
was their radical departure from the ideal of the Batavian model. 
Throughout their œuvre, from the first edition of the Politike Weeg-schaal 
in 1660 to the Sinryke Fabulen in 1685, the De la Courts insisted that in 
politics, speculative conceptions of an idealistic state of affairs are utterly 
worthless. Such speculations, like “Rempublicam Platonis, Aristotelis, 
Eutopiam Mori”, are nothing more than the building of “a Philosophical 
republic in the air”.130 in contrast, what truly matters is the harsh political 
reality on the ground. Human wickedness and ignorance are unavoidable, 
no country consists of virgin soil, and “in Politics, like in a ballgame, one 
ought never to set the ball where one wishes, but one must strike it as it 
lies”.131 Wishful thinking is therefore to no avail, and all a good patriot can 
do in politics is making society a bit less imperfect by choosing the least of 
two evils.132
This pragmatic stance against utopian speculation was of course a 
commonplace argument in early-modern political thinking. in Il Principe, 
machiavelli dismissed people who imagined nonexistent republics, and 
about a century later, the French skeptic Pierre Charron disclaimed 
in particular the republics of Plato and Thomas more as “castles in the 
aire” – a verdict echoed by De la Court.133 Spinoza would continue to ridi-
cule those who “have generally written satire instead of ethics, and have 
never conceived a political system which can be applied in practice”.134 
Yet De la Court’s metaphor of politics as a ballgame clearly involves more 
than just a commonplace. its underlying message is that the body politic 
is no predictable, quantifiable mechanism that can be analyzed scientifi-
cally. rather, it is a complex set of rules that leave room for competition, 
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135 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. macPherson (London etc.: Penguin, 1968) XX, 
p. 135.
136 James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics, ed. J.g.a. 
Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1992), 147.
contingency and individual ingenuity. Thomas Hobbes insisted that the 
“skill of making and maintaining commonwealths consisteth in certain 
rules, as doth arithmetic and geometry, not (as tennis-play) on practice 
only”.135 Harrington argued that in politics it is better to play “as it were at 
billiards … unless your ribs be so strong that you think better of football”.136 
Yet whatever the game of politics is called, its ultimate result is always 
determined by fortune.
Confronted with the crises and political contingencies of the 1650s, this 
machiavellian obsession with the power of fortune made the brothers De 
la Court depart from the conventional approach to the Dutch constitu-
tional framework in the terms of the ideal Batavian model. Following a 
gradual development in the public debate that had started around 1650, 
the De la Courts moved from a theoretical discussion of provincial sover-
eignty and institutional complexities to the language of interest. For what 
do speculative arguments matter if politics is all about de facto power and 
the law of necessity? in the wake of the Orangist coup d’état and the sub-
sequent debates about the act of Exclusion, the De la Courts became con-
vinced that the only feasible argument against the Stadholder and in 
favour of True Liberty was not so much a question of sovereignty, but one 
of interest. in a realm of de facto politics, where imperious Princes sud-
denly died and secretly signed treaties had to legitimate the new order, 
the interest of the state seemed to be the only indisputable foundation 
upon which republican politics could be built. academic disputations 
and thorough scholarly treatises in Latin now had little appeal, and the De 
la Courts eagerly turned to alternative sources that taught how to cope 
with political contingency: to machiavelli and Traiano Boccalini, to 
French and Spanish theorists of reason of state, and eventually also to the 
new star on the firmament of de facto politics, Hobbes.
Nonetheless, this attempt to push the political debate into a new direc-
tion did not mean that the brothers De la Court could entirely discard the 
conventions of the Dutch discussion culture. as all pamphleteers, they 
had to maneuver carefully in the public arena to appeal to the middle 
ground. On the one hand, if they wanted their ideas to be heard then they 
had to address as large an audience as possible; on the other, if they 
wanted to become truly influential, they had to reach the higher echelons 
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137 Aanwsying iii.8, p. 522: “… naar het oordeel aller bescheiden Leeseren, ende voornee-
mentlik der Wettige Regeerderen.” Politike Weeg-schaal iii.iii.6, p. 665: “… om de speculatie 
en gedagten op te wekken, der geenen, die, in mijn vry Vaderland eenig deel aan de Regeering 
hebbende.” See also the dedication of Welvaren, p. 1–2.
138 Den klagenden veen-boer, over de faem-roovende pasquillen tegens sijn Hoogheyt den 
Heere Prince van Orangie, en de selfs loffelijcke voorvaderen (The Hague, 1662), sig. a2: “… 
ick hadde noyt gelooft dat Hollandt tot soo een absoluten vryheyt soude gheraeckt heb-
ben, dat het een yder geoorloft soude zijn, te bedisputeeren de saken van Staet, en te dif-
fameeren de namen der lofbaere doode Princen … neen Hollant uwe vryheydt bestaet niet 
in consent tot laster.”
139 ‘W.H.’, Den oprechten Stadthouder in Hollant, waer in oock aengewesen wort de ydel-
heydt van de Interest van Hollant (amsterdam, 1663), sig. a5: “… dusdanige dingen niet en 
behoorde onder al het volck ende het graeuw gemeen gemaeckt te worden.”
where political decisions were taken. This tension between two opposing 
approaches pervades the form and contents of the works of the De la 
Courts. it is a tension between a popular discourse, deliberately set down 
in the vernacular, and a more distinguished, sophisticated attitude, 
infused with Latin quotes and academic terminology that betray the 
brothers’ cultured background. Time and again, specific passages in their 
work suggest that the brothers not only attempted to call upon “the judg-
ment of all modest Readers”, the common citizenry of the Dutch urban 
centres, but particularly hoped to reach the eyes and ears of the “Lawful 
Rulers” so as to “raise the speculation and thoughts of those who have any 
share in Government in my free Fatherland”.137 in short, the De la Courts 
were trapped in between the vulgarity of the agora and the decorum of 
the academy.
Still more than its provocative contents, the form of this slippery 
attempt to please two audiences at once reveals why the works of the 
brothers De la Court met with such a fierce public outcry. Shocked by the 
impropriety of their language, the aristocratic author of one opposing 
pamphlet asserted that “i have never believed that Holland could have 
reached such an absolute freedom that everyone would be allowed to dis-
cuss matters of State and to defame the name of the laudable dead 
Princes”. “No, Holland”, he exclaimed, “your liberty does not involve con-
sent to libel”.138 another reaction to the De la Courts insisted similarly that 
“such things ought not to be made public among the people and the rab-
ble”.139 These reactions reveal that the Orangist opponents of the De la 
Courts were particularly upset by the popular language that the brothers 
used, by the openness and outspokenness of their anti-Stadholder criti-
cism. as noted above, these Orangists were no monarchists that dis-
claimed the legitimacy of the De Witt regime. instead, they argued that 
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140 [Jasper Cattenbaert], Hollands op-komst, oft bedenkingen, op de schaadelijke schrif-
ten, genaamt Graafelyke Regeeringe en Interest van Holland, uit-gegeven door V.D.H. 
(Leiden, 1662), “Voor-reeden,” p. 123–124: “Eyndelijk, ons doel-wit is niet, yets te ageeren, 
tegens de tegenwoordige regeeringe, dese behaagt ons meest: ja derven vrymoedig 
seggen, datse is de beste, en zekerste, die ooit eenige Landen oft rijken, sedert, de aanvang 
des Werelts heeft genooten: maar gaan alleen tegen, die vehemente en ongesoute propoos-
ten, welke den Schrijver voert, tegen Persoonen, ampten, Staaten, en Bedieninge, die seer 
wel, met de hedendaagsche regeeringe en ruste der Landen konnen bestaan; waar door 
de Vryheidt niet verkragt, maar in ‘er hoogste zetel gestelt werdt. Wijl sulk een Heer en 
Hooft een gans verdragelijke zake is, en seer wel met de Interest van Holland over een 
komt.”
141 See e.g. [P. de Huybert], Apologie, tegens de algemeene, en onbepaelde vryheyd, voor 
de oude Hollandsche regeeringe (middelburg, 1669); Consideratien ende redenen, daer by de 
nootsaeckelijckheyt van de Stadthouderlijcke regeringe in desen staet ende republique wordt 
aengewesen (The Hague, 1677).
142 See esp. the large treatise by Petrus Valkenier, ’t Verwerd Europa (amsterdam, 1675). 
On Valckenier, see E.O.g. Haitsma mulier, “Die politisch-historischen ideeen von Petrus 
Valkenier,” in albert de Lange and gerhard Schwinge (eds.), Pieter Valkenier und das 
Schicksal der Waldenser um 1700 (Heidelberg: regionalkultur, 2004), 109–122; and Thomas 
maissen, “Petrus Valkeniers republikanische Sendung. Die niederländische Prägung des 
the liberty and the interest of the republic were not promoted by the 
harsh, blunt political speech of the brothers De la Court. as a certain 
Jasper Cattenbaert aptly explained the position of many moderate 
Orangists in his 1662 rebuttal of De la Court’s Interest van Holland:
Our goal is not to agitate against the current government, which pleases us 
most, yes we dare to say openheartedly that it is the best and most secure 
ever enjoyed by any Country or Empire since the beginning of the World. 
We only oppose those vehement and ongesoute [‘unsalted’, i.e. plain] pro-
posals which the Writer brings up against Persons, Offices, States, and 
Positions that can very well coexist with the current government and Peace 
of the Country, whereby Liberty will not be violated, but placed in the high-
est Seat. For such a Lord or Head is fully bearable and coincides very well 
with the Interest of Holland.140
Thus, before long the principled anti-Stadholder argument of the De la 
Courts was depicted as an extremist position, and the Orangists eventu-
ally succeeded in arguing that they represented the moderate middle 
ground. in the course of the 1660s and 1670s, they continued to take the 
Batavian model of grotius as their authoritative starting point.141 While 
the brothers De la Court and their few allies rallied behind the radical 
claim that a true republic is free of any monarchical element, the Orangist 
interpretation in the end won over the middle groups in society. after 
1672, Dutch republicanism would merge this support for the House of 
Orange with the language of commercial interest that was put at centre 
stage in the work of the brothers De la Court.142 and so, their attempt to 
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neuzeitlichen schweizerischen Staatsverständnis,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte 
48 (1998), 149–176.
143 Welvaren 6, p. 15: “Jae dat meer is kan er wel ietwas meer bespottelijck, en bequamer, 
om alle menschelijke wijsheid uijtteblusschen, bedaght werden, als de Philosophie, soo 
als sij door geheel Europa onderwesen is geweest, ende op veel akademiën als nogh 
onderweesen werd.” Ibidem 9, p. 21: “De roomsche reghtsgeleerdheid is maer een his-
torische kennis.”
reach two audiences failed: the establishment turned its back to the 
brothers’ fanaticism, while their appeal to the middle ground was never 
truly committed, as is revealed by the disdainful references in their work 
to the ‘ignorant rabble’. The brothers De la Court played the game of 
politics – and in due course, they lost.
all in all, the common œuvre of Johan and Pieter de la Court came about 
in the twilight zone between the autumn of late humanist culture and the 
gradual dawn of a new age. During their early years at Latin School and 
Leiden university, the brothers enjoyed a standard humanist education 
that schooled them thoroughly in the study of the classics, of history, phi-
losophy, and academic politics. meanwhile, their grand Tour revealed to 
them an exotic world outside Leiden’s walls, the international commu-
nity of famous scholars like Comenius and amyraut, the political intrica-
cies of pre-Civil War England, and all the diverse aspects of religious 
pluralism in France and geneva. The De la Courts were trained to become 
cosmopolitan humanists, and they would never renounce this back-
ground entirely.
Yet in the course of their lives, some of these earlier feathers were 
shaken off. in Het welvaren van Leiden, the critical eulogy for their home-
town, the brothers regretted the days that they had spent in the class-
room. “Can one think of anything more ridiculous and more capable to 
extinguish all human wisdom than Philosophy, as it has been taught all 
over Europe and is still taught at many academia?”, they asked. academic 
philosophy is only good for armchair pedantry, and the same goes for 
another prime element of late humanist university education, the study 
of roman law – which offers “mere historical knowledge” but is utterly 
useless for a modern public life.143 indeed, De la Court emphatically ridi-
culed all academic treatises of Latin politica that could not cope with the 
practical realities of seventeenth-century politics. instead of these ele-
ments of a humanist training, something different was required to deal 
with the challenges of an era when constant political change undermined 
past certainties. Swept away in the broad public debate that character-
ized Dutch urban culture, the brothers De la Court realized that humanist 
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values had begun to loose their utility and persuasiveness. The eventual 
result was their common œuvre, which, written in the vernacular, stands 
out for its attempt to break new ground in Dutch republican politics. it 
involves a clear departure from the pillars of late humanism, but its foun-
dation was built on exactly those pillars. The brothers De la Court tried to 
reform humanism with humanist means.
1 See Kevin Sharpe, Reading Revolutions. The Politics of Reading in Early Modern England 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 27–34.
2 For two useful introductions to humanist rhetoric, see Brian Vickers, “Rhetoric and 
Poetics,” in Charles B. Schmitt et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 715–745, and Quentin Skinner, Reason 
and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
Needless to say, the humanist reception of Classical rhetorical theory was much more 
complex and much less uncritical than my short remarks might suggest. See e.g. for 
CHaPteR two
tHe RHetoRiC oF tHe maRKet
the crucial criterion for successful participation in the seventeenth- 
century Dutch public debate was the establishment of authority. Con-
front ed with the limits imposed by convention and censorship, authors 
had to search for powerful patronage to support their publications and 
overcome potential opposition. the history behind the œuvre of the 
brothers De la Court reveals that this was no easy task: though he was 
initially backed by De witt and the political establishment, De la Court 
quickly lost this support after the publication of the Interest van Holland, 
he was scorned by the public and his works were banned by the church. 
Yet apart from official patronage, there was also a second, more powerful 
way to establish one’s authority and thereby undermine the authority of 
others: the power of language.1 with their humanist education, the broth-
ers De la Court, like all seventeenth-century authors, knew how to apply 
that power most effectively thanks to the study of rhetoric.
Since antiquity, the teaching and practice of rhetoric had played a cen-
tral role in public life, offering the foremost comprehensive system for the 
creation and evaluation of speech – and thus, for society’s most important 
feature: human communication. Famous Roman orators and theorists 
such as Cicero and Quintilian, who elaborated on a rich Greek rhetorical 
legacy, left hugely influential treatises that would dominate discussions 
on the subject for centuries. with the advent of humanism, this rhetorical 
tradition received new attention and emphasis. in line with the teachings 
of the classics, rhetoric came to be seen as an essential element of the 
ideal of a vir bonus dicendi peritus, the virtuous citizen who engages 
actively in the public life of the polity by eloquently advising his sovereign 
and instructing his fellow citizens to pursue truth and reason.2
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Ramus’s dialectic defiance of the Classical tradition: Kees meerhoff, “Ramus en tijdgen-
oten: de humanistische receptie van de retorica,” Lampas. Tijdschrift voor Nederlandse 
classici 34 (2001), 351–372. For other important theorists such as trebizond, agricola and 
erasmus see also thomas m. Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition (Chicago and 
London: the University of Chicago Press, 1990), esp. 111–133.
3 Hugo Grotius et al., Dissertationes de studiis instituendis (amsterdam, 1645). this col-
lection includes treatises by humanists like erasmus and Leonardo Bruni and more recent 
authors such as tomasso Campanella, Gabriel Naudé, arnold Clapmarius, and the Dutch 
scholar Caspar Barlaeus. the library of Pieter de la Court van der Voort owned a copy of 
this collection: Library, fol. 33. See also anthony Grafton, “the New Science and the 
traditions of Humanism,” in idem, Bring Out Your Dead, 97–117. on the social and cultural 
importance of rhetoric in the Dutch Golden age, see Jeroen Jansen, “Het geslaagde 
spreken: welsprekendheid als beroepsbekwaamheid in de zeventiende eeuw,” De zeven-
tiende eeuw 18 (2002): 31–42; and thijs weststeijn, The Visible World. Samuel van 
Hoogstraten’s Art Theory and the Legitimation of Painting in the Dutch Golden Age 
(amsterdam: amsterdam University Press, 2008), esp. 65–78.
4 See Chris L. Heesakkers, “an Lipsio licuit et Cunaeo quod mihi non licet? Petrus 
Francius and oratorical Delivery in the amsterdam athenaeum illustre,” in Gilbert 
tournoy and Dirk Sacré (eds.), Ut granum sinapis. Essays on Neo-Latin Literature in Honour 
of Jozef IJsewijn (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997), 324–349. there is no general study 
of rhetorical education in the Dutch Republic, but see for some introductory remarks a. 
Frank-Van westrienen, Het schoolschrift van Pieter Teding van Berkhout: vergezicht op het 
gymnasiaal onderwijs in de zeventiende-eeuwse Nederlanden (Hilversum: Verloren, 2007); 
and cf. for the english case Peter mack, Elizabethan Rhetoric. Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
5 See the extensive biography by C.S.m. Rademaker, Life and Work of Gerardus Joannes 
Vossius (1577–1649) (assen: Van Gorcum, 1981), esp. 177–181, 193–196.
this humanist project continued to dominate the teaching of rhetoric 
in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic. a popular collection of dif-
ferent treatises on the elements of a good education, introduced by 
Grotius and published in 1645 by elzevier in amsterdam, repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of rhetoric for a successful life both in public 
and in private.3 Rhetoric was also a central element of the academic teach-
ing at Leiden University, in particular of the introductory curriculum of 
the faculty of arts. During the 1640s, these classes in rhetoric were taught 
by Heereboord and, especially, Boxhorn, who as professor in eloquence 
organized public practical exercises in oratorical delivery for his stu-
dents.4 the texts that Heereboord and Boxhorn used in their courses 
included the treatises on rhetoric by the prolific Dutch scholar Gerard 
Vossius, whose textbooks were a standard source for the teaching of rhet-
oric at all Dutch schools and universities from 1625 onwards.5 Hence, we 
must turn to Vossius to analyze the kind of rhetorical education that 
taught students like the brothers De la Court how to participate in the 
public debate.
Starting from a detailed analysis of the work of Vossius, this chapter 
aims to show how the rhetoric of the brothers De la Court was formed by 
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6 this work is analysed in more detail by Jeroen Jansen, “De Institutiones oratoriae van 
G.J. Vossius (1577–1649),” Lampas. Tijdschrift voor Nederlandse classici 34 (2001), 373–390.
7 See for a short synopsis wilfried Barner, Barockrhetorik. Untersuchungen zu ihren 
geschichtlichen Grundlagen (tübingen: max Niemeyer Verlag, 1970), 265–274. For some 
general remarks on the nature of such rhetoric textbooks, see Brian Vickers, “Some 
Reflections on the Rhetoric textbook,” in Peter mack (ed.), Renaissance Rhetoric (New 
York: St. martin’s Press, 1994), 81–102.
  8 Vossius, Elementa rhetorica, oratoriis ejusdem partitionibus accomodata, inque usum 
scholarum Hollandiae et West-Frisiae edita (Leiden, 1626); idem, Elementa rhetorica, Dat is 
be-ghinselen der redden-riik-konst (amsterdam, 1648).
their education and their gradual involvement in the Dutch debate. i will 
argue that the role of the passions in persuasion, emphasized by Vossius, 
is an essential element of the way in which the De la Courts thought about 
the dangers and possibilities of human speech. through a careful exami-
nation of the various rhetorical devices with which they approached their 
audience, from the establishment of authorial ‘ethos’ to the use of fables, 
the chapter clarifies the form of rhetoric the brothers employed. thereby 
it reveals the form of rhetoric that the De la Courts postulated as the best 
way to speak in public: a ‘mercantile’ rhetoric, characterized by outspo-
kenness and rejection of dissimulation, which engendered a deliberate 
departure from humanist rhetorical conventions.
 Persuading the Passions
The Aristotelian Rhetoric of Vossius
at the start of the seventeenth century, Gerard Vossius was one of the 
most important protagonists in the humanist rhetorical tradition. in 1606, 
whilst employed as the rector of the Latin School in the Dutch town of 
Dordrecht, Vossius published his Institutiones oratoriae, a substantial eru-
dite encyclopaedia of rhetorical theory.6 with the subsequent advances in 
his career – he was appointed professor in rhetoric and history at Leiden 
University 1622, and in 1632 he became the first professor of the newly 
opened ‘athenaeum illustre’ in amsterdam – Vossius’s work on rhetoric 
was republished in numerous revised editions and enjoyed growing inter-
national influence. in 1621 a compendium version of the earlier work was 
published under the title Rhetorices contractae sive partitionum oratori-
arum libri V, which soon became the standard textbook for the teaching 
of rhetoric in the province of Holland.7 a far more concise edition, 
the Elementa rhetorica, also translated into Dutch, summarized the main 
topics in a few pages.8 Both works spread through the Dutch Republic and 
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  9 Jansen, ‘Institutiones oratoriae’, 388–389; Conley, Rhetoric, 160. i have used the oxford 
1651 edition.
10 See Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 276–286; 
and Conley, Rhetoric, 151–162.
11 Quoted in Conley, Rhetoric, 158.
12 “Les passions sont les seuls orateurs qui persuadent toujours”, quoted in Gisèle 
mathieu-Castellani, La rhétorique des passions (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
2000), 29.
13 See Lawrence D. Green, “aristotle’s Rhetoric and Renaissance Views of the emotions,” 
in mack (ed.), Renaissance Rhetoric, 1–26.
14 Quoted in Jansen, “Institutiones oratoriae,” 374.
abroad, and they were to dominate the study of rhetoric throughout 
the  following decades. By the end of the seventeenth century, the 
Rhetorices contractae had run to 33 editions, of which 14 German and 
7 from oxford.9
the work of Vossius stood firmly in the tradition of humanist rhetoric 
that paid increasing attention to the orator’s capacity to arouse the vari-
ous passions of the audience, the various movements in the soul which 
make us perceive some things as good and others as evil. in the later 
Renaissance, theorists increasingly emphasized this element of affectus, 
or passion, in the art of persuasion, and the various devices with which an 
orator could play upon the passions of his auditors in order to mobilize 
their wills. in the seventeenth century, the era of Baroque, this develop-
ment resulted in an ever more systematic treatment of the role of affectiv-
ity in rhetorical theory.10 For the German humanist Bartholomeus 
Keckermann, the primary function of rhetoric was motum cordis, “the 
moving of the heart”.11 as the French moralist La Rochefoucauld claimed, 
the passions were “the only orators who always persuade”.12
the principal authority to which Vossius turned for his analysis of rhet-
oric and affectus was aristotle. in the course of the sixteenth century, 
aristotle had emerged from the large shadow of his Roman followers 
Cicero and Quintilian and was reappraised on the basis of the elaborate 
discussion of the passions in his Rhetoric.13 Vossius followed this trend. His 
first work, the Institutiones oratoriae, aimed to give a comprehensive 
introduction to aristotle with the commentary of later theorists, and as 
such it was welcomed by other scholars. Daniel Heinsius, the father of 
De  la Court’s school friend and travelling companion Nicolaas, wrote 
to  Vossius that the work was not hampered by aristotle’s own “obscu-
rity”  and “pernicious conciseness”, and therefore it would reveal “the 
important secrets of aristotle”.14 the paramount presence of aristotle was 
toned down somewhat in the Rhetorices contractae, but the work has 
 the rhetoric of the market 73
15 Conley, Rhetoric, 160.
16 Vossius, Rhetorices contractae, sive partitionum oratoriarum libri V (oxford, 1651) i.i.3, 
p. 3: “Definitur Rhetorice ab aristotele, facultas utendi in unaquaque re, quod in ea est ad 
persuadendum idoneum.” Cf. aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric, trans. John Henry Freese 
(Cambridge, mass.: Harvard University Press, 1926) i.ii.1, p. 14.
17 Vossius, Rhetorices contractae i.ii.5, p. 18: “Loci Rhetorum proprii sunt triplices, alii 
argumentorum docentium, alii conciliantium, alii permoventium. Graeci ea vocant, λόγοs, 
ήθη, και πάθη (rationes, mores, & affectus).” Cf. aristotle, Rhetoric i.ii.4, p. 16.
18 Ibidem i.ii.1, p. 15: “inventio est excogitatio argumentorum, quae ad persuadendum 
idonea sunt.”
nonetheless been characterized as “the most ‘aristotelian’ of any treatise 
on rhetoric of the time”.15
this aristotelian influence is indeed dominant from the outset of the 
Rhetorices contractae. it starts with Vossius’s definition of rhetoric as a 
“faculty of finding in each thing that which is appropriate to persuade”, 
directly taken from aristotle.16 with this emphasis on the nature of rheto-
ric as a mere faculty and not as an art or science, Vossius clearly distin-
guished himself from the Ramist tradition, which subordinated rhetoric 
to dialectic in a comprehensive system of imparting knowledge. For 
Vossius, the goal was not the instruction of knowledge, but persuasion, 
the stimulation to action. accordingly, Vossius stated that the threefold 
nature of rhetoric is “that which the Greeks call logos, ethos, and pathos”: 
the correspondence between the argumentation of the orator, his per-
sonal ethos and the emotions that he might arise in the audience.17 this 
aristotelian inspired interaction between logos, ethos, and pathos forms 
the core principle underlying Vossius’s treatment of the faculty of persua-
sion, and hence the core principle of rhetorical education in the seven-
teenth-century Dutch Republic. How are these three elements of rhetoric 
connected? in order to answer this question, i will turn to the outline and 
contents of Vossius’s textbook Rhetorices contractae work in some detail.
after his introduction of the goal and nature of rhetoric, Vossius dis-
cusses the orator’s first and foremost task, inventio. He defines this central 
activity in basic terms as “the devising of arguments that are appropriate 
to persuade”.18 in other words, inventio entails the skill of finding the vari-
ous ‘commonplaces’, the loci communes, which offer the arguments that 
are most likely to convince and stimulate the audience. it depends on the 
sort of oration which arguments are appropriate for such persuasion. 
again in line with the Classical tradition, Vossius heads all possible ora-
tions under three different genera or sorts, with each genus correspond-
ing to a set of characteristic passions: first, the genus demonstrativum, 
which comprises epideictic orations of praise and blame to be attained by 
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19 Ibidem i.V.2–3, p. 49–50: “materia in hoc genere sunt res contingentes … Speciatim 
autim, si causa sit publica, quinque sunt, de quibus, juxta aristotelem, suleat institui delib-
eratio: vectigalia, bellum & pax, custodia regionum, ea quae importantur & exportantur, 
& ratio ferendarum legum.” Cf. aristotle, Rhetoric i.iV.7, p. 40.
20 Ibidem ii.i, p. 117: “atqui Deus animis nostris insevit adfectus, ut stimuli sint ad 
actiones honestas.” For the use of a ‘pathetic style’, cf. aristotle, Rhetoric iii.Vii.3, p. 378.
21 Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, trans. J.e. King (Cambridge, mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1927) iii.Xi.24–25, p. 254.
22 Vossius, Rhetorices contractae ii.i, p. 119, and cf. aristotle, Rhetoric, ii.i.8–9, p. 172. on 
the difference between the Stoic and the aristotelian conceptions of the passions, see 
Susan James, “Reason, the Passions, and the Good Life,” in Gaber and ayers (eds.), The 
Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, vol. ii: 1358–1396, esp. 1374–1376.
23 Vossius, Rhetorices contractae ii.ii–iV, p. 120–134, and cf. the extensive analysis 
of these passions in aristotle, Rhetoric ii.V–Vi, p. 200–220. For a lucid overview of 
delighting the audience; secondly, the genus deliberativum, the utterances 
with which the orator persuades or dissuades the audience from doing 
something by arousing either hope or fear; and third, the genus juridiciale, 
entailing the pleas of accusation and defence in the courtroom, to be 
achieved by playing upon the audience’s compassion or rage. of these 
three genera, the deliberative one is of most relevance for it concerns the 
“contingent issues” that are central to public life and politics, such as (and 
here Vossius follows again aristotle) “taxes, war and peace, the custody of 
countries, importations and exportations, and the making of laws”.19
in the second book of his treatise, Vossius discusses in detail the 
various ways in which an orator can arouse the appropriate passions in 
order to achieve total persuasion on these deliberative issues. in this way, 
he shows how the logos, the orator’s argumentation, is intrinsically con-
nected to the pathos of the audience, the passions that “God has implanted 
within our souls so that they are stimuli to honest deeds”.20 Vossius 
invokes the Stoics, in particular Cicero, for the claim that human nature is 
dominated by four basic passions – pleasure, hope, distress, and fear.21 Yet 
in contrast to the Stoics, he continues to stress the aristotelian idea that 
the passions should not be extirpated, but rather channelled towards a 
useful purpose. accordingly, Vossius also adopts the larger list of pas-
sions from aristotle’s Rhetoric, insisting on their use for rhetorical persua-
sion.22 explicitly following aristotle’s example, Vossius shows that every 
genus within the faculty of rhetoric corresponds to a number of pairs of 
contrary passions. in deliberative oratory, there are two sets of opposite 
passions which the orator should try to provoke: either fear for a future 
evil, or confidence in a positive outcome, and either shame, a “distur-
bance of the soul” because of an offensive judgment, or impudence, 
the  disregard of possible ignominy.23 when talking about politics, an 
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seventeenth-century classifications of and theorizing about the passions and their place in 
the explanation of action, see Susan James, “the Passions in metaphysics and the theory 
of action,” in Gaber and ayers (eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century 
Philosophy, vol. i: 913–949, and, more extensively, idem, Passion and Action. The Emotions 
in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
24 Vossius, Rhetorices contractae ii.XXi–XXii, p. 227–239.
25 Ibidem ii.XV.2, p. 168–169: “Quo morata sit oratio, ante omnia id agendum est oratori, 
ut in oratione ejus reluceant prudentia, probitas, benevolentia.”
orator should, dependent on his subject matter and intentions, try to 
mobilize the audience to action by evoking fear, confidence, shame or 
impudence.
Vossius emphasizes the various ways in which these four passions can 
be aroused. to provoke fear, an orator should use imaginative language 
that makes the coming evil look imminent. He should thus ‘put the case 
before the eyes’ of the audience, especially by referring to examples of 
situations where the evil in question has already been established. in con-
trast, he can create confidence by stressing that the danger can be easily 
avoided, for example by claiming divine favour. Shame is obviously pro-
voked by highlighting scandalous behaviour or facts, a strategy that is par-
ticularly employed in satire, while impudence is gained through the 
contempt of such scandal. Finally, Vossius provides an extensive discus-
sion of a range of specific speeches in which these considerations can 
prove their practical value. the speeches of deliberative rhetoric are sub-
divided into four parts, again based on different sets of passions. Vossius 
stresses in particular the establishment of love or hate through speeches 
of commendation, monition and conciliation.24 through numerous exam-
ples of such speeches from Classical literature, Vossius gives his student 
readers a practical overview of how to arouse the passions when speaking 
on public occasions.
Having thus established the interaction between logos and pathos, 
Vossius continues with the third element of the faculty of persuasion: 
ethos. this element concerns the morality of the oration, the impression 
that the orator leaves on the audience. “For an oration to be moral”, 
Vossius states, “an orator should above all perform in such a way that pru-
dence, probity and benevolence glitter within it.”25 a prudent speech will 
be the most comprehensible and therefore easily trusted, its probity will 
make it not seem too studious or suspect, while its benevolence will sim-
ply achieve that the orator is embraced by his audience. as Vossius says: 
“if the orator is loved, he has at his disposal a kind of helepolis [‘destroyer 
of cities’, a fortified wheeled tower in ancient Greece] with which he, 
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26 Ibidem ii.XV.3–5, p. 169: “… si ametur orator, habet quasi helepolin quandam, qua, 
absque violentia, animos auditorum invadat.”
27 Ibidem iii.ii.7, p. 283: “alterum exordii munus erat, ut auditoris animus, velut medica-
mentis quibusdam, ad benevolentia & attentionem, praeparetur.”
28 Ibidem iii.iii.4–5, p. 293; iii.iV.4–9, p. 311–312.
without any violence, can invade the souls of the auditors.”26 Yet ethos 
entails more than this combative morality of the orator himself: a good 
speech should also reckon with the mores of the audience and change its 
form accordingly. in a monarchy, a different approach is needed than in 
an aristocracy or in a democracy, and whatever the kind of government, 
people will always differ in passions, habits, age and fortunes. the skilful 
orator should know how to deal with this diversity. in short, a successful 
establishment of ethos is of paramount importance for winning the sup-
port of the audience.
according to the Classical rhetorical tradition, the second part of the 
orator’s task, after inventio, is the structuring of the speech, the dispositio. 
Vossius deals with this aspect in the third book of the Rhetorices contrac-
tae. He begins this discussion with a lengthy treatment of the exordium, 
the introduction to a speech, which is together with the conclusion the 
most appropriate part for arousing the emotions of the audience. while 
the exordium should indicate the scope of the oration and prepare the 
audience for its contents, it should above all try to achieve that “the soul 
of the auditor is made ready, just as by some kind of drugs, for benevo-
lence and attention”.27 For this purpose, it might be appropriate to start 
with an historical example, a fable or a metaphorical story, and it is also 
useful to address the audience directly, Vossius states. adversaries are to 
be refuted from the beginning, and they should not get any opportunity to 
turn that which is said to their advantage. therefore, the exordium ought 
not to be commutabile, liable to opposite reasoning, and it should main-
tain a certain degree of surprise and distinctiveness. However, it should 
not turn out to be swollen or arrogant, since this will be fatal for the ora-
tor’s ethos and will eventually make the audience far from benevolent 
towards him.28
the exordium of a speech is followed by the narratio, the part that 
entails the unfolding of the facts to be dealt with, and then the perspicu-
ous and brief proposition of the case followed by the contentio, the juxta-
position of the opposing arguments of the orator and his adversaries. 
according to Vossius, such contentio should be performed by first arguing 
one’s own case via syllogism or its more rhetorical form enthymeme, the 
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29 Ibidem iii.Vii.1–10, p. 327–334. Cf. aristotle, Rhetoric i.ii.8, p. 18–20, and see Skinner, 
Reason and Rhetoric, 36.
30 Ibidem iii.iX.5–10, p. 345–346: “in enumeratione … observare oportet … ut ea tantum 
repetamus, in quibus causae potissimum consistit, quaeque propterea maxime velimus 
auditorum animis inhaerere. … Hac in parte orator imprimis aperire debet fontes elo-
quentiae: sic ut non solum incendere judicem, sed ardere ipse videatur.”
31 Ibidem iV.iii.1, p. 387: “… undique ornata sit oratio, tum ea eligi debent, quae pictur-
arum instar per se habent ornatum; ut sunt verborum sententiarumque lumina, de quibus 
tractat Dignitas.” For the metaphorical sense of ornatus as offering the orator the weapons 
in a war of words, see Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 48–51.
32 Ibidem iV.Xi.1, p. 427: “altera Dignitatis pars in schematibus, sive figuris versatur. est 
vero schema, forma orationis, quae haec alio quopiam modo, quam inversione significa-
tionis, a vulgari consuetudine immutatur in meliorem.”
aristotelian device for arousing passions by letting premises speak for 
themselves;29 and then refuting the case of one’s opponent. For this pur-
pose, an argument can be either negated or twisted back to the adversary, 
while subsequent interrogation and indignant reproach then may serve 
to achieve total confutation. the speech finally ends with the peroratio or 
conclusion. together with the exordium, this is the most important part 
since it recapitulates all the strongest arguments which will thus “cleave 
to the auditors’ souls”. moreover, the conclusion is very well suited for 
pathopeia, the excitement of the passions: the last words are those in 
which “the orator must especially open up the sources of eloquence, so 
that the judge [i.e. the audience] seems not only to kindle, but even to 
burn”.30
in the fourth book of the Rhetorices contractae, Vossius gives an ample 
overview of all these different sources of eloquence that can ignite the 
passions of the audience under the general banner of elocutio, the style of 
the speech. Following the Classical definition, Vossius states that the elo-
cutio should be elegant by using pure and appropriate language, and plain 
and lucid by avoiding ambiguity and long-windedness. above all, good 
elocutio consists of dignitas: the quality that provides the oration with 
“pictures” and “lights”, also called the ornatus, the fully equipped, 
armoured language with which the orator can mobilize the inherent per-
suasive qualities of speech in order to triumph on the rhetorical battle-
field.31 Such ornatus is divided into two different parts: first, the various 
tropes, which alter the proper signification of a word to a different one, 
and secondly the figures of speech, by which a part of speech “is changed 
from its ordinary usage to a better one”.32 it would go far beyond the pur-
pose of this study to fully analyze Vossius’s extensive and elaborate dis-
cussion of all these tropes and figures, which range from various forms 
of  metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche to figures such as transitio, 
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33 Cf. James, Passion and Action, 218.
34 Vossius, Rhetorices contractae iV.Vii.1–3, p. 409–411: “ironia est tropus, quo intelligi-
tur contrarium ejus, quod dicitur. ironiae … cum acrius mordere volumus, usus est maxi-
mus. atque interdum in exordio etiam aedhibetur, quod securitatem causae ostendit.” For 
various notions, definitions and discussions of irony in medieval and Renaissance rhetori-
cal theory, including the one of Vossius, see Dilwyn Knox, Ironia. Medieval and Renaissance 
Ideas on Irony (Leiden etc.: Brill, 1989).
35 Ibidem iV.X.1–7, p. 423–425: “Sarcasmus est hostilis irrisio super jam mortuo, aut 
certo morituro … acteismus est jocus urbanus.”
36 Ibidem iV.Xi.7–11, p. 429–430: “asyndeton autem valet ad celeritatem, atque animi 
impetum significandum … Polysyndeton facit, ut res ipsa, de qua agitur, videatur major.”
rejectio, and revocatio, in total running to almost a third part of his trea-
tise. Yet a sample of some tropes and figures with special importance may 
suffice to show how Vossius deals with ornatus within the faculty of 
persuasion.
these tropes and figures of speech are particularly important because 
they present the ideas of the orator in adorned, sensible, and imaginative 
language and thereby play upon the imagination and the passions of the 
audience.33 one such trope that entices the imagination is irony, which 
Vossius defines as a device “by which is understood the contrary of what 
is said”. the proper signification of a word is thus altered for the sake of 
wit, and Vossius states that “when we want it to bite as sharply as possible, 
its use is highest”.34 other useful tropes are litotes (when, deliberately, less 
is said than actually understood) and hyperbole to give emphasis to a 
phrase. Ridicule is also discussed by Vossius in the part on tropes, though 
he adds that it should actually be seen as a distinctive form of speech. in 
his analysis, there are six different sorts of ridicule, from sarcasm (“a hos-
tile mockery of someone already dead, or certain to die soon”) to the more 
subtle asteismus, “an urbane joke”.35 Clearly, these six forms of ridicule 
can be used for provoking various passions, making the audience laugh 
and therefore love the orator and detest the object of laughter.
the second part of ornatus consists of the figures of speech, each of 
which can be employed for provoking the passions of the audience. For 
example, asyndeton gives an oration pace and impulse, while its opposite 
polysyndeton “makes that the case itself which is at stake, is perceived to 
a higher degree”.36 the use of synonyms brings about weight (gravitas) 
and sharpness (acrimonia), and a device such as anaphora (the repetition 
of a word at the start of successive sentences) adds force to the oration. 
Vossius further mentions a number of important figures of speech that 
enhance the orator’s argumentation, such as prolepsis and hypobole, by 
which the possible objections of the adversary are anticipated and 
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37 Ibidem iV.XiV.6–21, p. 450–457.
38 Ibidem iV.XViii.2–4, p. 472: “Пαραδιαστολή est, cum eorum, qua vulgo ob vicinitatem 
confundi solent, remoto uno, alterum ponitur … Convenit haec figura refellenti, & repre-
hendenti.” For the importance of this kind of rhetorical redescription, see the analysis in 
Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 142–153.
39 Ibidem iV.XX.7–9, iV.XXi.4–5, p. 481–485: “Έκφώνησις sive exclamatio sit, quando 
oratio interjectionem habens epressam, aut intellectam, animi affectum, ac rei magni-
tudinem significat.”
40 Ibidem iV.XXi.6–7, 24–25, p. 485–496.
answered, or the range of anacoinosis, paramologia, and epitrope, which 
entail consultation with or concessions to the opponent to move the 
auditor’s souls and gain their confidence. when this is done in an ironical 
way, Vossius adds, the adversary will become truly disliked.37
a different species of figure are those used for explanation, such as sen-
tentiae, general proverbs that instruct and delight, especially when 
applied to a specific person, exempla (either true or invented), and para-
bles such as fables to illustrate the speech. the device of paradiastole, the 
redescribing of certain actions by altering their conventional moral con-
notations, enjoys a particular rhetorical force. this technique is especially 
useful for refutation and reprehension.38 the same is true for paralepsis, 
when the orator states that he will not deal with a certain issue which is 
then nevertheless mentioned in passing. Ekphonesis, a forceful exclama-
tion which reveals “the passion of the soul and the magnitude of the case”, 
is said to be especially appropriate at the end of the oration.39 Finally, 
when the orator wants to catch the audience’s full attention, he should 
use a device such as aporia, stating he does not know what to do or how 
to continue, or interrogatio, posing a question directly to the audience or 
the adversary.40 Vossius’s Rhetorices contractae makes clear that once able 
to deploy all these rhetorical devices, the orator owns a powerful linguis-
tic arsenal to entice the imagination, arouse all sorts of passions, and thus 
win over and mobilize the audience.
taken as a whole, then, these are the various features of rhetorical 
instruction that students like the brothers De la Court practiced and 
learnt by heart at Latin School and university, with the emphasis on the 
correspondence between argumentation, ethos and the passions. Far 
from offering a range of dry devices to bring about exaggerated artificial 
reasoning, as modern disgust of stylistic rhetoric might suggest, these fea-
tures entailed a dynamic conception of how language reveals the inner 
human condition, of how rhetorical figures reflect, and can thus manipu-
late, human psychology and actual linguistic behaviour. the classification 
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41 a point stressed repeatedly by Vickers, In Defence, esp. 294–334.
42 See in particular James, Passion and Action. For positive assessments of the passions 
see Richard Strier, “against the Role of Reason: Praise of Passion from Petrarch to Luther 
to Shakespeare to Herbert,” in Gail Kern Paster et al. (eds.), Reading the Early Modern 
Passions. Essays in the Cultural History of Emotions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl-
vania Press, 2004), 23–42. the opposite attitude is often identified with the Neostoicism of 
Justus Lipsius, particularly his famous De Constantia (1584). For Lipsius’s influence, see 
Gerhard oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), and cf. the critique by martin van Gelderen, “Holland und das 
Preußentum: Justus Lipsius zwischen niederländischem aufstand und brandenburg-
preußischem absolutismus,” Zeitschrift für historische Forschung 23 (1996), 29–56. See also 
tuck, Philosophy and Government, 45–119.
43 ‘V.D.H.’, Naeuwkeurige consideratie van staet, wegens de heerschappye van een vrye en 
geheymen staets-regering over de gantsche aertbodem (amsterdam, 1662), esp. 103–112.
of all these figures was meant as a codification of real life, of all feelings as 
expressed in language.41 its teaching and performance were essential to 
late humanist culture, and therefore the analysis of rhetoric is crucial to 
every study that deals with the written word within that culture.
Cartesian Passions? Human Nature and the Ambivalence of Speech
Vossius’s rhetorical account of the passions was not particularly excep-
tional in the seventeenth century. the passions were a standard element 
of many treatises in moral and political philosophy, and an ongoing 
debate on the usefulness and dangers of the passionate human condition 
dominated european Baroque culture. in this debate, the view that the 
passions have a positive function because they can be mobilized as incen-
tives to honest deeds, was often countered with a description of the pas-
sions as unruly and treacherous elements, to be curtailed as much as 
possible. around the middle of the century, these conflicting theories 
continued to dictate the ‘new philosophy’ of the age, from Descartes to 
Hobbes.42 in the Dutch Republic, the Utrecht jurist Gerard van wassenaer 
discussed in intricate detail the arousal of all human passions in his 1657 
treatise which was later republished under De la Court’s pseudonym.43 
more famously, Spinoza put the passions at the centre of his philosophy, 
not only in part iii of the Ethics, but also in his political works. indeed, 
Spinoza’s intervention in the Dutch political debate can be characterized 
as a rhetorical attempt to play upon the imagination of his audience in an 
ethical way by the proper motivation of key passions such as ambition, 
fear and hope. as Spinoza made clear in the opening chapter of his 
Tractatus Politicus, the recognition of the passions as essential properties 
of human nature is a necessary condition for making sense of politics. 
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44 Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus i, p. 260–264. See for rhetoric in Spinoza: F. akkerman, 
“Le caractère rhétorique du Traité théologico-politique,” in idem, Met iets van eeuwigheid, 
eds. G.C. Huisman et al. (Groningen: Universiteitsbibliotheek, 1995), 67–79; Steven 
Frankel, “Politics and Rhetoric: the intended audience of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus,” The Review of Metaphysics 52 (1999), 897–924; and michael a. Rosenthal, 
“Persuasive Passions: Rhetoric and the interpretation of Spinoza’s Theological-Political 
Treatise,” Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie 85 (2003), 249–268.
45 Politike Weeg-schaal, “inleyding,” p. 1: “alzoo verwekt een scherpe waarheid, en het 
tergen, gramschap en haat.” Cf. Nauwkeurige consideratie, 159–160.
46 Aanwysing, “Voor-Reeden,” sig. *****3.
47 Politike Discoursen ii.Vi.1, p. 166–167: “De passien der menschen, diemen in ’t kort 
blydschap en droefheid soude konnen noemen, sijn soo noodsaakelik, datmen niet 
begrypen kan, hoe des weerelds ordre en loop, sonder die passien, soude konnen bestaan.”
accordingly, the successful political thinker knows how to use the pas-
sions in order to persuade the audience.44
a similar acknowledgment of the importance of language for the 
arousal of the passions pervades the thought of the brothers De la Court. 
the very first lines of their first treatise, published in 1660, state how a dif-
ferent use of speech, either tearful or cheerful, can cause different pas-
sions in the audience, from sadness and compassion to joy and laughter. 
moreover, telling “a sharp truth” might very well provoke wrath and hate, 
especially when the object of that truth is a monarch.45 From the very start 
of their œuvre, the brothers De la Court showed that they were acutely 
aware of the power of speech in the motivation of passions. as Vossius 
had taught, they realized that a rhetorician should always consider the 
mores of the audience, while successful persuasion is always dependent 
on the proper use of pathos. Affectus pro effectu, as a maxim in the intro-
duction of the Aanwysing has it, “passion goes before the effect”.46
How did the De la Courts portray the passions that define human 
nature? in general, their depiction of the passions mirrors much of the 
ambivalence in mainstream seventeenth-century conceptions of the pas-
sions as on the one hand useful, yet on the other dangerous elements of 
human conduct. First of all, the brothers fully recognized the unavoidabil-
ity of the passions: “the passions of men, which in short could be called joy 
and grief, are so necessary that one cannot understand how the world’s 
order and course could exist without these passions.”47 the De la Courts 
thus adopted the conventional idea that our passionate condition stems 
from the very moment of conception, an idea popularized for example in 
the influential treatise De la sagesse (1601) by the French ecclesiastic 
Pierre Charron. in their standard definition of the passions as urges that 
assist the soul in pursuing good or fleeing from evil, the De la Courts 
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48 Cf. e.g. Ibidem ii.Vi.13, p. 212: “… alle de passien die aan de natuur gegeeven schijnen, 
om door hare driften de ziel in het ontvlugten van ’t quaad, en ’t najagen van ’t goed, 
behulpig te zijn”; with Charron, Of Wisdome i.XViii, p. 71: “Passion is a violent motion of 
the Soule in the sensitive part thereof, which is made either to follow that which the Soule 
thinketh to be good for it, or to flie that which it takes to be evill.” on Charron, see anthony 
Levi, French Moralists. The Theory of the Passions 1585–1649 (oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1964), 95–111.
49 Politike Discoursen ii.iV.1, p. 1–2: “Sulks de passien eerst in possessie zijn, en die er op 
let, sal bevinden, dat sy ook den mensche tot het einde sijns leevens byblyven, en ooversulks 
is te gelooven, dat het oordeel, selfs der verstandigste menschen, nooit tot soo een vol-
maaktheid komt, dat het niet dikwils door de passien werde verrukt.”
50 See esp. the elaborate discussions of the passions in Ibidem i.ii.24, ii.iV.1,11, ii.
Vi.11,14,27; and in Sinryke Fabulen, 313–314, 407–408, 561–563, 568–570, 612–613. the library 
of Pieter de la Court van der Voort contained a copy of the first edition of Les passions de 
l’âme, and also a number of other works by Descartes, most notably his Opera Philosophica 
(amsterdam, 1677): Library, fols. 20, 26.
51 Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, 62–63. Cf. e.g. Haitsma mulier, 
Myth of Venice, 131; Blom, Morality and Causality, 160; malcolm, “Hobbes and Spinoza,” 43; 
Velema, “that a Republic”, 14.
equally followed Charron.48 they also shared his sceptical unease with the 
possible consequences of the passions for sound human judgment. “The 
passions are first in possession”, as their argument goes,
and who pays attention will realize that they also stick with man until the end 
of his life. therefore it is to be believed that the judgement of even the most 
prudent men will never reach such a perfection that it will not often be 
enchanted by the passions.49
the passions, in short, are necessary yet also deeply fraudulent aspects of 
human life: their positive role in helping us relate to the external world is 
counterbalanced by their ability to undermine rationality and virtue. at 
the same time, the fact that every one’s judgment is dependent on the 
passions means that the arousal of these passions can steer human judg-
ment. a rhetoric that plays upon the passions thus opens the way to suc-
cessful persuasion.
the De la Courts based this account on an extensive but also rather 
amorphous analysis of the physical causes of passionate human behav-
iour, loosely following the latest physiological insights from Descartes’s 
Les passions de l’âme, first published by elzevier in 1649.50 as Kossmann 
has shown, the De la Courts at times echoed directly the Cartesian physi-
ological vocabulary, and Kossmann’s ensuing classification of the De la 
Courts as followers of Descartes has become a commonplace characteri-
zation of the brothers’ thought.51 Recently, the De la Courts, together with 
Spinoza, have even been heralded as the leading lights of a “Cartesian 
republicanism”, of a “radical Cartesian politics” that dominated the Dutch 
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52 Van Bunge, From Stevin to Spinoza, 85–88; Harold J. Cook, “Body and Passions: 
materialism and the early modern State,” Osiris 17 (2002), 25–48, elaborated further in 
idem, Matters of Exchange. Commerce, Medicine and Science in the Dutch Golden Age (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 262–264; tammy Nyden-Bullock, “Radical Cartesian 
Politics: Velthuysen, De la Court, and Spinoza,” in wiep van Bunge (ed.), Spinoza and 
Dutch Cartesianism. Studia Spinozana 15 (1999/2006), 35–65; and idem, Spinoza’s Radical 
Cartesian Mind (London and New York: Continuum, 2007).
53 James, Passion and Action, esp. 106–107. See also Deborah J. Brown, Descartes and the 
Passionate Mind (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
54 René Descartes, Les passions de l’âme, ed. Benoît timmermans (Paris: Librairie 
Générale Française, 1990), art. 211, p. 176: “Car nous voyons qu’elles sont toutes bonnes de 
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Ibidem, art. 137, p. 127–128: “… leur usage naturel est d’inciter l’âme à consentir et con-
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plus parfait.”
55 Burgersdijk, Idea philosophiae moralis, 71–95. Cf. the analysis in Blom, Morality and 
Causality, 80–88.
intellectual scene in the second half of the seventeenth century.52 the 
basic assumption behind this interpretation is that the De la Courts’ 
attention for the passions must have been directly inspired by Cartesian 
philosophy, which made them initiate a new, radical phase in political 
theory.
Yet this alleged Cartesian influence should not be overemphasized. 
although the De la Courts adopted some of Descartes’s physiological 
explanations of passionate behaviour, their view on the passions can 
hardly be characterized as typically Cartesian. Central to Descartes’s Les 
passions de l’âme is an elaborate mechanical analysis of the soul’s passive 
perceptions of our bodily motions. this analysis departs from the tradi-
tional aristotelian and Scholastic accounts in its integrated account of the 
human mind, which unifies all different passions under the umbrella of 
the single passion of desire. However, Descartes’s rupture with tradition is 
not total. as Susan James has shown, for Descartes the passions are attrib-
utes of the soul, but dependent on the body, and therefore our passionate 
condition is both mental and physical, bridging Descartes’s own division 
between soul and body.53 in his ensuing analysis of how the passions reg-
ister and communicate the bodily interests to the soul, Descartes high-
lights the functionality of the passions, thus following directly in the 
footsteps of aristotelianism. this Cartesian view that the passions are all 
good in nature and that only their misuse and excess should be avoided, 
entails a fairly standard criticism of the position, often identified with 
neostocism, that the passions ought to be curtailed instead of motivated.54 
a comparable criticism can be found in, for example, Burgersdijk’s Idea 
philosophiae moralis, the Leiden textbook in moral philosophy,55 or in 
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56 Jean-François Senault, De l’usage des passions ([Leiden], 1643) i.i.1, p. 1–9: “apologie 
pour les Passions contre les Stoïques.” on Senault, see Levi, French Moralists, 213–224.
57 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.2, p. 19–20: “en hoewel alle passien in zig zelven goed zijn, ver-
mits zy alle kinderen en dieren drijven, om haar eigen zelven te bewaaren … hoe noodzake-
lik het is, dat deese driften des bloeds werden gematigd, en in den toom gehouden, door goede 
onderrigtinge, redenkavelinge, en ervarentheid … en bij allen triumpheerd deeze eerste 
oude mensch, Vleesch en Bloed, zoodanig oover den tweeden, Nieuwen mensch, de Geest 
en Reeden.”
58 See Descartes’s letter from 14 august 1649 in Descartes, Passions.
59 Cf. Victoria Kahn, “Happy tears. Baroque Politics in Descartes’s Passions de l’âme,” in 
Kahn et al. (eds.), Politics and the Passions, 1500–1850 (Princeton and oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 93–110.
Jean-François Senault’s influential De l’usage des passions, published by 
elzevier in Leiden in 1643. Senault’s position can be called typical for the 
age: his “apology for the passions against the Stoics” claims that the pas-
sions have both utility and merit, but at the same time it insists on the 
necessity to change the vicious passions to virtue through reason and 
grace.56 Deeply augustinian but also infused with quotes from Seneca, 
Senault’s treatise embodies the ambivalent attitude of the seventeenth 
century to the uses and dangers of the passions.
the brothers De la Court share this attitude, and their position is over-
all much closer to Senault than to Descartes. Following both, they assert 
that “all passions are good in themselves” because the passions assist us in 
searching for good and fleeing from evil and thus they further our self-
preservation. Yet it is still “necessary that these urges of the blood are mod-
erated and bridled through good education, reasoning, and experience”. in 
short, the passions are not inherently detrimental, but they should still be 
mastered and rationally channelled towards positive goals. the De la 
Courts do not only insist on the need to control the passions, but they also 
prove to be deeply pessimistic about the feasibility of such control, well 
aware that “with all triumphs this first old man, Flesh and Blood, over the 
second, New man, mind and Reason”.57 this suspicion of human weak-
ness involves an approach that is much more akin to Senault’s augustinian 
moralism than to the Cartesian naturalistic approach. Descartes insisted 
explicitly that he did not aim to analyze the passions as a rhetorician or a 
moral philosopher, but only as a natural philosopher.58 as a result, the 
public role that human passions play in the body politic is not the main 
concern of Les passions de l’âme. if anything, it can be argued that 
Descartes internalized politics within the individual body.59 For the De la 
Courts, however, as for Senault, the public role of the passions was abso-
lutely central. the failure to master the passions would imply that vice 
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61 antoine arnauld and Pierre Nicole, La logique ou l’art de penser, eds. Pierre Clair and 
François Girbal (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965) iii.30, p. 261: “Si l’on examine 
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jugemens, & qui nous y arrête de plus fortement. ”
62 Politike Discoursen ii.iV.1, p. 3: “Voorwaar nietwes, als dat sy geduurig naar schijn, en 
passien, oordeelen, soo zijn loogens, bedriegery, welspreekendheid, ende eenig teegenwoor-
dig goed ofte quaad kragtig genoeg, om by ’t meestendeel der menschen, een contrarie 
triumphs publicly over virtue. therefore, the public realm is the arena 
where passionate behaviour ought to be regulated. Pace Descartes, rheto-
ric and moral philosophy were for the De la Courts the prime objectives in 
their analysis of the passions.
instead of stressing the link with Descartes, it is therefore more useful 
to highlight the De la Courts’ connection to Senault’s augustinianism and 
to the aristotelian awareness of the rhetorical power of the passions. 
these two issues come together in the claim that human judgment is 
often frail and easily seduced into error. Senault, following augustine, 
asserted that the overarching passion that dominates all conduct is love. 
if moderated correctly, such love reveals itself in positive friendship, com-
passion, and the love of God. Yet if neglected and disordered, it turns out 
to be amour-propre, self-love, which leads our understanding astray into 
destructive irrationality.60 according to the influential Port Royal Logic 
that comes from the same augustinian background as Senault, human 
opinions are mostly not established by “the penetration of truth and the 
force of reasons; but [by] some chain of self-love, interest, or passion”.61
this anxiety with the susceptibility of human judgment to the passions 
and false appearances also dominates the thought of the brothers De la 
Court. true judgment is rare, they realized, and our passions all too often 
lure us into false beliefs. therefore, speech plays a crucial role for its 
potential corruption of human judgment by enticing the passions. in 
other words, false rhetoric, speech that tries to manipulate the opinions of 
the audience through deception, can be immensely dangerous in the pub-
lic realm. Since all humans judge according to appearances and to their 
passions,
lies, cheating, eloquence, and any present good or evil are strong enough to 
cause a contrary appearance and passions among the majority of humans, 
and to change their judgment and impulses. and hence comes the fickleness 
of the Community, being governed by appearance and passions.62
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schijn, en passien, te verwekken, en haar te doen veranderen van oordeel, en driften; en 
hier van daan komt de wispeltuurigheid der Gemeente, sig laatende bestieren van schijn, en 
passien.”
63 Ibidem i.ii.24, p. 162–163. Cf. Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus X.10, p. 436.
64 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.3, p. 22: “Het is eevenwel en blijft waaragtig dat de menschen 
haare eige liefde en passien, zouden volgen, ook tot naadeel en ondergang van anderen … 
ten ware zy door vreeze van eenig toekomend quaad, te zullen lyden oover die begaane 
daad, haare eigen passien intoomden.”
65 Cf. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, and John Staines, “Compassion in the Public Sphere 
of milton and King Charles,” in Kern Paster et al. (eds.), Reading the Early Modern Passions, 
89–109.
eloquence thus proves to be potentially highly treacherous in politics, 
because eloquence can easily turn into dissimulative demagogy by 
manipulating the capriciousness of human nature.
Nevertheless, this corrupting power of public speech which plays upon 
the imagination is offset by the rhetorical usefulness of the passions if cor-
rectly mobilized to reach truth and understanding. as Vossius taught, 
proper rhetoric can turn passions such as fear or shame into positive fea-
tures of the human condition when they are used as incentives to honest 
deeds. Similarly, the De la Courts argued that the passions of the soul can 
be balanced by causing contrary passions.63 indeed, “people would follow 
their self-love and passions, also to the detriment and ruin of others … if 
they did not moderate their own passions through the fear of any future 
evil”.64 Such fear can be installed by laws and strong punishment, but also, 
as Vossius showed, by speech – fear being one of the main four passions 
within deliberative rhetoric. a rhetorician who incites the fear of the 
audience by making a coming evil appear imminent, thus moderates the 
possible detriments of the other passions. through good rhetoric, passion 
curtails passion.
overall, then, speech is a highly ambivalent element of public life, an 
ambivalence that is rooted in the double-edged power of the human pas-
sions. on the one hand, speech can corrupt sound judgment by luring the 
passions into deception. on the other, it can establish sound judgment by 
playing upon the imagination to reach attentiveness, understanding, and 
agreement. the fundamental question therefore is how to cope with this 
ambivalence of speech, how to find out the proper place for the passions 
in rhetoric and in the political realm. Consequently, for the De la Courts, 
as for their contemporaries milton and Hobbes, the crucial issue was how 
to distinguish good rhetoric from bad rhetoric.65 they acknowledged that 
both forms of rhetoric are by necessity passionate. Yet while bad rhetoric 
abuses the passions in order to deceive, good rhetoric uses the passions, it 
 the rhetoric of the market 87
66 See Van tijn, “Pieter de la Court,” 311–312. on the Heereboord affair, see also ed van 
der Vlist, “een verstrooide brief van een verloren professor. Het eerewoord van 
Heereboord,” Nieuw Letterkundig Magazijn 21 (2003), 40–48.
appeals to human ambition, hope and fear in order to convey the truth. in 
the following sections of this chapter i will clarify what such ‘good rheto-
ric’ entailed exactly for the De la Courts. By revealing in detail the various 
elements of the brothers’ own rhetorical endeavour in the public arena, it 
will become clear that the rhetoric practiced by the brothers is the same 
as that which they postulated as the best form of speech for a proper per-
suasion of the passions.
 in the Public arena: Rhetoric in action
A First Test: The Confrontation with Heereboord
the brothers De la Court first entered the public arena in a direct conflict 
with one of their own teachers at Leiden University, adriaan Heereboord. 
this highly rhetorical and passionate conflict aptly reveals the form and 
the extent of the Dutch seventeenth-century public debate: the conflict 
began in the lecture-room of the academy but soon extended over the 
urban realm and briefly stirred up the whole of Leiden society. the con-
troversy with Heereboord thus shows how the De la Courts put their rhe-
torical education into practice. the first time that the brothers’ rhetorical 
skills were publicly put to the test turned out to be a confrontation with 
the man who had introduced them to the art of rhetoric.
the conflict with Heereboord started in the context of the public 
debate over Cartesianism, yet its immediate cause lay in the private 
sphere of the De la Court household. Heereboord’s eclectic defence of 
Descartes, expounded in particular at the start of 1648 in his public speech 
De recte philosophice disputandi ratione, caused much debate within the 
academic community in Leiden. a month after the speech, this debate 
even led to a fight in the lecture-room between the advocates and 
opponents of Heereboord, including Pieter de la Court.66 after a repri-
mand by the board the following day, all those involved were admonished 
to refrain from further dispute, and the board reconfirmed an earlier ban 
on Cartesian teachings. De la Court’s aggressive participation in this 
debate, however, had little to do with the rising tide of Cartesianism. 
instead, it was a consequence of the close but increasingly hostile rela-
tionship between him and his teacher, who had by then also become his 
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67 Op de onrijpe dood van Isak Heereboord (1648), Graf-dicht op den ongesiene Isaak 
Hereboord [1648], Af-comst ofte reken-tael, van Pieter Lacoer (1648), Het triumpherende 
Leyden over het beroemde huys-gesin van den vermaerde scietspoelder alias De La Court 
[1648].
68 Piere la Cour, gruwel der verwoestinge [1648]: “o grouwel! o verwoeste daet!/’t Geen 
selfs een turck een tartar laet,/Derft Pier la Cour met syn gespuys,/Bedryven in sijn eygen 
huys.”
69 ‘Claes Krynen van oossanen, met zijn vlammende swaert’, Nieuw liedeken van een 
hoere-waerts soon buyten Yperen, hoe hy van zijn ouders wegh gheloopen, ende to Leyden 
door dwangh van zijn oom aen ’t weven gestelt is, ende daer near door zijn vroome en 
ontrouwe handel en wandel, tot groote en onrechtveerdighe rijckdom is gheraeckt [1648]: 
“Door lieghen ende bedrieghen,/en knibbelen op een deuyt,/Door deuchdens schijn, en 
vals te zijn/wiert rijck, een vreemde guyt … Hy wiert so stracks ghevoert/Na d’Hemel 
heen, of nae beneen/Daer staet doch zyn La court.”
brother-in-law. two years earlier, Heereboord had married Johanna de la 
Court, the only daughter of the family, born in 1620. as a successful aca-
demic, Heereboord offered the social recognition that the De la Courts, as 
immigrants from humble origins, still lacked. Yet the marriage turned out 
to be anything but a success. Heereboord had huge debts, he used to drink 
excessively, and in april 1648 he seriously injured his young pregnant 
wife. when she gave birth to a son some months later, the child died 
shortly after being baptized. Soon thereafter, the marital conflict erupted 
in public.
During the funeral of the child and in the days that followed, numerous 
short pamphlets were distributed in Leiden, supposedly at the instigation 
of Heereboord himself, which harshly reproached his family-in-law.67 the 
vivid and very outspoken language typical to this kind of pasquilles 
mocked the De la Courts for their alien descent and accused them of 
unchristian behaviour and unjustly attained riches. a particularly fervent 
pamphlet, suggestively entitled Piere la Cour, gruwel der verwoestinge 
[“Piere la Cour, Horror of Devastation”] insinuated that Johanna, driven 
by a typically walloon lust that could not be satisfied by a scholar like 
Heereboord, approached her own father instead to alleviate her desires. 
“o horror! o devastating deed!”, the pamphlet exclaimed, “what even a 
turk leaves to a tartar, dares Pieter de la Court to do with his rabble in his 
own house”.68another pamphlet, meant to be sung on the tune of a popu-
lar melody, denounced De la Court sr. as “an alien rogue” who had only 
become rich “through lying and deceiving, and haggling on a penny, By 
virtue’s pretence, and being false”. Such behaviour would earn De la Court 
his place in hell, “there where his La court stands”, so the song ended with 
a pun.69 another pasquille, written by a range of self-declared “sworn pro-
ponents of the sincere truth and the free verse-right”, directly addressed 
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70 Gedwongen waarschouwing van S.v.M. e.a., altemaal gezwooren voorstanders van de 
oprechte waarheid, en het vrye dicht-recht aen La Courten. Den verkeerden s’Jaak, verrotten 
Pier, en schurftens Jan [1648]: “Dit is op ’t pampier, daar na op je huyt.”
71 [Pieter de la Court], Factum ofte gherechticheyt, van de huysvrouwe van Adriaen 
Heereboord, voor ende door deselve (the Hague, 1648) [wildenberg, Bibliografie, nr. 1011] 
For Pieter’s authorship, see Driessen (ed.), Het Welvaren van Leiden, “Bibliographie” nr. 50, 
a facsimile of a letter concerning the dispute that Pieter wrote to the Leiden court of 
justice.
72 Factum, sig. B: “lasterende wel-spreeckentheydt”. Cf. Vossius, Rhetorices contractae 
i.iV.38, p. 45.
the sons of the family, who where warned that “this is on the paper, the 
next will be on your skin”.70
in spite of this menace, the stream of pamphlets directed against his 
family prompted Pieter de la Court to take up his pen in reply. in a pam-
phlet titled Factum ofte gherechticheyt, van de huysvrouwe van Adriaen 
Heereboord [“Fact or Justice, from the wife of adriaen Heereboord”], sup-
posedly written by Johanna herself but in reality of Pieter’s hand, De la 
Court aimed to refute Heereboord and his adherents in public.71 For this 
purpose, Heereboord’s classes in rhetoric proved to be of much value. the 
various rhetorical strategies used in this open rhetorical clash with 
Heereboord would remain central in all later publications of the brothers 
De la Court: the careful establishment of authorial ethos and rebuttal of 
the adversary, the arousal of the passions, and, in particular, the criticism 
of duplicitous speech.
in the opening lines of the pamphlet against Heereboord, De la Court 
tried first of all to win over the audience by establishing his own ethos. as 
Vossius had instructed, he addressed his readers directly to gain their sup-
port and stated that his reaction was not meant as an answer to “the lies 
and slanders” of the various pasquilles published against him and his fam-
ily. De la Court thus presented himself as a trustful witness who did not 
demean himself to the base level of deceit and insult. insisting that his 
own testimony was based on evidence, he rebuked Heereboord for having 
used nothing but “slandering eloquence”. accordingly, the establishment 
of ethos turned immediately into reproach of the adversary, for which De 
la Court invoked the authority of the Greek statesman aristides, men-
tioned by Vossius as the commonplace embodiment of the virtue of jus-
tice.72 the ensuing refutation portrayed Heereboord in vivid terms as a 
highly aggressive and utterly unreliable drunkard. already on the day of 
the wedding, De la Court wrote, Heereboord “revealed at once his shame-
less affection to drunkenness”. His wife begged him to stop drinking, but 
in vain, for even in his study she caught him “filled up with wine which 
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73 Factum, sig. Bv.-B2v.: “… hy openbaerde terstondt sijne dulle ende onbeschaemde 
ghenegentheyt tot dronckenschap … wel vondt sy hem altemets, meenende dat hy in sijne 
Boecken besig was, in sijn Boeck-kamer droncken gekleet te Bedde leggen als hy sigh met 
wijn, die by sijn Boecken in Flessen verborgen was, opgevold had.”
74 adriaen Heereboord, Naackte ende nodige verdedigingh, vande eer ende het leven, van 
Adrianus Heereboord (Leiden, 1648), sig. a2, B3, Cv., D2v.: “… een register van lasteringen, 
leugenen, ende onchristelikke bitterheden … Soo veel te onmachtiger als hy is geweest in 
het schelden, soo veel te machtiger sal ik wesen in my te bedwingen … Hier mede speelt 
hy zeer wonderlick den Sophist … eerlicke armoede can niemand verweten werden … Soo 
hebbense noch een nieu Polijtyk axioma, men moet niet achten als gelt of die gene die gelt 
heeft … Beter is het, dat wy over onsselven, als dat een ander over ons triumphere: de 
grootste victorie bevechten wy over ons selven.”
was hidden near his Books in Bottles”.73 apart from being a drunkard, so 
De la Court’s defamation went on, Heereboord also mistreated his wife. 
By making public all sorts of private details and thus playing upon the 
shame of the audience, ranked by Vossius as one of the main passions in 
rhetoric, De la Court tried to damage Heereboord’s reputation as much as 
possible. at the same time, he sought to defend his own credentials as a 
writer and to defend the honour of his sister, restating at the end of the 
pamphlet that all said was based on clear evidence.
Not surprisingly, Heereboord reacted with the publication of a defence, 
in which he made two basic claims. First, immediately unmasking the 
author of the Factum as Pieter de la Court, he reproached him for having 
indulged in “a register of slanders, lies, and unchristian acridities” because 
of his inability to control his passions. “the more impotent as he has been 
in insulting, the more potent will i be in controlling myself”, Heereboord 
stated. Secondly, he accused De la Court of “playing very curiously the 
Sophist” and invoking unreliable witnesses and false testimony. aptly 
employing rhetorical redescription, Heereboord tried to convince his 
audience that instead of being drunk, he was merely “sad” because of the 
distrust of his wife, instigated by her family. He then juxtaposed his own 
“honest poverty” with the “Political axiom” of the De la Courts “to honour 
only money and those who have money”. in a clear move to arouse his read-
ers’ passions, Heereboord finally turned directly to his family-in-law to 
propose a settlement of the conflict, under the stoic motto that “it is bet-
ter that we triumph over ourselves than another over us, for the greatest 
victory we gain over ourselves”.74 in this way, Heereboord skilfully flung 
the accusation at De la Court, whom he portrayed as a passionate, greedy 
man unable to control himself.
De la Court replied again with a new pamphlet, almost twice as long as 
the first one. No longer hiding his identity, he followed the rhetorical 
strategies of his earlier work. again he blamed Heereboord for using mere 
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75 [Pieter de la Court], Antwoordt op de verdediginghe van Adriaen Heereboord, hem 
ghegheven door zijnen swagher (the Hague, 1648) [wildenberg, Bibliografie, nr. 1021], sig. 
B-B2v.: “… sulcks veelen als ’t hun maer in de verdediginghe hunner saecke voordeeligh 
kan zijn, sonder eenighe schaemte, valsche lasteringhen ende leughenen, met veele versi-
erde omstandigheden aerdigh trachten op te proncken … dat veele onvoorsichtighe ende 
eenvoudige menschen, met soo eene maniere van schryven die hy ghebruyckt, lichtelik 
verleydt worden … moet de Leeser oordeelen, of hy de suyverste waerheden niet voor 
leugenen, ende de deughden voor ondeughden uytgheroepen heeft.”
eloquence instead of clear argumentation, “because many, whenever it 
can be advantageous in the defence of their case, without any shame, try 
to adorn false slanders and lies nicely with many decorated details”. the 
reader, he insisted, should be warned that “many imprudent and simple 
people are, with the manner of writing that he uses, easily seduced”. in 
other words, De la Court contended that Heereboord rhetorically abused 
the passions of his audience because he “proclaimed the purest truths for 
lies, and the virtues for vices”.75 the controversy with Heereboord, then, 
had turned from a conflict over the honour of the De la Court family into 
a conflict over the best form of rhetoric. Both Heereboord and De la Court 
claimed that they knew best how to moderate the passions; both argued 
that they played upon the passions in an ethical way by telling the truth, 
while they repudiated their adversary for employing deceiving eloquence 
instead of true argument. the conflict reveals how both parties shared the 
same rhetorical culture, dominated by the ambivalent assessment of the 
passions in speech.
the dispute continued for some months and caused widespread com-
motion in Leiden, where the municipal authorities tried in vain to halt 
the quarrel by prohibiting the publication and circulation of more slan-
derous writings. once unleashed, public argument thus proved to be 
untameable – a phenomenon that the De la Courts would experience 
again later. moreover, the Heereboord affair offered De la Court a first 
opportunity to apply his rhetorical skills outside the lecture-room. as this 
chapter will continue to show, key elements of the confrontation with 
Heereboord, from the establishment of authorial ethos, the warning 
against “slandering eloquence”, to the rhetorical power of the passions, 
were to play a prominent role across the entire œuvre of the brothers De 
la Court.
Impressing the Reader: The Frontispiece
How did the De la Courts enter the marketplace of public debate in the 
1660s? their rhetorical and commercial involvement in politics started 
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76 Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, esp. 26–27, 44.
77 marika Keblusek, “Nieuwsvoorziening in de Republiek. De engelse burgeroorlog in 
Haagse drukken,” in Henk Kleijer et al. (eds.), Tekens en teksten. Cultuur, communicatie en 
maatschappelijke veranderingen vanaf de late middeleeuwen (amsterdam: amsterdam 
University Press, 1992), 60–77: 72.
with the material aspect of their works. as Kevin Sharpe has argued con-
vincingly, many of the physical features of early-modern texts, from size 
and frontispiece to typography, entailed important authorial and edito-
rial choices which merged the aesthetic with the political.76 the specific 
language of a text also had profound political consequences. the brothers 
De la Court did not present their works as scholarly Latin treatises on poli-
tics, rather they chose deliberately to write in the vernacular. this linguis-
tic choice had immediate political implications, for it meant that their 
works could be read and discussed on a much broader level than texts 
written in Latin. as long pamphlets, often handily published in duodec-
imo format and as such easily to carry and to distribute, the works of the 
De la Courts became part of the fervent pamphleteering business in the 
Dutch Republic. their decision to write in Dutch therefore reflected a 
deliberate attempt to be read and commented upon by many. at the same 
time, their works were published in the elevated Roman typeface rather 
than the more popular Gothic normally used in pamphlets.77 in other 
words, the brothers’ use of the vernacular in Roman typeface expressed a 
preference for a particular kind of public debate, broad, urban, but also of 
a certain standing. this notion implied that political issues require wide-
spread, but not too widespread, discussion and engagement – a claim 
with manifest political implications.
apart from language and typography, the exterior presentation of the 
work of the De la Courts also involved obvious political and commercial 
choices. the first 1660 edition of the Consideratien van Staat and all edi-
tions of the Interest van Holland were published with only a simple fron-
tispiece which mentioned the title, De la Court’s pseudonym, and the 
publisher. Yet in his reworking of the Consideratien to the Politike Weeg-
schaal and in the publication of the Politike Discoursen, the Historie der 
Gravelike Regering and the Aanwysing, Pieter de la Court chose differ-
ently. to raise the standing of these works and their capacity to seduce 
and impress, these new editions were presented to the public with a 
neatly engraved frontispiece which exploited not only language but also 
the power of the image, entering the battlefield of public debate in full 
armour.
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the case of the Politike Weeg-schaal offers a good example of how De la 
Court used visual imagery to illustrate and strengthen his argumentation. 
the frontispiece of the 1661 edition (see fig. 1), copied in all ensuing edi-
tions, shows a highly suggestive scene in which the scales of the title, 
managed by a divine hand emerging from a sunlit cloud, balance the 
two  weights of politics: at the left, the ius belli, adorned with a ribbon 
mentioning, in rather crude Latin, servitus bellium, and at the right, the ius 
civille (sic), garlanded with libertas et iusticia. while a king and his courti-
ers watch at one side and two wise jurists at the other, the ius civille clearly 
tilts the scales, and from the enlightened sky descends the Ciceronian 
maxim cedant arma togae.78 Below, a scene in which a royal family idly 
wastes its time in corporal pleasures while armies clash at the back-
ground, is juxtaposed with an image of flourishing maritime commerce, 
at the forefront of which stands a diligent farmer cultivating his land, the 
archetype of republican virtue. thus the book immediately directs the 
reader toward a depiction of divinely inspired good versus bad govern-
ment, epitomizing the contents of the work.79
this frontispiece also contained a distinct intertextual and interpicto-
rial reference that would not have escaped the eye of the attentive reader. 
in 1618, the famous Dutch poet and playwright Joost van den Vondel had 
published anonymously a satirical poem on the arminian controversy 
that tore apart Dutch society and politics (see chapter 5 below). this 
poem, entitled Op de jonghste Hollantsche transformatie [“on Holland’s 
Latest transformation”], entailed an implicit but highly critical account 
of the way in which the controversy had been settled, accompanied by an 
elaborate engraving that elucidated Vondel’s intentions (see fig. 2). the 
engraving shows the two opposing camps of the conflict placing their 
strongest arguments in the scales of a large balance, until the Stadholder, 
maurice of orange, forcefully interferes and makes the scales tilt to his 
side.80 Vondel’s poem and its imagery, printed several times throughout 
78 Cicero, De officiis i.XXii.77. the same motto embellishes the frontispiece of Lieuwe 
van aitzema, Herstelde Leeuw, of discours, over ’t gepasseerde in de Vereenighde 
Nederlanden, in ’t iaer 1650, ende 1651 (the Hague, 1652) a historical treatise on the 
attempted coup d’état by william ii.
79 For the rhetorical importance of the frontispiece see Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, 49. 
the frontispieces of the Politike Weeg-schaal, Politike Discoursen and Historie der Gravelike 
Regering are all signed by P[ieter] Philippe, an engraver active in the Hague in the early 
1660s.
80 [Joost van den Vondel], Op de Jonghste Hollantsche Transformatie [1618]. For an anal-
ysis of the political contents of the poem, see B.H. molkenboer, De jonge Vondel 
(amsterdam: Parnassus, 1950), 489–503; and N. wijngaards, “Vondels Hollantsche 
transformatie,” De nieuwe taalgids 59 (1966), 302–312.
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Fig. 1. Frontispiece to Johan and Pieter de la Court, Consideratien van Staat, ofte Polityke 
Weeg-schaal, 1661. amsterdam University Library, otm: oG 63-822
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Fig. 2. Joost van den Vondel, Op de Waeg-schaal, 1618. amsterdam University Library, 
otm: Pr. G16a
the century, had in time become known simply as Op de waeg-schaal van 
Hollandt [“on the Balance of Holland”]. even in 1682, it was said that this 
print was still “in everyone’s hands”.81 accordingly, the publication of 
the Politike Weeg-schaal in 1661 might very well have entailed an implicit 
reference to Vondel’s popular depiction of the arminian controversy, 
81 molkenboer, Jonge Vondel, 501.
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82 Horace, Epistles i.1, v. 45. this phrase is also quoted in Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, ed. 
David armitage (indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004), 14.
83 Lucan, Pharsalia X.407.
84 See Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, 49.
with the scales of the Politike Weeg-schaal being exactly asymmetrical to 
those of Vondel’s poem. De la Court’s message was obvious: by now, at the 
height of the era of ‘true Liberty’, the balance in the Dutch Republic had 
changed.
De la Court prepared a still more elaborate imagery for the editions of 
the Politike Discoursen. the frontispiece of this work (fig. 3) is dominated 
by eight emblematic representations of justice and war, religion and dili-
gence, clarified by telling sententiae that contrast the diligence of the 
maritime merchant (impiger extremos currit mercator ad Indos)82 with the 
untrustworthiness of soldiers (nulla fides pietasque viris qui castra sequun-
tur).83 Similarly, the reader of the Historie der gravelike regering (fig. 4) is 
confronted with six symbolic depictions of liberty and slavery: from a bird 
kept in a cage who watches another bird fly happily away, to the biblical 
donkey issaschar beaten by his master, with the maxim Tenere Libertatem 
aut mori ante Servitium. in both cases, the external appearance of the 
work introduces the reader to the themes of mercantile politics and 
republican liberty.
this function of the frontispiece as an introduction to the text is most 
evident in the case of the Aanwysing, the 1669 revised edition of the 
Interest van Holland. whereas the latter was printed with a simple page 
mentioning just title and publisher, often in cheap and practical duodec-
imo format, as a work of standing and authority the Aanwysing was 
instead published in quarto with a highly elaborated frontispiece in the 
form of a large arch (see fig. 5). this image literally performs the function 
of an entrance into the text with the powerful connotations of triumph 
and monumentality.84 De la Court’s arch is adorned with authoritative 
weaponry and blazons which depict the fishing industry and trade, 
Holland’s main sources of income and splendour. a scene of cheerful and 
talkative burghers shows how peace and happiness are only to be found 
in republics, while another scene of a governmental assembly embodies 
the republic’s rule of law. entering the text through this arch, the reader is 
visually confronted with what is to be encountered there in words. as in 
the case of the other works of the De la Courts, the frontispiece is thus an 
integral element of the brothers’ rhetoric.
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Fig. 3. Frontispiece to Johan and Pieter de la Court, Politike Discoursen, 1662. amsterdam 
University Library, otm: oG 63-7504
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Fig. 4. Frontispiece to Pieter de la Court, Historie der Gravelike Regering in Holland, 1662. 
amsterdam University Library, otm: oK 61-565
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Fig. 5. Frontispiece to Pieter de la Court, Aanwysing der heylsame politike gronden en max-
imen, 1669. amsterdam University Library, otm: o 63-3745
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85 Ibidem, 54–57.
86 Politike Weeg-schaal, “Voor-reeden, inhoudende het oog-wit des autheurs,” sig. *3: “… 
alle loffelike goede Orateurs en Schrijvers.”
The Power of the Image: Presentation & Justification
apart from the illustration of a work, this power of imagery is also con-
nected to a second meaning of the term image: the way the author pre-
sents himself to the audience, the authorial ethos as emphasized in 
rhetorical theory. Pieter de la Court demonstrated careful attention to 
this issue in his editing and revisions of the texts left by his brother Johan, 
adding large prefaces in which he clarified the intention of these works. 
these prefaces, each in line with Vossius’s remarks about the importance 
of addressing the reader directly, clearly aimed to justify the writing and 
to win the support of the audience, thus establishing a positive image of 
their author.85 De la Court constructed an image of himself and his brother 
as truth-tellers, as liable, trustworthy rhetoricians who know how to play 
upon the passions of their audience in an ethical way, instead of the “slan-
dering eloquence” of men such as Heereboord. this way of establishing 
ethos can be compared to the Classical notion of parrhèsia, the rhetorical 
device of outspokenness.
the establishment of authorial ethos in De la Court’s preface to the 
Politike Weeg-schaal starts with a description of the task of the orator, 
clarified by a telling metaphor – as Vossius had taught, a useful means of 
engaging the reader’s attention. From the beginning De la Court identifies 
himself with “all laudable good Orators and Writers” who, like sailors navi-
gating through difficult waters, must employ all their skills in order to 
reach the shore safely.86 this common naval metaphor is employed to jus-
tify the brothers’ involvement in politics: like the sailor, the orator is 
forced to devote himself completely to his cause, even if this devotion will 
lead to what some might judge as exaggerated conclusions. the reader, 
and especially the political establishment, should therefore take no 
offence at the work and the style in which it is written, since its writer is 
truly well-intentioned and keen to avoid causing offence. indeed, De la 
Court boldly continues his metaphor,
this Writing should be to the highest degree pleasing to all Regents and 
Children of Princes [read: the young william of orange, future william iii], 
since putting them the evil ways of Courtiers and the corruptions, or errors of 
Governments, clearer before the eyes than possibly has been done by any 
other writing so far, it can also serve them as a brightly shining beacon to 
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87 Ibidem, sig. *4: “maar is ter contrarie waaragtig dat dit Schrift ten hoogsten aange-
naam behoorde te wezen, aan alle Regenten en Kinderen der Princen, alzoo het zelven hun 
de quaade gangen der Hoovelingen en corruptien, of dwaalingen der Regeeringen, klaarder 
voor de oogen stellende, als mischien voor deesen, ooit door eenig ander Schrift is geschiet, 
hun ook kan strekken een helschijnend baaken, om in deeze zee der Regeeringe, alle de 
aangeweese sanden, klippen en stranden te vermyden.”
88 Ibidem, sig. *4v.: “… hy, by leeven zijnde, in het generaal geen Twist-schriften leesen-
swaardig agtede, om dat de selve ten weederzijden altijds meer door passie, als reeden, 
werden gedreeven.” Ibidem, sig. *6v.-**1: “indien nogtans iemant dien anderen twistgier-
igen weg wil inslaan, hy doe dat vryelik, en zy verseekert … dat men dienvolgende, dit last-
erent schuim van menschen (Spreta exolescunt; si irascare adgnita videntur. C. Tacit.) niet 
kragtiger kan beantwoorden, dan met veragten, en stil zwijgen.” the quote is from tacitus, 
Annals iV.34.
89 Ibidem iii.iii.6, p. 670: “… een Liefhebber mijns vry Vaderlands.”
avoid in this sea of Government all the revealed sandbanks, rocks, and 
beaches.87
Like in the pamphlets of the Heereboord affair, De la Court presents the 
work as a reliable account that offers the reader a trustworthy and reward-
ing guide through the panorama of political debate.
this image is reinforced by the presentation of the author (the deceased 
Johan) as a virtuous man who, “while alive, in general did not consider 
any Quarrelsome writings worth reading, because those are on both sides 
always more driven by passion than by reason”. again as in the Heereboord 
affair, De la Court thus claims the high moral standard of the author who 
refuses to demean himself to the base level of passionate argument. 
anyone is allowed to enter freely the “cantankerous path” of refutation, 
De la Court writes, yet he continues to insist that “such slanderous scum 
of men … cannot be more forcefully answered than with contempt and 
silence”.88 this powerful statement, which mirrors Vossius’s remarks on 
the utility of undermining possible critique from the start, is ultimately 
repeated to increase its impact in the very last phrases of the work. Here 
De la Court asserts that by publishing the Politike Weeg-schaal he has 
merely fulfilled his duty as “a Lover of my free Fatherland” and shall now 
refrain from further debate.89 all throughout the work, this image of the 
upright and objective author who rationally searches for truth instead of 
passionate quarrel is upheld eloquently. For example, prior to a long and 
radical criticism of monarchical rule, De la Court starts with the claim 
that he will discuss all (dis)advantages of all different kinds of govern-
ment, “without passing over any of these because of hate or favour, trust-
ing that all impartial Readers will praise my zeal in this”. Later, he sides 
with the advocates of republics, yet supposedly only for the sake of con-
venience “to avoid difficulty”. and juxtaposing aristocracy and democracy 
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90 Ibidem i.i.8, p. 40: “… zonder eenige der zelven, uit haat ofte gonst voorby te slaan. 
Vertrouwende dat alle onpartijdige Lezers mijnen yver in dezen zullen pryzen.” Ibidem 
i.i.11, p. 52: “… onder de persoon van gemelde liefhebbers der Republiken, en zal om de 
moejelikheid te schuwen, voortaan dus haar gevoelen, als of het mijn eigen waar, voorstel-
len.” Ibidem iii.i.6, p. 557–558: “… zoo heeft het my goed gedagt, om den Leeser in deese 
twijffelinge te helpen resolveeren.”
91 Politike Discoursen, “Voor-Reeden, aen den Leeser,” sig. *5: “… van veele andere 
boosaardige, door-trapte en schynheilige menschen, sullen om eigen interest, ten hoog-
sten verfoeid werden … Warelik, dit geheele werk, werd door my vergeleeken by een wel-
beplante-moes- kruyd- en Bloem-hof bestaande uit veelderley voedsame, schoone, 
heilsaame, en vergiftige Kruiden … Iaa dat meer is, gelijk een apotheekers-winkel.”
92 Ibidem, sig. (6): “… sulks indien de Leeser als een boosaardige Spin in een Kruid-Hof, 
uit-suigen, of als een quaadwillig roekeloos mensch in een medicinale apotheeke, het arg-
sten alleen uitkiesen, ende ’t sy onvoorsigtig, ’t sy boosaardiglik smaaken, en appliceren wil.”
with some room for doubt about which of the two should be considered 
best, De la Court presents himself as the unbiased and all-knowing guide 
who has decided “to assist the Reader in resolving these doubts”.90
a comparable image of a benevolent, prudent, and honourable author, 
yet now fused with a degree of unease about the reader’s independence, is 
presented in the preface to the Politike Discoursen, also added by Pieter de 
la Court. in this preface, De la Court again employs the power of meta-
phor to prove his point. aware that “malignant, villainous, and hypocrite” 
readers might loathe the work “out of self-interest”, he imaginatively com-
pares the book to a “well-planted Vegetable, herb, and Flower garden con-
sisting of many nutritious, beautiful, curative, and poisonous Herbs”.91 
Like a pharmacy, such a garden might contain many plants that are 
potentially very harmful and toxic, but these can nonetheless be useful 
when applied in the right manner. De la Court thus warns possible adver-
saries that they are themselves responsible for any misreading when they 
want to “suck like a malignant Spider in a Herb Garden, or like an evil-
minded reckless Man in a Medicinal Pharmacy, to chose only the worst, 
and to taste and apply it either imprudently or malignantly”.92 in other 
words, the author himself is not to blame for any possible mishandling of 
the work: aware that his playing upon the imagination of the audience is 
a risky affair, De la Court attempts from the start to elude possible criti-
cism. this is an important feature of his authorial ethos, for it shows that 
De la Court was acutely aware of the limits to successful persuasion. after 
all, every reader judges independently.
a skilful rhetorician should therefore know how to steer the reader’s 
judgment in the right direction. as Vossius instructed, it is essential for 
this purpose that authorial pretensions are not exaggerated and do not 
necessitate studiousness. De la Court eloquently follows this advice. in 
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93 Politike Weeg-schaal, “Voor-reeden,” sig. *5: “… pedantise school-sieke beuselingen, 
der Geleerden.”
94 Politike Discoursen, “Voor-Reeden,” sig. *5: “… in ’t geheel geconsidereerd weesende, 
leesens waardiger dunken; als eenige andere, die tot heeden oover diergelijke materien, in 
eenigerley taalen, sijn in het ligt gekoomen.”
95 Ibidem, sig. *4: “… een Naawkeurig Leeser sal konnen merken, dat de aeutheur veele 
saaken in sijne gedagten heeft gehad, die hy onder het haastig schryven, of niet gekonnen, of 
niet gewild, of ook vergeeten heefd, uit te drukken … Iaa dat meer is, de Leeser sal buiten 
twijfel omtrent de bygebragte exempelen bespeuren, een veel groter slordigheid.”
96 Politike Weeg-schaal, “Voor-reeden,” sig. *5: “… seekerlik heeft hy gelooft, in soo wijd-
luftige materien, door al te geringe kennisse, swakheit van een menschelik oordeel, als ook 
door traagheit, veelsints te sullen hebben gedwaalt.”
the preface to the Politike Weeg-schaal, he reacts fiercely against the 
“pedantic scholastic humbug of Scholars”,93 presenting the work as a much 
more realistic and accurate account of politics than the fruits of academic 
pens could possibly provide. this dismissal of scholarly politica is even 
more explicit in the Politike Discoursen, overtly claimed to be written out 
of disgust with conventional political studies in the Swiss, German and 
Dutch republics, so meagre when compared to their italian counterparts. 
in this way, De la Court evidently tries to capture the reader’s attention by 
emphasizing the autodidactic and anti-establishment character of his 
and his brother’s works. His blatant message is that these works provide 
something novel and unusual, that they are “more worth reading than any 
others that have come to light so far about such matters in any language”.94 
Yet for all this haughtiness, De la Court also realizes that he should not fall 
into overt arrogance and swollen language. therefore he also employs the 
device of modesty. Stating that some passages are “hastily written” and far 
from comprehensive, while others can hardly hide their “inaccuracy”,95 De 
la Court asserts that the author “has surely believed to have erred much in 
such extensive matters, because of far too poor knowledge, weakness of 
human judgment, and slowness”.96 as Vossius taught, such a blend of 
haughtiness and modesty ought to make the reader truly benevolent and 
attentive.
all these elements of the establishment of authorial ethos finally reap-
pear in the Aanwysing, De la Court’s most self-assured treatise. Following 
the rhetorical strategy of his earlier work, De la Court proclaims his pru-
dence and probity in publishing the work as well as the novelty of its con-
tents yet feebleness of judgment. most importantly, he again asserts that 
none should take offence at his writing since he is a truly trustworthy and 
impartial author, not biased in favour of either side of the political spec-
trum in the Dutch Republic. De la Court insists that he has never been 
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  97 Aanwysing, “Voor-Reeden,” sig. *4: “soo soudemen kennelik vander waarheid afd-
walen, indienmen my lasterlik wilde nageven, dit Werk met voordagt om de Vrye 
Regeerderen deser Doorlugtige en Grootmogende Republike te vleyen, of wel ter oneere 
ende ten nadeele der Princen van Oranjen.”
  98 Ibidem, sig. **1v.: “… die seer lang gepleegde verstand ende land-verdervende vleye-
rien der Schrijveren.” Ibidem, sig. *****2v.: “… soo gelieve de Leeser, procul ira procul studio, 
het volgende Bouk alsoo onpartydig te leesen, als het selven door my met een bedaard 
ende Vaderland- en waarheid-lievend gemoed is beschreven.”
  99 See David Colclough, Freedom of Speech in Early Stuart England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), esp. 12–60.
100 Rhetorica ad C. Herennium, trans. Harry Caplan (Cambridge, mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1954) iV.XXXVii.49, p. 353.
offended by the House of orange, that “someone would evidently stray 
from truth if he would slanderously criticize me to have written this Work 
with a design to flatter the free Rulers of this Serene and Powerful Republic 
or to the dishonour and disadvantage of the Princes of Orange”.97 De la 
Court thus claims his own disinterestedness and rational objectivity, in 
direct opposition to the “reason- and country-depraving flatteries of 
Writers”. while such flatterers distort the truth out of the fear for reper-
cussions, De la Court stresses his own patriotic desire to proclaim the 
truth, however unwelcome that may be, inviting the reader “to read the 
Book as impartially as it has been written by me with a calm Fatherland- 
and truth-loving mood”.98 in short, De la Court presents himself as rheto-
rician who knows how to entice the readers’ imagination in the service of 
the truth and the commonwealth.
this prominent claim of being an outspoken truth-teller involves the 
specific rhetorical figure of parrhèsia. this device, a prime element of the 
mechanisms of democracy and the definition of citizenship in ancient 
athens, was a distinct figure of speech in Classical and humanist rhetori-
cal theory: it entailed the act of bluntly telling the truth while at the same 
time vindicating such straightforwardness.99 the Roman treatise Ad 
Herennium in particular recognized the usefulness of this figure “in pre-
senting us, the speakers, as friendly both to the hearers and to the truth”.100 
accordingly, parrhèsia was an essential element of the establishment of 
authorial ethos. By claiming to tell the truth in a straightforward way, 
without fear or dissimulation, a rhetorician could win the support of the 
audience while expounding his opinions openly, however unwelcome 
they might be.
Similarly, for De la Court, the employment of parrhèsia offered the rhe-
torical means to win over the reader, justify his and his brother’s work and 
proudly expound the radical potential of their political ideas. Besides, 
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101 See Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 118–119, and ann moss, Printed Commonplace-
Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). many 
of the sayings in the works of the De la Courts are also present in the widely read work by 
Jacob Cats, Spiegel van den Ouden ende Nieuwen Tijdt (1632, facsimile ed. amsterdam 
1968), a collection of moralistic poems illustrated with emblems and popular expressions 
in various languages.
102 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.13, p. 78: “… een aap is een aap al heeft hy een gouden rok an, 
en aapery is aapery.” Cf. Vossius, Rhetorices contractae, iV.Xii.5, p. 432: “Simia est simia, 
etiam si aurea gestat insignia.” For sententiae as a rhetorical device, cf. e.J. Hundert, 
“Bernard mandeville and the enlightenment’s maxims of modernity,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 56 (1995), 577–593: 578–579.
parrhèsia could entice the imagination of the audience by playing upon 
the passion of impudence, one of the four main passions in Vossius’s 
account of deliberative rhetoric. through the act of outspoken parrhèsia, 
disregarding all forms of decorum, a rhetorician like De la Court made 
clear to his audience that audacity and impertinence are a virtue, thus 
motivating the readers’ impudence for the sake of persuasion. Finally, as 
an essential element of the establishment of ethos, De la Court’s parrhèsia 
also gives us a first hint of the sort of speech that he and his brother con-
sidered to be effective rhetoric. in being outspoken and singing the praise 
of such outspokenness, the De la Courts aimed to show that candour 
offers the key to a constructive public debate.
Tapping the Sources of Eloquence: ornatus & Ridicule
the establishment of authorial ethos is one aspect of the rhetorical design 
of Vossius’s helepolis, the fortified rhetorical battering-tower harnessed 
for the peaceful invasion of the reader’s soul. another aspect of this 
design, as shown above, is ornatus. Vossius, in line with Classical rhetori-
cal theory, extensively discussed a range of particular elocutionary devices 
that can be employed to play upon the imagination of the audience. many 
of these tropes and figures of speech are also prominent in the writings of 
the brothers De la Court.
the most central figure in their work is the explanatory use of senten-
tiae and exempla, which Vossius suggested as means to instruct and 
delight the audience. all works of the De la Courts are packed with prov-
erbs, expressions, and apophthegms in different languages, most proba-
bly taken from the commonplace books that were widely used in the 
early-modern period.101 in line with their rhetorical praise of candour and 
straightforwardness, the De la Courts are especially fond of witty proverbs 
that remove the façade of hypocrisy, such as the saying, also mentioned 
by Vossius, “a monkey is a monkey, even if he wears a golden suit”.102 more 
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103 Lucan, Pharsalia, sive de bello civili Caesaris et Pompeii, ed. Hugo Grotius ([Leiden], 
1614), reprinted numerous times throughout the century. Pieter de la Court van der Voort 
had a copy of the 1643 edition: Library, fol. 33. For Lucan’s impact in england, see Norbrook, 
Writing the English Republic, 23–62. Cf. on the politics of reading in early-modern england 
the seminal article by Lisa Jardine and anthony Grafton, “ ‘Studied for action’: How 
Gabriel Harvey Read His Livy,” Past & Present 129 (1990), 30–78; and Sharpe, Reading 
Revolutions. on the De la Courts’ republican reading of tacitus, see Jan Hartman, “tacitism 
and trade. Johan (1622–1660) and Pieter (1618–1685) de la Court’s maxims and algernon 
Sidney’s ‘Court maxims’ ”, unpublished paper.
104 on the use of exempla and the auctoritas of quotes, see wansink, Politieke weten-
schappen, 56–59.
105 Aanwysing ii.10, p. 308: “… die gelieve met aandagt te leesen de Historien van 
Francisco Guicciardini en Philips van Comines.” For a republican reading of De Commines, 
cf. Joël Blanchard, Commynes l’Européen. L’invention du politique (Geneva: Droz, 1996), 
esp. 205–227.
importantly, the brothers often quote short sententiae of two Classical 
authors in particular: tacitus, the prime authority for seventeenth- 
century political writing who is invoked by the De la Courts as a critical 
insider’s account of the abject life at a monarchical court; and Lucan, 
whose Pharsalia offered a telling historical account of what happens 
when one man tries to attain all power. Clearly, the De la Courts read their 
tacitus and Lucan as republican authors, as commentators on the moral 
and political ruin caused by monarchical rule. this reading of Lucan is 
particularly significant. as David Norbrook has shown, a similar anti-
monarchical interpretation of Lucan, following Grotius’s influential edi-
tion of the Pharsalia from 1614, informed the republican imagination in 
england at the opening of the Civil war.103
while sententiae thus add time-honoured authority to topical political 
claims, the rhetorical employment of exempla serves a similar purpose.104 
Numerous historical episodes, travel stories and literary anecdotes per-
vade the work of the De la Courts as rhetorical display of their wide 
knowledge and literary taste. moreover, the recurring exempla taken from 
authors like Francesco Guicciardini and Philippe de Commines involve a 
distinctly republican reading of history. as De la Court explains, whoever 
will “read with attention the Histories by Francesco Guicciardini and 
Philippe de Commines” must become convinced of De la Court’s own 
claims about the vicious behaviour of kings.105 also significant in this con-
text is the use of less conventional work such as the Gulistan, written by 
the thirteenth-century Persian author Saadi. this work, translated from a 
German edition into Dutch as Perssiaansche Roosengaard [“Persian Rose 
Garden”] was published in 1654 by the controversial amsterdam editor 
Jan Rieuwertsz, later the publisher of Spinoza. the De la Courts read this 
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106 Saadi, Perssiaansche Roosengaard: Beplant met vermaaklijke Historiën, scharp- 
zinnige Redenen, nutte regelen, en leerrijke Sin-spreuken (amsterdam, 1654), translated 
from the German edition by adam olearius. on this edition, see Faramarz Behzad, 
Adam Olearius’ “Persanischer Rosenthal”. Untersuchungen von Saadis “Golestan” im 17. 
Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970). on Rieuwertsz, see Pieter 
Visser, Godtslasterlijck ende pernicieus. De rol van boekdrukkers en boekverkopers in de ver-
spreiding van dissidente religieuze en filosofische denkbeelden in Nederland in de tweede 
helft van de zeventiende eeuw (amsterdam: aD&L, 1996).
107 Politike Weeg-schaal iii.i.4, p. 530: “… dat deese Populare Regeering op geen gewelt 
gefondeert, maar naturelik, redelik, en in zig zelven billik is. ’t welk niet klaarder beweesen 
kan werden, als met vragen; wat kan natureliker zijn, als te leven naar zijn eigen oordeel, 
ordre, en wetten? wat kan reedeliker zijn als te gehoorsamen die men zelfs gekooren heeft? 
wat kan billiker zijn, als te dulden, mislagen, en menschen die men zelfs beeteren, en straffen 
kan?”
108 Ibidem i.iii.8, p. 258: “O dwaze menschen kinderen! Meent gy dat het genoeg is, een 
Heer, een Hooft te maken, dat veel goets aan een land zoude kunnen doen? O neen, dat is 
waarelik de blinde klip daar gy schipbreuk lyden, en in der eeuwigheid over zugten zult.”
work too as a republican assessment of the gruesome fate of those who 
live under monarchical domination.106 Besides, Saadi’s anecdotes and par-
ables revealed the rhetorical usefulness of making a point by telling a 
funny story, another important element of the rhetoric of the De la Courts.
whereas sententiae and exempla principally play upon the reader’s 
imagination through delightful instruction and illustration of the argu-
ment, other figures of speech mobilize the intrinsic power of language 
itself to entice the passions. one of these figures is the device of interroga-
tio. a significant passage in the work of the De la Courts on the advantages 
of democratic rule explicitly acknowledges the use of this device for the 
sake of persuasion. this passage maintains that
it is evident that this Popular Government is not founded upon any violence 
but that it is natural, rational, and in itself fair. which cannot be proven 
clearer than with questions: what can be more natural than to live accord-
ing to one’s own judgment, order, and laws? what can be more rational than 
to obey the one of one’s own choice? what can be more fair than to endure 
mistakes and men that one can improve and punish oneself?107
through this device, the De la Courts lure the reader into agreement by 
making their statements seem obvious and irrefutable. a comparable sty-
listic figure that entices the audience is ekphonesis, a forceful exclama-
tion, as in another passage that imaginatively warns the audience never 
more to appoint a Stadholder: “O foolish children of men! Do you think it is 
enough to make a Lord a Head of State, which then could do much good to a 
country? O no, that is truly the blind rock where you will be shipwrecked and 
which you will groan about for all eternity.”108 Clearly, such an exclamatory 
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109 Ibidem i.i.10, p. 47: “maar hier tegen zeggen de Liefhebbers der Republiken dat alle 
deeze gemelde en ingebeelde voordeelen der monarchale Regeringe, zijn gefondeert op 
een deze groote dwalinge, namentlik, dat de menschen en Monarchen meer de Reeden als 
haare verkeerde passien en wellusten volgen, daar ter contrarie … by Koningen nog schaamt 
nog deugt te vinden is, indien zy de gemeene loop der menscheliker nature involgen.” the 
entire passage, comprising chapters 8–11 (pp. 40–56) from the first part of the work, offers 
a clear example of how Pieter de la Court revised the writings of Johan: the first edition 
mentions only the advantages of monarchy, while their rhetorical redescriptions appear 
in the later editions.
110 Aanwysing, “Voor-Reeden,” sig. ***4: “… dat dese Princen van oranjen geene engelen, 
maar menschen zijnde.”
warning plays upon two central passions of deliberative rhetoric: shame, 
stimulated by the insistence on the stupidity of desiring a Stadholder, and 
fear, aroused by the description of its disastrous consequences.
accordingly, these elements of ornatus sustain the De la Courts’ repub-
lican argumentation by engaging the passions of their audience. the same 
goes for the important device of paradiastole, the rhetorical redescription 
of men and actions by changing their conventional characteristics. 
Vossius had instructed that this figure is particularly powerful when used 
for reprehension, and this is exactly the way in which it is employed by 
the De la Courts. an important example is a passage in the Politike Weeg-
schaal that lists, under the guise of objectivity, all advantages commonly 
ascribed to monarchies, and then continues to re-evaluate and disclaim 
every one of these arguments. Reprehending the duplicitous rhetoric of 
flatterers, the passage argues that these “imagined advantages of 
monarchical Government are founded on a fundamental error, namely, 
that people and Monarchs follow rather Reason than their wrong passions 
and lusts, since, to the contrary, … there is no shame nor virtue to be found 
amongst Kings when they follow the common course of human nature”.109 in 
short, monarchs cannot escape the human condition. while courtly flat-
tery does not acknowledge this passionate baseness and therefore fails 
the test of good rhetoric, the paradiastole of the De la Courts implies that 
republican outspokenness knows how to deal with the passions. this 
message is especially prominent in the preface to the Aanwysing, which 
offers an elaborate example of rhetorical redescription, now directly 
aimed at the Dutch Stadholders. turning the established reputation of all 
members of the House of orange upside down, De la Court insists that 
“these Princes of orange are not angels but men”.110 Being human, they 
are by necessity slaves to their passions, and instead of embodying all 
princely virtues they are driven by lust and the dangerous ambition to 
dominate. the good rhetorician, so De la Court suggests, tells the truth 
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111 See Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 172–180, 279–284.
112 Politike Discoursen ii.Vi.18, p. 236: “… soo pleegen de Courtisans ombeschaamdelik 
haare pluim-strijkereijen; daar in meest bestaande, wie omtrent den Souverain aardigst sal 
konnen liegen, en bedriegen: en vermits yder der Hoovelingen, tragt daar in sijn makkers 
te booven te gaan, op hoope van meer als sy te verkrijgen; soo roemen sy niet alleen de 
Vorsten waaragtige macht, maar verkeeren selfs sijn ondeugden tot deugden, en noe-
mense die deugd, daar sy naast by gelijkt. Gelijk wanneermen de quistigheid milddaadig-
heid, de ooverdaad royaliteit, de dronkenschap vroylikheid, de hoerery liefde, de hoogmoed 
agtbaarheid, de wreedheid justitite, de dievery gaawigheid, het vloeken openhartigheid, de 
klap-achtigheid welspreekendheid, de geveinstheid politie, ofte wereld-wijsheid, ende der 
Grooten gewoonelike poltronerie, ofte kleinmoedigheid, voorsigtigheid noemd.”
113 Ibidem ii.iV.5, p. 37: “… dat de Iuristen quade Christen, de Medicyns Libertyns, de 
Philosophen atheisten, de Politiken geveinsde machiavillisten, de Mathematici en 
Astronomi, tovenaars en waarseggers waren.”
about this behaviour. the good rhetorician is a straightforward republi-
can who unmasks monarchical dissimulation.
Yet while employing paradiastole to undermine the reputation of their 
adversaries, the brothers De la Court also emphasize the dangers intrinsic 
to this device. in late humanist culture, rhetorical redescription was often 
repudiated for creating moral arbitrariness and the confusion of virtue 
and vice.111 the De la Courts share this concern, and while they present 
themselves as impartial seekers of truth, they arraign others who jeopard-
ize an objective assessment of good and evil. Such dishonest speech is 
especially characteristic to a monarchical court, where deceitful 
“Courtesans” indulge “impudently in their sycophancies” to please their 
king. as a result, these courtly flatterers
change his vices into virtues … as when one calls squandering generosity, 
excess royalty, drunkenness cheerfulness, whoring love, haughtiness respect-
ability, cruelness justice, thievery swiftness, cursing openheartedness, blab-
bing eloquence, dissimulation political, or worldly-wisdom, and the 
poltroonery or pusillanimity common to Grandees, prudence.112
in other words, the speech typical of a monarchical court consists of lies 
and hypocrisy and thus exploits human weakness with false appearances. 
when rhetorical redescription is abused, truth disappears from sight.
this climactic attack on the duplicitous abuse of rhetoric targets not 
only the speech of courtiers, but also that of the clergy. out of fanatical 
bigotry, the De la Courts argue, clerics tend to slander all who disagree 
with their opinions, in particular men of learning. the consequence is 
that the common people have always believed their claim “that the Jurists 
were evil Christians, the Physicians Libertines, the Philosophers atheists, 
the Politicians feigning machiavellians, the Mathematicians and 
Astronomers, wizards and Fortune-tellers”.113 Such paradiastole not only 
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114 Cicero, De oratore ii.LVii.236, quoted in Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 205.
115 Vossius, Rhetorices contractae iV.X.3, p. 423: “Diasyrmus est inimica irrisio, sed extra 
caedem.” Cf. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 406.
116 Politike Discoursen ii.iV.4, p. 31–32: “… sy by hun toe-hoorders sig veeltijds uitgeeven, 
voor Gods Ambassadeurs … door haare swakke herssenen, ende het onvoorsigtig leesen 
der Heilige Schrifture, ende Historien der Goddelike Helden. Gelijkmen exempelen heeft, 
dat door het leesen der Romans, Historien van Amadis de Gaule, Astrea, en Arcadia, &c. de 
Leesers daar door aan het mymeren zijn geraakt.”
perverts the truth, it may also morph easily into a dangerous demagogy 
that undermines the common good. the De la Courts put forward their 
own republican redescription of monarchical and clerical behaviour as an 
alternative to such demagogy, as a form of rhetoric that is persuasive in an 
ethical way. against conventional mirrors of princes or clerical preaching, 
the parrhèsia of the De la Courts aspires to entice the audience by telling 
the truth straightforwardly.
all the different rhetorical devices employed by the brothers De la 
Court share one common feature of ornatus: the element of ridicule, used 
to provoke laughter and delight among the readers, to strengthen the 
author’s popularity and to scorn all opponents. From the use of vivid 
expressions and colourful metaphors to the biting contempt for academic 
scholars, Stadholders, courtiers, and clergymen, the writings of the De la 
Courts are peppered with subtle and often not-so-subtle jokes and deri-
sions. Needless to say, this wittiness serves a clear purpose. as Classical 
rhetorical theory had already emphasized, joking can be a very useful 
means to repudiate an adversary, for as Cicero maintained, “humour can 
be used to break up his case, to obstruct his arguments, to make light of 
his cause, to deter him from speaking and to turn aside what he has said”.114 
winning an argument by provoking the laughter of the audience, laughter 
directed at the adversary: this is exactly what the brothers De la Court 
tried to achieve in their writings.
Following Vossius’s subdivision of ridicule into six different types, it is 
arguably the device of diasyrmus, an “inimical mockery” slightly softer 
than deadly sarcasm, which the De la Courts employ most frequently.115 
this form of ridicule, obtained through a comparison with something 
utterly ridiculous, is used for example to scorn the orthodox clerics who 
pretend to be “God’s Ambassadors”. For the De la Courts, this pretence is 
clearly not the consequence of any divine inspiration. Rather, “because of 
their weak brains and the imprudent reading of Holy Scripture and of the 
Histories of Godly Heroes”, these clerics “started musing” just as Don 
Quixote who indulged in romances of chivalry.116 with these words the 
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117 Vossius, Rhetorices contractae iV.X.3, p. 423, and Sinryke Fabulen, 7.
118 See H.w. Janson, Apes and Ape Lore in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London: 
warburg institute, 1952), esp. 40–41.
119 two Dutch examples from the eighteenth century are Jan Jacob d’orille, ’T Onbekende 
nieuwe Apenland (amsterdam, 1714), and ‘J.a. Schasz m.D.’ [Gerrit Paape], Reize door het 
Aapenland [1788], ed. Peter altena (Nijmegen: Vantilt, 2007). Cf. P.J. Buijnsters, “imaginaire 
reisverhalen in Nederland gedurende de 18e eeuw,” in idem, Nederlandse literatuur van de 
achttiende eeuw. Veertien verkenningen (Utrecht: HeS, 1984), 7–35; and a.J. Hanou, 
“Verlichte vrijheid. iets over een denkbeeld in imaginaire reizen,” in Haitsma mulier and 
Velema (eds.), Vrijheid, 187–211. For other imaginary voyages, see Percy G. adams, Travelers 
and Travel Liars, 1660–1800 (Berkeley etc.: University of California Press, 1962), and the list 
of eighteenth-century titles in Philip Babcock Gove, The Imaginary Voyage in Prose Fiction 
(London: Holland Press, 1961), 198–402.
120 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.13, p.77–79: “… in een aardsch paradijs … deeze botte, en van 
der apen-natuur zeer veel verscheelende mensch … rond uit zeide: hier gansch niet te heb-
ben gezien, dat eenigzins naar een goede regeering zweem: maar wel pragt en praal, vreeten 
en zuipen, hoereeren, jaagen, danssen en speelen … en alle de apen seiden amen.” 
brothers effectively mock the ecclesiastical establishment through a com-
parison with the timeless archetype of the deluded daydreamer.
Vossius had mentioned the fable of Asinus ad lyram, the donkey at the 
lyre, as a good example of such diasyrmus. Significantly, this same phrase 
is also used as the epigram of a fable that plays a prominent role in the 
writings of the De la Courts (see fig. 6).117 this tale entails a variation on 
the classical allegory of two travellers, one an honest man, the other a 
hypocrite, who together visit the Kingdom of apes,118 an exotic realm that 
was to become a standard element of many allegorical imaginary travel 
stories in the eighteenth century.119 De la Court’s version adds a revealing 
national element to the tale: a Dutchman plays the honest man while the 
hypocrite is personified by a Frenchman. Having discovered the Kingdom 
of apes, the two travellers are there invited to a lavish dinner and an 
exquisite ball, they are shown the luxurious Royal bedrooms and they join 
the court in a huge hunting party. after some days, the Frenchman is 
asked by the King of the apes for his opinion about this government, to 
which the flattering Frenchman answers that he feels to be “in an earthly 
paradise”. the King of the apes, satisfied and impressed by the 
Frenchman’s eloquence, appoints him his new counsellor, and then turns 
to the Dutchman with the same question. Yet this “blunt and most un-
apelike man’ answers that he has ‘seen nothing here that in any way tends 
to good government, but only pomp and circumstance, stuffing and booz-
ing, whoring, hunting, dancing, and gambling”. Having said this, the 
Dutchman is instantly executed, with the approval of the Frenchman, 
“and all the apes said amen”.120
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with this biting ridicule, De la Court evidently derides monarchical 
rule through comparing it with the overtly ridiculous kingdom of apes. He 
contends that monarchs and courtiers, exemplified by the Frenchman, 
are themselves merely apes, whose slavish nature is diametrically opposed 
to the outspoken parrhèsia of the free republican Dutchman. more spe-
cifically, the fable entails further mockery of the supporters of the monar-
chical principle in the Dutch Republic, and thus an explicit warning not 
the same fable is told again with some amendments in the Sinryke Fabulen, 7–12. Cf. as 
well the comparable fable in Ibidem, 261–266, also told in Welvaren 43, p. 98–99.
Fig. 6. “a Frenchman and a Dutchman in the Kingdom of apes,” from Pieter de la Court, 
Sinryke Fabulen, 1685. amsterdam University Library, otm: oK 63-2796
 the rhetoric of the market 113
121 Sinryke Fabulen, 12: “… die als een Vry ende regtschaapen Mensch wil spreeken, sig 
seer sorgvuldiglik wagten moet, van in den lande der Aapen te reisen, ende nog veel meer, 
van in sijnen eigen Vryen Vaaderlande een Koningrijke der Aapen te stiften.”
122 For humorous conventions in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, see the col-
lection of contemporary jokes and anecdotes compiled by the Leiden jurist aernout van 
overbeke, Anecdota sive historiae jocosae, ed. Rudolf Dekker and Herman Roodenburg 
(amsterdam: P.J. meertens-instituut, 1991), analyzed further in Rudolf Dekker, Lachen in 
de Gouden Eeuw. Een geschiedenis van de Nederlandse humor (amsterdam: 
wereldbibliotheek, 1997). Dekker shows how overbeke’s jokes arose in a milieu between 
high and low culture. See also the comparable collection Nugae venales, sive thesaurus 
ridendi & jocandi (s.l., 1681).
123 Horace, Satires i.1, v. 24–25. See ingrid a.R. de Smet, Mennipean Satire and the 
Republic of Letters 1581–1655 (Geneva: Droz, 1996), 41–53, for a discussion of the views of 
Lipsius, Heinsius, and Vossius on satire.
124 on the close relatedness between emblems and jokes, see Barbara C. Bowen, “two 
literary genres: the emblem and the joke,” Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 15 
(1985), 29–35; elaborated further regarding some Dutch examples in Karel Porteman, “Het 
embleem als ‘genus iocosum’. theorie en praktijk bij Cats en Roemer Visscher,” De zeven-
tiende eeuw 11 (1995), 184–197.
“to establish in one’s own Free Fatherland a Kingdom of Apes”.121 Such rhe-
torical scorn involves a double move. First of all, it serves to provoke 
laughter and please the audience on a scale as wide as possible. in the 
seventeenth century, this kind of burlesque satire was appreciated by 
large groups in Dutch society, from the general urban population to the 
refined tastes of the intellectual establishment.122 the employment of 
such ridicule therefore aimed to address both the higher echelons of soci-
ety and a more popular audience, entering all social strata of public 
debate – obviously a deliberate political choice. as the De la Courts expe-
rienced in the Heereboord affair and later after the publication of the 
Interest van Holland, Dutch public debate was characterized by biting sat-
ire and offensive ridicule. in order to challenge their opponents, what 
could be more effective than using the same rhetorical weaponry?
Resorting to satire also served a second purpose: the comical, enter-
taining guise of a deeply moralistic message. this function of satire went 
back to the Classical recognition of the power of humour, immortalized 
by Horace when asking “ridentem dicere verum quid vetat?”123 the De la 
Courts, who quoted these words and often referred to Juvenal’s Satires, 
were deeply aware of this expedient of ex nugis seria, and they clearly 
employed it in order to convey their political and moral messages in an 
appealing manner. as in the case of the fable of the Kingdom of apes, they 
did so by telling colourful, illustrative parables that could at once delight 
and instruct their audience.124 this use of emblematic fables, itself a genre 
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125 this section builds upon my “the Power of ‘Pliant Stuff’: Fables and Frankness in 
Seventeenth-Century Dutch Republicanism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 72 (2011), 1–27.
126 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, trans. H.e. Butler, 4 vols. (Cambridge, mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1920–1922) V.Xi.19, vol. 2, p. 283.
127 Cicero, Partitiones oratoriae ii.40, quoted in James Hankins, “Rhetoric, History, and 
ideology: the Civic Panegyrics of Leonardo Bruni,” in idem (ed.), Renaissance Civic 
Humanism, 143–178: 168.
128 Cf. Vickers, In Defence, 320–321; and Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 182–188.
at the crossroads of popular and elite culture, is arguably the most striking 
characteristic of the De la Courts’ rhetorical ornatus.
 Fables and Frankness
The Emblematic Fable between Pedagogy & Politics
ever since antiquity, when authors like aesop and Phaedrus had created 
a distinct genre of allegorical tales, the use of such fables had been as 
much reproved as their particular rhetorical force had been recognized.125 
Quintilian maintained that fables should not be a part of the linguistic 
armoury of the truly decent orator, for fables “are specially attractive to 
rude and uneducated minds, which are less suspicious than others in 
their receptions of fictions and, when pleased, readily agree with the argu-
ments from which their pleasure is derived”.126 the other prime authority 
of Roman rhetoric, Cicero, was slightly more willing to appreciate the 
employment of fables. as Cicero stated, an orator can use verisimilar or 
plausible exempla to obtain the trust from the audience, but “sometimes 
even a fable, though incredible, will impress people”.127 in spite of being 
overtly fictitious, fables were thus said to have a distinctive illustrative 
power. By creating a lively and easily understandable mental picture of 
the issue at stake, fables put a case ante oculos, before the audience’s eyes 
by virtue of their imaginative appeal. in Classical and humanist rhetoric, 
such evocative language was considered to be one of the most significant 
tools that an orator could employ to make his audience not only hear but 
actually see things and thus become truly impressed.128
this hesitant view on the employment of fables, wavering between dis-
taste and approval, was echoed in late humanist rhetorical and pedagogi-
cal theory. Like his Classical predecessors, Vossius frequently emphasized 
the persuasive power of figures and language ‘that put the case before the 
eyes’. Yet he spoke with reluctance about using fables for this purpose, 
since fables were only appropriate for, as Vossius insisted, “vulgar souls” 
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129 Vossius, De artis poeticae natura, ac constitutione liber (amsterdam, 1647) 9.6, 54: 
“Nec pueros modo, sed omnes vulgares animas, rudiaque ingenia, fabulae juvant.”
130 Francis Bacon, De sapientia veterum, in The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James 
Spedding et al., 14 vols. (London, 1857–1874), vol. Vi: 617–686. Quotes are from the english 
translation of the preface in Ibidem, 695–699.
131 Jayne elizabeth Lewis, The English Fable. Aesop and Literary Culture, 1651–1740 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 41.
132 See Kirstie m. mcClure, “Cato’s Retreat: Fabula, Historia and the Question of 
Constitutionalism in mr Locke’s anonymous Essay on Government,” in Kevin Sharpe and 
Steven N. Zwicker (eds.), Reading, Society and Politics in Early Modern England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 317–350, quote on 329.
133 on the relation between fables and emblems, see in particular Barbara tiemann, 
Fabel und Emblem. Gilles Corrozet und die französische Renaissance-Fabel (munich: 
wilhem Fink, 1974), and, more generally, Peter m. Daly, Literature in the Light of the 
Emblem. Structural Parallels between the Emblem and Literature in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries (toronto etc.: University of toronto Press, 1979).
and “coarse characters”.129 Francis Bacon similarly lamented the “levity 
and looseness with which people indulge their fancy in the matter of alle-
gories” in the preface to his 1609 collection of Classical fables De sapientia 
veterum [“on the wisdom of the ancients”]. Yet Bacon then vindicated 
his work claiming “the employment of parables as a method of teaching, 
whereby inventions that are new and abstruse and remote from vulgar 
opinions may find an easier passage to the understanding”.130 in later 
years, Bacon’s follower Comenius, with whom Pieter de la Court had 
enjoyed lengthy conversations at the start of his Grand tour, equally com-
mended the pedagogical use of fables following the commonplace adage 
“nothing in the mind is not first in the senses”.131 Finally, towards the end 
of the century, John Locke argued that fables, “being stories apt to delight 
and entertain a child, may yet afford useful reflection to a grown man”. 
accordingly, Locke did not hesitate to include the genre in his political 
writings.132
the insistence on the combination between the pedagogical and the 
pictorial found its clearest expression within early modern culture in the 
subgenre of the emblematic fable, which combined the imaginative 
appeal of two literary traditions: the aesopian tradition, and the more 
elitist, iconographical tradition of emblemata.133 the latter went back to 
the early sixteenth-century Emblematum liber by andrea alciato, which 
inspired a rising production of emblem books of an often very abstract 
and symbolical, even mystical nature, in particular popular among courtly 
circles. in the course of the following century, the tradition took a deci-
sively bourgeois turn, involving far more realistic, moralized depictions of 
civic life with a clearly humorous element. in the Dutch Republic this 
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134 See P.J. meertens (ed.), Nederlandse emblemata. Bloemlezing uit de Noord- en 
Zuidnederlandse emblemata-literatuur van de 16e en 17e eeuw (Leiden: martinus Nijhoff, 
1983); and cf. the useful remarks in Frijhoff et al. (ed.), 1650, 464–471.
135 See Frank-Van westrienen, Schoolschrift, 196–240.
136 Claude François menestrier, L’Art des emblems ou s’enseigne la morale par les figures 
de la fable, de l’histoire, & de la nature, ed. Karl mösenender (mittenwald: mäander, 1981), 
27: “Les apologues d’esope sont aussi d’eux-mêmes des emblemes, parce que ces 
apologues … ont toujours leur instruction morale jointe aux discours & aux actions de ces 
animaux.”
137 on emblematic fables in the Netherlands in general, see Paul J. Smith, Het schouwto-
neel der dieren. Embleemfabels in de Nederlanden (1567-ca. 1670) (Hilversum: Verloren, 
2006), and the extensive overview in J. Landwehr, Emblem and Fable Books Printed in the 
Low Countries 1542–1813. A Bibliography, 3d. ed. (Utrecht: HeS, 1988).
138 For this and other english examples, see Lewis, English Fable, esp. 14–25, and mark 
Loveridge, A History of Augustan Fable (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
change was especially reflected by the very popular love emblems of 
Daniel Heinsius and the moralistic emblem books by Jacob Cats, such as 
his 1632 Spiegel van den ouden ende nieuwen tijdt [“mirror of old and New 
ages”].134 Such emblem books were often particularly deployed for their 
pedagogical use. they played a central role in the education in rhetoric in 
seventeenth-century europe at large, including the Latin schools in the 
Dutch Republic.135 emblems thus served a purpose similar to fables, and 
as the French Jesuit theorist Claude François menestrier stressed in the 
1684 edition of his treatise L’art des emblemes, aesopian fables should be 
seen as essentially emblems.136
many seventeenth-century collections of fables indeed employed 
emblematic engravings as illustrations to the age-old aesopian allegories, 
thus enhancing the latter’s illustrative force. a prominent Dutch repre-
sentative of this subgenre was Joost van den Vondel’s Vorsteliicke warande 
der dieren [“Royal Reserve of animals”], published in 1617 and arguably 
the playwright’s first intervention in the political debate in the Republic.137 
across the North Sea, an important example of such a political use of the 
emblematic fable was the royalist Fables of Aesop, Paraphras’d in Verse by 
John ogilby (1651).138 these two collections, both written in times of 
domestic turmoil (in Vondel’s case the arminian controversy, in ogilby’s 
the establishment of the Cromwellian regime) reveal that the emblematic 
fable was increasingly used for the purpose of political argument. these 
fables share the rhetorical design of another emblematic subgenre, the 
so-called emblemata politica. one particularly popular example of these 
collections is the Idea de un príncipe político christiano representada en 
cien empresas (1642) by the Spanish diplomat Diego Saavedra Fajardo. 
written in a dense prose directed to the governing establishment, 
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139 For Fajardo’s reception in the Dutch Republic, see Frijhoff et al., 1650, 468, and 
Frank-Van westrienen, Schoolschrift, 221–230. For Fajardo’s tacitist political thought, see 
andré Joucla-Ruan, Le Tacitisme de Saavedra Fajardo (Paris: Éditions Hispaniques, 1977), 
and especially Christian Romanoski, Tacitus Emblematicus. Diego de Saavedra Fajardo und 
seine “Empresas Políticas” (Berlin: weidler, 2006).
140 See alain Boureau, “État moderne et attribution symbolique: emblèmes et devises 
dans l’europe des XVie et XViie siècles,” in Culture et idéologie dans la genèse de l’état mod-
erne (École Française de Rome, 1985), 155–178; and idem, “Books of emblems on the Public 
Stage: Côté jardin and côté cour,” in Roger Chartier (ed.), The Culture of Print. Power and the 
Use of Print in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 
261–289.
141 Cf. Smith, Schouwtoneel der dieren, 99, and see for ogilby’s royalist critique on the 
english Revolution in particular annabel Patterson, Aesopian Writing and Political History 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1991), 53–54, 85–87.
142 these emblems were made by the young engraver Jacob Gole (1660–1737), who 
signed his creations, often much simplified copies of the sixteenth-century emblems by 
marcus Gheeraerts the elder, with his initials ‘i.G.’ or ‘i.G.F[acit]’. Cf. Smith, Schouwtoneel, 
97–98.
Saavedra’s Idea offers both tacitean and esoteric guidelines for political 
and moral behaviour as an alternative mirror of princes.139 another exam-
ple is the compilation Emblematum ethico-politicorum centuria, published 
in 1619 in Heidelberg by Julius wilhelm Zinkgref, which, on the basis of its 
focus on the common welfare of the republic, might be called a mirror of 
citizens.140 in the wake of these emblemata politica, fable collections too 
became increasingly politicized. as both Vondel and ogilby realized, the 
aesopian world populated by animals enabled allegorical representations 
of good government and the colourful parody of opponents.141
The Fable’s Two Handles
this short survey reveals that the De la Courts’ employment of fables 
clearly followed an established and successful literary practice that 
countered the repudiation of the genre by classical and late humanist rhe-
torical theory. in all the brothers’ treatises, parabolic fables play a promi-
nent role, culminating in the Sinryke Fabulen which consists of a hundred 
different fables with the extra explanatory force of emblematic engrav-
ings.142 in line with conventional emblemata, every one of this work’s 
fables consists of, first, a motto in Dutch, followed by an emblem which is 
clarified by a Latin epigram, then the corresponding parable itself and 
finally some explanatory remarks. Yet in this last part of the emblematic 
fable, De la Court clearly departed from tradition: to every fable he added 
a short explanation in the terms of ‘who is who?’ which he then further 
elucidated in a long interpretive discussion, starting with general remarks 
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143 Cf. Smith, Schouwtoneel der dieren, 97–98; and meertens, Nederlandse emblemata, 
164.
144 Fajardo, Idea principis christiano-politici centum symbolis expressa (Brussels, 1649). 
the library of Pieter de la Court van der Voort contained a copy of this edition: Library, 
fol. 16.
145 Boxhorn, Emblemata politica, et orationes (amsterdam, 1635).
146 Cf. Bettina Noak, “De Sinryke Fabulen (1685) van Pieter de la Court: verhulling en 
onthulling in een ‘verlicht’ genre,” De Zeventiende Eeuw 18 (2002), 65–78; and H. wansink, 
“De “Sinryke Fabulen” van Pieter de la Court,” in Blom and wildenberg (eds.), Pieter de la 
Court, 185–193.
147 Sinryke Fabulen, “Voorreeden tot den Leesere,” sig. *3; Ibidem, 520: “… die wonderlik 
klouke Philosooph Renatus des Cartes.” Ibidem, 561: “Descartes, die … sijns gelijken in 
geene voorgaande eewen heeft gehad.” For the role of fables in Cartesian philosophy, 
cf. Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, Descartes. La fable du monde (Paris: Vrin, 1991).
on human nature and then focusing on the current political situation in 
the Dutch Republic. Hence, throughout the Sinryke Fabulen, the reader is 
persuaded to connect its contents with contemporary events and debates 
in agreement with De la Court’s own conclusions.
this explicit politicization of the fable, as well as the long comments in 
prose whilst more traditional collections were in general written in 
verse,143 reveal the influence of the emblemata politica. the De la Courts 
proved to be ardent readers of Fajardo and they frequently referred to the 
Latin edition of his Idea.144 their Leiden teacher Boxhorn had also com-
piled a comparable emblem collection of emblems in 1635, which offered 
its readers guidelines on how to behave in governmental and civic 
affairs.145 in the work of the De la Courts, this political endeavour goes 
hand in hand with the subject matter, the moralizing message, and satiri-
cal features of the aesopian fable. written in the vernacular and clearly 
addressing a much more popular audience than Boxhorn’s Latin prose 
could aspire to, the De la Courts’ fables move on the borderline between 
two closely related subgenres.
in the preface to the Sinryke Fabulen, De la Court offers the reader an 
extensive discussion of his motives for this employment of emblematic 
fables.146 the preface begins with an analysis of the way in which abstract 
ideae (De la Court translates this term to the Dutch “Denkbeelden”, which 
has the significant connotation of ‘images’) are imprinted on the human 
mind. this analysis is the first direct sign in the brothers’ entire œuvre of 
the influence of Cartesian epistemology: praising “that wonderfully clever 
Philosopher Renatus Descartes … who has not had his equal in all previ-
ous centuries”,147 De la Court attempts to present his considerations as 
being in vogue with the newest philosophy. Yet his reading of Descartes 
remains fairly superficial. Referring to Descartes’s Meditations, De la 
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148 Sinryke Fabulen, “Voorreeden,” sig. **2v.: “… dat yder Leeser die Vergelijkenissen met 
opgemelde Beelden, seer ligtelik maken, als ook ligtelik toepassen kan, ende gaarne wil.” 
Cf. also Politike Discoursen ii.iV.13.
149 Ibidem, sig. **3: “… al schertsende ende al laggende, de waarheid seggen, ende de 
menschen door haare aangenaamheid beweegen, soodanig, dat der Fabulen lighaame-
like Figuren, waar van sy spreeken, seer ligtelik in onse Memorie ofte Geheugenisse 
geprent, ende seer lange onthouden konnen werden.”
150 See Patterson, Aesopian Writing, esp. 4–5. Cf. as well Lewis, English Fable, 35–36, who 
quotes from the 1703 english translation of the Sinryke Fabulen, yet unaware that its author 
was De la Court. Lewis states on p. 44 that the author’s “name, once thought to be Johan de 
wit, has been lost”, which reveals the obscurity of the De la Courts within anglophone 
historical scholarship, as well as the apparent obstinacy to investigate possible continen-
tal influences on english culture more thoroughly.
151 Bacon, Works, vol. Vi: 695.
Court discusses how intelligible ideas can be made accessible to the mind, 
and he then claims that the expedient of the fable is a particularly appro-
priate means to convey ideas and reveal hidden knowledge, since “every 
Reader can very easily make the Comparisons with those Images, and also 
apply them easily, and willingly”.148 in other words, the use of illustrative 
images of, for example, speaking animals and plants, offers a rhetorical 
means to impress people and to make them perceive the issue at stake, 
arousing the passions of pleasure and delight. as Horace and Juvenal 
revealed, fables make it possible “to speak the truth while jesting and 
laughing, and move the People through their pleasantness, in such a way 
that the bodily Figures of the Fables … can be very easily imprinted in our 
Memory or Remembrance and be recalled for a very long time”.149 the 
emblematic fable combines satire with instruction and is therefore a par-
ticularly forceful rhetorical device for playing upon the imagination and 
expounding the author’s truth.
the genre of the fable also entails another highly significant character-
istic: its openness to a variety of different readings, whereby it actively 
engages readers to construct their own interpretation independently.150 
Bacon, in his preface to De sapientia veterum, had expressed his discom-
fort with this feature of the fable, assuring that “i know very well what 
pliant stuff fable is made of, how freely it will follow any way you please to 
draw it, and how easily with a little dexterity and discourse of wit mean-
ings which it was never meant to bear may be plausibly put upon it”.151 
Bacon did not feel at ease with this intrinsic ambivalence of the fable, yet 
not all seventeenth-century writers of fables shared his concerns. instead, 
for many the very nature of the fable as ‘pliant stuff’, as a genre which 
conveys meanings in an ambiguous, suggestive and indirect manner, 
involved a deliberate rhetorical move through which the authority of the 
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152 Sinryke Fabulen, sig. **3: “… alsoo men van alle menschelijke saaken met der 
waarheid segt, dat sy twee Hand-vatten, eene regte eene linkse hebben; ende men van alle 
oude Fabulen met meerdere reedenen kan seggen, dat sy ontallike veele aangreepen heb-
ben: Sulks nieman behoorde te vermoeden, dat alhier door ons eenige Fabul op hem 
alleen gemaakt zy, ende uitgelegt behoorde te werden: nemaar alsoo de Leeringen ofte 
Uitleggingen van dien oneindig zijn, soo kan een yder voor sig selven de beste toepassing 
ende uitlegging maaken.” Cf. a similar passage in Ibidem, 464.
153 a point stressed by Patterson, Aesopian Writing, esp. 1–12, 55.
154 Sinryke Fabulen, ‘Voorreeden’, sig. **2: “… de Volkeren die van ouds meest onder 
tyrannen ende Dwingelanden in het Oosten geleefd, ende dien volgende gevreesd heb-
ben, met de waarheid ende nuttigheid der menschelike Saaken te beschrijven ende te 
leeren, deselve Tyrannen te vertoornen; genoodsaakt, ende de vrye Grieken ook daar na 
vrywillig ten raade zijn geworden, de menschen in het gemeen van der waarheid te 
onderrigten, ten Deugden te raaden, ende van haare gebreeken af te schrikken door versi-
erde Historien, Apologen, Vergelijkenissen, Parabolen ende Fabulen; om door dat middel de 
menschen te gelijk te leeren ende te vermaaken, sonder opgemelde afkeerigheid der 
text was ultimately bestowed by the author upon his readers. De la Court 
was acutely aware of this feature of the fable. in the preface to the Sinryke 
Fabulen, he states:
it is said with truth of all human matters that they have two Handles, one 
right and one left; and one can say of all old Fables more rightly that they 
have countless levers: therefore, no one should suspect that a Fable is made 
by us and should be explained referring to him only: instead, because the 
Lessons or explanations of it are endless, so can any one make for himself 
the best application and explanation.152
as this significant passage reveals, the use of fables to encode one’s con-
victions serves the additional purpose of renouncing any responsibility 
for how the text is being interpreted.
Such a rejection of authorial responsibility has a clear political dimen-
sion. ever since antiquity, when the allegedly black slave aesop created 
the genre, fables had been a favourite medium of communication used by 
or in behalf of those without power to denounce the political establish-
ment: on the one hand, because fables evidently address unequal power 
relations, on the other because they perform, with their openness to mul-
tiple readings, an intrinsic function of self-protection.153 as De la Court 
puts it,
the Peoples who have lived of old mostly under tyrants and Bullies in the 
East … have become compelled … to teach men in general of truth and to 
recommend Virtues and to deter them from their failings, through adorned 
Histories, Apologues, Comparisons, Parables, and Fables; to by this means 
instruct and delight men at the same time without being subject to the aver-
sion of the People, and to the bitterness or hate of the great Lords.154
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menschen, ende de verbitteringe, ofte haat der groote Heeren onderworpen te zijn.” Cf. a 
similar passage in Politike Weeg-schaal, “inleyding,” p. 1–2.
155 Sinryke Fabulen, 162: “… dat wy ons eigen oordeel daar van niet oopenbaaren, maar 
den Leesere selfs laaten oordeelen sullen.” Cf. the comparable passages in e.g. Ibidem, 76, 
388, 644.
in other words, the use of fables liberates a writer from the restrictions 
imposed by censorship and the wrath of those in power – a particu-
larly important expedient for unconventional authors such as the De la 
Courts, especially in the case of the Sinryke Fabulen, written under the 
Stadholdership of william iii. while the references in this work to 
the government in power are always rather obvious, De la Court refrains 
from making them utterly explicit, and he often resorts to mere rhetorical 
litotes or abruptly finishes his speech when it comes to the crunch. His 
method, as he explains, entails that “we do not reveal our own judgment, 
but leave the Reader judge for himself”.155 Fables thus entice the reader’s 
imagination, they engage the audience to participate in the establish-
ment of literary meaning and authority. they make not only the author 
but also the reader an active part of the public debate.
Yet this involvement of the audience is not free of risks. as argued 
above, the De la Courts were deeply suspicious of the frailty of human 
judgment if left unattended. the rhetorical strategy of the Sinryke Fabulen 
therefore also entails an attempt to take the reader by the hand and guide 
him or her, under the guise of fables, towards agreement with De la Court’s 
republican stance. the fable’s veil is thin, the connotations of all its 
aesopian characters are often more than obvious, and unlike the tradi-
tional, more neutral enactment of animals as mere representation of the 
human world, De la Court clearly mobilized all the elements of the 
emblematic genre to expound his overtly partisan republican message.
a good example of this strategy is De la Court’s rendering of the 
Classical story of the frogs who desire a king. Unhappy with their useful 
but uninspiring leader, a log, the frogs ask Jupiter for an new lord and 
eventually end up with a hungry stork. De la Court’s version of this fable 
offers first, above the emblem itself, a Dutch motto saying “Happy is he, 
who does not desire to be anyone’s Slave or tyrant”, followed by the Latin 
epigram ut servitus contra naturam, ita natura in tyrannidem proclivis 
(see fig. 7). the fable then describes the initial state of the frogs as one of 
“full freedom” where every frog served in turns as “Head or the First of the 
assembly”. Yet because of their ignorance and longing for splendour, the 
frogs aspired to be honoured by a military leader, the stork. as De la Court 
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clarifies in the terms of fabula docet, this stork proved to be a “Head of the 
Republic who cannot only fight its enemies, but also tyrannize its Lawful 
Regents and inhabitants”. ‘Frogs’ was a popular derogative term for 
Dutchmen, and De la Court asserts that “as we have seen in our times”, 
free republics perish when they bestow the military power in the hands of 
one man, who as a stork will eat up the country’s riches and liberties.156
156 Ibidem, 89–94: “De Kikvorssen seekeren tijd in voller vryheid geleefd hebbende, 
soodaanig, dat yder van haar op sijne beurt Hoofd ofte de Eerste der Vergaaderinge wierd 
… den ojevaar … een Hoofd der Republike, dat niet alleen de Vyanden van dien beoorloo-
gen, maar ook de Wettige Regenten ende de Ingeseetenen van dien, tyranniseeren kan … 
Gelijk wy ook in onse tijden gesien hebben.” the same fable is told in Politike Weeg-schaal 
ii.ii.4. For the mockery of Dutchmen being ‘frogs’, cf. the fable “of the Frogs Fearing the 
Sun would marry” in the 1668 edition of John ogilby’s Fables of Aesop, discussed in 
Loveridge, Augustan Fable, 124–126.
Fig. 7. ‘‘the frogs and a log,’’ from Pieter de la Court, Sinryke Fabulen, 1685. amsterdam 
University Library, otm: oK 63-2796
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157 Sinryke Fabulen, 99–102: “… het Bos, eene Vrye Republik … de magt die soo een Overste 
krijgt om de Krijgs-Knegten ten allen tijden by een te roepen, ende naar sijnen sin te gebieden 
ter beetere bescherminge der Republike, ende die de selve altijds gebruiken kan, ende ook 
veeltijds gebruikt, ter onderdrukkinge van dien … die Krijgs-ooversten haare onderhoorige 
Krijgs-luiden gebruikt hebben, om sig Tyrannen oover dien Vryen Staat, ende alle de 
ingeseetenen van dien tot haare Slaaven te maaken.”
158 Ibidem, 43–46: “… de man ende die Ruiter, een in magt-uitsteekend mensch, die tot 
Veld-oversten voor eene reise ofte voor eene Veldtogt aangenoomen werd. Met een Ruiter 
op sig te hebben … in slaavernie te leeven.”
this obvious – though never explicit – identification of the fable’s 
tyrannical figure as Stadholder william iii, who obtained power when he 
was appointed to captain-general in 1672, is repeated in many other 
fables. there is the story of the lumberjack who asks the “Free Republic” 
of the trees for one branch to repair his axe, with which he eventually 
chops down the entire forest. this lumberjack, De la Court warns, is like a 
“General who obtains the power to convoke the soldiers at all times … and 
who can use them at all times, and does use them often, to suppress the 
Republic”. eventually he “makes himself Tyrant over that Free State and 
all its inhabitants his Slaves”.157 Similar is the fable that tells of the dispute 
between a horse and a dear. to fight his opponent, the horse asks for the 
assistance of a knight. together they kill the deer, but when the horse 
thanks his rider and asks to be free again, the horseman maintains his 
yoke. again, De la Court characterizes the horseman as a “General who is 
employed for one campaign or for one Battle”, while being ridden by such 
a knight equals to “living in slavery”.158 with this powerful republican rhet-
oric designed to play upon the passions of shame and fear, De la Court 
evocatively suggests that under the regime of william iii, the Dutch 
Republic lost its true liberty and was again enslaved by the tyrannical ele-
ment of the Stadholder. Conveyed in the characteristic language of repub-
lican liberty as opposed to the slavery of arbitrary domination, De la 
Court’s fables prove to be an integral element of his and his brother’s anti-
monarchical enterprise.
the overt politicization of these fables is not restricted to versions of 
aesopian allegories. the works of the De la Courts also feature a number 
of parables that are clearly inspired by their own context and the com-
mercial, urban society of the Dutch Republic. For example, one emblem 
in the Sinryke Fabulen depicts the members of different guilds disputing 
over the defence of their town, a scene which reveals that the work was 
directed at the debating practices of the civic population of the Dutch cit-
ies. the same discursive dimension comes to the fore in another fable, 
which is a variation on the age-old theme of the body politic that aspires 
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159 Cf. on the same theme Ibidem, 287–294 and 517–530. See for some general comments 
on the metaphor of the body politic Patterson, Aesopian Writing, 111–137.
160 Politike Weeg-schaal iii.iii.2, p. 647–648: “… het eerste van een opperste Doctor in de 
Medicinen … het twede Eiland zeide hy bewoond te zijn van veele Heeren Doctoren in de 
Medicinen … maar dat het derde Eiland, ter contrarie geen Medicijn-meesters in hebbende, 
was bewoond van menschen, die met zeer geringe kennisse, haar eige Medicijn-meesters der-
fden te weezen.” Cf. the slightly different and still more overtly politicized version in the 
Sinryke Fabulen, 71–76.
161 Sinryke Fabulen, 501–508: “De Kool-brander ende de Laaken-bereider.”
to maintain concord and political health.159 this fable introduces a sailor 
who tells his expectant audience a tale of three islands he has encoun-
tered on a long journey through the seas of the east indies. the first island, 
he says, was ruled by “one supreme Doctor of Medicine”, the second by 
“many Lords Doctors of Medicine”, while the third “was inhabited by peo-
ple, who with very small knowledge, dared to be their own Medical doc-
tors”.160 the sailor explains that he saw many people in very bad health on 
the first two islands, yet on the third, the population was large and people 
were hale and hearty. the message of this fable has a strong democratic 
connotation, which is dramatized by an exotic story of travel and discov-
ery. Commercial expansion overseas, as the fable seems to suggest, pro-
vides a fresh answer to the question how the metropolis should be 
organized politically.
this fable of the three islands highlights again the discursive practices 
of the civic population of the Dutch towns. its emblem in the Sinryke 
Fabulen (see fig. 8) captures the sailor’s speech-act when addressing his 
attentive audience. So too does the engraving to another fable which 
stages a conversation between a charcoal burner and a textile entrepre-
neur (fig. 9).161 accordingly, these emblematic fables reveal how the genre 
gradually changed over the course of the seventeenth century. From 
being disclaimed by Vossius as only apt for a coarse and vulgar audience, 
with the brothers De la Court the fable had become a literary means for 
the mobilization of this popular public. Deliberately involving the audi-
ence in the establishment of meaning and authority, the fable, from a 
symbol of an imaginative animal realm outside of human life, had become 
a representation of the emergent reality of a popular public debate.
Unmasking the Fox: Boccalini vs. Machiavelli
to summarize, the De la Courts’ employment of fables entailed a rhetori-
cal strategy to encode their political message suggestively and in an enter-
taining way, directly appealing to the imagination of their readers. apart 
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from such instruction and delight, there is also a further dimension to the 
fable, which brings us back to the issue of parrhèsia. this aspect, aptly 
revealed in the parable of the Kingdom of the apes, involves the placing 
of a mirror in front of two-faced behaviour. the fable confronts the reader 
with a world where corruption cannot be shrouded and where frankness 
proves its value.162
a telling illustration of this aspect is an emblematic fable that rebukes 
monarchical and clerical hypocrisy. the emblem of this fable (see fig. 10), 
162 Cf. Sharpe, “Commonwealth of meanings,” 101. on the relation between fables and 
parrhèsia, see also Jennifer London, “How to Do things with Fables: ibn al-muqaffa’‘s 
Frank Speech in Stories from Kalīla Wa Dimna,” History of Political Thought 29 (2008): 
189–212.
Fig. 8. “a boatman’s tale,” from Pieter de la Court, Sinryke Fabulen, 1685. amsterdam 
University Library, otm: oK 63-2796
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again a variation on a Classical theme, shows, under a biblical warning for 
pharisaic dissimulation, a fox in a sculptor’s atelier, intrigued by the life-
like statue of a woman. the fox, who represents shrewdness, has taken off 
his mask, the timeless symbol of duplicity. as the fable then explains, the 
fox has eventually realized that the woman is only stone, and thus he 
embodies “wise and experienced people who penetrate appearances and 
expose underhand Hypocrites”. the elements of the fox’s mask and the 
sculpture serve as emblematic representations of the way in which reality 
can be shaped and manipulated, playfully unmasking the disguised inten-
tions underlying human behaviour. more significantly, in his explanatory 
words De la Court reproaches “that famous Instructor of Kings and 
Monarchs”, machiavelli, for encouraging foxy behaviour. as De la Court 
Fig. 9. “the charcoal burner and the textile entrepreneur,” from Pieter de la Court, Sinryke 
Fabulen, 1685. amsterdam University Library, otm: oK 63-2796
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163 Sinryke Fabulen, 473–480: “… den Vosse, wijse ende ervaarene menschen, die den 
schijn ontdekken, ende de geveinsde Hypocriten ten toone stellen … met welke onse mee-
ninge seer wel oover een komt die in Staatkonde, kennisse der menschelike Saaken; ende 
manhaftige kloukmoedigheid, onvergelijkelike Trajano Boccalini … die bekende 
Leermeester der Koningen ende Vorsten … dat in wel-gestelde Vrye Republiken, opgemelde 
geveinsdheid den Regenten niet noodsaakelik is, jaa aldaar gebruikt werdende, den selven 
Geveinsden veeltijds meerdere schaade aanbrengd, dan of sy den regten weg des Deugds 
waaren ingegaan.” Cf. machiavelli, Principe XViii.
maintains, “in well-ordered Free Republics such dissimulation is not nec-
essary for the Governors” and it will be only detrimental. Here De la Court 
explicitly aligns with another italian political writer, stressing that his 
‘opinion corresponds very well to the in Politics, knowledge of human 
matters, and manly stout-heartedness incomparable Traiano Boccalini’.163
Fig. 10. ‘‘the fox and the mask,’’ from Pieter de la Court, Sinryke Fabulen, 1685. amsterdam 
University Library, otm: oK 63-2796
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164 Haitsma mulier, Myth of Venice, esp. 126–130, and idem, “Controversial Republican,” 
254–257. For a meticulous survey of all borrowings from machiavelli in the Politike 
Discoursen, see Paul van Heck, “in het spoor van machiavelli: de Politike Discoursen, 1662, 
van Johan en Pieter de la Court,” LIAS. Sources and Documents Relating to the Early Modern 
History of Ideas 27 (2000), 277–318. as Van Heck shows, the De la Courts read machiavelli 
in italian and referred to the so-called testina-edition that was published repeatedly in 
Geneva between ca. 1610 and ca. 1670 under the false date of publication ‘m.D.L.’ the 
library of Pieter de la Court van der Voort contained such a copy of “tutte l’opere di Nic. 
machiavelli” with the year of publication indicated as 1550: see Library, fol. 19.
165 Kahn, Machiavellian Rhetoric, 169.
166 Franciscus van den enden, Vrije politieke stellingen, ed. wim Klever (amsterdam: 
wereldbibliotheek, 1992), 161: “N. machiavel, een ongeveinsden, en openbare voorstander 
van alle vuile superstitie, en bedriegerye.” See also Ibidem, 191, 195, 229.
this remark reveals an important aspect of the way in which the De la 
Court brothers appropriated the legacy of italian Renaissance republican-
ism. thus far, historians have emphasized the De la Courts’ debt to 
machiavelli as a major source of their republican endeavour. Haitsma 
mulier, in particular, has highlighted that many passages in the brothers’ 
work directly echo machiavelli’s political and historical treatises.164 Surely, 
machiavelli’s influence on their thought is beyond doubt. Yet his influ-
ence is more ambivalent than hitherto assumed. according to Haitsma 
mulier, the De la Courts were the first in the Dutch Republic to openly 
read machiavelli in a positive way as a republican theorist and an intel-
lectual guide for their own anti-monarchical agenda. Yet if we follow 
Victoria Kahn’s characterization of the machiavellian moment as primar-
ily a rhetorical moment, then another issue comes to the fore which has 
escaped Haistma mulier’s acute insight: the appropriation of machiavelli 
not only as a republican theorist, but also as a dangerous rhetorician, a 
hypocrite machiavel. as Kahn has shown, the combination of these two 
different readings dominated the early-modern reception of machiavelli. 
in the work of milton, for example, “the machiavel and the republican – 
far from being decorously distinguished – are conspicuously linked”.165
a similar reading of machiavelli as both a crafty rhetorician and 
a republican theorist can be detected in the works of the brothers De 
la Court and their Dutch contemporaries. their characterization of 
machiavelli as “that famous Instructor of Kings and Monarchs” makes 
clear that the De la Courts did not read machiavelli only as a republican, 
but also as a notorious teacher of dissimulation and fraud in speech and 
politics. Van den enden similarly portrayed machiavelli, referring to the 
Discorsi, as “an unfeigned and open advocate of all foul superstition and 
deceit”.166 machiavelli embodied reason of state politics at its worst, and it 
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167 Caspar Barlaeus, “een Redening of Dissertatie … tegens de stockredenen van 
Nicolaes machiavel,” in idem, Oratien, en Blijde inkomst van Maria de Medicis (amsterdam, 
1662), 48–89, a Dutch translation of the original Latin oration held in 1633. Gentillet’s Anti-
Machiavel was translated into Dutch in 1637 as Discours van State … tegens Nicolaes 
Machiavel, an edition also in the library of Pieter de la Court van der Voort: Library, fol. 19.
is this particular aspect of machiavellianism which may explain why 
machiavelli became such a popular source for republicans in england and 
the Dutch Republic in the course of the 1650s – in both countries, a period 
of sudden changes that revealed the highly contingent character of 
politics. machiavelli offered a framework to deal with such contingency 
rhetorically. out of their anxiety about the role of language in politics, 
thinkers like the De la Courts turned to machiavelli for insight in the 
realm of de facto power, but not necessarily because they saw in him a 
champion of republicanism. instead, for the De la Courts machiavelli con-
tinued to be the advisor of princes, the archetypical shrewd counsellor 
who abuses rhetoric and blurs the distinction between virtue and vice. 
this was the traditional depiction popularized in Gentillet’s Anti-
Machiavel (1576) and, in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, in an 
oration by the humanist scholar Caspar Barlaeus.167 in their rebuttal of 
dissimulative speech, the De la Courts followed this traditional portrayal 
of machiavelli. as this book shows throughout, they heartily differed from 
machiavellian republicanism on various significant issues, from their ref-
utation of Roman expansionism to their embrace of commercial wealth 
and social concord.
it is therefore more instructive to highlight the De la Courts’ appropria-
tion of another italian thinker, and one the brothers openly mention as 
their real hero: traiano Boccalini. Boccalini was the author of two works 
that would become the seventeenth-century locus classicus of tacitean, 
republican satire of princely and clerical hypocrisy: the Ragguagli di 
Parnaso and the Pietra del paragone politico (1612–1614). this series of 
‘announcements’ from mount Parnassus consists of a total of almost three 
hundred fantastical, allegorical tales in which many famous men, above 
all sixteenth-century italian writers, historians and politicians, figure as 
the characters in a timeless realm of emblematic irony and ridicule gov-
erned by apollo. in every one of these allegories, Boccalini effectively sati-
rized the world of letters and politics through vivid descriptions of how its 
representatives experience all kinds of bizarre encounters. Boccalini’s 
tales are populated by men and not by animals, yet their fictional and 
comical character performs the same function of metaphor and parody as 
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168 Quoted in Harald Hendrix, Traiano Boccalini fra erudizione e polemica. Ricerche sulla 
fortuna e bibliografia critica (Florence: olschki, 1995), 5.
169 traiano Boccalini, Ragguagli di Parnasso e scritti minori, ed. Luigi Firpo, 3 vols. (Bari: 
Laterza, 1948). See for the praise of Venice esp. i.5 and i.39; for the critique of monarchs 
and princes i.35 and i.77; and for tacitus i.29 and ii.71. For some general remarks on 
Boccalini’s political thought, see maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State. The 
Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics 1250–1600 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 257–266; and cf. for a more republican reading Vittor 
ivo Comparato, “From the Crisis of Civil Culture to the Neapolitan Republic of 1647: 
Republicanism in italy between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in Van 
Gelderen and Skinner (eds.), Republicanism, vol. i: 177–179.
170 See Harrington, Oceana, 240–241. For a general survey of the reception of Boccalini, 
see Hendrix, Traiano Boccalini, esp. 109–137.
171 Ibidem, 25–26, 33–34, 54–56, 146–149, and the overview of Dutch imitations on 
352–356.
in aesopian fables. as Boccalini explained his intentions in a letter to – of 
all people – James i:
in order that the open truth, to which i have paid particular attention, will 
not harm me through provoking the rage of those great princes, interests 
and opinions of which i have spoken, i have covered the truth with the 
cloaks of jokes, masked by the shades of metaphors.168
accordingly, below the surface of satire, Boccalini’s allegories reveal 
committed political convictions. they herald the aristocratic constitu-
tion of Venice as the most perfect republican government and eloquently 
condemn the imperious, lazy, and uncultured behaviour of monarchs 
and courtiers, disclosed by the ingenious “occhiali politici” of tacitus’s 
writings.169
after Boccalini’s death in 1613, his writings enjoyed much appeal 
across the continent among such diverse groups as German Rosicrucians, 
Venetian libertines, and english republicans, including Harrington.170 
arguably, Boccalini found the largest following in the Dutch Republic, 
both in terms of publications (after italy, most seventeenth-century edi-
tions of the Ragguagli were published in the Netherlands), and in terms 
of direct literary and republican impact, enhanced by Boccalini’s strong 
anti-Spanish sentiments which met with substantial Dutch approval. this 
Dutch interest in Boccalini peaked after 1660. a series of publications of 
his works in ‘Cosmopoli’ (i.e. amsterdam) culminated with the widely cir-
culated 1669 edition of the Ragguagli by the editorial house of Blaeu. 
Numerous Dutch imitations of the events on Parnassus followed until the 
end of the century.171
many of these publications had a distinct political connotation, as 
exemplified by the collection of poems titled Den herstelden Apollos Harp, 
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172 Den herstelden Apollos Harp, versien met verscheyde nieuwe snaren [1663], a modified 
re-edition of Apollos harp, bestaande in Nederduytsche Mengelrymen (amsterdam, 1658), 
“ordonnantie,” sig. *2: “apollo ende den breeden raadt der vermaerde dichteren en 
scherp-sinnighe verstanden eendrachtelijck vergadert op den berg Helicon … van ouden 
tyden vyanden sijn gheweest van monarchale ende tyrannische regeringhe … dat sy volko-
mentlijck de opperhoofdigheyt van een mensch soo in wereltlijck als in ’t kerckelijck 
souden verworpen hebben”; sig. *7: “… om de loffelijcke intentie van onse wettige overheyt 
soo veel in ons was te seconderen, en de geblindthoekte ingesetenen nader door ’t schri-
jven van de waerheyt de oogen te openen.” the collection also contains Vondel’s poem Op 
de Weegschael van Hollandt.
173 the De la Courts most probably read Boccalini in italian. Hendrix, Boccalini, 135, 
suggests otherwise, but he does not discuss all the brothers’ references to Boccalini so his 
argument is not conclusive. in any case, the library of Pieter de la Court van der Voort 
contained only an italian edition of the Raggguagli, published in Venice in 1617, as well as 
a copy of La Bilancia Politica di tutte l’opere di Trajano Boccalini (‘Castellana’ [= Geneva], 
1678): Library, fol. 19.
174 Politike Weeg-schaal iii.i.6, p. 565: “… heeft Trajano Boccalini wel aardig konnen bes-
potten in zijne Politike Fabulen.”
175 Cf. Haitsma mulier, Myth of Venice, 133–134.
versien met vesrcheyde nieuwe snaren [“the Recovered Harp of apollo, 
Provided with Several New Strings”], published in 1663. this partisan 
anthology is introduced to the public by an “ordinance”, signed by 
“traiano Boccalini” on behalf of “apollo and the broad council of famous 
poets and sharp-witted minds harmoniously gathered at the mount 
Helicon”. the ordinance states that these men “have as of old been ene-
mies of monarchical and tyrannical governments”, who, after their first 
dwellings in the free republics of ancient Greece and Renaissance italy, 
have now settled in Holland. with their verse, they reveal the baseness of 
“the chiefdom of one man, both in worldly and ecclesiastical matters”. 
thus they aim “to support the laudable intention of our lawful Government 
[read: the regime of ‘true Liberty’] as much as possible, and to open the 
eyes of the blindfolded inhabitants further through the writing of the 
truth”.172 in short, this anthology mobilized Boccalini’s Parnassus as a 
poetical realm of Dutch anti-orangism.
the De la Courts’ explicit praise of Boccalini was evidently part of this 
tendency to read and interpret the Ragguagli in a Dutch republican con-
text.173 their work contains numerous passages directly taken from 
Boccalini as fable-like illustrations and explanations of the brothers’ own 
republican enterprise. in referring to these allegories explicitly as “Political 
Fables”,174 the De la Courts’ employment of Boccalini transcends a mere 
correspondence in political stance and pessimism about human nature.175 
it serves in particular a distinctly rhetorical function: just as the other 
fables within their writings, the passages taken from Boccalini combine 
132 chapter two
176 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.35, p. 170–171 (absent from the first edition): “eindelik indien 
iemant vraagt, waarom de menschen zoo veele uitsteekende deugden konnen zien in 
Monarchen; indien de zelven daar niet zijn; die kan zijn antwoort vinden in ’t 59 Ragg. van 
Trajano Boccalini … en besluit, Boccalini deese Fabul met deeze woorden: Alle welke actien 
dezes loshoofdigen Prince een yder dede oordeelen, dat het geluk alleen, van in een absolute 
authoriteit en hoogheyt te zijn, ons zeer dikwils doet gelooven, wijze Salomons te zijn, zoodan-
ige menschen, welke gemeene Borgers weezende, zouden bevonden werden, waarelik te zijn 
harssenlooze Flegels.”
the satirical expedients of delight and instruction, the political feature of 
indirectness and variability of meaning, and the anti-machiavellian 
morality of unmasking hypocrisy and pleading for candour.
this threefold rhetorical function is exemplified by De la Court’s 
employment of one of Boccalini’s Ragguagli to conclude his brother’s 
reproof of monarchical rule in the Politike Weeg-schaal. Having disclaimed 
all possible advantages of a monarchy, De la Court finishes with a power-
ful prolepsis. He writes: “Finally, if someone asks why men can see so many 
outstanding virtues in Monarchs, when these are not there?; then he can 
find his answer in the 59th Ragguaglio of Trajano Boccalini.” this raggua-
glio tells the story of a pretentious nephew of the Prince of Sparta 
who, when unexpectedly not appointed as his successor, turns out to be 
as stupid as any other human being. after a free translation of a part of the 
tale, De la Court then approvingly rephrases Boccalini’s conclusion that 
“only the fortune of being in absolute authority and highness makes us often 
believe that those men are wise Salomons, while if they were common 
Citizens, they would be considered truly brainless Boors”.176 For contempo-
rary readers, it must have been clear that De la Court was not making a 
general remark here but that he had a particular pretentious young man 
in mind: the Prince of orange, and future king, william iii. the employ-
ment of Boccalini’s parables thus entails all three rhetorical expedients of 
the fable. First, it serves to illustrate and clarify the argument in a witty 
and attractive manner. Secondly, it makes any attentive reader aware of 
the obvious similarity between the unsuccessful Spartan Prince and the 
young william iii, a comparison that therefore does not need to be made 
dangerously explicit. and thirdly, it shows the necessity of unveiling 
monarchical dissimulation and the force of humour to convey such a 
truth. whilst machiavelli revealed the political power of dissimulation, 
Boccalini offered the De la Courts the rhetorical means to challenge this 
power through the device of the fable.
in sum, the De la Courts’ employment of Boccalinian and aesopian 
fables can be characterized as a rhetorical endeavour that dramatizes 
the paradox between a very clear political message and its openness to 
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177 G.w.F. Hegel, Aesthetik, ed. Friedrich Bassenge, 2 vols. (Frankfurt: europäische 
Verlagsanstalt, [1955]), vol. i: 376: “… weil er seine Lehren nicht offen sagen darf, sondern 
sie nur versteckt, in einem Rätsel gleichsam, zu verstehen geben kann, das zugleich immer 
gelöst ist.”
178 Cf. Lewis, English Fable, 3, 20.
179 Sinryke Fabulen, 9: “… deesen Neederlander, die een hark een hark noemde.”
multiple readings, between the covering of meaning and the necessity 
and duty to reveal the truth. at the start of the seventeenth century, 
Bacon, reflecting the verdict of Classical rhetoric that fables were only apt 
for a vulgar public, had expressed his preoccupation with the genre’s 
capacity to undermine authorial intentions and to enable the reader to 
make up his own interpretation. However, in the work of the brothers De 
la Court, these elements of the fable are not any longer seen as detrimen-
tal but instead as conducive to the author’s aims of political critique. 
Because of its openness to different readings, the fable offers a façade 
behind which the author can escape from the censorship and loathing of 
his inconvenient truths. Yet the meaning and message of the fable can 
always be understood as they are meant. indeed, as Hegel has observed, 
the essential skill of the fabulist is that “since he is not allowed to articu-
late his message openly, he can only make it intelligible furtively, as in a 
riddle which is at the same time always being solved”.177
thus as a consequence of, rather than despite, its intrinsic opaqueness, 
the fable entails a distinct rhetorical move that results in an indirect con-
vulsion of traditional authority.178 in an age in which the power of mon-
archs was represented through clear and direct signs of hierarchy and 
dependence, this convulsion involved a distinctively republican endeavour 
to construct a system of signs and meanings that are constituted horizon-
tally and autonomously. in other words, by giving fables such a  prominent 
place within their theory, the brothers De la Court pleaded for a kind of 
debate that is relatively open, free, and independent from received opin-
ion. the almost transparent veil of fables offered the brothers the rhetori-
cal armory to convey this critical message and to present themselves as 
the embodiment of exactly this ideal of frankness – the ideal embodied by 
the Dutchman in the parable of the Kingdom of the apes who, though 
fearing for his life, did not waver and “called a spade a spade’.179
 Conclusion: the Rhetoric of the market
this plea for frankness as a distinct form of public speech reveals the 
extent to which the rhetoric of the De la Courts eventually departed from 
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180 Ibidem, 367: “… alsoo afkeerig zijn van alle oopenhertigheid, ende goede reeden-
kaavelinge, als sy wel in teegendeel geneegen zijn, om door duistere ende opgepronkte 
woorden ofte teekenen, het goed oordeel ofte verstand der menschen te bedwelmen.” Cf. 
a comparable passage in Ibidem, 234.
181 Politike Weeg-schaal iii.i.5, p. 544–545: “… met heftige welspreekentheit … zoo kon-
nen de gemeene Burgers tot de grootste excessen van de wereld werden vervoerd.”
182 on Hobbes’s rhetoric, see the extensive analysis in Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, and 
cf. the reaction of Lodi Nauta, “Hobbes the Pessimistic? Continuity of Hobbes’s Views on 
tradition. in many respects the narrative strategies employed by the 
brothers followed conventional late humanist rhetorical theory as exem-
plified by Vossius. Playing upon the passions of their audience through 
the establishment of authorial ethos and tapping the sources of eloquence 
by using all kinds of tropes, figures, and forms of ridicule, the De la Courts 
were evidently embedded within the rhetorical culture of their day. 
Nevertheless, their criticism of this culture is at least as evident, and ulti-
mately this criticism led the brothers into a direction that opened up new 
rhetorical ground.
the brothers’ departure from the rhetorical conventions is first 
discernible in their repudiation of the humanist orators par excellence: 
the courtly advisors and counsellors of princes, and the clergymen who 
preach from the pulpit. these two groups are the primary target of the 
brothers’ attack on hypocritical and demagogical speech that blurs 
the essential distinction between virtue and vice, in short, their attack at 
bad rhetoric. according to the De la Courts, courtiers and clergymen 
are merely dissimulative flatterers and obsessive agitators, “as averse to all 
openheartedness and proper reason as they are instead willing to stun 
through dark and embellished words or signs the good judgment or 
understanding of men”.180 this insincere, irrational speech is disastrous 
for the maintenance of social peace and political order, for “with vehe-
ment eloquence … the common Citizens can be carried away to the larg-
est excesses of the world”.181 the humanist rhetoric practiced by courtiers 
and clergy thus abuses the passions of the audience in an immoral way, 
and so it leads kings, worshippers and citizens astray into false judgment 
and immoderate impulsiveness.
Such a dismissal of demagogy and dissimulation was of course a com-
monplace argument in early-modern political theory, and in essence 
went as far back as Socrates’s dismissal of the sophistry of Callicles in 
Plato’s Gorgias. However, the De la Courts evidently try to surpass the 
borders of convention in a way that bears much resemblance to the com-
parable rhetorica contra rhetoricam of Hobbes.182 the De la Courts share 
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Reason and eloquence between The Elements of Law and Leviathan,” British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy 10 (2002), 31–54.
183 Politike Discoursen ii.iV.10, p. 72: “… sy uit haar studeer-kamer, Celletjen, ofte 
Predikstoel, anderen menschen losselik; of veeltijds daar-en-booven looselik, tot groot- 
making van haare eige schynheiligheid, eere ende profyt pleegen te schryven, te raaden, ofte 
te leeren.”
184 Ibidem ii. iV.13, p. 87–88: “… de wel-spreekendheid meenen sy te bestaan, in eenige 
bloemetjens, die uit-steekende Leeraars in haare schriften, ofte predicatien gesaaid heb-
ben, naar te seggen.”
185 Cf. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 298–299, for the comparable stance taken by 
Hobbes.
186 Sinryke Fabulen, 687: “want woorden te spreeken die geenen sin hebben, ende uit-
drukken; ofte woorden by een te vougend die teegen een strijdende sinnen hebben; als dat 
een vierkant, rond; of een deel soo groot aks sijn geheel is; ende gants niet te spreeken, eene 
ende de selve saak is.” Cf. Hobbes on insignificant speech in Leviathan i.5, p. 113: “and 
therefore if a man should talk to me of a round Quadrangle … i should not say he were in 
an errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, absurd.”
Hobbes’s suspicion of meaningless, deceptive language. Like Hobbes they 
specifically target the darkly embellished speech of ecclesiastics who, 
“from their study, little Cell, or Pulpit, use to write, counsel, or teach other 
people loosely, or often moreover wrongly, for the enlargement of their 
own hypocrisy, honour, and profit”.183 this audacious mockery of clerical 
counsel involves a refutation of two essential elements of humanist rheto-
ric. in the first place, the brothers De la Court argue that such detrimental 
speech is a consequence of awe for tradition and authority, which kills 
creative innovation and makes its practitioners “think that eloquence 
exists in repeating some little flowers that other outstanding teachers 
have sown in their writings or sermons”.184 Dismissing imitatio and the 
standing of auctoritas, this significant remark entails an obvious rejection 
of conventional humanist practice.
Secondly, and more importantly, the De la Courts criticize the assump-
tion that one of the main tasks of the orator is to be able to argue in 
utramque partem, on both sides of a case. according to the De la Courts, 
this traditional humanist claim that any issue can and should be defended 
on either side, lies at the origin of the duplicitous, cheating rhetoric of 
courtiers and clerics who play upon the passions of their audience in 
a wrong, immoral way and thus undermine an objective assessment of 
the common good.185 Such speech is utterly meaningless, for “to speak 
words that have or express no meaning, or to join words that have contra-
dictory meanings, such as saying that a square is round, or that a part is 
as big as its whole, is one and the same thing as not speaking at all”.186 with 
this Hobbesian move, the De la Courts demonstrate that the humanist 
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187 Aanwysing iii.8, p. 520–521: “… geene twijfelagtige ende voorstellende, maar wel 
deegelik eene Reeden-kavelende, Besluitende, ende dringende wijse van spreeken gebruike; 
ik antwoord, dat alle saaken die niet alleen in ietwes te weeten; maar ook ende voornee-
mentlik in ietwes te Begeeren ofte niet te Willen bestaan; ende die daar en boven teegen 
veeler menschen vooroor- en voordeelen strijden; niet anders konnen ofte behoorden ver-
handeld te werden.”
188 Quoted in Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning From More to 
Shakespeare (Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press, 1984), 231.
189 erasmus, A Diatribe or Sermon Concerning Free Will, in ernst F. winter (ed. and 
trans.), Discourse on Free Will. Erasmus-Luther (London and New York: Continuum, 1990), 
8. For a perceptive analysis of the dispute, see Brian Cummings, The Literary Culture of the 
Reformation. Grammar and Grace (oxford: oxford University Press, 2005), 144–183.
190 Politike Weeg-schaal, “inleyding,” p. 3: “… met de ronde waarheid zeer opentlik te 
spreeken.”
ideal of arguing both sides of a case eventually amounts to nothing but 
silence.
as an alternative to such meaningless discourse, the brothers propose 
“no doubtful and suggestive, but rather indeed a Rational, conclusive, and 
insisting way of speech”. it is such blunt, persuasive rhetoric that the De la 
Courts consider necessary to hold court in the public debate and to con-
vince the audience of an unpopular truth:
all matters which do not only consist in knowing something, but also and 
primarily in Desiring or not Wanting something, and which furthermore 
oppose the prejudgments and advantages of many people, cannot and 
should not be treated otherwise.187
essentially, the De la Courts thus repudiate the humanist emphasis on 
the variability of meaning. this humanist creed is perhaps best repre-
sented by erasmus, for whom the inconsistency of language and the limits 
drawn by decorum and mutual respect rendered bluntness both impos-
sible and counterproductive. thus erasmus praised thomas more’s abil-
ity “to play the man of all hours with all men”,188 and in his famous dispute 
with Luther on the topic of free will, he argued strongly that “the truth 
may be spoken but it does not serve everyone at all times and under all 
circumstances”.189
the De la Courts occupy a diametrically opposed stance, which bears a 
certain resemblance to the assertio of Luther, erasmus’s opponent. as the 
brothers’ praise for the Dutchman in the Kingdom of apes reveals, they 
declare the need for straightforward speech, even in the face of danger. 
they present themselves as the embodiment of precisely this ideal of 
frankness, pretending time and again “to speak very openly the round 
truth”.190 their “manner of writing”, so they assert, “is always outspoken, 
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191 Welvaren, p. 2: “… de maniere van schrijven, die altijds vrijmoedich, jae somtijds 
langh Stout ende scherp is, maer noijt, mijns wetens, van ernst ende waerheid afdwaeld.”
192 Bacon, Works, vol. Vi: 701–702, and cf. Colclough, Freedom of Speech, 61–62, 73–74.
193 Jacob Cats, Houwelyck (1625), quoted in eric Jan Sluijter, De ‘Heydensche Fabulen’ in 
de Noordnederlandse schilderkunst circa 1590–1670 (PhD dissertation University of Leiden, 
1986), 172.
yes at times very Bold and sharp, but it never strays from earnestness and 
truth”.191 in short, pace erasmus, the De la Courts insist that the truth must 
be spoken at all times. whilst the courtly Frenchman of the fable might 
engage in slavish flattery and merely ape the opinions of others, the fable’s 
free republican Dutchman speaks the truth bluntly, even when con-
fronted with death. this ideal of frankness, of parrhèsia, is the core of the 
De la Courts’ rhetorical assault on conventional rhetoric.
Significantly, parrhèsia was not always perceived to be a positive prac-
tice in late humanist culture. For example, the very first fable of Bacon’s 
De sapientia veterum, entitled “Cassandra, sive parrhesia”, comprised a 
critical account of such “unreasonable and unprofitable liberty in giving 
advice and admonition”. the fable tells of the fate of Cassandra, who, hav-
ing openly rejected apollo’s love, encountered his revenge in the punish-
ment “that though she should always foretell true, yet nobody should 
believe her”. For Bacon, her doom offered a clear warning for those who
will not submit to learn of apollo, the god of harmony, how to observe time 
and measure in affairs, flats and sharps (so to speak) in discourse, the differ-
ences between the learned and the vulgar ear, and the times when to speak 
and when to be silent.
Bacon, like erasmus, thus revealed his concern about the maintenance of 
decorum, respect, and moderation in speech.192
this chapter has shown that the emphasis in the work of the De la 
Courts is strikingly different. this different attitude towards free speech 
and decorum is perhaps clearest in the brothers’ rendering of another 
Classical fable that can be called their favourite self-fashioning image: the 
classical myth of the hunter actaeon who discovered the nudity of Diana. 
according to Classical mythology, actaeon was punished by the goddess 
for his impertinence and transformed into a stag, whereupon his own 
dogs devoured him. in seventeenth-century Dutch culture, this fable had 
a clear moralistic message, for example in the widely diffused writings of 
Jacob Cats. For Cats, actaeon was the archetype of a lecherous, immoder-
ate and unrestrained man, “a beast full of horny lust” who was justly pun-
ished for not containing his passions and curiosity.193 Yet the De la Courts 
138 chapter two
194 Sinryke Fabulen, 175–180: “Diana ende haare Nymphen, zijn by de ouden alle seer 
aansienelijke Menschen, ende insonderheid Koningen ofte Koninginnen, ende haar gevolg: 
als ook daar meede verstaan konnen werden de Beveinsde Geestelijken, ofte de Bestierders 
der Kerkelijke Saaken … Naaktheid ende onsuiverheid, is Onweetendheid ende 
Dwaasheid, Ondeugd ende Gebreeken.” See also Politike Weeg-schaal iii.iii.1, p. 637–638.
195 Politike Weeg-schaal, “inleyding,” p. 11: “… gedagten zijn tolvry.”
give a daringly new interpretation to this ovidian fable: actaeon in fact 
represents the brothers’ own intellectual endeavour. as actaeon, so 
the De la Courts claim, they have revealed the baseness of the bathing 
Diana and her nymphs who are normally splendidly dressed. they 
maintain that the goddess and her attendants are anything but divine. 
instead, they represent “Kings or Queens and their retinue, as well as … the 
Dissimulative Clerics, or the Governors of Ecclesiastical Matters”, whose 
nudity symbolizes “Ignorance and Stupidity, Vice and Failings”.194 the rev-
elation of all these monarchical and clerical vices is a duty which should 
not be neglected out of fear for Diana’s wrath. “Thoughts are toll-free”, the 
De la Courts contend, and liberty requires that they actively expose the 
naked truth.195
the brothers De la Court thus stress that speaking the truth is at all 
times a duty, even in the face of death when confronted with monarchical 
oppression. where erasmus and Bacon emphasized the limits to free 
speech drawn by decorum, the De la Courts instead insist on the moral 
obligation to speak straightforwardly, also, if not especially, when deco-
rum and respect for the authorities call for the opposite. true rhetoric 
means such parrhèsia, the telling of a truth that one is not forced to tell, 
even if it involves the risk of capital punishment – as in the case of the 
Dutchman in the Kingdom of apes. Given his gruesome fate, the essential 
point for the De la Courts is that speaking the truth without having to fear 
for one’s life is ultimately only possible in free republics. Free speech, for 
Bacon a sign of hazardous licentiousness, is for the brothers De la Court a 
quintessentially republican virtue: the ability to raise one’s voice freely in 
public distinguishes the citizens of a true republic, like the Dutchman, 
from the slavish and ape-like subjects of a monarchy such as Frenchmen. 
where the rhetoric of a flattering courtier is necessarily slavish by nature, 
the candid speech of the republican citizen is free.
this opposition between slavery and liberty is frequently put into a dis-
tinctly national vocabulary that reveals the antagonism between the 
Dutch Republic and the France of Louis XiV. in the words of the Sinryke 
Fabulen, “Frenchmen are in general capable of pleasing entire companies, 
and in particular young Women, Kings, or Lords, with humbug or with 
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196 Sinryke Fabulen, 54: “Dus zien wy, dat de Françoisen in het gemeen bequaam zijn; 
om geheele geselschappen, ende insonderheid jonge Vrowluiden, Koningen ofte Vorsten, te 
vermaaken, met beuselingen ofte met saaken daar geene nuttigheid ter weereld inne 
steekt.”
197 Aanwysing, “Voor-Reeden,” sig. *4v.: “… ik niet ben een uitheems ende slaafs-gesind 
Hoveling, dien aan ‘s Lands welvaaren niets gelegen, ende die gewoon is, te swijgen ofte te 
spreken naar het eenen monarche ofte Prince lust … een gebooren rond Hollander, die 
Scapham Scapham, een schuit een schuit te noemen, en daar mede regt door zee te vaaren, 
pleeg.”
198 Cf. Dietmar till, Transformationen der Rhetorik. Untersuchungen zum Wandel der 
Rhetoriktheorie im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (tübingen: max Niemeyer Verlag, 2004), esp. 
26–32.
199 For the rhetoric of a ‘marketplace of ideas’, see Gary Remer, Humanism and the 
Rhetoric of Toleration (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), esp. 
248–249.
matters that have no utility in the whole world”.196 in contrast, Dutchmen 
are incapable of such flattery because they are far too serious and outspo-
ken. as De la Court presents himself in the preface to the Aanwysing:
i am no foreign and slavish Courtier who does not care for the Country’s 
welfare and who is used to be silent or to speak whenever the monarch or 
Prince pleases so … [i am] a born, rounded Hollander who is used to calling 
Scapham Scapham, a boat a boat, and who straightforwardly steadies its 
helm.197
as a Dutch republican, De la Court contends to be the archetypical truth-
teller who openly expresses his opinions to the public regardless of estab-
lished authorities, decorum, or the impulsiveness of the audience. the 
fact that the brothers De la Court claim to practice such frankness is 
highly significant, for it shows that they propose this rhetoric as the most 
appropriate form of speech to play upon the passionate impulses of the 
audience in a moral and constructive way.
this plea for republican parrhèsia therefore forms the foundation of 
the De la Courts’ rhetorica contra rhetoricam.198 Departing from the con-
ventions of humanism, their rhetoric, dominated by jokes, fables, and 
ridicule, unmistakably addresses a popular audience, Vossius’s “vulgar 
souls” and “coarse characters”. as such it deliberately challenges Bacon’s 
stress on the “differences between the learned and the vulgar ear”. 
Crossing the fault lines between abstract political issues and the popular 
discussion culture of the Dutch urban centres, the De la Courts postulate 
an image of the public debate as a ‘marketplace of ideas’, where the high-
est, most outspoken bid wins the intellectual contest.199 the kind of speech 
that the De la Courts propagate might therefore be described as the one of 
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the stallholder who extols the virtues of his goods in a loud voice, trying to 
catch the attention of passers-by: it is the rhetoric of the market.
the rhetorical education of the brothers De la Court, as of all educated 
seventeenth-century Dutchmen, centred on the prominence of the pas-
sions. Following Vossius’s elaborate analysis of the ambivalent role of the 
passions in persuasion, the De la Courts sought to play upon the imagina-
tion of their readers in an ethical way by employing powerful imagery and 
a range of rhetorical devices, in particular fables, that present them as 
truth-tellers, as outspoken and free authors who do not waver when 
revealing the naked truth. this characteristic parrhèsia, though following 
classical example, rejects conventional humanist rhetoric which stressed 
the changeability of meaning and the need for decorum in speech. 
moreover, as michel Foucault has argued suggestively, such parrhèsia 
involves a crucial social and political dimension since only those citizens 
of a certain standing and trustworthiness can be expected to master the 
“parrhesiastic game”.200 the rhetoric of candour of the brothers De la 
Court is therefore of fundamental significance for their account of citizen-
ship. Rhetoric, as the interpretative framework of public speech, informs 
the way in which we constitute ourselves as citizens by participating in 
the public debate. the rhetoric of the De la Courts involves the claim that 




On 20 november 1657, pieter de la Court married elisabeth tollenaar, the 
daughter of a family of the ruling class of Leiden. elisabeth’s father and 
grandfather had been members of the veertigraad, the city council of forty 
local patricians of whom the four burgomasters of the town were elected 
annually through cooptation. elisabeth’s brother would join this munici-
pal assembly a decade later, and the husband of her sister, Johannes 
eleman, became a burgomaster of Leiden in 1659.1 to celebrate his 
entrance into this influential family, De la Court organized a lavish dinner 
for the guests at the wedding. a huge baked and gilded game pie stood at 
the centre of the table, surrounded by poultry and a pyramid of larks, 
hams, and a large sucking pig. this copious meal was accompanied by 
over sixty litres of hippocras, a typical wedding drink made of wine and 
spices.2 De la Court clearly took great pains to please his guests and behave 
as his new position required. Yet the marriage would not last long: before 
the year was out, elisabeth had died in childbirth. De la Court remarried 
in 1661 with the daughter of a rich merchant family from amsterdam. 
meanwhile, he had become close friends with eleman, whose connection 
to the governing establishment of the Dutch republic eventually led to 
the publication of the bestselling Interest van Holland.
the marriage therefore proved to be of paramount importance for De 
la Court. it evidently improved the social status of his family, which con-
tinued to be conditioned by his father’s foreign origins and nouveau riche 
characteristics – for many in Leiden a source of aversion. here social 
tensions blended with xenophobia: the large group of Flemish immi-
grants who successfully made their way in the Leiden textile business 
often operated as independent entrepreneurs, bypassing the traditional 
1 For an analysis of the social, political, and cultural dimensions of the Leiden veerti-
graad in the seventeenth century, see Dirk Jaap noordam, Geringde buffels en heren van 
stand. Het patriciaat van Leiden, 1574–1700 (hilversum: Verloren, 1996). For a general sur-
vey of early-modern Leiden politics, cf. s. Groenveld and Jan a.F. de Jongste, “Bestuur en 
beleid,” in simon Groenveld (ed.), Leiden. De Geschiedenis van een Hollandse stad, vol. 2: 
1574–1795 (Leiden: stichting Geschiedschrijving Leiden, 2003), 55–83.
2 see the documents published in C. Willemijn Fock, “het eerste huwelijk van pieter de 
la Court in 1657,” Leids Jaarboekje 74 (1982), 72–85.
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3 Van tijn, “pieter de la Court,” 306–309. see also Dirk Jaap noordam, “textielond-
ernemers en het Leidse patriciaat, 1574–1795,” Textielhistorische bijdragen 36 (1996): 20–36, 
esp. 21–23.
4 noordam, Geringde Buffels, 36–41; and idem, “De Leidse veertigraden in de lange 
zeventiende eeuw, 1574–1700,” in Jaap moes and Dirk Jaap noordam (eds.), Macht, aanzien 
en welzijn. Nieuwelingen in het Leids stadsbestuur, 1200–1795 (Leiden: primavera, 2003), 
48–59.
intermediaries and settled drapers.3 as a result, few of them were consid-
ered to be truly full members of society, even though they had, like De la 
Court sr., obtained the citizenship rights of the city. De la Court’s marriage 
into the powerful tollenaar family reveals that the second generation of 
wealthy immigrants could eventually enter the ranks of the civic estab-
lishment. nonetheless, this gradual acceptance did not mean that burgh-
ers of alien descent were granted any significant political role in the 
Leiden council, which was ever more reserved to the closed regent oligar-
chy of a few well-established families.4
these issues of immigration, social acceptance, and civic participation 
in politics, of marriage and household, as well as the indulgence of lavish 
dinners, pivot on the key political concept of citizenship. this third chap-
ter focuses on the social, political, and ethical aspects of this concept in 
the thought of the brothers De la Court. it shows that De la Courts con-
structed an account of commercial citizenship, whereby the merchant 
who honourably pursues his self-interest within the borders of civil disci-
pline personifies the true republican citizen. i will analyze how this 
account of commercial citizenship develops from, first, the De la Courts’ 
quasi-hobbesian theory of the contractual foundation of civil society; sec-
ond, from their criticism of the exclusivist corporate politics in Leiden; 
and third, from their mercantile interpretation of the Ciceronian ethics of 
honour and ambition. the resulting image of the wise merchant, revealed 
in the brothers’ pictorial self-representation, is specifically significant for 
our understanding of seventeenth-century Dutch civic culture and the 
relation between commerce and citizenship in early-modern republican-
ism at large.
 hobbes & the Foundation of the Commonwealth
From the State of Nature to a Democratic Polity
the De la Courts’ account of the origins and structure of civil society starts 
and ends with their assessment of the passionate condition of human 
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5 Politike Weeg-schaal, “inleyding,” p. 13: “Vermits de naturelike Menschen boven alles 
haar eige lighaam, leeven en eere beminnen.”
6 Cf. senault, De l’usage des passions, i.i.4, p. 41: “… nous ne reconnoissons qu’une pas-
sion qui est l’amour, & que toutes les autres ne sont que des effects qu’il produit … C’est un 
premier mobile qui emporte tous les autres Cieux par son impétuosité.”
7 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.3, p. 22–23: “… (Homo homini Lupus in statu naturali) welke 
oorlog van alle menschen teegen alle menschen, de rampsaligste staat der menschen is die 
men hier op aarde zoude konnen bedenken. en dienvolgende zoo is in allen maniere 
noodzakelik, dat eenige middelen werden gezogt om uit deese ellendige naturelike staat te 
geraken: want howel de onweetendheid en boosheit der menschen, zoo groot is, dat in dit 
nature. as argued above, human nature is for the brothers De la Court 
shaped by the unsettling but also functional power of the passions. From 
the very first edition of the Politike Weeg-schaal, which starts with a dis-
cussion of the state of nature to explain the contractual foundation of the 
commonwealth, this characterization of human nature forms the basis of 
the analysis.
the initial version of the argument runs as follows. in a hypothetical 
state of nature, when political organization is still absent, life is totally 
dominated by the most elementary of all passions: self-love, the further-
ing of one’s own “body, life, and honour”.5 such self-love has, on the one 
hand, positive consequences, since it drives all human beings to the fulfil-
ment of their most basic instinct, their self-preservation. But on the other 
hand, it causes such competition, mistrust and hate that ultimately the 
preservation of every individual is jeopardized. this view echoes the 
French augustinian emphasis on self-love as the essence, but therefore 
also the possible corruption, of humanity.6 Yet the De la Courts do not 
share the augustinian answer to the disruptive consequences of self-love 
in terms of divine grace. instead, their solution to overcome the detri-
ments of natural self-love is entirely secular: the solution lies in politics as 
such. the relentless pursuit of self-love can only be restrained by fear, yet 
in the absence of any hierarchical power to inflict punishment, such fear 
for the other necessarily leads to mutual destruction. the result is endless 
warfare, and
(Homo homini Lupus in statu naturali) such a war of all men against all men 
is the most disastrous state of men which one could think of here on earth. and 
therefore it is in all ways necessary that some means are searched to get out 
of this dreadful natural state. For, although the ignorance and evil of men are 
so great that in this life no perfect human state or society will or can be 
found, it is nonetheless true that the most imperfect Government of the 
World, compared to this disastrous state of war of all men against all, could 
be called (Homo homini Deus in statu politico) a paradise.7
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leeven geen volmaakte menschelike staat, ofte societeit, sal, nog kan werden gevonden: 
zoo is nogtans waaragtig, dat de onvolmaakste Regeering des Weerelds, vergeleeken zijnde, 
by deezen rampsaligen oorlogs-stand, aller menschen onder malkanderen, (Homo homini 
Deus in statu politico) een heemel zoude konnen werden genaamt.” the first Latin phrase 
is also used in Welvaren 6, p. 14, the second in Aanwysing i.9, p. 44.
 8 thomas hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. and trans. richard tuck and michael silverthorne 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univerity press, 1998), 3. Cf. erasmus, Adages i.i.69–70, and John 
Owen, Epigrammata (London, 1606), iii.23: ‘homo homini lupus, homo homini Deus’. see 
also François tricaud, “ ‘homo homini Deus’, ‘homo homini Lupus’: recherche des 
sources des deux Formules de hobbes”, in reinhart Koselleck and roman schnur (eds.), 
Hobbes-Forschungen (Berlin: Duncker & humblot, 1969), 63–71.
 9 Cf. the classical depictions of the state of nature and the origin of society in Cicero, 
De inventione i.2, and niccolò machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, ed. 
Corrado Vivanti (turin: einaudi, 2000) i.1–2.
10 Politike Discoursen ii.iV.2, p. 11–12: “De ervarendheid leerd dat de natuurlike stand der 
menschen, noodsaakelik de Regering, en politie soude uitbroejen.” Cf. on the hypothetical 
state of nature in hobbes, François tricaud, “hobbes’s Conception of the state of nature”, 
in G.a.J. rogers and alan ryan, Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon press, 
1988), 107–123.
11 Politike Discoursen ii.V.7, p. 123–124: “Daar is niets ellendiger als de natuurrelikke 
stand (status naturalis) der menschen, dewyl zy als dan alle onderling vyanden, en in
With these common lines about wolf-like versus god-like man, popular-
ized in particular by thomas hobbes,8 the De la Courts confront the 
unruly state of nature with civil society, which channels human behav-
iour and enables people to preserve themselves without harming others.9 
this concept of a state of nature clearly serves as a hypothetical construct 
to explain the inevitability of society, for “experience teaches that the 
natural state of men would necessarily breed Government and politics”.10 
the instinctive desire for self-preservation makes human beings realize 
that they should commit themselves to a political organization in which 
their self-love can be directed. moreover, since all people in the state of 
nature are equally weak and needy, the use of force cannot lie at the basis 
of such a political society. the only option is to search for a peaceful pact 
with other individuals, a pact that ultimately establishes a government 
based on the consent of the majority of all contractors:
there is nothing more dreadful than the natural state (status naturalis) of 
men, because then they are all mutual enemies and in continuous anxiety. 
as a result, man should try to get out of this state of war against all men and 
obtain some help on this occasion. and because no men are by nature so 
mighty that they could compel others to help them, therefore they should 
necessarily try to obtain the same of others through pact. and since no-one 
would pact with them but on fair and equal conditions, so it follows that 
according to this fairness, they must necessarily devolve the right and power to 
rule to the majority.11
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gedurige ongerustheid zijn: en dienvolgende soo moet de mensch tragten uit deesen oor-
logsstand teegen alle menschen te geraaken, ende eenige hulp in deese geleegentheid te 
bekomen. en dewijl geen menschen van nature soo magtig zijn, dat zy andere souden 
konnen dwingen om haar te helpen; soo moeten zy noodsaakelik van anderen, door ver-
drag ‘t selven tragten te bekomen. en vermits niemand met haar, als op billike en gelijke 
conditien soude willen verdragen, soo volgd hier uit, dat zy volgens deese billikheid, nood-
sakelik het regt, ende magt van gebieden, aan de meeste stemmen moeten ooverdragen.”
12 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.1, p. 16: “… het naturelik regt tot onze eige conservatie, alle 
andere naturelike Wetten te boven gaat: en alle volgende civile Wetten op het selven regt 
zijn geboud, ofte ten minsten het zelven presupponeren … Sie dit alles breeder en klaarder 
beweezen by Th. Hobb. Elem. Phil. de Civ.” Cf. hobbes, On the Citizen i.8–9, iii.26.
13 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.4, p. 28: “… dat het souverain recht, om te gebieden, en wetten te 
maken, niet kan werden gescheiden van het souverain recht, om alles te executeeren, en zig te 
doen gehoorzamen.” this statement is explicitly connected to the situation in the Dutch 
republic on p. 31–32.
14 Ibidem, 31: “Die dit alles breeder begeert te sien, leeze Thom: Hobbes Elem: Phil: de 
Cive. Power of a Commonwealth. en le Corps politique.”
in short, the state of nature necessarily leads to the establishment of a 
civil society through contract, and the human condition implies that the 
terms of this contract necessarily involve a democratic sovereign power.
this fundamental argument that democracy is the elemental form of 
all political association forms the straightforward argumentation in the 
first edition of the Politike Weeg-schaal and in the Politike Discoursen – as 
explained above, probably largely written by Johan de la Court. While 
rewriting the Politike Weeg-schaal, his brother pieter added two passages 
that broaden the line of reasoning. a first addition, clearly meant to 
ground the argument in the authority of natural law theory, states that 
self-preservation is not only a passion, but also a right, a right that “sur-
passes all other natural Laws; and all following civil Laws are founded on 
the same, or at least presuppose it”. One of these natural laws, only to be 
broken when it conflicts with this primary natural right, is the golden rule 
“do as you would be done by”. this passage ends with a brief yet telling 
remark: “See all this more broadly and clearly proven by Th. Hobb. Elem. 
Phil. De Civ.”12 De la Court’s second addition clarifies the conditions under 
which a civil society is formed, and then continues to claim the necessary 
indivisibility of the thus established sovereignty. a separation of powers 
would mean a contradictio in adjecto, De la Court asserts, and in obvious 
reference to the debate on provincial sovereignty in the Dutch republic, 
he insists that “the sovereign right to command and to make laws cannot be 
separated from the sovereign right to execute everything and to be obeyed.”13 
again, this passage ends with a significant remark: “he who desires to see 
all this more broadly should read Thom. Hobbes Elem. Phil. de Cive, Power 
of a Commonwealth and le Corps politique.”14
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15 hobbes, Le corps politique ou les elements de la loy morale et civile ([rouen], 1652).
16 Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, 61, 63, 78.
17 see e.g. Van tijn, “pieter de la Court,” 331–333; haitsma mulier, “pocock and 
seventeenth-Century Dutch republicanism,” 26–27; Visentin, “assolutismo e libertà,” 78; 
Van Bunge, From Stevin to Spinoza, 86–87. Cf. Blom, Morality and Causality, 159–160, and 
israel, Enlightenment Contested, 231–236.
18 Wolfgang röd, “Van den hoves ‘politische Waage’ und die modifikation der 
hobbesschen staatsphilosophie bei spinoza,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (1970), 
29–48: 29.
19 m.J. petry, “hobbes and the early Dutch spinozists,” in C. de Deugd (ed.), Spinoza’s 
Political and Theological Thought (amsterdam, 1984), 150–170: 154.
20 malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 44–47, 515. Cf. also alexandre matheron, “the theoretical 
Function of Democracy in spinoza and hobbes,” in Genevieve Lloyd (ed.), Spinoza. Critical 
Assessments, 3 vols. (London and new York: routledge, 2001), vol. iii: 112–121.
De la Court thus revealed the obvious source of his statements, the 
recent works of thomas hobbes – respectively, De Cive, first published by 
elzevier in 1647, the Leviathan (1651, with as subtitle The Matter, Forme & 
Power of a Commonwealth), and the French translation of De corpore polit-
ico, published in 1652.15 these short references have been the subject of 
substantial attention in the historiography to date, which has resultes in a 
widespread interpretation of the De la Courts’ account of the state of 
nature and the contractual foundation of the commonwealth as the 
essential link between the political thought of hobbes and spinoza. as 
Kossmann put it bluntly in 1960, De la Court “was a pupil and disciple of 
hobbes”, and “it was of course hobbes who persuaded De la Court to 
reject the traditional idea that men first entered the state fully equipped 
with morality and religion”.16 this supposedly essential hobbesian influ-
ence on the thought of the brothers De la Court has since been restated by 
other historians without question – with the sole exception of hans Blom 
in his later work.17 moreover, it has been argued repeatedly that this 
hobbesian influence turned the De la Courts into the “mediators between 
hobbes and spinoza”,18 or indeed the “medium” between the two.19 as 
noel malcolm maintains, the brothers De la Court constructed a theory in 
which “the hobbesian overtones are obvious”, a “theory built on thor-
oughly hobbesian foundations”. thus, malcolm argues, they contributed 
to a “Dutch hobbesian-republican tradition” which formed the back-
ground to spinoza’s political philosophy.20
the question arises as to whether these statements offer a fruitful inter-
pretation of De la Court’s short references to hobbes. First of all, the 
brothers De la Court obviously did not intend to form a ‘medium’ between 
hobbes and spinoza – a characterization that involves a teleological 
approach in which historical actors are primarily interpreted ex post facto, 
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21 see Cornelis W. schoneveld, Intertraffic of the Mind. Studies in Seventeenth-Century 
Anglo-Dutch Translation (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 29–46; Catherine secretan, “La reception de 
hobbes aux pays-Bas au XViie siècle,” Studia Spinozana 3 (1987), 27–45; and the large over-
view by noel malcolm, “hobbes and the european republic of Letters,” in idem, Aspects of 
Hobbes, 457–545.
22 see Gisbert Cock, Exercitationis philosophica-theologicae, de lege in communi 
(Utrecht, 1653), and idem, Vindiciae pro lege & imperio: sive dissertationes duae … contra 
tractatum Hobbii De Cive (Utrecht, 1661), esp. 82–88. Cf. secretan, “La reception de hobbes,” 
28–31; and malcolm, “hobbes and the european republic of Letters,” 475–477.
23 [Lambert van Velthuysen], Epistolica dissertatio de principiis iusti, et decori, continens 
apologiam pro tractatu clarissimi Hobbaei, De Cive (amsterdam, 1651). see on Van 
Velthuysen’s reading of hobbes in particular Blom, Morality and Causality, 101–128;
with hindsight of later developments. secondly, the inclination to posi-
tion these historical actors between the canonized grand old men of the 
history of political thought reveals a clear preference for those authors 
and texts which have passed the tests of time and can therefore be seen as 
constitutive of modernity. again, such an inclination likely does not do 
justice to the past relevance and meaning of texts and statements. the 
interesting question to ask is not how the De la Courts connected hobbes 
and spinoza, but why and how exactly they appropriated hobbes in their 
theory. What do the references to hobbes’s works actually reveal about 
the brothers’ intentions in reading hobbes?
Reading Hobbes as a Republican
hobbes’s political philosophy enjoyed a broad and early reception in the 
Dutch republic after the first publication of De Cive.21 samuel sorbière, a 
French contact of hobbes who enrolled as a student in 1646 at Leiden 
University where he attended heereboord’s classes, had brought a copy of 
De Cive to the netherlands which was published in 1647 by elzevier. the 
work, which was sold out and reprinted within a year, had a large impact, 
and the discussions about the work reflected clear political positions in 
the Dutch debate. On the one hand, the Calvinist clergy reproached 
hobbes for his moral relativism and allegedly ‘machiavellian’ concept of 
absolute sovereignty, as well as for his subjection of ecclesiastical affairs 
to the civil magistrate, one of the main controversies in seventeenth-cen-
tury Dutch politics.22 On the other hand, an important critic of Calvinist 
orthodoxy, the Utrecht regent Lambert van Velthuysen, openly declared 
himself a disciple of De Cive, although he did so by fundamentally altering 
hobbes’s subjectivism into a Grotian theory of natural human sociabil-
ity.23 thus hobbes was soon mobilized by different sides in the Dutch 
debate as either immoral scapegoat or anti-clerical inspiration.
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malcolm, “hobbes and the european republic of Letters,” 517–518; and Jon parkin, 
“taming the Leviathan: reading hobbes in seventeenth-Century europe,” in t.J. 
hochstrasser and p. schröder (eds.), Early Modern Natural Law Theories. Contexts and 
Strategies in the Early Enlightenment (Dordrecht etc.: Kluwer, 2003), 31–52: 36.
24 Cf. Groningen University Library, ms 233: “‘t Welvaren der stad Leyden,” fol. 127, with 
Welvaren 71, p. 154–155. On the dating of this manuscript, see Lucassen, “het Welvaren van 
Leiden.”
25 Cf. Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.1, p. 17–18, with hobbes, On the Citizen, 10, 25.
26 see schoneveld, Intertraffic of the Mind, 46–63, and arie-Jan Gelderblom, “the 
publisher of hobbes’s Dutch Leviathan,” in susan roach (ed.), Across the Narrow Seas. 
Studies in the History and Bibliography of Britain and the Low Countries (London: the 
British Library, 1991), 162–166. the library of pieter de la Court van der Voort contained a 
copy of Van Berkel’s translation and the 1668 edition of hobbes’s Opera Philosophica 
Omnia, published by Blaeu, but no earlier copies of hobbes’s works: Library, fols. 20, 24.
Given this initial politicized reception of hobbes in the Dutch republic, 
it is likely that the brothers De la Court were introduced to hobbes’s writ-
ings in the course of the 1650s. nonetheless, there is an important caveat 
here, for textual evidence suggests that this introduction to hobbes might 
have arrived fairly late in the development of their thought, perhaps only 
after Johan’s death in 1660. First of all, the references to hobbes in the 
Politike Weeg-schaal were, as noted above, only included by pieter in the 
later re-editions to clarify passages that had not been present in the first 
edition. secondly, the earliest manuscript of Het welvaren van Leiden, 
which probably dates from the autumn of 1659, does not mention hobbes 
at all, while the later versions of the text, from after 1660, contain a pas-
sage on absolute sovereignty that approvingly refers to hobbes.24 in sum, 
the few parts of the brothers’ works that directly rest on hobbes were 
most probably written by De la Court after his brother’s death. there are 
some phrases in the first edition of the Politike Weeg-schaal that hint at 
least to a superficial reading of De Cive, such as the characterization of the 
state of nature as a war of all against all, or the predominance of fear and 
distrust among humans.25 Yet overall, the confrontation with hobbes, 
pace Kossmann and others, does not seem to have been a fundamental 
theoretical starting-point for the development of the thought of the De la 
Courts.
instead, their reading of hobbes implies primarily a partisan (and 
highly partial) appropriation of his political philosophy in the context of 
Dutch republican politics. this appropriation is exemplified by the 1667 
Dutch translation of the Leviathan by abraham van Berkel, a former 
student at Leiden in theology and medicine.26 in his introduction to 
the work, Van Berkel compared the execution of Charles i in 1649 with the 
attempted coup d’état by the Dutch stadholder a year later: both were 
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27 hobbes, Leviathan: of van de stoffe, gedaente, ende magt van de kerckelycke ende 
wereltlycke regeeringe, trans. abraham van Berkel (amsterdam, 1667), “Voor-reeden,” sigs. 
*4–*5.
28 Religio Medici. Dat is: Noodwendige beschryvinge van Mr Thomas Browne, trans. 
abraham van Berkel (‘Laege-duynen’ [=Leiden], 1665), 238, note 2: “mijn vertrouden 
Vrient, dat wel-geoeffende Verstant, den genoemden autheur van ‘t Hollands-Interest.”
29 [Joseph hill], The Interest of These United Provinces, Being a Defence of the Zealander’s 
Choice (middelburg, 1673), which refers to the Politike Weeg-schaal. see schoneveld, 
Intertraffic, 4–6, 38–39, 142, note 21.
30 Jon parkin, Taming the Leviathan. The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of 
Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2007), 205.
illegitimate deeds, he argued, which resulted from a fundamental misun-
derstanding of the absolute nature of sovereignty in england and the 
United provinces. For Van Berkel, hobbes’s argument against the english 
tyrannicides was therefore also an argument against the Dutch Orangists – 
a highly telling volte-face that mobilized hobbes for the cause of the pro-
vincial sovereignty of the states of holland. moreover, Van Berkel insisted 
that the Leviathan exemplarily revealed the extent of civil liberty and the 
subordination of ecclesiastical power to the civic magistrate.27 in short, he 
turned hobbes into a Dutch anti-Orangist republican.
Van Berkel was the central figure of a small circle of Leiden intellectu-
als which included pieter de la Court, to whom Van Berkel referred in his 
1665 translation of thomas Browne’s Religio Medici as a “trustworthy 
Friend, that well-trained mind, the author of Holland’s Interest”.28 among 
the other friends of Van Berkel were Janus rampius, a teacher related to 
the governing circles of Leiden by marriage, the englishman Joseph hill, 
who a decade later published a political pamphlet on the relations 
between england and the United provinces which directly echoed the De 
la Courts,29 and adriaen Koerbagh, a radical freethinker whose first publi-
cation involved a strong defence of the provincial sovereignty of the states 
of holland. in the wake of the political crisis of 1650, hobbes’s political 
philosophy offered these critical intellectuals an innovative theoretical 
framework to cope with the fundamental yet undecided question of polit-
ical obligation. as Jon parkin has argued convincingly regarding the 
reception of hobbes in england, “hobbes’s works made sense of a world 
of political and religious conflict in a way that more traditional political 
theory did not”.30 the same can be said of his reception in the Dutch 
republic: for many of his readers in an age defined by political contin-
gency, hobbes’s compelling characterization of civil disorder and the 
foundation of absolute sovereignty implied a new, potent means to come 
to terms with de facto politics.
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31 Ibidem, 86, and parkin, “taming the Leviathan,” esp. 37.
32 henning arnisaeus, De republica, seu reflectionis politicae libri II (strasbourg, 1636) 
i.i.2.8, p. 9. On arnisaeus, see horst Dreitzel, Protestantischer Aristotelismus und absoluter 
Staat. Die “Politica” des Henning Arnisaeus (ca. 1575–1636) (Wiesbaden: Franz steiner 
Verlag, 1970).
33 Johannes angelius Werdenhagen, Universalis introductio in omnes respublicas sive 
politica generalis (amsterdam, 1632) ii.ii.9–13, p. 219–221. Cf. alfred Voigt, Über die Politica 
generalis des Johann Angelius v. Werdenhagen (Amsterdam 1632) (erlangen, 1965), and 
rolando Crahay, “Dalla République di Jean Bodin alla Synopsis di Johann angelius 
Werdenhagen (1635). Un rinnovamento dei concetti religiosi e politici,” Rivista Storica 
Italiana 104 (1992), 629–677.
the way in which hobbes was appropriated by the brothers De la Court 
equally stems from this novel potential of his ideas. the De la Courts 
found in hobbes an authoritative source for three important elements of 
their theory: the depiction of natural equality and mutual fear as the foun-
dations of political organization, the ensuing argument that all govern-
ment originates as democracy, and the eventual classification of 
sovereignty as necessarily absolute and undivided. none of these three 
issues are exclusively hobbesian, and therefore it does not make much 
sense to speak of the De la Courts as Dutch disciples of hobbes. instead, 
the brothers turned to hobbes to further substantiate their views on the 
basis of his evocative, though ambiguous, language. hobbes’s rhetorical 
strategies defied a straightforward reading, as Jon parkin has shown, and 
one of the main reasons for his influence in the seventeenth century was 
his ability to entrap the reader and thus address different political agen-
das – even the radical republican agenda of the brothers De la Court.31
the writings of hobbes offered the De la Courts compelling new evi-
dence of what they had been taught when studying at Leiden. the politica 
of their professor Boxhorn gradually moved away from the aristotelian 
notion of man as a political animal to a depiction of human nature as 
essentially self-interested. For Boxhorn civil society originated in neces-
sity and fear, a view shared by other important seventeenth-century 
scholars on politica such as henning arnisaeus, who equally acknowl-
edged fear as an important factor in the establishment of politics,32 or the 
helmstedt professor Johann Werdenhagen, for whom “fear and indi-
gence” lay at the basis of every commonwealth.33 hobbes, in particular in 
De Cive, developed this view into a suggestive image of the state of nature 
that amounted to a full-blown repudiation of aristotle. in far more com-
pelling detail and expressive language than his academic predecessors, 
hobbes emphasized the fundamental equality of power among all natural 
human beings. it is this equal “power to kill” that makes mutual fear, and 
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34 hobbes, On the Citizen i.2–3, p. 21–26.
35 Politike Weeg-schaal iii.i.2–3, p. 521, 524–525: “naademaal volwasse mannen moeten 
werden geconsidereert gelijk te zijn in naturelike kragten … zoo ontstaat gemeenelik uit die 
naturelike gelijkheid en onderlinge vreese, modestie, en zeedigheyd; zulks men zich schaamt, 
en niet derfd begeeren dat anderen van ons verdragen, ’t gunt wy van anderen niet zouden 
willen lijden. en vermits onderwijlen de menschelike behoeftigheid groot, en de ordre om 
uit die ellende en behoeftigheid te geraken noodsaakelik is, zoo staat men zeer ligtelik, in 
alle verscheidentheit van oordeel, dese billikheit toe, dat reedeliker-wijse, weinigen zig 
behooren te voegen naa het oordeel van veelen. Welke naturelike billik- en reedelikheit de 
gront-slag is van alle Demokratike, ofte populare regeeringe.”
36 hobbes, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, ed. Ferdinand tönnies, 2d. ed. 
(London: Frank Cass, 1969) ii.ii.1, p. 118; idem, Les corps politiques, 73.
37 Cf. Boxhorn, Institutiones politicae ii.i exp., p. 260, with Johannes althusius, Politica 
methodice digesta, 3d. ed. (herborn, 1614) iV.1.
38 see Deborah Baumgold, “the Composition of the hobbes’s Elements of Law,” History 
of Political Thought 25 (2004), 16–43.
not benevolence, the origin of society.34 this emphasis on natural equality 
was readily adopted by the brothers De la Court. all men are by nature 
equal in their strengths and passions, and
out of this natural equality arise commonly mutual fear, modesty, and moral-
ity, for one feels ashamed and does not dare to desire that others endure 
from us what we would not want to suffer from others. and since human pri-
vation is meanwhile large, and the order to get out from that misery and 
privation necessary, therefore one very easily, in all diversity of judgment, 
concedes this fairness: that reasonably, few should comply with the judgment 
of many. and this natural fairness and rationality is the foundation of all 
Democratic, or popular, Governments.35
this revealing passage makes clear that the De la Courts eagerly con-
nected hobbes’s evocative depiction of the state of nature with his sec-
ondary argument that democracy is the original form of all government. 
in De corpore politico, the second part of the treatise titled The Elements of 
Law in the english version, hobbes argued that democracy must be neces-
sarily “first in order of time”, because both aristocracy and monarchy can 
only be instituted by the consent of the majority.36 this idea that demo-
cratic consensus must lie at the basis of every commonwealth was, again, 
not particularly original. although, for example, Boxhorn maintained that 
monarchy and aristocracy precede democracy, Johannes althusius had 
insisted at the start of the seventeenth century that all commonwealths 
originate in consent, never in coercion.37 hobbes merely restated this con-
ventional view, but he did so rather ambiguously (and perhaps hastily).38 
the argument that democracy is the original form of government plays a 
minor, even anomalous role in his political philosophy, and it gradually 
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39 Cf. hobbes, On the Citizen Vii.5, with Leviathan XViii.1. On democracy in hobbes, see 
the debate between richard tuck, “hobbes and Democracy,” and Kinch hoekstra, “a Lion 
in the house: hobbes and Democracy,” in annabel Brett et al. (eds.), Rethinking the 
Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2006), 
171–218.
40 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.7, p. 36: “… dat de Democratie ofte Populare regeering de oud-
ste en wettelikste is. Want geen Vergaadering, aan een ander een souveraine magt kan 
opdraagen, indien zy die zelfs niet heeft.”
41 the library of pieter de la Court van der Voort contained the four volumes of Grotius’s 
Opera omnia (1679), and also editions of Van de oudheijd van de Batavische republyk (the 
hague, 1610), Van de wettige regeering van Holland (paris, s.d.), De jure belli ac pacis 
(amsterdam, 1631), De mare libero (Leiden, 1633), and Annales et historiae Belgicae 
(amsterdam, 1647): Library, fols. 10, 15, 19, 22, 31.
42 Cf. Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, ed. martine Julia van ittersum 
(indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006), esp. 26–28, and The Rights of War and Peace, trans. 
William evats (London, 1682), iii–v. For the notion of oikeiosis, see reinhard Brandt, “self-
Consciousness and self-Care. On the tradition of Oikeiosis in the modern age,” Grotiana 
(new series) 22/23 (2001–2002), 73–92; and Benjamin straumann, “Oikeiosis and appetitus 
societatis. hugo Grotius’s Ciceronian argument for natural Law and Just War,” Grotiana 
(new series) 24/25 (2003–2004), 41–66. For a more general comparison between Grotius 
and hobbes, see tuck, Philosophy and Government, 303–306, 347–348; and Knud 
haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1996), 26–35. Cf. as well the criticism by Johann 
disappears almost entirely in the development from The Elements of Law 
to De Cive and eventually to Leviathan.39 Yet the De la Courts appropriated 
this ambiguous argument from hobbes for their own ensuing claim that 
all sovereignty is by necessity popular. as the Politike Weeg-schaal insists 
(in a passage added to the first edition, so perhaps written by De la Court 
after having read hobbes): “Democracy or Popular Government is the old-
est and most legitimate one. For no Assembly can charge a sovereign power 
to someone else, when it does not possess this itself.”40 thus, what was for 
hobbes a secondary claim became in the work of the De la Courts a cen-
tral element of their republican theory.
 the brothers De la Court could adapt hobbes in this way because they 
looked at his work through Grotian lenses with a fairly radical focus.41 
hobbes’s subjectivism, coined in a language of rights, is turned by the De 
la Courts into a language of ‘fairness’, in which rights do not play any sig-
nificant role. For the De la Courts, the natural equality among human 
beings leads not only to mutual fear but also involves natural justice and 
morality. it is such morality which enables the contractual foundation of 
the commonwealth along rational and democratic lines. this argument 
merges the hobbesian prominence of fear with a Grotian emphasis 
on mutual human recognition, primarily based on the stoic notion of 
oikeiosis, the natural inclination to self-protection and common support.42 
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p. sommerville, “selden, Grotius, and the seventeenth-Century intellectual revolution in 
moral and political theory,” in Victoria Kahn and Lorna hutson (eds.), Rhetoric and Law in 
Early Modern Europe (new haven: Yale University press, 2001), 318–344.
43 see Quentin skinner, “hobbes and the purely artificial person of the state,” in idem, 
Visions of Politics, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2002), vol. iii: 177–208.
44 e.g. Sinryke Fabulen, 301–308, 355–362.
45 Politike Discoursen i.i.1, p. 1–2: “… een onderlinge civile societeit, ofte verbonden en 
wetten maken, ende Magistraten kiesen, om die tot nut van ’t gemeen te doen onder-
houden, ende alzoo een vrye Republijck te formeeren. Of de sterkste en looste sig van veelen, 
d’een voor d’ander naa, ’t zy door kragt, ’t zy door bedrog, meester gemaakt hebbende, 
soude een Monarchie opregten.” Cf. also Ibidem ii.V.9.
46 Cf. esp. hobbes, Elements of Law ii.ii.9; On the Citizen Vii.11–17.
the De la Courts also adapt hobbes in a Grotian manner by insisting on 
the fundamental preservation of sovereignty among the democratic 
assembly that forms the basis of all government. For hobbes, the contrac-
tual institution of sovereignty turns a multitude of individuals into a uni-
fied body of people, and therefore the people cannot set limits to the 
exercise of that sovereignty.43 Yet for the De la Courts, the initial consent 
that lies at the basis of government implies that all legitimate sovereign 
power remains in principle with the people – a claim evocatively epito-
mized in a number of fables that recount how sheep and foxes meet in 
their animal assembly to discuss the affairs of their community.44
this view, rooted in monarchomach thought and the traditional justi-
fication of the Dutch revolt, clearly involves a crucial departure from 
hobbes. Yet more importantly, it also entails a significant reinterpreta-
tion of conventional contract theory, including that of Grotius. the work 
of the De la Courts argues that the hypothetical passage from the state of 
nature to a political society can proceed along two diametrically opposed 
lines: either all “would make a mutual civil society, or pacts and laws, and 
choose Magistrates to let them provide for the benefit of the community, 
and so create a free Republic”; or the strongest man would prevail by force 
or deceit and “would thus establish a Monarchy”.45 in other words, all gov-
ernment by consent is necessarily republican, while monarchy necessar-
ily originates from forceful coercion and is hence no true civil society. 
this differentiation between democratic government by institution and 
monarchical government by acquisition is also central to hobbes, but the 
essential difference from hobbes (and most other contract theorists) here 
is the consequent claim that monarchy can never derive from consent – 
and is therefore essentially illegitimate.46 the central passion of self-love, 
so the argument of the brothers De la Court goes, makes it impossible that 
any human being would think that another is more competent to rule, 
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47 Politike Weeg-schaal iii.i.2, p. 523: “… waaragtig, de menschen naturelik soo groote 
presumptie van hare eige bequaamheit te hebben, dat sy nooit willens en wetents, de magt 
van haar eigen voordeel te betragten, aan eenige anderen, hoedanig die zijn, sullen heb-
ben opgedragen.”
48 Ibidem i.i.7, p. 37: “… onbedenkelik te zijn, dat ooit een populare Vergaadering daar 
toe hebbe geauthoriseerd een mensch, en zijn afkomelingen inder eeuwigheid … zoo kan 
gantsch niet werden gepresumeerd ooit de minste intentie eeniger populare Vergaderinge te 
zijn geweest zig zelven te beneemen de magt van by onbequaam- of quaadwilligheid eens 
Regeerders en zijner Successeurs, te kiezen een veel bequamer of beeter.” Cf. also Ibidem 
iii.i.2–3, iii.iii.3.
49 samuel pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri octo (1688, facs. ed. Oxford: 
Clarendon press, 1934) Vii.V.9, p. 706–707, quoting Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.7, p. 37–38. Cf. 
as well Ibidem Vii.V.22, p. 721: “ex adverso nihil, quod in monarchas maligne aut invidiose 
dici queat, videtur omisisse scriptor Belgicus Bilancis politicae. Quorum tamen non pauca 
retundi possunt per cap. X Hobbesii de Cive, & Leviath.c.19.”
50 [henry parker], Observations upon Some of His Majesties Late Answers and Expresses 
[London, 1642], 2. see michael mendle, Henry Parker and the English Civil War. The Political 
Thought of the Public’s ‘Privado’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1995), 85–88.
since “men have naturally such a large presumption of their own capabil-
ity that they will never have willingly and knowingly charged the power to 
promote their own advantage to some others, however those may be”.47 
therefore, it is “unthinkable … that a popular Government has ever author-
ised one man and his descendants for all eternity” to be sovereign, since “it 
cannot be presumed at all that there has ever been the least intention from 
any popular Assembly to take away the own power of choosing, in case of 
incapability or malevolence of a Ruler and his Successors, a much more 
capable or better one”.48 in short, because of human nature, the demo-
cratic assembly that forms the basis of all government always retains sov-
ereignty. a hereditary monarchy can only originate in the illegitimate 
usurping of this original popular government by force or deceit.
For samuel pufendorf, who read the Politike Weeg-schaal in the years 
he spent in the Dutch republic during the early 1660s, this view of the 
inconceivability of a chosen hereditary monarchy was merely a “pestilens 
dogma”, clearly refuted by the philosophy of hobbes.49 Yet it is more sig-
nificant that the brothers De la Court not only departed from hobbes, but 
essentially employed the hobbesian characterization of the human con-
dition to reinterpret the contract theory that hobbes himself argued 
against. this contract theory is exemplified by the english supporters of 
parliament in the 1640s, particularly by henry parker’s Observations of 
1642 – published a few months before pieter de la Court was in London for 
his Grand tour. parker’s main argument in favour of parliamentary sover-
eignty was “that power is but secondary and derivative in princes, the 
fountaine and efficient cause is the people”.50 hobbes’s reply was intended 
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Cf. hobbes, On the Citizen Vi.5–18, Xii.5.
54 François Vranck, Short Exposition (1587), in martin van Gelderen (ed.), The Dutch 
Revolt (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1993), 227–238. Vranck’s text was repub-
lished several times throughout the seventeenth century as an appendix to the re-editions 
of Boxhorn’s Commentariolus. see also the analysis in Van Gelderen, Political Thought, 
204–205.
to make clear that this view was both absurd and dangerous, since a divi-
sion of sovereign power would necessarily entail the dissolution of the 
commonwealth, and thus a return to the state of nature where every sin-
gle individual exercises the right of self-preservation.51 the De la Courts 
adopt this argument, but they do so to argue that human selfishness in the 
state of nature makes it a priori absurd to conceive of a monarchy insti-
tuted by consent. they thus use hobbes’s own weapons against hobbes, 
while their repudiation of the primacy of monarchy equally undermines 
the space allocated to kings in the work of Grotius and parker.52 in the 
political universe of the De la Courts, monarchies might be successful 
polities, but they cannot be true civil societies based on popular consent.
Finally, the brothers De la Court also appropriate the hobbesian argu-
ment that “the sovereign is always One, or indivisible” – yet they do so 
again in a quasi Grotian way.53 in reaction to Bodin, Grotius had argued 
that sovereignty in holland originated from the people but was adminis-
tered by the provincial states. in this way Grotius attempted to reconcile 
Bodin’s absolutism with the time-honoured ideal of the mixed regime. 
this view went back to the period of the Dutch revolt, when François 
Vranck, pensionary of the town of Gouda, had written a defence of the 
sovereignty of the states of holland, the “magna Carta of the Dutch 
republic”, in reply to claims for princely authority.54 hobbes’s notion of 
absolute sovereignty offered the De la Courts a new, powerful source to 
radicalize this established justification of provincial sovereignty. the 
result is a sort of republican absolutism, which emphasizes the indivisibil-
ity of sovereignty to counter any claims on behalf of a political or military 
role for the stadholder, while ardently defending the supreme authority 
of the states of holland in all religious and political matters. thus, like 
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55 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.4, p. 26: “Want het is klaar, dat in alle gevallen van verdeeld-
heid der souveraine magt, deeze independente verdeelde menschen, gedurig tegen mal-
kanderen zouden moeten waaken; en dat de swakste door de sterkste zoude werden 
verslonden, zulks metter daad de naturelike oorlogs-stand weederom zoude weezen 
ingevoert.”
56 Ibidem, 29–30, more extensively in Sinryke Fabulen, 27–32.
57 see parkin, Taming the Leviathan, 78–79, 178–185; sullivan, Machiavelli, Hobbes, 165–
173; and rahe, Against Throne and Altar, 321–346.
Van Berkel, the brothers De la Court employ hobbes’s absolutism to reach 
a conclusion that would probably have horrified hobbes himself. For the 
De la Courts, the popular origin and preservation of sovereignty means 
that a division in sovereignty would entail a violation of the contract that 
lies at the basis of political society. When the legislature is separated from 
the executive, individuals gain the opportunity to assume all military 
command, whereby the power of arms prevails over legitimate rule and 
all people are again entrenched in mutual warfare:
For it is clear that in all cases of a separation of the sovereign authority, these 
independent, divided people would have to guard against each other, and 
that the weakest would be devoured by the strongest, so that the natural 
state of war would in fact be introduced again.55
Civil society, which originates from the human need to escape the war of 
all against all, would fail in its purpose when sovereignty is divided 
between different bodies. the eventual result can only be conflict and the 
abuse of powers, a gruesome fate exemplified by a fable that tells how a 
lion illegitimately gets hold of all authority in a badly ordered animal 
republic.56 to overcome this monarchical state of affairs, sovereignty 
must remain absolute and located with its original possessors, the people. 
the brothers De la Court thus give a decisive republican twist to hobbes’s 
political philosophy.
this republican appropriation of hobbes was not unique. Contemporary 
english republicans, notably marchamont nedham and James harrington, 
equally adopted elements from hobbes to sustain their defence of the 
english Commonwealth. arguably, the lasting influence of hobbes is due 
to precisely this capacity to speak to many different political agendas.57 
Yet the rather arbitrary and highly partisan way in which the De la Courts 
adapted hobbesian arguments means that their thought should not too 
hastily be labelled as belonging to a certain school of thought, be it 
‘hobbesian’, ‘Grotian’, or ‘Cartesian’. instead, like most early-modern 
political thinkers and pamphleteers, the brothers seem to have chosen 
whatever suited their argument eclectically from a range of sources, with 
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more concern for rhetorical force than for scholastic consistency. their 
diverse reading brought them in due course to the en vogue writings of 
hobbes, which offered a temptingly novel outlook on de facto politics and 
the question of political obligation, the crucial issue in the 1650s on either 
side of the north sea. in constructing their account of the foundation of 
the commonwealth, they extracted a few of hobbes’s ambiguous views, 
discarded all the rest, and distilled the residue into an explosive brew that 
radicalized conventional contract theory with the claim that any legiti-
mate form of political society must necessarily be non-monarchical.
 Citizenship in theory and practice
The Acquisition & Limits of Urban Citizenship
this account of the contractual origins of politics, based on the hypotheti-
cal passage from the state of nature to civil society, plays an important 
normative role in the political thought of the brothers De la Court. in con-
trast, their approach to the ensuing question of who actually counts as a 
citizen in this civil society is far less systematic and does not follow from 
any rigorous theoretical framework.58 this section therefore turns primar-
ily to the practice of citizenship in the seventeenth-century Dutch 
republic and considers how the De la Courts conceived of the extent and 
limits of citizenship in relation to, and criticism of, the urban corporate 
politics of the Dutch Golden age.
in the communal tradition of the early-modern netherlands, as in 
renaissance italy, the embodiment of the commonwealth was the city. 
this centrality of the city implied that politics was by definition consid-
ered to be civic, i.e. taking place in an urban framework, as is reflected in 
the contemporary Dutch usage of the term politicus as ‘burgherlick’, for 
example in the influential late sixteenth-century treatise on citizenship 
by the Dutch engineer simon stevin.59 this urban emphasis equally domi-
nates in the thought of the brothers De la Court. the starting-point of 
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p. 32–33.
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63 harrington, Oceana, 197.
64 see maarten prak, “Burghers, Citizens and popular politics in the Dutch republic,” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 30, 4 (1997), 443–448; and erika Kuijpers and maarten prak, 
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Kloek and tilmans (eds.), Burger, 113–132. Cf. for the case of Leiden: annie Versprille, “het
their politics is not the single family but rather a large gathering of many 
households into one civic unit. in line with Burgersdijk’s textbook on 
politica, the De la Courts insist that one household, “consisting of a man, 
woman, children, servants and maids … cannot be said to be a Political 
State”, since a single household will never be able to fulfil the principal 
purpose of civil society, the establishment of order to avoid internal vio-
lence and the defence against any external aggression.60 For the De la 
Courts, quantity is an essential criterion for the establishment of a com-
monwealth. Only an assembly of at least thirty or forty thousand males 
who convene to establish mutual peace and defence deserves the name of 
a political state that can be expected to last. this number of thirty or forty 
thousand men roughly corresponds to the brothers’ primary empirical 
source of inspiration, the larger seventeenth-century holland cities, like 
Leiden, which contained a comparable male adult population.61 these 
Dutch urban polities form the central frame of reference for the analysis 
of citizenship in the work of the De la Courts. “all inhabitants of a City 
constitute together truly a Political or Civic body”,62 and this focus on the 
city as the essence of politics means that the countryside, and thereby 
agriculture and ownership of land, play no particular role in the brothers’ 
political thought. this entails a significant difference from the aristotelian 
embrace of rural property, especially in the work of harrington who 
asserted that “agriculture is the bread of the nation”.63 in clear contrast, for 
the De la Courts republican politics are all about being a member of an 
urban community.
Citizenship in the early modern cities in the netherlands was a formal, 
juridical category that separated the poorters, the burghers of a town who 
enjoyed citizenship rights, from those inhabitants without such rights 
and from foreigners.64 the privileges connected to citizenship included 
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jurisdictional protection outside the city gates, the possibility to engage in 
certain occupations organized in guilds or to profit from the local social 
institutions, and, theoretically at least, the participation in urban govern-
ment. One became poorter by birth or through marriage, or, as in the case 
of pieter de la Court sr., by buying the poorterrecht. in addition to a juridi-
cal category citizenship also pertained to a social and economic category, 
which distinguished relatively rich from poor immigrants who could not 
afford to become a citizen. in Leiden, citizenship was relatively easy to 
obtain because it was cheap: during the 1650s and 1660s, the Leiden poor-
terrecht sold at only a tenth of the price asked in holland’s main metropo-
lis, amsterdam.65 however, Leiden maintained a formal distinction 
between such paid citizenship and the ‘complete right’ obtained by birth. 
an immigrant who had bought his rights had to wait for seven years to 
become accepted as a full citizen with the same status as the native popu-
lation.66 in theory, by then he was formally entitled to partake in local 
government, but in practice immigrants and their offspring were excluded 
from the higher echelons of the Leiden magistracy for generations.
the brothers De la Court, facing this practice, repeatedly criticized 
these obstructions to the acquisition of full citizenship. the partial poor-
terrecht purchased by newcomers, their argument goes, “would change 
into an idle, powerless term if over time all the advantages … would be 
separated from it”.67 to counter this deflation of the value of citizenship, 
“one should grant all foreigners who want to come to live in the Cities 
as much freedom as the other old inhabitants”.68 in other words, the De 
la Courts proposed the abolition of any formal juridical distinction 
between new and old poorters by “granting the Citizens uniform Freedom 
and right”.69 this argument for a policy of open citizenship is substanti-
ated by a number of moves. First of all, the brothers insist that biblical 
morality calls for hospitality towards immigrants, confirmed as well by 
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the classical examples of inclusive citizenship in athens and rome.70 
Following machiavelli, who repudiated the policy of sparta of excluding 
foreigners from civil military service, these references to classical exam-
ples of immigration had been a commonplace element of many reason of 
state treatises that championed the admittance of foreigners as a means 
to further the greatness of the polity.71 the De la Courts adopted this claim 
for the Dutch context, in particular in connection with their plea for com-
prehensive religious toleration (see chapter 5 below).
apart from this assertion that a policy of inclusive citizenship enhances 
the general interest of society, the brothers De la Court also proposed a 
second argument in favour of free immigration in terms of natural right. 
this argument follows partly Grotius’s justification of “the right of per-
petual cohabitation” for persecuted foreigners who “submit to the 
Government” of their new home.72 the De la Courts develop this Grotian 
notion in a fable that tells of a group of water birds who seek refuge on an 
island. after an initial welcome, the native bird population imposes dis-
criminatory regulations upon the water birds, who complain in reply that 
“against the right of nature and of birth, you call our Children and 
Grandchildren Foreigners in their own Patria”, a verdict that amounts to 
a “civil death”.73 the fable serves as an evocative illustration to the claim 
that the willingness to immigrate reveals that newcomers have tacitly 
consented with the social contract of the civil society in which they settle. 
therefore these newcomers should be granted the same means for their 
self-preservation as the native population:
it is and remains true that all inhabitants who have or desire to obtain a 
permanent residence in this Country are to that extent no foreigners, but 
Compatriots, and that they should be permitted to the necessary common 
provisions as much as the old Citizens, since they do not need those less but 
more.74
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75 Cf. marijke meijer Drees, “ ‘Burgerlijke’ zeventiende eeuwse literatuur,” in Kloek and 
tilmans (eds.), Burger, 133–153, esp. 144.
76 Quoted in simon schama, The Embarrassment of Riches. An Interpretation of Dutch 
Culture in the Golden Age (London: Collins, 1987), 386. Cf. Cicero, De officiis i.XVii.54.
77 Jacob Cats, Houwelick, dat is: het gansche beleyt des echten-staets (1625), in Alle de 
werken van Jacob Cats, ed. W.n. Wolterink, 2 vols. (Dordrecht: J.p. revers, 1880), vol. i: 253: 
“… de staet des huwelicx is een smisse van menschen, een grontsteen van steden, en een 
queeckerye van hooge regeeringe.”
the De la Courts thus take up Grotius’ justification of the right of cohabi-
tation, but turn it into a more fundamental defence of not only the right 
to settle, but also the right to partake in all social and economic exchanges. 
this plea for equal economic opportunities involves in particular a strong 
denunciation of the policy of the Dutch guilds, which excluded non-citi-
zens from the exercise of certain professions (see further chapter 4 below).
the brothers’ plea for the abolition of the jurisdictional barriers 
between natives and newcomers entails a relatively broad conception of 
citizenship, clearly critical of the restrictive reality in Leiden and else-
where. nevertheless, this appeal for hospitality and equal opportunity 
does not entail the claim that any individual should be considered a full 
citizen. in particular, one fundamental condition distinguishes those who 
are capable of actually performing the rights and duties connected to citi-
zenship: the condition of independence in a profoundly hierarchical 
society.
seventeenth-century Dutch characterizations of the societas civilis pre-
supposed the active role of its members in a range of ordered communi-
ties that together constituted the urban political space.75 the fundamental 
unit of this communal life was the household. as the physician Johan van 
Beverwijck noted it in Ciceronian vein in his 1639 treatise Van de wtne-
mentheyt des vrouwelicken geslachts [“On the excellence of the Female 
sex”], the family is “the fountain and source” of all authority in which “the 
first principle of a town and thus the seed of a common state” rests.76 a 
similar view was popularized in the widely read manual for a prosperous 
family life, Jacob Cats’s Houwelick [“marriage”]. Cats’s influential work 
offered its readers a range of moralistic instructions in verse about the 
four seasons of a female life, from the spring of the bride to the winter of 
the widow. all culminated in wedlock, described by Cats as “a smithy of 
men, a foundation of cities, and a nursery of high government”.77 Women 
were supposed to perform an exemplary role in taking care of their homes 
and families. such ‘paragons of virtue’ were epitomized in a range of artis-
tic representations of the private life of the household versus the public 
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78 see Wayne e. Franits, Paragons of Virtue. Women and Domesticity in Seventeenth-
Century Dutch Art (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University press, 1993).
79 Cats, Houwelick, 283: “De man betracht de wet des lants, het wijf den wille van de 
mans.”
80 Julia adams, The Familial State. Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early 
Modern Europe (ithaca and London: Cornell University press, 2005).
81 Aanwysing i.24, p. 118: “… politike Regeerders seer wel Vaders, ende de Onderdaanen 
haare Kinderen genaamd werden.” Ibidem iii.6, p. 495: “… dat het Land een Wees-kind is, en 
dat de regeerders zijnde de Voogden van dat Wees-kind.”
82 Politike Weeg-schaal iii.i.1, p. 520: “… alle onderdaanigheit ontstaat door gebrek van 
magt, en kennisse. Welk gebrek van magt zig allesins openbaart in de Vrouwluiden, om dat 
de passien van vreese, schrik en droefheit, grooter in haar, en het oordeel minder, als in de 
mannen schijnt te wesen … Zulks de Opperhoofdigheit der Mannen, boven de Vrouwen, en 
Kinderen hier uit klaarlik schijnt te volgen.”
life outdoors.78 Yet outside the private sphere, male superiority remained 
largely unquestioned. as ‘Father Cats’ stated: “the man practices the 
country’s law, the wife the man’s will”.79
this characterization of paternal authority in politics reflected the 
patriarchal character of seventeenth-century Dutch society. public life 
was handled by the male representatives of large elite families, who, 
linked together through lineage and strategic alliances, constituted the 
urban councils and the boards of the chartered companies for overseas 
trade. as Julia adams has argued, this patrimonial governance was an 
important factor in the gradual formation of the Dutch republic as a 
world power, contributing to the establishment of what she calls a 
‘Familial state’.80 this concept clearly entails more than a historical 
abstraction, for the familial dimensions of politics were echoed in the 
prevalent political discourse of the time. the writings of the brothers De 
la Court aptly reveal this language in claims such as “political Rulers are 
very well called Fathers and the Subjects their Children”, or “the Country is 
an Orphan and the rulers are the Guardians of that Orphan”.81
a significant result of this patriarchal emphasis was the idea that 
women are by nature dependent on their male representatives. as the 
argument of the De la Courts goes, “all submission originates through 
lack of power and knowledge, and such lack of power manifests itself fully 
with Women, since the passions of fear, fright, and sadness seem to be 
larger, and judgment smaller, in them than in men”. Women are for the 
De la Courts neither able to master their passionate condition, nor to 
take care of themselves and their offspring without male assistance, and 
“thus the Domination by Men over Women and Children seems to follow 
clearly”.82 the De la Courts conclude that women cannot participate inde-
pendently in the public life of the community, they cannot speak for 
 wise merchants 163
83 see Kuijpers and prak, “Burger,” 123. Cf. for the juridical status of women Donald 
haks, Huwelijk en gezin in Holland in de 17e en 18e eeuw (Utrecht: hes, 1985), 153–154.
84 Cf. for an exceptional defence of gender equality in this period siep stuurman, 
François Poulain de la Barre and the Invention of Modern Equality (Cambridge, mass.: 
harvard University press, 2004).
85 Quoted in herman roodenburg, “naar een etnografie van de vroegmoderne stad: De 
‘gebuyrten’ in Leiden en Den haag,” in peter te Boekhorst, peter Burke and Willem Frijhoff, 
Cultuur en maatschappij in Nederland 1500–1850: Een historisch-antropologisch perspectief 
(meppel etc: Boom, 1992), 219–243, 239: “goede vrede ende burgerlijcke eenigheyt”. see 
also ronald sluijter and ariadne schmidt, “sociale verhoudingen en maatschappelijke 
zorg,” in Groenveld (ed.), Leiden, 109–125.
86 Quoted in paul Knevel, Burgers in het geweer. De schutterijen in Holland, 1550–1700 
(hilversum: Verloren, 1994), 216: “goede burgeren ende innewoonderen deser stede jegens 
alle overval, moetwille ende andersints.”
87 Ibidem, 189–190, 200–201. Cf. also the oath for new Leiden poorters quoted in 
Versprille, “Leidse poorterschap,” 96.
themselves and must be represented by their male superiors. this was a 
fairly standard view: in theory seventeenth-century Dutch poorterrecht 
did not make any differentiation on gender grounds, but in practice 
women were excluded from most civic offices because of their condition 
of dependence.83 For the De la Courts, as for most of their contemporaries, 
full citizenship was in all aspects implicitly confined to independent 
men.84
The Might & Right of the Independent Householder
the brothers’ conception of citizenship, then, centres on the male house-
holder who represents his family outside the private realm in the higher 
strata of the urban society. Dutch cities such as Leiden comprised various 
gebuyrten or self-installed small neighbourhoods meant to advance the 
“good peace and civic unity” within the city through the informal settle-
ment of conflict and the organization of communal festivities.85 On a 
more general level, the cities in the Dutch republic were subdivided into 
a number of districts that organized the civic militias, or schutterijen. 
these militias, according to a Leiden statute, ought to protect the “good 
citizens and inhabitants of this city against all attack, both wanton and 
otherwise”.86 the members of Leiden’s militias were recruited from poort-
ers and regular inhabitants alike, yet only those men who were settled as 
independent householders, who practised a certified profession and who 
were wealthy enough to pay for their own armour, roughly one in every 
eight male adults, qualified. to serve in the militia was therefore consid-
ered a highly honourable task, an essential fulfilment of one’s civic duties 
in the service of the city.87
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88 Politike Discoursen i.iii.18, p. 297: “Het is beeter sijn eige Onderdaanen, als vremde 
Krijgs-luiden, in den Oorlog te gebruiken … vermits sy alleen om geld, en sonder liefde 
dienen.” Cf. niccoló machiavelli, Il Principe, ed. Giorgio inglese (turin: einaudi, 1995) 
Xii.5–6, p. 79–80: “Le mercenarie e ausiliarie sono utile e pericolose … La cagione di questo 
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pendio.” see also idem, Discorsi i.43.
89 Politike Discoursen i.ii.31, p. 196: “… sijn eigen volk in waapenen te oeffenen is geraad-
saamst: want die sijn getrou, en gewillig om haar eigen goed, bloed, wijf, en kinderen, te 
beschermen.”
90 Aanwysing ii.15, p. 370: “Voorwaar dus sterk werd men, als men sijn eigen meester 
derfd weesen; ende wanneer de inwoonders beginnen te kennen de kragten eens Volks 
dat voor sijne Vryheid vegten wil.”
91 Ibidem ii.12, p. 333–334: “… als meede insonderheid veele voorsigtige van ouds koo-
phandel drijvende ingeseetenen.”
in the thought of the brothers De la Court, this urban reality of civic 
military service attains a distinctive machiavellian dimension. Directly 
echoing machiavelli’s dismissal of mercenary armies, the De la Courts 
argue that “it is better to use in War one’s own subjects than foreign 
soldiers”. Foreign mercenaries “only serve for money and without love” and 
hence they do not fight to defend their own liberty, but only to indulge in 
licentiousness.88 With a reference to the same historical episodes as in 
machiavelli, the De la Courts insist that “it is most advisable to instruct 
one’s own people in arms, for they are loyal and willing to protect their 
own goods, wife, and children”.89 Civic militias that fight in self-defence 
are therefore a crucial element of a successful commonwealth, for “truly, 
one becomes very strong when one dares to be his own master and when 
the inhabitants start to know the powers of a people that wants to fight 
for its Liberty”.90 this assumption is modelled on the experience of a range 
of republican city-states that preserved their independence for centuries 
thanks to their arme proprie, from the German free imperial cities and the 
swiss cantons to Dalmatian ragusa and the town of Lucca. De la Court 
insists that the Dutch republic also owed its independence from spain to 
the patriotic struggle of its people, “especially many prudent inhabitants, 
being in trade for years”, who fought to safeguard their liberty and com-
mercially attained riches.91
With this remark, De la Court establishes a direct connection between 
mercantile wealth and military civic duty. in line with contemporary 
practice, he argues that only the rich should be trained in the defence of 
the state, for they have something to loose and therefore will “serve loy-
ally without payment to protect a lawful Government, as well as their 
beloved Freedom and all other private Goods, firmly against internal and 
external violence”. the poor, in contrast, should only be allowed to enter 
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92 Ibidem ii.15, p. 377–378: “… souden de rijke inwoonders sonder soldye getrouwelik 
dienen om eene wettige Regeeringe, neevens haare dierbaare Vryheid, en alle andere par-
ticuliere Goederen, standvastelik teegen in- en uitheems geweld te beschermen: de arme 
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dan vertrouwde rijke Borgers tot Officieren gaf.”
93 pocock, “patriotism and politeness,” 8.
94 Aanwysing ii.4, p. 255: “… soo sijn wy van naatuuren Koopluiden, die in geene Krijgs-
knegten veranderd konnen werden.”
the armed forces in times of war, at a small reward and under the com-
mand of “trustful rich Citizens as Officers” so as to prevent them from 
rebellion.92 De la Court thus makes a crucial distinction on the basis of 
wealth between those who can be expected to defend the government in 
power, and the poor who should be kept under close control given their 
unreliability and seditiousness. this is an important move because it 
involves a direct repudiation of pocock’s interpretation of the early-mod-
ern republican tradition. For pocock, militant virtù was intrinsically 
linked to landed property. he therefore suggested that it should not be 
surprising that, in his reading, “pieter de la Court … does not seem to have 
thought his description of a republic of trade called for any account of 
how the ownership of arms was related to the ownership of property”.93 
Yet as the material discussed here clearly indicates, De la Court did argue 
that because of their commercial riches, the wealthy in a republic of trade 
are competent to bear arms and to defend the country’s liberty. however, 
this mercantile military service is fundamentally different from the 
machiavellian expansionist virtù that pocock assumed to be the paradig-
matic republican case. For De la Court, merchants will only take up their 
arms in defence, never for the sake of territorial expansion. “We are by 
nature Merchants who cannot be turned into Military servants”, so he pro-
claims:94 a citizen of a commercial republic will protect his liberty and 
wealth if necessary, but he always prefers profitable peace over costly war.
De la Court’s claim that only the wealthy can be considered capable to 
serve in the civic militia and thus fulfil the prime civic duty of the defence 
of the commonwealth entails a significant restriction of the concept of 
citizenship in line with economic criteria. this restriction, by which not 
only women but also all dependent males are excluded from full citizen-
ship, becomes particularly evident in the context of the ultimate charac-
teristic of the true citizen, the right to partake in the political decision 
-making of the community. in a key passage of the Politike Weeg-schaal, 
revised after his brother’s death, De la Court asserts that the governing 
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95 Politike Weeg-schaal iii.iii.5, p. 662: “… een Vergaaderinge, bestaande uit alle de 
Ingeseetenen des Lands, die gepresumeerd konnen werden magts en kennisse genoeg te heb-
ben, om hun eigen welvaaren te versorgen … Ten eersten, weegens gebrek van magt, moe-
sten werden buiten geslooten, alle Onmondigen, Vrouwluiden, en Dieners, als aan haare 
Ouders, eegade, en meesters ofte heeren gehoorsaamheid schuldig zijnde. en dienvol-
gende niet vryelik moogende stemmen. Ten tweeden, moesten werden buiten geslooten 
alle vreemdelingen die niet seekeren bepaalden tijd, noodig om genoegsaame kennise van 
het interest deeser republike te verkrijgen, onder die regeering hadden gewoont.”
96 Ibidem ii.iV.11, p. 417–418, with an overview of the population of Venice taken from 
Francesco sansovino, Le cose meravigliose dell’inclita città di Venezia. Riformate, accomo-
date, e grandemente ampliate da Leonico Goldioni (1603, facs. ed. napoli: Liguori, 2003).
97 Ibidem iii.iii.5, p. 662–663: “Ten derden, moesten werden buiten geslooten, alle stom-
men, dooven, infamen, en arme luiden van aalmissen ofte in Godshuisen leevende als meede 
alle anderen, die binnen seekeren tijd van jaaren, eenig ambagt hadden gedaan, ofte om een 
dagloon gewrogt in iemands dienst, hoedanig die zoude mogen weesen; vermits het selven 
moet werden gepresumeert te geschieden, uit behoeftigheid; moet ook werden gepresu-
meert, de noodige kennisse tot de regeeringe te ontbreeken.”
assembly in the ideal republican polity should consist of “all the Inhabitants 
of the Country who can be presumed to have sufficient power and knowledge 
to take care of their own welfare”. this assertion implies that all those 
members of society who live in a condition of dependence cannot be con-
sidered capable to master and know themselves and therefore they should 
not participate in public politics. Women, children, and servants in a 
household who depend on the pater familias “should for lack of power be 
excluded … since they have to pay obedience to their parents, husbands, 
masters or Lords, and therefore they cannot vote freely”. moreover, new-
comers who do not master the local language should equally be prevented 
from partaking in political debate since they lack “sufficient knowledge of 
the interest of the republic” – an important limitation to the De la Courts’ 
appeal for open citizenship.95 a final category of persons who do not qual-
ify as full citizens are those inhabitants who work for wages and rely on 
their masters for their income and reputation. Following the example of 
Venice, where the economically dependent were not included among the 
citizenry,96 De la Court emphasizes that
all dumb, deaf, infamous, and poor people who live of alms or in relief houses, 
should be excluded, as well as all others who have practised in a certain 
amount of time any craft or who have worked as day labourers in someone’s 
service … since it must be presumed that this happened due to destitution, 
it must also be presumed that they lacked sufficient knowledge for 
government.97
in other words, De la Court viewed dependency as a sign of incapacity to 
govern oneself, and hence incapacity to govern the community. public 
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Personal Demands, 150–173.
 99 see the discussion of the Levellers in David Wootton, “Leveller Democracy and the 
puritan revolution,” in Burns and Goldie (eds.), Cambridge History of Political Thought, 
412–442: 429–434. On the practice of being an independent citizen, cf. steven shapin, A 
Social History of Truth. Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago and 
London: the University of Chicago press, 1994), 355–407.
100 Van den enden, Kort Verhael, 50; and idem, Vrije politijke stellingen, 179–180.
101 spinoza, Tractatus Politicus Vi.11, Viii.14, and esp. Xi.3–4, p. 442: “… peregrinos 
secludam, qui sub alterius imperio esse censentur … mulieres et servos secluderem, qui in 
potestate virorum et dominorum, ac etiam liberos et pupillos, quamdiu sub potestate
performance and active participation in political decision-making require 
the ability to speak freely and knowingly without any constraint, and this 
quality is unattainable for those in a condition of dependence. a central 
asset that distinguishes active citizens from their passive fellow residents 
is therefore the issue of proper speech, the rhetorical capacity to speak 
truthfully in public by mastering free republican parrhèsia. the implicit 
message that underlies the De la Courts’ conception of citizenship is the 
suggestion that only those capable of performing the same rhetoric as 
they can be expected to speak frankly in public and thus pass the test of 
being a true citizen.98 those unable to speak the truth should be consid-
ered incapable of any political say. the assumption is that their voices are 
heard through their husbands and masters who represent their interests 
in public.
autonomy, being one’s own master and sui iuris, is for the De la Courts 
the key principle that enables men to enjoy their civic rights and perform 
their civic duties. all those who live in a condition of dependence – 
women, children, servants, the poor, the destitute and the ignorant – can-
not enjoy these rights, nor perform these duties, and therefore they are 
not considered full citizens. the brothers’ conception of citizenship is 
relatively comprehensive for its criticism of Dutch exclusivist practice 
and its subsequent plea to abolish the existing juridical discrimination 
between full poorters and newly arrived citizens. nonetheless, their idea 
of what constitutes a citizen remains within the narrow aristotelian 
boundaries that dominated seventeenth-century theory and practice, 
even among ‘radical’ contemporary circles like the Levellers in england or 
the spinozists in the Dutch republic.99 For instance, Van den enden, 
spinoza’s Latin teacher, unequivocally equated citizens with independ-
ent males,100 while spinoza employed the very same categories of exclu-
sion as De la Court.101 For some historians this might be a reason to criticize 
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infames sunt.” Cf. Jaap Kerkhoven, Spinoza’s clausules aangaande uitsluiting van politieke 
rechten in hun maatschappelijke context. mededelingen vanwege het spinozahuis 63 
(Delft: eburon, 1991), esp. 4–5.
102 hans Bödeker, “Debating the respublica mixta: German and Dutch political 
Discourses around 1700,” in Van Gelderen and skinner (eds.), Republicanism i, 219–246: 
228.
103 Cf. israel, Radical Enlightenment, 22; and idem, “intellectual Origins,” 8–9.
104 On the aristocratic tendencies of early-modern republicanism, see John p. 
mcCormick, Machiavellian Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2011), 
8–11.
spinoza for such a “moment of theoretical inconsistency” that would have 
impeded him from “putting democracy into practice”, but this, needless 
to say, is a highly anachronistic (and thereby in itself inconsistent) criti-
cism.102 instead, it makes more sense to stress that seventeenth-century 
republicanism, unlike the modern idea of democracy, was not based on 
any concept of the intrinsic equality of all people, but only of the equality 
of all citizens. this fundamental difference should not be underestimated. 
it shows that it can be problematic to link spinoza and the De la Courts 
directly to the “egalitarian tendency” that was to characterize later ages.103 
moreover, it reveals an important aspect of early-modern republican ide-
ology that is often overlooked by its current advocates: for its emphasis on 
the active dominating citizen over the passive dominated individual 
might be particularly difficult to reconcile with the challenges of modern 
society.104
 the ethics of self-interest
The Two Guises of Self-Love: Eerzucht vs. Heerszucht
to summarize, civil society originates through a contract between natural 
men, who thereby turn themselves into citizens and, as independent 
householders, serve in the defence of the commonwealth and participate 
in its government. Yet these citizens remain human, enslaved by the fun-
damental passion of self-love. is there room for civic morality if citizens 
will always pursue their deepest instinct of self-preservation, even at 
the cost of others? this section analyzes the way in which the brothers 
De la Court tackle this fundamental question. their moral thought, 
which involves a significant reinterpretation of Ciceronian ethics, 
embraces well-understood self-interest as the essence of civil behaviour. 
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109 Sinryke Fabulen, 130–131: “ende eindelik aan mindere ellendige Menschen, uit oover-
denkinge der gemeene menschelikheid … Derhalven noodsaakelijk zijnde, dat de 
this account forms one of the main pillars of their anti-monarchical and 
largely secular appeal for the rule of law.105
as i have argued in the previous chapter, the brothers De la Court high-
light the passionate nature of mankind, a position that merges the rhe-
torical emphasis on the role of the passions in human speech with 
Cartesian and augustinian notions of the way in which our conduct is 
motivated by the passions. the approach of the De la Courts is particu-
larly close to the contemporary emphasis in French augustinianism on 
self-love as the prime human characteristic. Like Jean-François senault’s 
De l’usage des passions, they begin with the premise that self-love is “the 
largest and lengthiest Passion by which all people are to a small or large 
extent captured”,106 it is “the true origin of all human actions, either good or 
evil”.107 this assertion involves the further claim that this central passion 
of self-love appears in two different ways, either as a moderate virtue or as 
an excessive vice. Whereas an excess of self-love reveals itself in lust for 
power and licentiousness, “well-founded self-love is the root of all lauda-
ble outward deeds”,108 for such true self-love urges humans to preserve 
themselves and to take care for their nearest family and friends. Loving 
oneself in a sincere way opens the way to loving “lesser miserable people, 
out of consideration of common humanity”. positive self-love thus leads 
to the love of one’s neighbour and of the community of common citizens, 
the fatherland, and the entire human race:
since it is necessary that humans must love above all firstly themselves, and 
then the ones of their home, and all the inhabitants of the Fatherland 
because they are a part of it, yes that they also must love sincerely the 
strangest people like they love themselves and those of their home … there-
fore those people, who are in such a way their own Friends that they are at 
the same time Friends of all the world, are the ones whom God almighty will 
crown here or hereafter with his Blessing. For this is God’s Will, the order of 
nature.109
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menschen voor allen eerst sig selfs, ende daar na die van haaren huise, ende alle de 
ingeseetenen haares Vaaderlands, om dat sy daar van een deel zijn, lief moeten hebben, 
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111 Cf. esp. Grotius, Commentary, prolegomena, p. 21, 41.
112 On the impact of Cicero’s De officiis in seventeenth-century europe, see peter n. 
miller, Defining the Common Good. Empire, Religion and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1994), 21–87.
113 Cicero, De officiis, trans. miller, i.XiX.65, p. 67; iii.Viii.36, p. 303.
true self-love, in short, fulfils the divine ordainment of the human con-
dition: a claim that distantly echoes augustine’s “brief and true definition 
of virtue” as “an order of love”, by which “someone who loves God does not 
err in loving himself”.110
this characterization of self-love as the basis of sociability and charity 
entails a fairly conventional Christian reading of stoic ethics, in particular 
of Cicero – a reading exemplified by augustine, senault and, in the seven-
teenth-century Dutch republic, by Grotius.111 however, the brothers De la 
Court clearly depart from both the Grotian analysis of self-love and self-
preservation in terms of natural right and the augustinian emphasis on 
divine grace to overcome amour-propre. their differentiation between 
true and false self-love involves a distinctive rereading of Cicero that 
eventually amounts to a largely secular, republican interpretation of the 
diverse guises of passionate human behaviour.
the contours of this interpretation stem from the stoic repudiation of 
personal ambition in Cicero’s De officiis, probably the most influential 
classical treatise in the early-modern period.112 For Cicero, ambition, 
defined as the desire for glory, was the human passion that most endan-
gered the virtue of justice, for “the higher a man’s ambition, the more eas-
ily he is tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame”. Cicero 
maintained that such a desire for fame generally reveals itself in the desire 
to rule over others, the desire “for making oneself king even in the midst 
of a free people; and anything more atrocious or repulsive than such a 
passion cannot be conceived”.113 in the augustinian tradition, this categor-
ical rejection of ambition was not primarily interpreted as a criticism of 
the lust for political power, but rather as an exposure of human sinfulness 
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114 senault, De l’usage des passions, 235: “Je concluds donc, que cette affection desordon-
née est la mort des familles, la ruine des estats, & la perte de la religion … Car de cet 
amour desreglé, naissent trois autres amours, qui empoisonnent toutes les ames, & qui 
bannissent toutes les vertus de la terre; Le premier est l’amour de la Beauté, qu’on appelle 
incontinence; Le second est l’amour des richesses, qu’on appele avarice; Le troisiesme 
est l’amour de la Gloire, qu’on appele ambition. ”
115 Sinryke Fabulen, 86–87: “… in der daad eene groote aanprikkeling, om geduurende 
het kort ende broos leeven der selven menschen, sig met allen yver te spoeden, ietwes 
loofwaardigs te verrigten.”
116 Ibidem: “… om dat seer veele menschen door eene verkeerde eergierigheid, anders 
gesegt Heerssugt, gedreeven werdende, sig booven de geenen, die haar waarelik gelijk zijn, 
willen verheffen.”
117 Ibidem, 124: “… eene verkeerde eigen-selfs liefde, ende quaade Eergierigheid.”
when devoid of divine grace. as senault argued evocatively, the “disor-
dered affection” of amour-propre involves “the death of families, the ruin 
of states, and the loss of religion … For from this disordered Love origi-
nate three other loves that poison all souls and that banish all virtues from 
the earth: the first is the Love of Beauty, which is called immoderation, 
the second is Love of riches, which is called avarice, and the third is Love 
of Glory, which is called ambition”.114 For senault, immoderate love of 
oneself leads to the worship of false appearances instead of true adoration 
of God.
the brothers De la Court read Cicero’s criticism of personal ambition 
in a different way by establishing a fundamental distinction between 
eerzucht, the desire for honour, and heerszucht, the desire to rule. this 
distinction comes down to the claim that sincere self-love causes people 
to want to be praised and admired. although such desire for praise 
might seem nothing but vanity, “in fact it is a large incentive to speed dili-
gently during the short and fragile life of humanity to perform something 
laudable”.115 the desire for honour drives people to fulfil their human 
potential in a way that does not harm others, thereby gaining esteem 
through which their self-love is gratified. true self-love as expressed in 
eerzucht therefore enables people to understand that they have to per-
form deeds by which they themselves and the rest of society have some-
thing to gain.
the De la Courts are acutely aware that such personal ambition can 
also corrupt, “for many people, driven by a wrong Desire for honour, oth-
erwise called Imperiousness, desire to rise above those who are truly equal 
to them”.116 here the excess of self-love reveals itself, “the false self-love, 
and bad Desire for honour”, which changes eerzucht, the incentive to 
be praised, into heerszucht, the ambition to rule.117 this tacitean cupido 
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118 Ibidem, 385: “… dat de Heerssugt ofte Begeerte, om oover andere menschen te heers-
sen, de vierigste van alle onse herts togten is.” the saying is a literal translation from 
tacitus, Annals XV.53, p. 300: “cupido dominandi cunctis adfectibus flagrantior est”, also 
quoted in slightly different versions in Politike Weeg-schaal, i.i.18, p. 98; i.iii.1, p. 234; and 
Aanwysing, “Voor-reeden,” sig. ****2.
119 Ibidem, 131: “… menschen, die soo Beestagtig zijn, dat sy meenende aan de gemeene 
menschelijke maatschappie niet verbonden te zijn, niemand dan sig selfs agten, ende by 
gevolge sig daar van af scheidende, oopenbaarelik voor niemand als voor haar eigen selfs 
sorgen, ende ook niemand anders lief hebben.”
120 Politike Discoursen ii.Vi.5, p. 184: “ten is dan niet vreemd indien de Vorsten, en andere 
Overheeden, of seer Magtigen, deese vreese ontwassen zijnde, ende gelijk als wilde men-
schen in statu naturali, of puris naturalibus, alles doen wat hun lust, sonder op lof, of straf, te 
passen.”
121 Ibidem ii.V.11, p. 146: “Jaa dat meer is, den Souveraine Heeren ontbreekt niet alleen 
dese toom, om haar van de ondeugd te wederhouden; maar de eergierigheid, die den 
gemeene menschen een seer scherp prikkel tot alle deugden is, prikkel haar tot alle 
schelm-stukken, concessa pudet ire via, civemque videri, Lucan., die den Borgers verbooden 
zijn.” the quote is from Lucan, Pharsalia ii, v. 446.
dominandi is not only “the most ardent of all our passions”,118 it is also the 
most dangerous, since unlike true self-love, the lust for power necessarily 
jeopardizes others. Heerszucht is a characteristic of those who have 
become so powerful that they are exclusively lauded and never admon-
ished and thus indulge in all the bodily lusts and other passionate excesses 
of human nature. such people are in fact “so Bestial that they think that 
they are not connected to the common human society and esteem no one 
but themselves … and also love no one else”.119 this false form of self-love 
is especially characteristic to monarchs, whose relentless pursuit of power 
remains unchecked by any fear or discipline. Living “like wild men in 
statu naturali”, virtually outside of the ordered civil society, they “do eve-
rything that they desire without minding praise or punishment”.120 accord- 
ingly, “the desire for honour, which is for all common men a very sharp 
incentive to all virtues, stimulates [these monarchs] to all the villainies – 
concessa pudet ire via civemque videri, Lucan – that are forbidden for the 
Citizens”.121 this revealing quote from Lucan’s Pharsalia shows that for the 
De la Courts the figure of Caesar, the commonplace incarnation of tyr-
anny, also embodies false self-love, the ruthless desire to rule. they con-
sider false self-love to be essentially a monarchical passion, contrasted by 
the sincere republican ambition to be honoured by one’s fellow citizens.
Appropriating the Language of Interest
the focus of this account of the political consequences of the passions is 
sharpened by the distinctly modern vocabulary that the De la Courts 
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122 Cf. Francesco Guicciardini, Ricordi, ed. emilio pasquini (milan: Garzanti, 1999), 218, 
p. 254: “Quegli uomini conducono bene le cose loro in questo mondo, che hanno sempre 
innanzi agli occhi lo interesse proprio, e tutte le azione sue misurano con questo fine. ma 
la fallacia è in quegli che non conoscono bene quale sia lo interesse sua, cioè che reputano 
che sempre consista in qualche comodo pecuniario più che nell’onore, nel sapere manten-
ersi la riputazione e il buono nome.”
123 For an analysis of the language of ‘interest’ in Guicciardini and in subsequent natural 
law theory, see the highly informative article by Lionel a. mcKenzie, “natural right and 
the emergence of the idea of interest in early modern political thought: Francesco 
Guicciardini and Jean de silhon,” History of European Ideas 2, 4 (1981), 277–298. For 
Guicciardini’s political thought in general, see Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State, 
178–200.
124 For lucid overviews of the emergence and spread of the language of ‘interest’ and 
reason of state, see tuck, Philosophy and Government, 38–119; Viroli, From Politics to Reason 
of State, 238–280; and for the later seventeenth and eighteenth century, pierre Force, Self-
Interest Before Adam Smith. A Genealogy of Economic Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University press, 2003).
125 michel de montaigne, Les Essais, ed. Jean Balsamo et al. ([paris]: Gallimard, 2007) 
iii.1, p. 833, 843.
employ to characterize human self-love, either true or false: the vocabu-
lary of ‘interest’. the use of ‘interest’ as a political and moral concept origi-
nated in the Ricordi of the Florentine republican Francesco Guicciardini, 
written around 1530 and first published in 1576. Guicciardini argued that 
human nature is essentially selfish, yet as long as this egotism encourages 
people to maintain their honour and perform laudable deeds, it can be 
justifiable. Confronted with the question of how individual gains can be 
reconciled with the common good, Guicciardini asserted that searching 
for one’s self-interest is positive as long as it pursues aristocratic honour 
instead of pecuniary advantage as a means to further the public interest.122 
Guicciardini mainatined that such an interesse dello stato or general inter-
est of the state exists, in particular in international affairs. the relations 
between different polities, like the intersubjective behaviour of self-inter-
ested individuals, can be explained trough a rational calculation of every 
state’s needs and priorities.123
this language of interesse, or as it soon was to be called, ragion di stato 
became widely diffused in late sixteenth-century italy and subsequently 
spread over the rest of europe.124 Yet from the outset, it was a highly 
ambiguous language. as in montaigne, it contained a strong tension 
between the notion of “l’interest commun”, or the common good, and 
the notion of “l’interest et passion privée”, the disruptive passion of self-
love.125 this tension, overlooked by albert hirschmann in his classic 
The Passions and the Interests, would characterize the use of the term 
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126 albert O. hirschmann, The Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for 
Capitalism before its Triumph (princeton: princeton University press, 1977). hirschmann 
maintains that ‘interest’ as a concept arose in opposition to the predominant view on the 
passions, as a countervailing tamer of man’s unruly passionate behaviour. however, this 
interpretation is too narrow, for it overlooks the seventeenth-century notion of ‘interest’ 
as a fashionable designation of human self-love, the major human passion. Cf. Force, Self-
Interest, 142–144; and ernst Wolfgang Orth “interesse,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 
iii, 305–365: 319–320, with evidence of ‘interest’ used as a synonym for either proprio amor 
(ignatius de Loyola), l’amour naturel de soi-même (Fénelon), or l’âme de l’amour propre (La 
rochefoucauld).
127 henri de rohan, De l’interest des princes et Estats de la Chrestienté, in [rohan], Le 
parfait Capitane … augmenté d’un traicté: de l’interest des princes et Estats de la Chrestienté 
([Leiden], 1648), 100–101. see also J.h.m. salmon, “rohan and interest of state,” in roman 
schnur (ed.), Staatsräson. Studien zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs (Berlin: Duncker 
& humblot, 1975), 121–140.
128 Virgilio malvezzi, Discorsi sopra Cornelio Tacito (Venice, 1635), 91: “e quì è da notare, 
che gli huomini si muoveranno sempre più per privato interesse, che per publica utilità: e 
che ogn’uno ha più caro d’esser servo, e ricco, che povero, e libero.” pieter de la Court van 
der Voort owned this edition: Library, fol. 19. For malvezzi’s life and works, see rodolfo 
Brändli, Virgilio Malvezzi. Politico e moralista (phD thesis Basel, 1964).
throughout the seventeenth century.126 in some writings of the reason of 
state tradition, ‘interest’ was equated with the indisputably main concern 
of a polity, independent of personal opinion or the character of the sover-
eign. this most roaring and resounding phrasing of this view came in the 
motto of the Duke of rohan’s De l’interest des princes et des etats de la 
chrestienté (1639), which exclaimed that “Les princes commandent aux 
peuples, et l’interest commande aux princes”, for “Le prince se peut 
tromper, son Conseil peut estre corrompu; mais l’interest seul ne peut 
jamais manquer”.127 however, not all seventeenth-century authors were 
so emphatic about the positively unfailing character of interest. For a 
sceptical tacitist like Virgilio malvezzi, who wrote in the same years as 
rohan, it should rather “be noted that men will always be more moved by 
private interest then by public utility” and thus, to their own disadvan-
tage, even prefer to be “a slave and rich then to be poor and free”.128
By employing the language of ‘interest’, the brothers De la Court posi-
tion their writings in this many-sided approach to the connections 
between self-interested personal behaviour and the needs and concerns 
of statecraft. their use of the concept entails a double move that aptly 
reveals the ambiguities that characterized the term. First of all, the De la 
Courts appropriate the abovementioned phrase of the Duke of rohan to 
claim that there exists a normative common interest such as the ‘interest 
of holland’, a general political standard that can be scrutinized empiri-
cally. Given that “all peoples of europe, like the spanish, the italians and 
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129 Aanwysing i.1, p. 1: “en dewijl meest alle Volkeren van europa, als spanjaarden, 
italianen en Francoisen, deese saak uitdrukken met den woorde Interest.”
130 see mcKenzie, “natural right,” 279, 294, note 1. For ‘interest’ as a commercial term, 
see e.g. Politike Weeg-schaal i.iV.2, p. 297; ii.iV.10–11; iii.ii.4, p. 621; iii.iii.2, p. 651.
131 marchamont nedham, Interest will not Lie. Or, A View of England’s True Interest 
(London, 1659), 3. On nedham, see esp. Blair Worden, “marchamont nedham and the 
Beginnings of english republicanism, 1649–1656,” in Wootton (ed.), Republicanism; 45–81; 
idem, Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England. John Milton, Andrew Marvell, 
Marchamont Nedham (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2007); and rahe, Against Throne 
and Altar, 179–244. more on the language of ‘interest’ in seventeenth-century england in 
J.a.W. Gunn, ‘ “interest Will not Lie’: a seventeenth-Century political maxim,” Journal of 
the History of Ideas 29, 4 (1968), 551–564.
132 e.g. in Welvaren, p. 119, 138. Cf. on this language of interest in early-modern republi-
can Lucca, peter n. miller, “stoics Who sing: Lessons in Citizenship from early modern 
Lucca,” The Historical Journal 44 (2001), 313–339. For the appropriation of this language in 
the Dutch political debate, see Tieranny van eigenbaat (1679). Toneel als wapen tegen 
Oranje, ed. tanja holzhey and Kornee van der haven (Zoeterwoude: astraea, 2008).
the French, express this thing with the word Interest”, De la Court assumes 
that this remarkable linguistic agreement proves the universal validity of 
the concept.129 such an analysis of politics in terms of interest, originally a 
commercial term, implies that political behaviour is somehow compara-
ble to commercial exchanges that follow the laws of predictability.130 
perhaps the most insistent example of this attitude came from the sharp, 
chameleonic pen of the english pamphleteer marchamont nedham, 
whose short 1659 treatise Interest will not Lie opens with the claim:
that if you can apprehend wherein a man’s interest to any particular Game 
on foot doth consist, you may surely know, if the man be prudent, wherea-
bout to have him, that is, how to judge of his designe: For, which way soever 
you foresee his interest doth in prudence dispose him, that way (provided 
he be so wise as to understand his own Concernment) he will be sure to go, 
and so his interest (provided also, that in your calculation thereof you be 
not mistaken) will not lie to you, it will not deceive you in your judgement 
concerning the mans intents and proceedings.131
accordingly, this first use of the vocabulary of interest involves the pre-
tension that it is possible to achieve certain, calculable knowledge of poli-
tics and morals.
On the other hand, the De la Courts also adopt the second meaning 
of the term, the assertion that the unsettling passion of self-love expresses 
itself primarily in the desire to further one’s self-interest at the cost of 
the common good. they frequently employ typical proverbs from italian 
scepticist reason of state, like Il proprio interesse è una grande bestia, 
che comanda a tutti and Piú pesa una oncia d’util proprio, che cento libre 
di stato, to confirm this point:132 for “who would bring water to his 
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133 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.1, p. 15: “Een ander mans huis aan brand steeken om sig by te 
koolen te warmen.” ii.i.4, p. 325: “(piu pesa un oncia d’util proprio, che cento libre di stato) 
wie brengd water aan zijn buyrmans huis als eigen in brand staat?” iii.iii.1, p. 639: 
“niemand hinkt van het seer eens ander mans, in wiens oore is te snijden als in een 
vilthoed, en wiens huis men ligtelik aan brande steekt, als men sig by de koolen sal konnen 
warmen.”
134 Sinryke Fabulen, 192: “… Eigen-Interest is het voornaamste, indien niet eenigste oog-
wit aller menschelike uitwerkingen.” Ibidem, 441: “… de geneegenheid om sijn eigen 
Interest te bejaagen … aan den menschen eigen is, ende dienvolgende in der eewigheid 
duuren kan, ofte sal.” Cf. the similar usage of the term in aitzema, Historie of verhael, vol. 
iii, 841: “… zijnde natuerlick dat een yeder jaeght en janckt na ’t geen hy bemindt, ende een 
yeder bemindt zijn interest.”
135 Cf. for a more extensive analysis with some different accents: Blom, Morality and 
Causality, esp. 174–180; and idem, “Burger en Belang.”
136 Politike Discoursen ii.iV.7, p. 50: “ende dat eigen voordeel, dus wyselik met het gemeen 
welvaaren verknogt zijnde.”
137 Sinryke fabulen, 126: “… een verkeerd begreepen eigen Inter-esse.” Cf. harvey C. 
mansfield, “self-interest rightly Understood,” Political Theory 23, 1 (1995), 48–66.
neighbour’s house when his own is on fire”, when it is also possible “to set 
another’s house to fire to warm oneself by its coals”?133 in the development 
of the brothers’ œuvre, this second usage of ‘interest’ increasingly replaces 
the term ‘self-love’. eventually this development results in the claim that 
“Self-Interest is the most prominent, if not the only, objective of all human 
deeds”, and that “the inclination to hunt for one’s own Interest … is typical 
of humanity, and therefore it can and will last for eternity”.134 the work of 
the brothers De la Court is thus characterized by the same tension that 
pervaded the general use of the language of ‘interest’ throughout the sev-
enteenth century: human behaviour is dominated by the unruly passion 
of self-interest, often without regard for the common good, yet at the 
same time society at large has one general interest that is independent of 
the whims of personal human conduct.
the core of the moral thought of the brothers De la Court involves an 
attempt to alleviate this very tension.135 at the basis of this attempt lies 
their reappraisal of Ciceronian ambition as the true, sincere form of self-
love, the desire to be praised by one’s fellow citizens for the performance 
of laudable deeds. this characterization leads to the acknowledgment 
that self-interest does not necessarily run counter to the common good: 
as Guicciardini had argued before, the desire for honour is justifiable if it 
brings about behaviour that serves society at large. this form of self-inter-
est involves the ability to connect “private advantage wisely with the com-
mon welfare”, the ability to understand how individual gains can be linked 
to the public good.136 as such it is the direct opposite of “self-interest 
wrongly understood”,137 the pursuit of self-love without attention to the 
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138 senault, De l’usage des passions, 232–233: “La Justice veut qu’un bon Citoyen prefere 
l’interest public à celuy de sa maison … Cependant l’amour propre ne fait travailler un 
homme, que pur son plaisir ou pour sa gloire, il le constitüe la fin de toutes ses actions.”
139 Politike Discoursen i.ii.5, p. 105–106: “Wie kan sijn borge zijn, dat hy daar in bestendig 
sal blijven, ende niet tot ondeugd sal vervallen?”
140 Welvaren 61, p. 141: “en voorwaer hier in bestaet de deughd van een eerlijck man en 
van een Goed politijck, dat hij voorsightighlijck sijn eigen voordeel aen ’t Gemeen koppelt. 
en het is wel doenelijck, want de wegh des Deughds soo onvrughtbaer niet en is voor de 
politijcquen, als sij wel werd uijtgekreten.”
general interest. a proper acknowledgment of the connection between 
personal advantage and the common good implies that self-interest as 
the defining characteristic of human behaviour can be reconciled with 
the indisputable interest of society at large.
this doctrine of well-understood self-interest entails a crucial depar-
ture from the classical view that the quest for personal advantage should 
be subordinated to the common good. as, for example, senault insisted, 
“Justice requires that a good Citizen prefers the public interest over the 
one of his house … When self-love only induces a man to work for his 
pleasure or for his glory, it constitutes the end of all his actions”.138 Yet for 
the brothers De la Court, the pursuit of glory does not necessarily entail 
the demise of civic virtue. Given the predominance of the passion of self-
love, this is in fact the only way to achieve any form of virtuous behaviour. 
according to their logic, an individual who subordinates his personal 
interest unconditionally to the common good is a mere chimera. For “who 
can be his guarantee that he will remain steady in his virtue and not fall into 
vice?”139 someone who pretends to search for the public interest without 
regard for his personal advantage should not be trusted, for such a preten-
sion merely reveals that he has misunderstood his self-interest – and thus 
is enslaved by the worst of all passions, the desire to rule. By contrast, “the 
virtue of an honest man and of a Good politician entails that he prudently 
connects his own advantage to the Common one. and this is quite doable, 
for the path of Virtue is not so unfruitful for the politicians as has been 
wailed sometimes”.140 the brothers De la Court see no reason to be overly 
sceptical about the political consequences of the human condition, as 
long as the key passion of self-love manifests itself as the virtue of self-
interest well-understood.
The Politics of the Passions
the crucial means to overcome the corruptive potential of the passion of 
self-love lies in the disciplinary framework that is established with the 
creation of civil society. as the argument of the De la Courts goes:
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141 Politike Discoursen ii.Vi.5, p. 182: “indien niet alle Burgerschap, en Vergadering, door 
onderlinge vreese veroorsaakt, en by een gebragt wierd; soo soude de mensch gelijk de 
Kinderen, alles wat hem aanstond, of lusten mogte, begeeren te verkrygen; sulks hy sijn 
lusten niet boetende, het selven naa-laat door de vreese die de Tugt, en de Reeden in hem 
heeft gebragt.”
142 Politike Weeg-schaal iii.i.5, p. 537–538: “Jaa niet alleen door eige ervarentheit haare 
passien en oordeel te beteren, maar ook door de studien, en kennisse van verscheide Talen, 
en oude Historien, die ervarentheit wonderlik te vergrooten, en haar te doen leeven met 
alle de voorgaande eeuwen, en verre-afgelege Landen.”
if all Citizenship and assembly would not be generated and caused by 
mutual fear, then man would, like Children, desire to obtain anything that 
he likes or that pleases him. so he refrains from doing that, not paying for 
his lusts, through the fear that Discipline and Reason install in him.141
the bridle of discipline, the fear for punishment that regulates a well-
ordered civil society, thus ensures that the passions intrinsic to human 
nature are harnessed towards a useful civic purpose. this reformation of 
manners relies in particular on two central disciplinary factors, education 
and the rule of law. One of the primary aims of the brothers De la Courts 
is to demonstrate that in the absence of such a disciplinary framework, 
that is, in a monarchy, the consequences are disastrous. meanwhile, their 
embrace of disciplined civic behaviour involves a distinctive secular 
appeal for mercantile moderation as the key characteristic of the true 
citizen.
First of all, the brothers De la Court insist that the passions that define 
human nature should be disciplined by good civic instruction. this means 
that parents teach their children “not only to improve through their own 
experience their passions and judgment, but also to increase that experi-
ence wonderfully through studies and knowledge of various Languages 
and old Histories, and to let them live with all the earlier centuries and 
far-away Countries”.142 this typically humanist educational precept, com-
bining historical knowledge with practical experience, leads to knowl-
edge of oneself and the world at large, and thus it teaches people how to 
take care for themselves without harming others. Yet such civic teaching 
is not alone sufficient to create true, sincere self-love. human nature is 
capricious, and even those who have been raised in virtue may become 
haughty, pretentious and imperious when praised by others. a further 
disciplinary means is therefore necessary to counter excessive self-love. 
this is the corrective framework of the rule of law. in the De la Courts’ 
secular augustinianism with hobbesian undertones, human nature 
always tends to evil unless it is moderated by the rule of law. hence, “all 
the laws of a State should be made thus, as if all men were evil, since they will 
Plate A. Abraham van den Tempel, Pieter de la Court, 1667. Collection Rijksmuseum, 
Amsterdam. Acquisition with support of the Vereniging Rembrandt.
Plate B. Abraham van den Tempel, Catharina van der Voort, 1667. Collection Rijksmuseum, 
Amsterdam. Acquisition with support of the Vereniging Rembrandt.
Plate C. Godfried Schalcken, Pieter de la Court, 1679. Museum de Lakenhal, Leiden.
Plate D. Abraham van den Tempel, The City of Leiden Receives the Textile Industry, 1651. 
Museum de Lakenhal, Leiden.
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143 Politike Discoursen ii.Vi.20, p. 252: “ende dien volgende soo is ook klaar dat alle 
wetten van een Staat soodanig behoorden gemaakt te zijn, als of alle menschen boos-aardig 
waaren, dewijl sy inder daad boosaardig staan te werden, ten minsten voor het meeste 
gedeelte, ten zy sy door de vreese van straf, werden weederhouden. en daarom segt het 
spreek-woord: La fame & la povertà, fa gli homini industriosi, & le leggi gli fanno boni.” the 
phrase is from machiavelli, Discorsi i.3, p. 16.
144 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.12, p. 57: “… in hare kindsheid nooit omgaan met kinderen 
haars gelijk, die zonder geveinstheid, kennisse met kennisse, ofte passie, met passie, 
opscharpende ofte tegengaande haar zouden leeren dat zy menschen zijn … dat alle goede 
kennisse en deugden in haar werden uitgebluscht, en ter contrarie alle onweetenheid en 
ondeugt, zoo veel mogelik aangequeeckt … en waar om de kinderen der monarchen, 
voorneementlik dien de Hoogheid booven ’t hoofd hangt, zig dus vermaaken met kinder-
like pronkery.”
145 Ibidem, 57–64, quoting e.g. tacitus, Annals ii.42 an ii.82; a passage in translation 
from philippe de Commines, Mémoires (1524–28, published in Leiden by elzevier in 1648), 
and a fable from Boccalini’s Ragguagli, vol. i., ragg. 56, p. 203–204.
indeed become evil, at least for the largest part, unless they are restrained by 
the fear for punishment. and therefore the saying goes: La fame & la pov-
ertà fa gli homini [sic] industriosi & le leggi gli fanno boni”.143 this 
machiavellian phrase makes clear that without the rule of law, the pas-
sions that define human nature can never be harnessed towards a virtu-
ous purpose. in the absence of education and disciplinary laws, the 
human condition reveals its most ardent and most dangerous character-
istic: the desire for domination.
the republican logic of the brothers De la Court presents the perni-
cious life at a monarchical court as the exemplary locus where such undis-
ciplined conduct thrives. princes and courtiers, who have not grown up 
amongst equals, have never experienced the temperance of “knowledge 
with knowledge, or passion with passion”. therefore they have never 
learned “that they are human”. instead, being the victim of the envy and 
distrust of their parents and competitors, princes and courtiers have been 
educated in such a way “that all good knowledge and virtues are extin-
guished in them, and at the contrary all ignorance and vice as much as 
possible cultivated”. this is the reason that the “children of monarchs” 
who are about to ascend to supremacy (the allusion to the young prince 
of Orange is clear) indulge in “childish ostentation” and all kinds of bodily 
lusts.144 the De la Courts appropriate numerous sources to prove this 
assumption, from a range of disenchanted sententiae taken from tacitus’s 
description of tiberius and his adopted son Germanicus, to a critical ver-
sion of philippe de Commines’s judgment on Louis Xi, and finally, an 
adaptation of the anti-monarchical satire of the prime contemporary 
tacitist, Boccalini.145 in revising the Politike Weeg-schaal, De la Court 
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146 Ibidem, 59–62, 66–69, with a translation and a long quote in French from hardouin 
de péréfixe, Histoire du Roy Henry le Grand (amsterdam: elzevier, 1661), 458–461, 513–517. 
the library of pieter de la Court van der Voort had a copy of this edition: Library, fol. 32.
147 Ibidem i.i.10, p. 47, quoting from Lucan, Pharsalia Viii, v. 452: “nil pudet adsuetos 
sceptris” and tacitus, Annals ii.42: “regibus aequa, nedum infima insolita sunt.”
148 Ibidem i.ii.1, p. 172: “… dat de monarchen boven alle Wetten en politike ordren 
zijnde, moeten werden geconsidereerd altijds hare passien en driften des bloeds, schoon 
genoomen die klaarelik ten verderve hunner Onderdaanen strekken, te zullen involgen.”
149 Ibidem i.i.21, p. 105: “De beste geboore Heeren zijn ongelukkige menschen, en 
regeerders; levende zonder waarheid te hooren, ofte Vrienden te zien.”
150 Ibidem, 108–110, quoting from Fajardo, Idea principis christiano-politici, symb. Xiii. i 
have used the contemporary spanish edition: Idea de un príncipe político christiano repre-
sentada en cien empresas (amsterdam, 1661), 116: “… le traen divertido con músicas, y 
entretenimientos, procurando tener ocupadas sus orejas, sin que puedan entrar por ellas 
los susurros de la murmuración y las vozes de la verdad, y del desengaño.” For an analysis 
of this passage see romanoski, Tacitus Emblematicus, 409–412.
included yet another, less obvious source to substantiate his claims: the 
Histoire du Roy Henry le Grand by hardouin de péréfixe, the former tutor 
of Louis XiV, published by elzevier in 1661 when the king took over gov-
ernmental powers after the death of mazarin. this work was essentially a 
mirror of princes in the form of a historical tract that praised the rule of 
henry iV, but De la Court deployed it as an insider’s account that revealed 
the baseness of monarchical education.146
the second means to harness true self-love, discipline by the rule of 
law, is equally absent at a royal court. the brothers De la Court insist 
that the fundamental mistake of the adherents of monarchy is their 
assumption that kings will be more virtuous than other mortals, though 
they are merely all too human. this claim is again illustrated by the sen-
tentiae of tacitus and Lucan.147 “Living above all Laws and political orders”, 
kings will always follow their passions instead of reason, not bridled by 
any disciplining.148 they do instil fear among their subjects, but of the 
wrong kind, since it makes people afraid of uttering the truth and instead 
conduces them to indulge in sycophancy. subjected to the dissimulative 
speech of courtiers who change their vices into virtues, kings will in 
fact lead the unhappiest life, destitute of true Ciceronian amicitia and “liv-
ing without hearing truth or seeing Friends”.149 again, in his revision of 
the Politike Weeg-schaal De la Court employed a typical mirror of princes 
as incontestable evidence for this statement: the Idea de un príncipe 
político christiano by the spanish diplomat Fajardo. Fajardo warned his 
royal audience for the ministers who keep the king “diverted with songs 
and entertainments, intending to occupy his ears while the murmur-
ings  and the voices of truth and exposure cannot enter”.150 all such 
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151 elzevier published three Latin editions of the second part of the work in 1642, 1644 
and 1649, and a French version in 1656: eustache du refuge, Traicté de la Cour, ou instruc-
tion des courtisans (amsterdam, 1656). For the influence of this treatise on english views 
on courtly conduct and civility, see markku peltonen, The Duel in Early Modern England. 
Civility, Politeness and Honour (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2003), 28–31.
152 see Du refuge, Traicté i.ii–V, p. 15–17 (on courtly ‘civilité’ and ‘affabilité’), i.XXXiV, 
p. 149–156, ii.Vi–Vii, p. 193–201, ii.Xii, p. 224–228 (on dissimulation and flattery), i.Xiii–
XXVi, p. 44–117 (on how the passions “aveuglent du tout nostre entendement” and on the 
“Usage de la cognoissance des passions, & les moyens de les moderer, en nous, & en 
autruy”).
153 Ibidem ii.V p. 189, quoted in Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.21, p. 110; i.i.27, p. 132 (“te hoof, in 
dat Groot Bordeel”); Politike Discoursen ii.V.12, p. 150 (“het Hof, sijnde een groote hoer”); and 
Sinryke Fabulen, 194.
154 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.14, p. 82: “eindelik is onder monarchale regeeringen een zeer 
groot quaat, dat de gebreeken des souverains, voor zo veel hy een Mensch is, terstont werden 
naargevolgt van zijn hovelingen, en van daar zig over het geheele Land verspreiden.” Cf. 
machiavelli, Discorsi iii.29.
dissimulation necessarily results in the corruption that is intrinsic to 
life at court where the worst of human passions thrive – a claim based on 
yet another insider’s account of courtly behaviour, the Traicté de la Cour, 
ou instructions des courtesans by the French diplomat eustache du refuge, 
first published in 1616 and again by elzevier in several editions in the 
1640s and 1650s.151 this manual for courtiers was meant to instruct its 
readers how to comply with the conventions at court, paying ample 
attention to the importance of speech, the uses of flattery and how to 
moderate the passions.152 Yet the De la Courts merely employ it for its 
statement “que la Cour est une grande putain, laquelle corompt [sic] le 
plus entiers et le plus chastes” – a phrase quoted repeatedly (and with 
noticeable gusto) throughout the brothers’ works.153 they thus turn a 
warning to courtiers into a fundamental critique of courtiers, which 
entails an obvious rhetorical move: if even the insiders of monarchical 
life such as péréfixe, Fajardo, and Du refuge maintain that the court cor-
rupts, then no adherent of the monarchical principle can possibly refute 
this claim.
in this way, the brothers De la Court employ numerous sources from 
the inner circles of the european royal courts to argue that under monar-
chical rule the passions intrinsic to the human condition will necessarily 
corrupt true human self-love. they stress empathically that all the pas-
sionate defects of a monarch “as far as he is Human” will not only spread 
among those at his court, but also among all his subjects.154 the result 
is that especially “in old absolutist Monarchies, public shame is not at 
all bothered about, and self-interest is absolutely shamelessly pursued … 
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155 Ibidem i.i.27, p. 133: “… in oude absolute Monarchien, wert die publike schande, gantsch 
niet geagt, en eigen intrest, allesins onbeschaamdelik voortgezet, … zonder eenigzins op 
eenige schanden, ofte welvoegentheit, te passen.”
156 Ibidem i.i.14, p. 82–83: “… en niet vreemt is dat een land wert vervult, met Pronkerts, 
Dansers, Speelers, Vloekers, Hoereerders, Jaagers, Vreeters, en Zuipers, &c. alles naar dat de 
heer zelfs sig geneegen toont te weesen.”
157 Ibidem i.ii.1, p. 173: “… in deeze booze werelt, voor de societeit der menschen niet 
schaadeliker kann werden bedagt, dan dat men, in het formeeren der regeeringe en maaken 
van wetten, voor oogen hebbe, hoe voorzigtige, duegtzame en ongepassioneerde Regeerders 
en Onderdaanen behoorden gezint te weezen; en dat in zoo een geval, ter contrarie niet heil-
saamer kan werden bedagt, dan wel te considereeren, hoe doortrapte, boosaardige, wellust-
ige, en allezins gepassioneerde menschen gezint zijn, op dat de politie en wetten zoodanig 
werden geformeert, dat de boosaardige Regeerders, en Onderdaanen, altijt genootsaakt 
werden, zig wel te draagen.” Cf. machiavelli, Discorsi i.3, p. 15: “… è necessario a chi dispone 
una repubblica ed ordina leggi in quella presupporre tutti gli uomini rei.”
without taking any notice of shame or decency”.155 a society ruled by a 
monarch is no true civil society where the passionate excesses of the 
human condition are bridled, but rather “a country that will be filled with 
Fops, Dancers, Players, Cursers, Fornicators, Hunters, Gluttons, and Boozers 
&c.”156
these moral concerns about the corruptive potential of immoderate 
self-love might not seem particularly exceptional, given that the basic 
conventions of Christian humanism shared the same emphasis on educa-
tion and discipline vis-à-vis human sinfulness. however, it is important to 
note that the thought of the brothers De la Court relies neither on a provi-
dential divine framework nor on the cultivation of inner virtue to over-
come the excesses of human nature. instead, their approach to the role of 
the passions in politics centres on a largely secular notion of the rule of 
law, indebted to, in particular, machiavelli. echoing the Discorsi, the De la 
Courts insist that
in this evil world nothing more detrimental to human society can be 
thought of than to envisage, when establishing a government and making 
Laws, how prudent, virtuous and impassionate Rulers and Subjects ought to be 
inclined … On the contrary, nothing more beneficial can be thought of than to 
consider well how cunning, evil, lecherous and fully passionate people will be 
inclined, so that politics and laws are established in such a way that the evil 
Rulers and Subjects will always be obliged to behave well.157
this key passage asserts that politics is not about the elusive concept of 
virtue but about the harsh reality of the passions, the self-loving nature of 
rulers and ruled alike. as a result, the conventional emphasis on a range 
of Ciceronian and Christian virtues, from fortitude to magnanimity, 
largely disappears from sight in the work of the De la Courts. their account 
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158 Politike Weeg-schaal i.i.33, p. 167–168: “… dat de uiterlike Proffessie van Religie, ’t zy 
Joodse, ’t zy Christelike, geen veranderinge brengt in den menscheliken aart, en dat alle 
menschen, ’t zy Jooden, Christenen of Heydenen, seer onwetende en boosaardig zijn of 
werden, wanneer sy tot sodanige Hoogheid geboren zijn, ofte stigen; dat sy gansch geen 
wetten ofte straffen onderworpen zijn.”
159 scott, Commonwealth Principles, esp. 41–62.
160 algernon sidney, Court Maxims, ed. hans W. Blom et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University press, 1996), 190, 194.
161 John milton, Second Defence of the People of England, in idem, Areopagitica and 
Other Political Writings (indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), 315.
162 see eric nelson, The Hebrew Republic. Jewish Sources and the Transformation of 
European Political Thought (Cambridge, mass.: harvard University press, 2010). For the 
Dutch context, see also Lea Campos-Boralevi, “Classical Foundational myths of european 
republicanism: the Jewish Commonwealth,” in Van Gelderen and skinner (eds.), 
Republicanism, vol. i: 247–261.
replaces the devotional love of one’s neighbour with calculated self-inter-
est, it subordinates the fear for God and the afterlife to the fear for worldly 
punishment. significantly, this passage is followed by the remark that 
such a secular disciplinary framework corresponds among all religions 
best with reformed Calvinism. this embrace of a particular creed is thus 
not the foundation of the analysis, but only a secondary consequence. 
moreover, the De la Courts assert “that the external Profession of Religion, 
whether Jewish or Christian, does not make any change in human nature, 
and that all people, whether Jewish, Christians or Heathens, are or become 
very ignorant and evil if they are born in or ascend to such Supremacy that 
they are not subjected to any laws or punishments”.158 the universal 
human condition reveals its darkest side if it remains unrestrained by the 
rule of law, regardless of confessional particularities.
the secular emphasis of this politics of the passions is particularly 
important because it points to a significant difference between the 
thought of the brothers De la Court and contemporary republican ideol-
ogy in england. as Jonathan scott has argued convincingly, seventeenth-
century english republicanism primarily involved a religiously inspired 
reformation of manners.159 in particular John milton and algernon sidney 
continuously connected their criticism of the corrupted stuart court with 
the threat of looming religious corruption. For example, sidney unequivo-
cally equated monarchical tyranny with impiety, “idolatry” and “the 
destruction of the godly”,160 while milton insisted that the execution of 
Charles i “delivered the Commonwealth from a grievous domination, and 
religion from a most debasing thraldom”.161 this emphasis on political the-
ology also explains the remarkable popularity of the model of the hebrew 
republic among seventeenth-century english republicans.162 Yet even 
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163 see Dirk van miert, Illuster onderwijs. Het Amsterdamse Athenaeum in de Gouden 
Eeuw, 1632–1704 (amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2005).
though this model was largely developed by Dutch authors, most impor-
tantly petrus Cunaeus, Grotius, and spinoza, such religious engagement is 
largely absent from the republican endeavour of the brothers De la Court. 
their emphasis on self-interest largely eclipses any notion of Christian 
virtuousness, and their anti-monarchical criticism consequently lacks the 
religious connotation of english republicanism. Yet, as the next chapters 
will continue to argue, this does not mean that the De la Courts are less 
radical, or ‘exclusivist’, than their english republican contemporaries. On 
the contrary: the brothers’ anti-monarchism proves to be exceptionally 
far-reaching and consistent in comparison with other seventeenth-cen-
tury republicans, while the brothers’ religious relativism has equally 
important consequences for their plea for comprehensive religious 
toleration.
Overall, the brothers’ repudiation of monarchical mores centres on 
their reappraisal of Ciceronian ambition as the sincere quest for personal 
honour within the bounds of civic discipline. this particular reading of 
Cicero, meant to adapt the ethics of honour for an urban society based on 
commerce, reveals a striking parallel with the archetypical figure in the 
Dutch Golden age of the ‘wise merchant’: the successful entrepreneur 
who engages in self-interested trade yet, reaping the seeds of a humanist 
education, proceeds rationally and honestly in public affairs.
 representing the Wise merchant
Barlaeus on the mercator sapiens
the concept of the ‘wise merchant’ was coined in a famous speech by 
the Dutch humanist scholar Caspar Barlaeus. On January 9, 1632, Barlaeus 
gave a lecture at the opening of the amsterdam ‘athenaeum illustre’, a 
college that, in the absence of a local university, offered higher schooling 
to the city’s youth.163 the first chairs of the athenaeum were taken by 
Barlaeus and his close friend and colleague Gerard Vossius. addressing 
the fathers of the young men he was about to teach, the prosperous 
elite of a city that had become famous for its trade, Barlaeus chose an 
appropriate topic for his speech: the connection between commerce 
and the study of philosophy, or, as he called it, the ideal of a mercator 
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164 the lecture was published the next year: Caspar Barlaeus, Mercator sapiens, sive ora-
tio de conjungendis mercaturae & philosophiae studiis (amsterdam, 1633). For a modern 
edition with a Dutch translation see Caspar Barlaeus, Mercator sapiens. Oratie gehouden 
bij de inwijding van de Illustere School te Amsterdam op 9 januari 1632, ed. s. van der Woude 
(amsterdam: Universiteitsbibliotheek, 1967). see also the French edition with an exten-
sive introduction by Catherine secretan (ed.), Le “Marchand philosophe” de Caspar 
Barlaeus. Un éloge du commerce dans la Hollande du Siècle d’Or (paris: honoré Champion, 
2002), and the analysis of Barlaeus’s speech, with some different accents, in Cook, Matters 
of Exchange, 68–73.
165 Barlaeus, Mercator sapiens, 3–4: “stat supplex civium ordo … in novo hoc musarum 
sacrario … Da, ut mercuriales hactenus, jam sapientiae candidati audiant; parci, sed cum 
elegantia; pecuniae studiosi, sed sine detrimento melioris studii, hoc est, artium & 
virtutis.”
166 Ibidem, 8: “… non ut opum studia damnem, sed rectae rationis sufflamine coërceam.”
167 Ibidem, 24: “aristoteles … prudentiae civilis administras comitesque facit, 
experientiam, memoriam, solertiam, ingenium, sententiam & Consolium. at hae ipsissi-
mae sunt mercaturae partes & oficia.”
sapiens.164 Barlaeus’ main aim was to reveal the value of the time-hon-
oured studia humanitatis for a modern commercial society. his speech 
clearly manifests a Ciceronian attempt to reconcile the right and the 
expedient in a world dominated by the pursuit of private gains.
From the start, the lecture reflected the communal concerns of the 
speaker and his audience, gathered in “this new sanctuary for the muses”. 
in an opening oration, Barlaeus asked God for wisdom and guidance in 
civic and commercial affairs, stressing in particular the need to maintain 
religious concord in the city of amsterdam. he then continued to request 
“that those, who have so far followed mercury, will by now be called can-
didates for Wisdom; plain but with elegance; striving for money but with-
out detriment for a better motivation, which is science and virtue”.165 
From the opening lines of his speech, Barlaeus thus made an explicit con-
nection between mercantile virtuousness and the challenges of a society 
characterized by religious diversity. his professed intention “not to con-
demn but to control the strivings for possessions through the reins of 
right reason”,166 indicates that he considered the rational and balanced 
pursuit of riches essential for the welfare and stability of the common-
wealth. indeed, Barlaeus stressed that the elements of aristotelian “civil 
prudence”, from experience and ingenuity to judgment and consultation, 
were also “the very same elements and tasks of commerce”.167 the mer-
chant who took up these tasks wisely embodied the ideal citizen engaged 
in the public life of the polity.
at the same time, Barlaeus also revealed his preoccupation that riches 
and luxury might corrupt amsterdam’s merchants. his aim was thus to 
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168 Ibidem, 13–14: “sed proprium libet mercantium virtutes expendere, & depromptis è 
philosophia gravibus praeceptis ostendere, quam & illorum vitiis mederi possit 
sapientia … Qui immodicas opes sectantur, immodicis saepe excidunt … atque ita dum 
alios sua luxuria, alios ambitio praecipitat, hos inconsulta ac prudentiae monitis destituta 
lucri cupiditas … non enim qui plus habet, sed qui minus cupit, dives est … philosophus 
animum hominis divitem appellat, non loculos. Qui quantumvis pleni sint, dummodo 
pecuniae cupiditate laboret animus, pauper es.”
169 Ibidem, 16: “sapientia opulentos non fastidit, sed exosculatur unice. illos nempe, qui 
locupletes sunt sine ullius injuria, magnifici sini luxu, liberales sine ostentatione, graves 
sine morositate, religiosi sine superstitione.”
170 Ibidem, 18–19. Cf. the classic discussion of utile and honestum in Cicero, De officiis, 
esp. ii.iii.9, iii.iii.11, iii.Viii.35, p. 303: “quod autem bonum, id certe utile; ita, quicquid 
honestum, id utile.”
171 Barlaeus, Mercator sapiens, 20: “… cum ea lege natus sis, ne publicae saluti officias, & 
ut homo de hominibus, civis de concivi bene merearis.”
“demonstrate with the weighty precepts derived from philosophy that 
Wisdom can cure their vices”. First of all, he insisted that merchants 
should not to be avaricious but rather practice moderation and always 
acquiesce to their position. “those who strive for immoderate riches”, 
Barlaeus taught his mercantile audience, “will often lose immoderately … 
and thus while luxury overthrows some, ambition brings down others if 
the lust for profit is destitute of and unadvised by the warnings of 
prudence”. hence, “not he who owns more, but he who desires less, is 
rich  … the philosopher calls the soul of man rich and not the money-
boxes, however full those are, for as long as the soul suffers from the lust 
for money, she is poor.”168 to overcome the threat of such commercial cor-
ruption, Barlaeus put forward his central claim:
Wisdom does not contemn the wealthy but embraces them, under one 
condition: that they are rich without harm to others, magnificent without 
luxury, liberal without ostentation, weighty without pedantry, religious 
without superstition.169
thus Barlaeus sought to justify mercantile enterprise with an account 
that, explicitly based on ancient stoicism and in particular on Cicero’s De 
officiis, highlighted the virtuousness of a rational and moderate pursuit of 
riches in the service of the common good.
as Barlaeus repeatedly stressed in a distinctly Ciceronian vein, hones-
tum, the morally right, cannot be separated from utile, the expedient.170 he 
continued to stress the practical merits of the wise merchant, his firmness 
in times of misfortune, the duty to be honest in commercial exchanges, 
and, in particular, to take care for the “public welfare” as “a man among 
men, and a citizen among fellow citizens”.171 this practice of charity and 
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172 Cf. Jacob soll, “accounting for Government: holland and the rise of political 
economy in seventeenth-Century europe,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 40, 2 (2009), 
215–238.
173 Barlaeus, Mercator sapiens, 30–31.
174 Ibidem, 9–10: “… ingeniosissimum Deorum mercurium, illum sapientiae ac eloquen-
tiae autorem. nempe ut doceant, & sapientia & facundia opus esse mercantibus; illa, ut 
quaestum honestum à turpi discernere possint, hac; ut verborum lenocinio commendent 
eas merces, quas extrudere satagunt.”
175 Ibidem, 16: “erectae & bonae mentis mercator … sicut vitiosas merces à probis, ita 
virtutes a vitiis distinguit.”
sociability would be enhanced by the study of both moral and ‘specula-
tive’ philosophy (i.e. the sciences of geography, biology, astronomy, and 
meteorology), and by learning the languages and customs of different 
peoples. Barlaeus thus suggested that commercial wisdom consists to a 
large extent of the practical application of theoretical knowledge, and 
that this practical insight is essential for the fulfilment of civic duties.172 
his panegyric emphasized that with the establishment of the ‘athenaeum 
illustre’, amsterdam would obtain the same status as other outstanding 
centres of trade, learning and civility such as ancient athens and Venice: 
in educating young merchants to become wise, the entire city would 
flourish.173
this carefully constructed plea for the public cultivation of mercantile 
virtue and insight involved the claim that one specific commercial quality 
makes the wise merchant in particular apt for performing in public. as 
Barlaeus argued, this quality stems from the double divinity of “the most 
ingenuous of the Gods, mercury”, who apart from being the god of com-
merce was also “the author of wisdom and eloquence”. through incorpo-
rating these two faces of both commerce and wise rhetoric, mercury 
revealed that “merchants need both wisdom and fluency; the one so that 
they can discern honest from disgraceful gains, the other in order to com-
mend with the allure of words the goods which they are satisfied to sell”.174 
this suggestion that the ability to discern honesty from dishonesty is 
related to appealing speech entails a significant parallel between com-
mercial practice and truthful, persuasive rhetoric. as Barlaeus insisted: 
“a merchant with a sincere and good mind … distinguishes decent from 
vicious merchandise, like he distinguishes virtues from vices.”175 the theo-
retical and practical upbringing of the wise merchant makes it possible 
to approach human behaviour as if it were merchandise, to differenti-
ate  between virtue and vice on the account of commercial insight into 
what is good and bad, irrespective of any in utramque partem reason-
ing.  With this argument against both unfair trade and dissimulative 
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Oratien, en Blijde inkomst van Maria de Medicis (amsterdam, 1662). a Dutch translation of 
the lecture was published separately in 1641: Verstandighe coopman, of Oratie, handelende 
van de t’samen-voeginghe des koop-handels, ende der philosophie (enkhuizen, 1641).
177 see herman pleij, “poorters en burgers in laat-middeleeuwse literaire bronnen,” in 
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margaret C. Jacob and Catherine secretan (eds.), The Self-Perception of Early Modern 
Capitalists (new York: palgrave macmillan, 2008), 75–97.
178 aristotle, Politica i.9–10 (1257a–1258b); Cicero, De officiis i.XLii.151.
speech, Barlaeus asserted that honesty and outspokenness are essen-
tially  commercial virtues. it is the wise merchant who masters as no 
other the proper parrhèsia for entering the marketplace of public 
political debate, and thus he fulfils the prime prerequisite of a truly civic 
life.
Barlaeus’ inaugural lecture was an important public event, and his por-
trayal of the mercator sapiens resonated far beyond the walls of the 
amsterdam athenaeum when it was published and translated into Dutch 
in the following decades.176 in general, his attempt to reconcile the vicis-
situdes of commercial society with the precepts of classical humanism 
arose from the long-standing mercantile culture of the cities in the Low 
Countries, which, from the medieval period onwards, resulted in a char-
acteristically urban and commercial approach to civic ethics in which ‘the 
citizen’ was at times identified with ‘the merchant’.177 the speech of 
Barlaeus evidently stood in this tradition. in particular, his reading of 
the Ciceronian connection between honestum and utile was part of a 
more widespread endeavour in the Dutch Golden age to legitimize the 
pursuit of commercial gains in light of classical and Christian mistrust of 
mercantile activity. aristotle’s Politics argued that trade for the sake of 
the accumulation of wealth is unnatural, a verdict echoed by Cicero in 
his disapproval of the “vulgarity” of trade.178 the Biblical condemnation 
of usury and worldly riches reinforced this anti-commercial ethics. 
accordingly, humanist scholars and clergymen in the Dutch Golden 
age struggled with the challenge of how to reconcile this classical 
and Christian legacy with the commercial realities that defined their 
society.
an early example of this struggle was the dialogue De Coopman [“the 
merchant”], in which the sixteenth-century moralist Dirck Coornhert 
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179 Dirck Volckertsz Coornhert, De Coopman. Aenwijsende d’oprechte conste om 
Christelijck ende met eenen gelijcken moede in ’t winnen ende verliesen Coophandel te drijven 
(norden, 1620).
180 Godefridus Udemans, ’t Geestelyck roer van ’t coopmans schip, 3d. ed. (Dordrecht, 
1655), sig. *4: “dat de Koopmanschap, is eene eerlijcke handelinge, als die maer gedreven 
wordt in de gerechtigheyt, ende vreese des heeren.”
181 Ibidem, 14–61. see schama, Embarrassment of Riches, 330–331.
182 Burgersdijk, Idea oeconomicae et politicae i.Viii.16, p. 26: “mercatura ergo est legiti-
mus acquirendi modus, si adhibeatur ad supplendis nature defectus. at si referatur ad 
augendam pecuniam, sine aloquo ulteriore fine, jam naturae contraria erit, quia progredi-
etur in infinitum.”
183 Consideratien raeckende ’t stuck van leeninge op interest ende panden (Leiden, 1657), 
sig. a: “… dienstich is tot de onderlinge gemeynschap en hanteringe met malkanderen, 
welckers handelingen en contracten niet strydigh syn, met de plichten van de Christelycke 
liefde, en welkce gefundeert en gegrondvest is in de naturele billickheydt.”
debated with his interlocutor the need for a range of virtues, most impor-
tantly Christian charity, to counter the corruptive effects of trade.179 the 
Calvinist cleric Godefridus Udemans tackled the issue in his widely read 
treatise ’t Geestelyck roer van ’t coopmans schip [“the spiritual helm of the 
merchant’s ship”], which aimed to show “that Commerce is an honest 
activity, as long as it is pursued in the justice and fear of the Lord”.180 
Udemans reproved Cicero’s portrayal of petty trade in De officiis, and in 
reply argued that commerce is a necessary means to foster the welfare of 
society and to spread God’s word overseas. Yet Udemans then continued 
with an extensive account of all the devout virtues that the merchant 
should cultivate – an account that, as simon schama has shown in his 
classic on the subject, The Embarrassment of Riches, left little room for any 
truly mercantile enterprise.181 meanwhile, at Leiden University, Burgersdijk 
transmitted the aristotelian doctrine with the claim that commerce is 
justifiable, but only if it aims to relieve scarcity, for the mere accumula-
tion of wealth goes against nature.182 Other academics such as Boxhorn 
and salmasius equally participated in the public debate on the role of 
commerce, in particular with regard to the pressing issue of usury and the 
establishment of municipal loan offices. this issue continued to domi-
nate theological and political debate throughout the 1650s, when one 
Leiden pamphlet asserted on the basis of a range of classical and Christian 
sources that usury “is useful for the mutual society and conduct with each 
other” if compatible with “Christian love”, and therefore “founded and 
based on natural fairness”.183 such apologies for mercantile practice were 
obviously not restricted to the narrow confines of the Dutch republic. For 
example, the German academic Johannes marquardus published a large 
juridical treatise in 1662 that sought to make commerce salonfähig in the 
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184 Johannes marquardus, Tractatus politico-juridicus de iure mercatorum et commercio-
rum singulari (Frankfurt, 1662) i.2, p. 18: “mercatura non est nomen Vitii sed Officii.” pieter 
de la Court van der Voort owned a copy of this treatise: see Library, fol. 10.
empire. Frequently referring to the Dutch example, including Barlaeus’s 
speech, marquardus emphasized the public utility of trade, following the 
adage that “Commerce is not the name of a Vice but of an Office”.184
Barlaeus’s contribution to this debate on the social role of commerce 
and mercantile wealth stands out for its distinctive humanist use of clas-
sical sources, which eclipse the religious emphasis that dominated from 
Coornhert onwards. Barlaeus did not aim to come to terms with commer-
cial society from a Christian point of view, but rather to turn the icons of 
humanism, in particular Cicero, into advocates of honourable trade. he 
took the pursuit of mercantile riches and the accumulation of wealth for 
granted as unavoidable elements of modern life, not to be curtailed by 
piety but rather to be mobilized in the service of the common good and 
the study of the classics. the brothers De la Court continued on this path 
set out by Barlaeus. On the one hand, they shared a similar emphasis on 
mercantile moderation and wisdom as essential features of a civic life. On 
the other, the way in which the De la Courts presented themselves, both 
in image and in word, reveals that their embrace of riches gradually 
departed from the classical preoccupation with the corrupting potential 
of commercial wealth.
Un-courtiers: A Mercantile Reformation of Manners
it should be stressed that the œuvre of the brothers De la Court does not 
engage explicitly either with the aristotelian claim that trade for the sake 
of the accumulation of riches is unnatural, or with the contemporary 
debate on the legitimacy of commercial practices such as usury. instead, 
their portrayal of what makes a merchant wise involves a clear political 
move which suggestively contrasts mercantile civic ethics with the base 
morality of a courtly society. the distinctive reformation of manners that 
the De la Courts propagate is therefore not directed against the possible 
excrescences of commerce, but rather against the continuous threat of 
courtly decadence and dissimulation that corrupt all honour and honesty 
in commercial affairs. they turn Barlaeus’s humanist account of mercan-
tile virtues and honourable trade into a decisively politicized interpreta-
tion of true republican citizenship.
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185 Politike Discoursen ii.Vi.15, p. 222, 224–225: “… quist-gierigheid, waarlik een passie 
die doorgaans in Vorsten is … ende ter contrarie is het booven alle, voor den gemeene 
Borgeren een seer loofwaardige saak sijn leeven naar deese volgende spreek-woorden aen 
te stellen … een wijs mensch, is met weinig te vreeden.”
186 Ibidem ii.Vi.4, p. 178.
187 see e.g. Cats, Spiegel iii, emblem ii, p. 5–6 (on a monkey climbing to the top of a post, 
thereby revealing his bottom), and emblem Viii, p. 21–23, which concludes saying “Die 
hooger klimt als hem betaemt/Valt laeger als hy heeft geraemt”. Cf. also Vondel, Vorsteliicke 
warande, fables XXVi, LXiX and XCViii.
188 Sinryke Fabulen, 65: “… binnen den arbeidsaamen ofte sorgvuldigen Borgerlijken 
Stand blijvende … sy des niet te min alsdan die dwaasheid begaan van nog veel hooger te 
willen stijgen, ende waanen als Eedelluiden te konnen leeven.”
189 Politike Discoursen ii.Vi.19, p. 242: “… door te groote begeerte van Eere, sig selven 
pragtiger kleeden, grooter huis bewoonen, en rijker tafel houden als haar staat of midde-
len toelaaten.” Cf. a similar passage in Sinryke Fabulen, 235–236.
One of Barlaeus’ main messages was the claim that the pursuit of profit 
is honourable if it does not give rise to uncivil greed and ostentation. the 
brothers De la Court adopt this plea for mercantile modesty to their 
account of the political consequences of self-love. this account reproves 
“squandering” as “truly a passion that generally belongs to Princes”, whose 
constant exposure to courtly flattery and unbridled power deprives them 
of self-knowledge and leaves them enslaved by their lusts. in a true civil 
society, citizens should not try to follow such royal example. instead, “it is 
especially for the common Citizens very laudable to lead their live accord-
ing to the following saying … a wise man is content with little.”185 
moderation thus fulfils the civil desire to be praised, while the unre-
strained yearning for possessions reveals a greed similar to the desire for 
domination, as in the imperial devices of plus oultre and semper augus-
tus.186 With this juxtaposition of the covetousness of the monarch versus 
the modesty of the true citizen, the De la Courts give an explicit republi-
can content to Barlaeus’s assessment of the poverty of the insatiable soul.
an essential element of such civil moderation is the placid acquies-
cence with one’s social status, a popular theme in seventeenth-century 
Dutch literature which clearly reflected a widely shared discomfort with 
the realities of social climbing.187 the De la Courts insist that citizens who 
have successfully obtained an honest way of living should not try to leave 
this “industrious or careful Civil State” and “commit the stupidity of want-
ing to rise even higher and imagine to be able to live like Nobles”.188 such 
parvenus merely prove to be driven by false self-love, and “by a too large 
desire of Honour they dress themselves more splendidly, live in bigger 
homes and set richer tables than their position or means permit”.189 this 
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190 Sinryke Fabulen, 61–66. Cf. Vondel, Vorsteliicke warande, fable XXXiii.
191 Ibidem, 47–50: “… aan de alderkostelikste tafelen, eet aldaar de lekkerste spijse … 
slaap op purperen bedden, ende kus aldaar de wangen der allerschoonste Vrouwen … een 
Mensch die pragtig ende wellustig leefd; ofte een hooveling. met een mier, een Mensch, die 
neederig, arbeid- ende spaarsaam is.” Cf. Vondel, Vorsteliicke warande, fables Xii and LVii.
192 Ibidem, 272–273: “… de meeste rijkdommen van Borgerlijke Familien in Holland, 
sijnen oorsprong heeft van … naarstig- en suinigheid … volgens der Francoisen wijse.”
193 Cf. Christopher J. Berry, The Idea of Luxury. A Conceptual and Historical Investigation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1994), which emphasizes the importance of the 
‘Dutch example’ in the seventeenth century, yet without any discussion of Dutch sources.
uncivil pretentiousness is imaginatively ridiculed in a fable that tells of a 
frog who does not understand the fundamental equality of his species and 
vaingloriously thinks he is able to grow as large as a cow: blowing himself 
up to the extreme, the frog finally bursts apart.190 the obvious message is 
that such swollenness strips people of all civil dignity and reduces them to 
the base level of those who personify monarchical manners: nobles and 
courtiers.
another fable evocatively explains this difference between the civility 
of the modest citizen and the incivility of the courtier. the fable tells of a 
fly who, while eating “at the most sumptuous tables … sleeping on purple 
beds, and kissing there the cheeks of the most beautiful Women”, ridicules 
the hard labour of an ant. the ant then replies with saying that he has 
carefully amassed enough goods to survive, while the fly will certainly not 
make it through the winter. in a further clarification, De la Court defines 
the fly as “a Man who lives splendidly and lecherously, or a Courtier”, while 
the ant personifies “a Man who is humble, diligent and thrifty”.191 this praise 
of a modest accumulation of goods as opposed to courtly display makes 
clear that riches as such are not to be condemned if achieved by honest 
means. De la Court eulogizes how “most of the riches of Civil Families in 
Holland” stem from “thrift and frugality” and the utter renunciation of any 
luxury. such praiseworthy conduct stands in direct opposition to the idle-
ness of those who refuse to practise a useful occupation, like commerce, 
and instead indulge in opulence “in the French way”.192 as in the fable of 
the Kingdom of apes, De la Court thus contrasts Dutch diligence and 
modesty, the example of mercantile morality, with the ostentation and 
laziness of the Frenchman, the prototype of courtly corruption.
this preoccupation with the corruptive consequences of luxury was 
fairly conventional.193 however, it is important to stress that the brothers 
De la Court never rebuke the pursuit of riches. On the contrary: in their 
commercial logic, wealth generally proves to be the result of sincere self-
love and civil ambition. it is therefore not riches that corrupt, but power. 
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194 Politike Discoursen ii.Vi.5, p. 183: “maar men moet seer wel op-merken dat menschen 
wiens rijkdom ontbloot is van magt, door de meeste reedenen tot kennissen, en deugden 
geprikkeld, en van alle boosheeden afgeschrikt werden … sulks niet eigentlik de rijkdom, 
maar de magt en licencie, oorsaak veeler boosheeden is.”
195 Sinryke Fabulen, 512–514: “… eene verkeerde barmhertigheid.”
as the brothers argue, “people whose wealth is devoid of power are by 
most reasons incited to knowledge and virtues and deterred from all evil … 
thus actually not wealth but power and licence are the cause of many 
evils”.194 the De la Courts thus adopt Barlaeus’s claim that mercantile 
riches should be appraised if employed for the sake of wisdom and virtue. 
at the same time, they make an implicit move away from the classical 
concern that the accumulation of goods will lead to corruption. this con-
cern still haunted Barlaeus’s portrayal of the wise merchant. For the De la 
Courts, in contrast, mercantile wealth gives no reason for anxiety, since 
the real source of evil is the unrestrained lust for power.
the brothers’ gradual departure from the traditional mistrust of the 
accumulation of riches is revealed by the language in which they portray 
honourable civil conduct. Barlaeus’s humanist vocabulary of the classical 
virtues of the wise merchant, from piety to prudence, virtually disappears 
from their writings, while his Ciceronian argument for the overlap 
between utile and honestum becomes couched in the consciously modern 
language of ‘interest’. this gradual move from virtue to self-interest even-
tually results in a corresponding shift from the common good to private 
advantage as the standard of mercantile morality. Like his predecessor 
Coornhert or his Calvinist contemporary Udemans, Barlaeus primarily 
emphasized the value of individual commercial activity for society at 
large, in particular through the practice of charity. Yet in the thought of 
the De la Courts charity attains a strikingly different connotation. a cru-
cial passage in the Sinryke Fabulen describes charity not primarily as a 
virtue, but as a passion, a passion that can easily turn into “wrong charity” 
when directed towards people who indulge in laziness and only hope to 
profit from the riches of their industrious fellow human beings.195 this 
remarkable change in emphasis shows how the brothers De la Court 
depart from the late humanist view on riches and poverty as expressed by 
Barlaeus. in the development of their œuvre, and most strikingly in De la 
Court’s last work, the Sinryke Fabulen, wealth is increasingly identified as 
a moral value that characterizes the thrifty, the diligent, and the wise. 
Barlaeus’s assertion that “wisdom does not contemn the wealthy but 
embraces them” thus turns into an account that maligns poverty as a 
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196 Politike Discoursen ii.Vi.16, p. 227–229: “en dewijl de arme Luiden haar tijd in ’t 
werken tot haar onderhoud, moeten besteeden, soo gebreekt hun de selve om haar ziele 
te leeren tugtigen … de behoorlike eersugt … alle tugt uit-gebannen hebbende, deese 
heeren soo onmatig haare lusten volgen, dat sy vol schulden steeken, eer sy weeten dat 
hun goed verminderd. en hier door brengt de weelde by haer te weege het selfden, dat de 
behoeftigheid by de arme Luiden te veroorsaaken pleeg.” Cf. the similar argument in 
milton, Defence of the People of England, in idem, Areopagitica and Other Political Writings, 
250: “… the middle sort, amongst whom the wisest men and most skilful in affairs are gen-
erally found; the rest are most commonly diverted, on the one hand by luxury and wealth, 
on the other by want and poverty, from achieving excellence, and from the study of laws 
and government.”
197 Welvaren 51, p. 115: “maer die gewoon sijn rijck te weesen, beseffen, dat hare 
schat … door de ongevallen ende boosheid des werelds lichtelijck kan werden verlooren … 
waar door sij suinigh ende naerstigh op de huishoudingh lettende geneegen sijn hun 
kinderen … in alle wetenschappen, konsten ende deughden op te brengen.”
result of human weakness and vice. the concerns of late humanism make 
place for the concerns of commercial enterprise.
a significant result of this line of reasoning is the ensuing claim that 
commercially attained riches and mercantile rationality and moderation 
are the essential tokens that distinguish true citizens from their counter-
parts, the poor and the plush. With conventional scorn for the unruly rab-
ble, the De la Courts insist that poor people, who “have to spend their 
time in working for their subsistence”, lack the education and resources 
necessary to harness their passions into “the appropriate desire for hon-
our”, and hence they lose themselves in wastefulness. the other social 
pole, the nobility, is equally prone to false self-love:
having banned all discipline, these Lords follow their desires so immoder-
ately that they have run into debt before they realize that their goods are 
diminishing. and therefore luxury brings about the same among them as 
need tends to cause among the poor people.196
the civic middle group in between these two extremes practices diligence 
and thrift to preserve and accumulate wealth without lavishness and 
luxury. these citizens, “who are used to being rich, realize that their 
treasure … can be easily lost due to the accidents and evil of the world”. 
to weapon themselves and their offspring against the whims of fortune, 
they “frugally and diligently take care for their household” and they “raise 
their children … in all sciences, arts and virtues”.197 in short, it is these wise 
merchants who fulfil the prime criteria of honourable citizenship.
Finally, the De la Courts’ adaptation of Barlaeus’s portrayal of the wise 
merchant has important implications for their position in the classical 
debate on how to reconcile the vita activa in the service of the public good 
with the vita contemplativa of isolated philosophical inquiry. Barlaeus’s 
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198 Cf. the classical account in Cicero, De officiis i.XX.69–70 and i.XXVii.92.
199 Sinryke Fabulen, 222, 224: “Want men in soo eenen stande weinige saaken nodig heb-
bende, ende het weinige dat men heeft, wel gebruikende, met weinig rijk ende eenigsins 
Goode gelijk werd, ende, als een stil vergeeten Borger, op sijn eigen haard, ende naar 
sijnen sinne leeven kan … ende op hoe gladden yse de hoogste Dienaars van Staat in 
Republiken, daar een Vorst groot gesag heeft, ofte insonderheid onder Koningen staan.”
200 Ibidem, 39: “Door haasen, Menschen die van haar eigen inkoomen, sonder andere te 
beschaadigen, gewoon zijn te leven in der stilte, ende nogtans veele Landen bereisd, als meede 
veel geleerd, gehoord, ende gesien hebben. Dit zijn menschen die vaste ende deugdsaame 
maximen van leven hebbende, niet willen krommen, om gemakkelijker door de weerelt te 
koomen, ende mogt men die wel on-hoovelingen noemen.”
201 Cf. the ranting chapter against fraudulent bankruptcy in Aanwysing i.25. On the 
importance of honour and trust in seventeenth-century Dutch commercial society, see 
speech addressed this question in a clearly Ciceronian vein by stressing 
the value of mercantile wisdom and private wealth for the common-
wealth at large.198 the De la Courts’ shifting focus from the community to 
the individual results in a different, more ambiguous account of the good 
life. On the one hand, the brothers repeatedly stress the importance of 
public service and the civic duty to take up arms in defence of the com-
monwealth. On the other, they suggest that true wisdom consists of the 
acquiescent acceptance of one’s fate, taking care of oneself while main-
taining a stoic distance from “the slippery ice” of politics: “For in such a 
state one needs few things, and using properly the small means that one 
owns, one becomes with little rich and somehow God’s equal, and one 
can live as a quiet, forgotten Citizen in his own home on his own way.”199 
it is such a life of modesty and utter self-reliance that characterizes those 
who personify the opposite of base courtly morals. Like hares in a world 
populated by lions, apes, foxes and parrots, these are the
People who are accustomed to live in peace from their own income without 
harming others, and who have nonetheless travelled many Countries, as well 
as learned, heard, and seen a lot. These are people who, having firm and virtu-
ous maxims of life, do not want to bend to pass through life more easily, and 
one might very well call them un-Courtiers.200
the mercantile reformation of manners of the brothers De la Court thus 
entails a highly politicized plea for erudition, moderation and self-suffi-
cient perseverance vis-à-vis the threat of courtly corruption. in many 
ways, this plea follows Barlaeus’s endeavour to appropriate the Ciceronian 
ethics of honour to a commercial society. honesty and trust are necessary 
to maintain profitable trade, and the cultivation of personal honour is a 
crucial means to foster such honesty.201 Eerzucht, the civil desire to be 
praised, is therefore in essence a mercantile virtue. this view was shared 
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anne Goldgar, Tulipmania. Money, Honor, and Knowledge in the Dutch Golden Age 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago press, 2007), esp. 253–304.
202 Johan van nyenborgh, Bericht van den koophandel, in idem, Toneel der ambachten 
(Groningen, 1659), esp. 166, 175, 184. Van nyenborgh attributed one of his works to De la 
Court.
203 the portrait of De la Court and tollenaar, attributed to Godaert Kamper, was until 
recently part of the collection of the ‘Diaconessenhuis’ in Utrecht. see for the entire collec-
tion of paintings of the De la Court family J.h. Kernkamp, “De familie-portretten uit de 
collectie De la Court,” in Dancwerc. Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. Dr. D. Th. Enklaar
by, for example, the merchant Johan van nyenborgh, an acquaintance of 
De la Court who wrote a long poem in praise of modest profits and hon-
ourable trade, referring to both Barlaeus and Cicero.202 as for Van 
nyenborgh, the honest pursuit of riches is for the De la Courts an intrinsic 
element of such mercantile ambition, and therefore a token of true 
citizenship.
The Wise Merchant on Canvas
this self-confident portrayal of honourable wealth not only entails a theo-
retical model of mercantile manners. it is also a chief component of the 
way in which the brothers De la Court presented themselves in public. 
the De la Courts, as commercial entrepreneurs and political pamphlet-
eers outstanding examples of the mercator sapiens, pretended to embody 
the ideal of wealthy and wise traders capable of honest and truthful 
speech. they established this image through the power of rhetoric, but 
also through another powerful source of self-presentation in the Dutch 
Golden age: painting.
in 1657, when De la Court married elisabeth tollenaar, the newlywed 
couple was portrayed on canvas in a typical setting of domestic virtue and 
diligence (see fig. 11). the painting shows De la Court and his wife at a 
large table in the middle of their home, with a reserved yet not uninviting 
look to the observer who intrudes their privacy. at the right, elisabeth is 
sewing, performing the duty of the obedient and caring housewife; at the 
left, pieter is engaged in the bookkeeping of his firm, diligently making 
notes and calculations in two large volumes. the background of the panel 
reveals a bed that symbolizes the marital happiness behind the long green 
curtains. the entire rear wall of the room is occupied by a large bookcase, 
at the front of which stands a globe. thus, the painting tells the viewer 
that this is an exemplary household of carefulness and love, virtue and 
learning, worldly knowledge and industry; the household, in short, of a 
wise merchant.203
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(Groningen: Wolters, 1959), 290–304; idem, “De portrettering van pieter de la Court 
opnieuw bekeken,” in Ondernemende geschiedenis. 22 opstellen geschreven bij het afscheid 
van mr. H. Van Riel (the hague: martinus nijhoff, 1977), 66–74; and especially C. Willemijn 
Fock and r.e.O. ekkart, “De portretgalerij van de familie De la Court,” Jaarboek van het 
Centraal Bureau voor genealogie 35 (1981), 177–230.
a few years after elisabeth died in childbirth, De la Court remarried in 
1661. his new bride, Catharina van der Voort, came from a very different 
background. she was the daughter of a rich italian-Dutch merchant fam-
ily that, after an initial period in naples, had settled in amsterdam, where 
Catharina’s brothers, Giovanni and Guglielmo, continued the thriving 
commercial firm established by their late father. the difference between 
the southern Van der Voorts and the Leiden tollenaar family is aptly 
revealed in a painting of Giovanni and Catharina by Ferdinand Bol, a 
pupil of rembrandt who lived opposite the Van der Voorts in amsterdam. 
in 1661, shortly before Catharina’s wedding to De la Court, Bol portrayed 
the two Van der Voorts in an italianized setting that nostalgically refers to 
Fig. 11. Godaert Kamper, Pieter de la Court and Elisabeth Tollenaar, 1657/58. Formerly 
Utrecht, Diaconessenhuis. present location unknown.
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204 see albert Blankert, Ferdinand Bol (1616–1680). Rembrandt’s Pupil (Doornspijk: 
Davaco, 1982), 153, cat. 173, plate 185. the painting is now in the royal museum of arts in 
antwerp.
205 these letters are published in Kernkamp (ed.), “Brieven (1661–1666)” and idem (ed.), 
“Brieven (1667–1685).” Cf. for the upbringing of De la Court’s children Benjamin roberts, 
Through the Keyhole. Dutch Child-Rearing Practices in the 17th and 18th Century. Three 
Urban Elite Families (hilversum: Verloren, 1998), esp. 66–67, 79, 89–90.
206 see h.F. Wijnman, “De schilder abraham van den tempel,” in idem, Uit de kring van 
Rembrandt en Vondel. Verzamelde studies over hun leven en omgeving (amsterdam: noord-
hollandsche Uitgevers maatschappij, 1959), 39–93. the two portraits are now part of the 
collection of the amsterdam rijksmuseum.
their mediterranean roots. the painting shows how brother and sister, 
both sumptuously dressed in the midst of a lavish garden, admire each 
other in a richly decorated mirror. an opened jewel case reveals the fam-
ily’s wealth, and in the background a copy of the hercules Farnese com-
pletes the opulent scenery. Clearly, De la Court was about to become part 
of a family whose views on public appearances differed strikingly to those 
of his previous in-laws.204 that said, De la Court’s second marriage implied 
that he could finally settle as a pater familias and establish his own inde-
pendent household. Over the next years, Catharina gave birth to two chil-
dren, magdalena and pieter de la Court van der Voort. in the letters that 
he wrote to his brothers-in-law, De la Court aptly cultivated his new sta-
tus as a loving father and husband.205
to celebrate this marital happiness and increased prestige, De la Court 
commissioned two large separate portraits of himself and his wife from 
the painter abraham van den tempel in 1667 (colour plates a–B). the 
couple had moved to amsterdam in 1665 to join Catharina’s brothers, and 
Van den tempel, who had worked as a textile entrepreneur in Leiden, was 
perhaps an old acquaintance from the De la Courts.206 With his trained 
eye for cloths and colours, he portrayed Catharina on a red chair in a 
sumptuous white satin dress with a black cloak, glistening earrings and a 
pearl necklace; an unfolded curtain reveals in the background a large 
flower vase and an extensive garden. the portrait of De la Court symmet-
rically mirrors that of his wife. he too is seated on a red armchair, wearing 
an eminent black toga with a white jabot. at the left wall, above the 
entrance to an arcade that leads outside, stands the quintessential symbol 
of wisdom and modesty: a bust of socrates.
With such evocative imagery, De la Court aptly represented himself 
as a learned man who deals in rich textiles, touched by a hint of italian 
splendour yet aware of the higher goal of wisdom. the addition of a 
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207 Cf. on this type of portraiture Julius s. held, “rembrandt’s Aristotle,” in idem, 
Rembrandt Studies (princeton: princeton University press, 1991), 17–59.
208 see the inventory drafted by allard de la Court in 1749, published in Kernkamp, 
“Familie-portretten,” 298–304, which mentions the prices paid for these paintings, respec-
tively f4,- and f300,-.
209 the portraits of De la Court sr. and his wife are by pierre Dubourdieu, also a Flemish 
immigrant in Leiden and a friend of Van den tempel. Both paintings are now in the 
philadelphia museum of art. see Fock and ekkart, “portretgalerij,” 188–190.
210 see thierry Beherman, Godfried Schalcken (paris: maeght editeur, 1988), 164–165, 
180–181, cat. 65–66, 82. De la Court’s portrait is part of the collection of museum De 
Lakenhal in Leiden.
bust of a classical figure was a common feature in seventeenth-century 
portraiture, and De la Court’s choice of socrates is revealing. in rubens’s 
famous painting of ‘the four philosophers’, Lipsius and his friends 
are accompanied by a bust of seneca, as is, for example, Jacob Cats in a 
portrait by arnoldus van ravesteyn.207 Yet De la Court did not chose for 
the embodiment of stoic constancy but for the archetype of the engaged 
philosopher condemned for telling the truth – the very same theme 
as in the fables of the Dutchman in the Kingdom of apes and of actaeon 
who discovers Diana’s nudity. the difference in emphasis and pretension 
with respect to De la Court’s portrait with his first wife is notable (and 
not surprisingly, the difference in price was almost a hundredfold).208 
Compared to the portraits that the parents of the brothers De la Court had 
commissioned in 1635, sober depictions of a respectable and devout cou-
ple, the change is still more striking: the bible on which mother De la 
Court laid her hand has become the extravagant dress of Catharina 
van der Voort; the sandglass as a symbol of human vanity which attended 
De la Court sr., has become the bust of a pagan philosopher as the icon of 
his son.209
accordingly, there was pieter de la Court the diligent husband, and 
there was pieter de la Court the merchant-philosopher. eventually, there 
was also pieter de la Court the orator. at the end of the 1670s, De la 
Court commissioned a series of portraits of his entire family from the 
painter Godfried schalcken, a pupil of the art theorist samuel van 
hoogstraten. schalcken portrayed De la Court in a brown dressing gown, 
nonchalantly leaning on a balustrade (see colour plate C). With his right 
hand performing a typical rhetorical gesture, De la Court seems to pause 
as during a speech.210 the wise merchant, who posed with his drapery and 
his books and who emulated socrates, here addresses the spectator with 
the portrayal of words: he characterizes the alluring rhetoric of the 
market.
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211 schama discusses two of the De la Court’ fables in his work, yet without any analysis 
of the general characteristics of their thought: see schama, Embarrassment of Riches, 211, 
287–288.
212 Welvaren 39, p. 90: “Voorwaer neeringh is geen erf, maer een jonkvrouw (tout par 
amour, rien par force) die den rugge keert aen alle die haer hard handelen, en alles, siel 
lichaem en goed overgeeft, aen die haer best diend, en oppast.” Cf. machiavelli, Principe 
XXV, p. 167: “perché la fortuna è donna ed è necessario, volendola tenere sotto, batterla e 
urtarla.”
213 pocock, “spinoza and harrington,” 440.
 Conclusion: Commercial Citizenship in perspective
the opulence and composure with which the De la Courts presented 
themselves in word and in image betrays no explicit sign of any embar-
rassment of riches. Contrary to that which simon schama has typified as 
the main characteristic of the culture of the Dutch Golden age, the broth-
ers apparently saw no reason to be preoccupied with a self-assured dis-
play of their commercial wealth.211 they repeatedly argued that a modest 
accumulation of riches is an indication of the honourable ambition of the 
educated mercantile citizen who practises diligence, thrift and persever-
ance to counter the capriciousness of fortune. indeed, commerce and 
industry share the same features as Lady Fortune, as the De la Courts sug-
gest with a metaphor that is markedly more chivalrous than bourgeois:
truly, industry is not an estate but a Lady (tout par amour, rien par force) 
who turns her back on all those who treat her forcefully, and who gives all, 
soul, body and goods, to the one that serves her best and takes care of her.212
For the De la Courts private wealth is the result of the mercantile virtue of 
knowing how to please the demanding yet voluptuous Lady Fortune. 
Wealth is no sign of corruption but of competence, of virtù, and therefore 
it is to the rich to rule the republic.
at first sight, this identification of wealth with civic virtue, couched in 
the language of honour and self-interest, as well as the embrace of an un-
courtly life in private, seem to place the republican thought of the broth-
ers De la Court squarely outside of the early-modern republican tradition 
as it has been defined by pocock. a convinced pocockian should conclude 
that the De la Courts, just like spinoza, ultimately define “the political 
good as living quietly, obeying the laws and exercising liberty of mind – 
which is a long way from the vivere civile of the Florentines”.213 there is 
certainly a fundamental difference between the representation of the true 
citizen as a peaceful wise merchant and the figure of the militant land-
owner who serves in the enlargement of the republic as propagated by 
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214 Cf. israel, “intellectual Origins,” esp. 8–17.
215 see Cary J. nederman, “Commercial society and republican Government in the 
Latin middle ages: the economic Dimensions of Brunetto Latini’s republicanism,” 
Political Theory 31 (2003), 644–663; hans Baron, “Civic Wealth and the new Values of the 
renaissance: the spirit of the Quattrocento,” in idem, In Search of Florentine Civic 
Humanism. Essays on the Transition from Medieval to Modern Thought, 2 vols. (princeton: 
princeton University press, 1988), vol. i: 226–257; mark Jurdjevic, “Virtue, Commerce, and 
the enduring Florentine republican moment: reintegrating italy into the atlantic 
republican Debate,” Journal of the History of Ideas 62, 4 (2001), 721–743; and the more criti-
cal reading by maria Luisa pesante, “il commercio nella repubblica,” Quaderni storici 105 
(2000), 655–695. see also the classical portrayal in eugenio Garin, L’umanesimo italiano. 
Filosofia e vita civile nel Rinascimento (Bari: Laterza, 1993), 54–58, 74–83.
216 see the biography by anthony Grafton, Leon Battista Alberti. Master Builder of the 
Italian Renaissance (London etc.: penguin, 2001), esp. 152–180.
217 Leon Battista alberti, I libri della famiglia, in Opere volgari, ed. Cecil Grayson, 2 vols. 
(Bari: Laterza, 1960), vol. i: 180–181: “O pazzia degli uomini! i quali tanto stimano l’andare 
colle trombe inanzi e col fuscello in mano, che a loro non piace più il proprio riposo
machiavelli and harrington, pocock’s role models. Yet this difference 
does not necessarily mean that the commercial republican thought of the 
De la Courts was of a unique and distinctly ‘modern’ nature, entirely at 
odds with the legacy of renaissance republicanism.214 On the contrary, a 
similar account of the importance of mercantile riches and a comparably 
hesitative evaluation of the elements of the good life of the merchant can 
be traced back to exactly the fifteenth-century Florentine tradition of 
vivere civile – albeit to a number of representatives of that tradition who 
are largely overlooked in pocock’s work.
Following in the footsteps of the thirteenth-century rhetorician 
Brunetto Latini, these civic humanists championed the importance of pri-
vate fortune and commercial activity as an essential part of the life of the 
virtuous citizen.215 they included noteworthy humanists like poggio 
Bracciolini, matteo palmieri, and, in particular, the famous renaissance 
uomo universale Leon Battista alberti.216 in the third book of his well-
known I libri della famiglia, composed in the 1430s, alberti conveyed a 
fictional discussion between two members of his family, the aging mer-
chant Giannozzo and the young man of letters Lionardo. the discussion 
can be read as a dialogue intérieur of alberti, split apart by two conflicting 
views on the relation between commerce and public service. Giannozzo 
first propagates the quiet life of the wealthy merchant who “lives happily 
of his own goods”. he eloquently ridicules the behaviour of the statuali, 
the men of state “who esteem so much to go with trumpets in front and a 
twig in the hand that they abstain from proper domestic repose and the 
true peace of mind”.217 then Lionardo stresses in reply
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domestico e la vera quiete dell’animo … a me non pare buono colui il quale non vive con-
tento del suo proprio.”
218 Ibidem, 183, 185: “e affermovi che il buono cittadino amerà la tranquillità, ma non 
tanto la sua propria, quanto ancora quella degli altri buoni, goderà negli ozii privati, ma 
non manco amerà quello degli altri cittadini suoi, desiderà l’unione, quiete, pace e tran-
quillità della casa sua propria, ma molto più quella della patria sua e della repubblica … 
per reggere altri, mai lasciate di reggere voi stessi; per guidare le cose publiche non lasciate 
però le vostre private … e le cose publiche non sovvengono alle necessità private.”
219 see the analysis of the dialogue in hans Baron, “Leon Battista alberti as an heir and 
Critic of Florentine Civic humanism,” in idem, In Search of Florentine Civic Humanism, vol. 
i: 258–288; and cf. the slightly different reading by Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State, 
96–98.
220 pesante, “il commercio nella repubblica,” 672–675.
221 Cf. massimo Danzi, “Fra “οικος” e “πόλις”: sul pensiero familiare di Leon Battista 
alberti,” in Claudia Bastia and maria Bolognini (eds.), La memoria e la città. Scritture 
storiche tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna (Bologna: il nove, 1995), 47–62.
that the good citizen will love tranquillity, but not so much his own as the 
one of other good men, he will enjoy his private leisure but also love the one 
of his other fellow citizens, he will desire the unity, peace and tranquillity of 
his own household, but much more the one of his fatherland and of the 
republic.
Gianozzo agrees, yet eventually, he has the last word. “For reigning oth-
ers”, he says, “never forget to reign yourselves; for guiding public affairs 
never forget your private ones … [since] the public affairs never meet pri-
vate needs.”218
through the voices of Gianozzo and Lionardo, alberti wavered between 
the civic ideal of public service and the commercial ideal of private gains. 
Ultimately he made clear that the pursuit of mercantile riches and the 
maintenance of self-rule are essential preconditions for the enhancement 
of the common good.219 it has been remarked that alberti’s dialogue thus 
instigated a critical reflection on the ethics of commercial activity, even 
though his treatise remained unpublished.220 Yet in many ways, the inter-
play between Gianozzo and Lionardo seems to have been restaged in the 
work of the brothers De la Court. Like alberti captured in between the 
needs of the oikos and the demands of the polis,221 the De la Courts simi-
larly claim the value of a peaceful and self-sufficient life in private as the 
best foundation of public service. they echo almost literally alberti’s 
emphasis on the duties of the merchant-householder, the need for thrift 
and frugality and the public usefulness of “the riches of private citizens”, 
and they faithfully follow his assertion that “if gains follow from labour, 
diligence and our industry, then poverty, the contrary of gain, will stem 
from contrary things, from negligence, laziness and slowness, vices which 
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222 alberti, I libri della famiglia, 141–142, 144: “e sono negli ultimi casi e bisogni alla patria 
le ricchezze de’ privati cittadini, come tutto el dì si truova, molta utilissime … se adunque 
nel guadagnare s’adempie le ricchezze, e se i guadagni seguono la fatica, diligenza e indus-
tria nostra, adunque l’impoverire contrario al guadagno diverrà dalle cose contrarie, dalla 
negligenza, ignavia e tardità, li quali vizii non sono in la fortuna, né in le cose estrinsece, 
ma in te stessi.”
223 max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik. Eine Aufsatzsammlung, ed. Johannes 
Winckelmann, 2d. ed. (münchen and hamburg: siebenstern, 1969), 51, 86.
224 Cf. schama, Embarrassment of Riches, 568–569.
225 pieter de la Court to the brothers Van der Voort, 7 July 1664, in J.C. Overvoorde (ed.), 
“De noord-Oostelijke doorvaart naar China,” Bijdragen en mededelingen van het historisch 
genootschap 47 (1926), 249–331, 270: “… beeter is ’t wat min baatsoekende en meer 
do not lie in fortune or in external causes but in yourself”.222 in short, both 
alberti and the brothers De la Court characterize private mercantile 
wealth as the expression of civic virtue and hence the foundation of the 
common good of the republic.
this convergence between the republican ethics of a mercantile aristo-
crat from fifteenth-century Florence and two schooled entrepreneurs 
from seventeenth-century holland reveals that it is doubtful whether 
pieter de la Court, allegedly “ganz im geist des alten Calvinismus denkend”, 
would have characterized alberti’s preference for a peaceful family life as 
“sündhafte Kreaturvergötterung” or as “aristocratische Pathetik”, in line 
with max Weber’s famous thesis on the protestant ethic.223 instead, the 
‘capitalist spirit’ of the De la Courts, like alberti’s, champions the honest 
pursuit of profit as a laudable civil ambition that connects the private 
advantage of the household with the public utility of society at large. this 
chapter has shown that the brothers’ appeal for the disciplinary frame-
work of civil society to overcome the possible corruption of such personal 
ambition follows from an essentially secular notion of the rule of law. this 
notion, as the brothers insist, corresponds only secondarily to the dogmas 
of reformed Calvinism. moreover, the cultivation of personal honour that 
underlies the mercantile ethics of the De la Courts can hardly be defined 
as a bourgeois ethic of asceticism. as a language of hierarchy and prestige, 
it entails above all a civic ethics that defines the individual citizen in rela-
tion to his fellow citizens and the commonwealth at large.224 in the De la 
Courts’ reappraisal of Ciceronian ambition, the pursuit of profit is never 
for the sake of profit itself, but always for the sake of civil honour. as De la 
Court summarized in a private letter from 1664: “it is better to be some-
what less searching for profit and more desirous for honour … although it 
conflicts with the maxims of a merchant who should, qualitate qua, search 
for nothing but profits.”225
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eergierig te zijn … hoewel ’t strijd teegen maximen van een koopman, die qualitate qua 
niet dan profijt soeken moet.”
On the basis of several different strands of thought concerning human 
nature, the origin of society, the rights and duties of citizens and the mor-
als of the market, the brothers De la Court constructed an account of com-
mercial citizenship that merged a principled anti-monarchism with an 
appeal for honourable trade and mercantile wealth. First, the De la Courts 
appropriated the fashionable writing of hobbes to argue that all legiti-
mate government originates in democratic consent. reading hobbes 
through Grotian lenses, they radicalized mainstream contract theory with 
the claim that a true civil society can never be a monarchy. instead, sover-
eignty remains indivisibly with the community of contractors, the house-
holders who constitute the ruling citizenry. While critical of the exclusivist 
practice of seventeenth-century Dutch citizenship, the De la Courts main-
tained a mainstream definition of this citizenry as the collective of free, 
independent males who represent their household in the hierarchies of 
urban society. these merchant citizens, who actively participate in the 
defence and the decision-making of the polity, harness the defining 
human passion of self-love towards honourable ambition. Contrary to the 
corrupting mores of a monarchical court, the disciplinary framework of a 
true civil society enables such a sincere pursuit of self-interest in connec-
tion to the common good – the virtue that reveals itself in the wealth and 
erudition of those who embody non-monarchical manners: the wise mer-
chants. this intrinsic connection between republicanism and trade 
applies not only to the individual level of citizenship, but also to the gen-
eral level of the commercial commonwealth at large.
1 The petition is printed in N.W. Posthumus (ed.), Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van de 
Leidse textielnijverheid, 6 vols. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1910–1922), vol. IV: 429.
2 Cf. Robert S. DuPlessis and Martha C. Howell, “Reconsidering the Early Modern 
Economy: The Cases of Leiden and Lille,” Past and Present 94 (1982), 49–84.
3 See Van Tijn, “Pieter de la Court,” 306–307, 312–315; and N.W. Posthumus, De 
geschiedenis van de Leidsche lakenindustrie II: De nieuwe tijd, 2 vols. (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1939), 548. Posthumus’ standard work is critically surveyed in J.G. van Dillen, 
“Leiden als industriestad tijdens de Republiek,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 59 (1946), 
25–51. For a more recent and more lucid introduction to the early-modern economic his-
tory of Leiden, see Boudien de Vries et al., “Het economische leven: spectaculair succes en 
diep verval,” in Groenveld (ed.), Leiden, 85–107.
4 See the inventory of De la Court’s possessions in Kernkamp (ed.), “Brieven (1667–
1685),” 148–161. For the De la Courts’ relative prosperity, cf. Israel, Dutch Republic, 633.
CHaPTER FouR
THE CoMMERCIaL CoMMoNWEaLTH
The brothers De la Court were still in their mid-twenties when they sought 
permission from the Leiden court to start an independent textile busi-
ness.1 With the establishment of their joint firm in March 1645, the broth-
ers aimed at a vertical concentration of the various stages of textile 
manufacturing and trade: they provided the capital for the purchase of 
pure woollen materials, they set up a central atelier at their own house 
and a dyeworks where a group of employees processed the wool, and they 
were themselves responsible for putting the finished product on the mar-
ket. The De la Courts thus bypassed intermediary producers and traders, 
and as so-called reders they became the patrons of an entirely self- 
sufficient business that went well beyond the system of ‘small commodity 
production’ characteristic to the earlier stages of Leiden’s economic 
development.2 Thanks to their father’s wealth and experience, the broth-
ers were able to make the large investments needed for this new, early-
capitalist type of entrepreneurship, which was soon to dominate the 
textile industry in Leiden.3
The firm ‘Pieter and Johan de la Court’ would prove to be very success-
ful. By the end of the 1650s, it had become a thriving firm that manufac-
tured and exported cloth and camlet from Leiden all over Europe, from 
the Baltic to the Mediterranean. The brothers’ joint capital amounted to 
the substantial sum of 76000 guilders, mainly invested in readymade cloth 
and loans.4 The De la Courts were active at the apogee of the Leiden  textile 
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5 See for useful overviews esp. Burke, “Tacitism, Scepticism, and Reason of State”; 
Stolleis, Staat und Staatsräson; and Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State, 238–280.
business, which was by then the largest in Europe and employed more 
than half of the city’s population. Leiden, the city where they were born, 
where they had studied and where they made their fortune, would be the 
prime empirical foundation of the brothers’ analysis of the challenges and 
perspectives of a commercial commonwealth.
This chapter shows how the De la Courts’ critical analysis of the eco-
nomic policies of their hometown engendered a radical critique of the 
principle of monarchy and a related plea for a broad aristocratic govern-
ment close to democracy. My central argument is that these two crucial 
characteristics of the brothers’ republicanism follow from their distinc-
tive portrayal of a commercial society where liberty reigns. The De la 
Court modelled their ideal republic on the experience of Leiden, whose 
fate as a mercantile, self-contained and pacifist city reflected the example 
of ancient athens. on the basis of their critical assessment of Leiden’s 
policies, they constructed a commercial reason of state theory that cen-
tres on an inclusive notion of republican liberty, merging freedom from 
economic interference with freedom from arbitrary domination. This 
comprehensive idea of liberty results in the claim that all forms of monar-
chy are necessarily tyrannical, a claim with clear implications for the 
Dutch debate on the position of the Stadholder. The commercial empha-
sis of their thought leads to the brothers’ argument for a broad republican 
assembly consisting of wise merchants. This radically anti-monarchical 
and tentatively democratic move is particularly significant in comparison 
with the De la Courts’ republican contemporaries in England.
 The Batavian athens
Urban Reason of State: Debating Leiden’s Welfare
at the start of their first treatise, Het welvaren van Leiden, the De la Courts 
stated explicitly that the politics of their hometown should be conceived 
“sopra la raggion di Stato”. From the outset, they thus positioned them-
selves in the tradition of reason of state. This intellectual current com-
prised a heterogeneous array of political treatises that, from the end of the 
sixteenth century onwards, flooded the European markets with intricate 
accounts how to preserve and enlarge a dominion according to the noto-
rious adage ‘necessity has no law’.5 one of the first and foremost 
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 6 Giovanni Botero, Della ragion di stato e delle cause della grandezza delle città (Venice, 
1598) I, p. 1: “Ragione di Stato è notitia di mezi atti a fondare, conservare, e  ampliare un 
Dominio cosí fatto.” Cf. the similar terminology in Rohan, De l’interest des princes, 101.
 7 Welvaren 1, p. 3: “Sullende mine gedaghten laten gaen, sopra la raggio di Stato, over ’t 
Welvaren der Stad Leiden, soo moet in ’t begin werden geseid, dat ick daer mede verstae 
de Conservatie ende vermeerderingh der Leidsche Republieke, en menschelicke societeit 
bestaande uijt Regeerders ende onderdanen.”
 8 Cf. Botero, Della ragion di stato I, p. 1: “Stato è un dominio fermo sopra popoli … la 
Ragione di Stato suppone il principe.”
 9 Cf. e.g. Aanwsying I.24, p. 118: “… de politike Regeerders, over alle onderdaanen 
gesaamentlik een Politik lighaam uitmaakende, welke wy den Staat noemen.” on the shift-
ing vocabulary of the state in early-modern Europe, see Quentin Skinner, “From the State 
of Princes to the Person of the State,” in Idem, Visions of Politics, vol. II: 368–413.
10 Botero, Cause della grandezza delle città, esp. 351–366.
11 Ibidem, 309, 318–330.
 contributions to this tradition was Giovanni Botero’s Della ragion di stato, 
first published in 1589. Botero’s definition of reason of state as “the knowl-
edge of the means of establishing, preserving and enlarging a Dominion” 
became the leading premise of most subsequent reason of state literature, 
for example of the Duke of Rohan’s influential tract De l’interest des 
princes.6 Following this definition, the De la Courts similarly asserted that 
Leiden’s welfare was to be found in “the Conservation and the increase of 
the Republic of Leiden and its human society consisting of Rulers and 
Subjects”.7 Yet this phrasing reveals a significant difference from the con-
ventional reason of state literature, including Botero and Rohan, for 
whom the term ‘state’ meant the personal dominion and status of a 
prince.8 For the De la Courts, the state involved the collective body of both 
rulers and ruled, i.e. the city or commonwealth at large – the traditional 
idiom of the Italian Renaissance republics.9 Botero, in another treatise 
titled Delle cause della grandezza delle città, often appended to Della 
ragion di stato, also spoke about the reason of state of cities, yet still with 
a focus on the central role of a prince and his residence.10 The brothers De 
la Court adopted Botero’s guidelines for a self-governing city like Leiden, 
merging the republican legacy with the language of reason of state.
according to the conventional reason of state logic, Leiden posed a 
difficult case. Botero had argued that the grandezza of cities consists in 
the quantity of the people and their belongings, for which, apart from 
the splendour of a princely court, a favourable geographical position 
and fecund surroundings are essential.11 Yet Leiden, as the De la Courts 
insisted, lacked all these assets. Therefore, the city should resort to two 
highly unpredictable means of attaining civic grandezza: the world 
of learning, embodied by Leiden’s famous university, and the world 
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12 Welvaren 1, p. 3–5. Cf. Botero, Cause della grandezza delle città, 339–348.
13 Welvaren 4, p. 11: “… dat de ingeseetenen binnen de mueren der Stad geene middelen 
van subsistentie besitten, als die der kraghten der zielen ender menschelijke lichamen 
verschaffen konnen, Namentlijck wetenschappen, konsten ende handwerken … hier kon-
nen veijlen en verkopen met geode profijten aen vreemden.”
14 Jan orlers, Beschrijvinge der Stadt Leyden, 2d. ed. (Leiden, 1641), sig. **3: “Duytschen 
Helicon.” See also Leonore Stapel, “ ‘Tuyn van heel Holland, Moeder der Wijsheyt en 
bequam tot de drapery.’ Reputatie en zelfbeeld van Leiden in beeld en tekst (circa 1590–
1660),” De zeventiende eeuw 22 (2006), 149–169.
15 See Linda a. Stone-Ferrier, Images of Textiles. The Weave of Seventeenth-Century 
Dutch Art and Society (ann arbor: uMI Research Press, 1985), 32–34; and Christiaan 
Vogelaar, “abraham van den Tempel,” in Hollands Classicisme in de Nederlandse schil-
derkunst (Rotterdam: Museum Boijmans van Beuningen, 2000), 254–263.
of industry and trade.12 Leiden’s population and riches pivoted on the 
mutual enhancement of commerce and learning, for “inside the walls 
of the City the inhabitants have no other means to subsist than those 
provided by the powers of the soul and the human body, that is, sci-
ences, arts, and manufacturing … and to trade [these] with strangers for 
good profits”.13 The main aim of the De la Courts’ treatise on Leiden was 
to convince the city’s establishment to uphold the two central pillars 
with which they themselves were so well-acquainted: the academy and 
the market.
This notion that Leiden’s welfare depended on the correlation between 
learning and trade was a standard element of the city’s self- representation 
in the seventeenth century, both in word and in image. For example, the 
former Burgomaster Jan orlers praised Leiden in his eulogizing chronicle 
of the city as a “Dutch Helicon” where industry thrived thanks to divine 
providence and good government.14 The painter Van den Tempel (who 
later portrayed De la Court and his second wife) celebrated this shared 
fate of Leiden and its textile industry in three large panels commissioned 
in the immediate aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia. The first of these 
panels shows how the personification of the city’s industry, escorted by 
Minerva and Mercury, flees from the destruction brought by Mars, who 
tramples the figures of Freedom and Justice. In the central piece, the Maid 
of Leiden is crowned by Minerva under the city’s motto “Haec libertatis 
ergo”, while Justice kneels and Mercury reveals his full purse. Finally, in 
the third panel (see colour plate D), the splendidly dressed Maid of Leiden 
invites the personification of industry to her stage. at the front, Freedom 
offers her emblematic attributes to the city; at the left, Minerva and 
Mercury witness the scene. Mercury’s hand rests on Minerva’s shoulder: 
commerce embraces wisdom.15
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16 Jan de Vries and ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy. Success, Failure, and 
Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 
1997), 175–176.
17 See DuPlessis and Howell, “Reconsidering,” esp. 59–62, and the reworking of their 
argument in Karel Davids, “Neringen, hallen en gilden. Kapitalisten, kleine ondernemers 
en de stedelijke overheid in de tijd van de Republiek,” in C.a. Davids et al. (eds.), Kapitaal, 
ondernemerschap en beleid. Studies over de economie en politiek in Nederland, Europa en 
Azië van 1500 tot heden (amsterdam: NEHa, 1996), 95–119.
In their discussion of Leiden’s reason of state, the brothers De la Court 
borrowed many elements of this iconographical representation of a city 
in which peace and liberty reign and commerce and learning go hand in 
hand. Yet their approach was fundamentally more critical of Leiden’s 
status quo than mainstream eulogies such as that of orlers. They engaged 
in a fervent criticism of the corporate politics of Leiden’s society, based on 
the primacy of guilds and municipal economic regulation. as independ-
ent entrepreneurs and relative newcomers to the Leiden textile industry, 
they looked at Leiden’s economy from within yet with the critical eye of 
the outsider. This approach resulted in a passionate and remarkable plea 
for an ‘open’ city where entrepreneurial liberty fosters prosperity, in 
opposition to the traditional closed urban system of comprehensive cor-
porate regulation.16
The textile industry of early-modern Leiden was organized in various 
communal institutions, usually installed by the municipal government, 
which administered and controlled the production and trade of all com-
modities. Every single branch of the industry was represented by its 
own corporative association, the so-called nering, presided over by mem-
bers of the government and wealthy delegates of the industry. Like guilds, 
the various neringen regulated the production and imposed obligatory 
inspections of the textiles in a centrally located hall. Through the estab-
lishment of such halls, the municipal government sought to support the 
small producers, the drapers. In exchange for a levy on every article, the 
hall provided independent producers with opportunities to hire equip-
ment and to purchase raw materials, as well as a marketplace to sell their 
products. In this way, the system of neringen and halls minimised entre-
preneurial risks and maintained industrial stability, which attested to the 
ideological commitment of both the authorities and the drapers to sus-
tain the order and prosperity of the community.17
In 1642, the Leiden government installed a hall for the commerce of 
laken, a relatively new form of cloth that had become very fashionable and 
highly lucrative. The firm of the brothers De la Courts traded primarily in 
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18 Posthumus (ed.), Bronnen, vol. IV: 498–501: “… strijdich tegen de vrijheyt ende natuyr 
van coopmanschap … alsoo daer geen souverainder middel te bedencken is om de 
gantsche lakenneeringe deses stadts te ruyneeren.” For other examples of the resistance of 
the reders against the system of halls, see Van Tijn, “Pieter de la Court,” 315–321.
19 Welvaren 11, p. 30: “ dat Leiden noijt is toegenoomen, als door Vrijheid.”
20 Ibidem 16. Cf. the similar argument in Henry Parker, Of a Free Trade (London, 1647), 
31: “If the question then be, whether the Merchants interest, or the Clothiers do more con-
duce to this publick reason of State; sense it self will presently distinguish, that the 
Merchants advantage is more compliant with the publick then the Clothiers.”
21 Politike Discoursen I.I.1, p. 9: “… sulks deese buitenlandse Handelers, de aller profitelik-
ste ingeseetenen, ende die het land allermeest verryken, zijn.”
22 Welvaren 16, p. 44: “En die de pap selvs eeten moet, kookt en koelt se best … een ijder 
in ’t maken van sijn eigen goed, ende besteden desselvs gansch vrij en onbedwongen 
behoorde te weesen … daer een ijder sich selven soekt, vind men sich best, en gaet nie-
mand verlooren. Dit is de naturelijcke vrijheid, die de Regeerders noit hunne onderdanen 
behoorden te beneemen.”
laken, and from the start, independent reders like the De la Courts opposed 
the establishment of the hall and its legislation, levies, and control. 
Together with a large group of other producers and traders, the De la 
Courts addressed their complaints to the Leiden court in 1653. They 
argued that “there is no better way conceivable to ruin the entire cloth 
industry of this city” than the hall’s regulation of the production, which 
they denounced as “incompatible with the freedom and nature of trade”.18 
a few years later, the brothers De la Court further elaborated this argu-
ment against economic regulation in their treatise on Leiden, following 
their initial claim “that Leiden has never increased but by Liberty”:19 the 
preservation and enlargement of the commonwealth, they asserted, the 
prime principles of reason of state, could only be furthered if all its citi-
zens were allowed to do business as they please.
The De la Courts primarily insist that the success of Leiden’s trade and 
industry is based on the consumption of its goods outside of the city walls, 
and is therefore entirely dependent on the mercantile reders. Small pro-
ducers and petty artisans can only be employed thanks to the investments 
and success of these large entrepreneurs, especially of those who export 
Leiden textile across the borders.20 Since the largest profits are made in 
international trade, “these international Merchants are the most profitable 
inhabitants and they enrich the country the most”.21 Yet they can only 
make such high revenues if they are left unhindered in their decisions, for 
“he who has to eat the porridge cooks and cools it best”:
Everyone ought to be totally free and unrestrained in producing and dealing 
with his own commodity … Where everyone takes care of himself, everyone 
is fine, and no one gets lost. This is the natural liberty that the Rulers should 
never take away from their subjects.22
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23 Ibidem 23, p. 56–57: “… die missen noit tot hun eigen voordeel te raden, al is het ken-
nelijck tot nadeel van ’t gemeen … soo gebruijcken sij evenwel die schone dekmantels van 
de Neeringe eeuwighdurende te willen maecken.” See also Ibidem 28.
24 Ibidem 26, p. 61 “… dat geen onser neeringen aen onse grond vast sijn, en dat sij dien-
volgende de boomen niet gelijcken, daer men eenige weinigh vrughtdragende tacken 
mach afsnijden.”
25 Posthumus (ed.), Bronnen, vol. V: 282: “Persisteert bij de liberteyt. De neringe (anders) 
te sullen diverteren.”
26 Welvaren 31, p. 68: “… de reghte reputatie der Neeringen bestaet in de bequaemheid, 
om aen het grootste getal menschen hier eerlijck den kost te geven.”
27 Ibidem 34, p. 74: “… het vergift der Hallen doodelijcker is voor draperien, als de bloe-
dige swaerden der plonderende soldaeten.”
The core assertion of De la Courts is that the system of halls and guilds 
fundamentally obstructs such natural liberty – and hence, Leiden’s 
reason of state. The halls are governed by oligarchic boards of inexperi-
enced people “who never fail to advise to their own advantage, even if it 
is obviously to the disadvantage of the community”. Driven by such 
wrongly understood self-interest, the governors of the halls will simply try 
to fill their own purses under the pretext that they care for the common 
good, “using that nice cover of wanting to make the Industries eternal”.23 
Yet the hall’s rigid system of regulation cannot obtain that goal of eternity 
given the vicissitudes of international trade. as the De la Courts insist, 
“none of our industries is fixed to the ground, and therefore they do not 
resemble the trees, from which one may cut some branches that bear 
little fruit”.24 In the realm of commercial Lady Fortune, characterized 
by cross-border competition and the capriciousness of fashion, a pragma-
tist mercantile virtù is necessary to maintain Leiden’s industry and to 
improve its competitiveness. as De la Court put it in 1657 when discussing 
the regulations concerning the production of camlet with his entrepre-
neurial colleagues: “Persist with liberty. otherwise, the industries will 
divert.”25
The De la Courts therefore contend that all sorts of commodities, of 
whatever quality or price, should be put on the market, irrespective of the 
hall’s obligatory controls. The resulting increase in production would do 
justice to “the right reputation of the Industries, [which] consists in the 
ability to provide honest work for the largest number of people”.26 opening 
up the market fosters general employment and the common welfare, 
whereas corporate regulation would result in the direct opposite. as the 
De la Courts conclude emphatically: “The poison of the Halls is deadlier to 
the draperies than the bloody swords of looting soldiers.”27 With equally 
vehement language, they continue to reproach the economic policies of 
the guilds, the central institution of early-modern Dutch corporate 
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28 See Maarten Prak et al. (eds.), Craft Guilds in the Early Modern Low Countries. Work, 
Power, and Representation (aldershot: ashgate, 2006).
29 Welvaren 46–52, p. 104, 110, 118: “… een bijsondere pest voor Leiden … om leuij en 
quistich ten laste der andere ingesetenen te leeven … de vuijle tijrannie ende monopolie 
der gildebroederen, ende gouverneuren der Loijhallen over hunne mede ingesetenen.” Cf. 
the similar passages in Politike Discoursen I.I.1, p. 5–7, I.I.6, p. 57–59.
30 Groningen university Library, Ms 233, addendum: “Vrijheid is Leidens welvaren.”
31 Welvaren 8, p. 19: “… onmogelijk is het, soo onseeckre inwoonders te hebben, en die 
soo licht vertrekken sullen, als Studenten, of wel koopluiden van een Landstad.”
32 Ibidem 14, p. 33–35: “… met die loffelijcke aristocraticke regeeringe te doen degener-
eeren in een altoos schadelijcke Stato da Pochi, Regeeringh … ende opentlijck opgereght 
eene Regeeringh in Regeeringe.”
 politics.28 Like the halls, the exclusivist policies and unifying regulations 
of the various guilds are “a special pest for Leiden” which obstruct eco-
nomic freedom and overall prosperity. Guildsmen, who “live lazily and 
wastefully at the expense of the other inhabitants” embody the prime 
characteristic of incivility – the desire for domination. To counter this 
“filthy tyranny and the monopoly of the guildsmen and the Governors of 
the Halls over their fellow inhabitants”, all production should be deregu-
lated, wages should be set free, levies and cartels abolished and every one 
should be able to choose with whom to trade.29 Such economic freedom 
will increase manufacturing, attract foreigners, and thus enhance Leiden’s 
overall grandezza, for “Liberty is Leiden’s welfare”.30
The second pillar of Leiden’s reason of state, next to trade and industry, 
is its university, which according to the De la Courts requires an equal 
degree of liberty. The brothers maintain that commerce and science are 
strikingly similar endeavours that require a similar approach, for “it is 
impossible to have such uncertain inhabitants who will leave so easily as 
Students or merchants in a country town”.31 Just like its merchants, 
Leiden’s students should therefore be cherished and granted freedom of 
choice. Yet Leiden’s policies are very unfavourable to the student body, 
so the De la Courts claim. as in the textile industry, regulations and 
monopolist exploitation undermine the advancement of science and they 
chase students away. Tuition fees have become too high, the Professors, 
who operate like a guild, “have openly founded a Government within a 
Government”, while the university’s senate, like the boards of the halls, 
“has degenerated from a laudable aristocratic government into an alto-
gether detrimental Stato da Pochi [sic] Government”, an oligarchy based 
on cooptation and characterised by incompetence.32 In short, commerce 
and learning prove to be intrinsically related. For the De la Courts, the 
status quo of Leiden’s academy and market are a clear demonstration of 
 the commercial commonwealth 213
33 Ibidem 73, p. 160: “… een oneindelijcke naturelijcke verdeeldheid … jae soo groote, 
dat geen grooter kan werden bedaght, als te sien, soo veelderleij Natien, Talen, Religien en 
occupatien, als hier bij een sijn.”
34 Ibidem 68, p. 148: “… den Studenten, door die jalousie, ambitie, ende nijd op het vli-
jtighste te onderwijsen.”
35 Politike Discoursen I.I.2, p. 40–41: “… keur van menschen, met wien men vriendschap-
pen maken ende converseeren wil … door de meenigvuldigheid der negotianten ende 
konstenaars.”
what happens when freedom is restrained and when office-holding is not 
based on merit but on favouritism. The distinctive idiom in which they 
criticize this status quo reveals the political implications of their plea for 
economic deregulation.
The urban reason of state of the brothers De la Court principally aims 
to defend the position of Leiden’s independent entrepreneurs against the 
regulative and exclusivist policies of the city’s corporate establishment. 
Leiden is a diverse society, the brothers insist, it is characterized by the 
“endless natural division” of its inhabitants which is “that large, that 
no larger can be imagined when seeing so many Nations, Languages, 
Religions and occupations as are here assembled”.33 This diversity should 
be cherished and enhanced instead of curtailed, for diversity breeds com-
petition and competition breeds prosperity, in the economic as well as in 
the academic realm. If the Senate of Leiden university could change from 
an oligarchy into a broad assembly of diverse professors and lecturers, the 
resulting mutual envy would cause widespread ambition to “teach the 
Students in the most diligent way”.34 Diversity thus channels human self-
love towards a useful purpose. at the level of society at large, a polity that 
includes a variety of immigrants, creeds, and professions will engender 
the welfare and happiness of all, for its inhabitants will then be able to 
choose from all kinds of produce, employers and preachers, and from “a 
variety of people with whom to make friendship and to converse”. In such 
an open and diverse city, abundance is assured and hunger rare thanks to 
“the multiplicity of merchants and artisans”, whose presence assures a 
constant import and production of food and goods. Science and knowl-
edge, arts and music are bound to flourish in all freedom and variety.35 
The brothers De la Court do not hesitate to claim that their model of an 
open city amounts to a true commercial arcadia.
Paragons of Republican Splendour & Demise
a standard element of many reason of state treatises was the comparison 
with other polities from the past and the present as noteworthy examples 
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36 Politike Weeg-schaal II.III.2–II.IV.12 and II.V.1–11. See the elaborate analysis in 
Haitsma Mulier, Myth of Venice, 147–157.
37 Francesco Sansovino, Del governo et amministratione di diversi regni et repubbliche, 
cosi antiche come moderne (Venice, 1568), esp. 111–115, 146–149. Pieter de la Court van der 
Voort owned a copy of this work: Library, fol. 19. on Sansovino, see Viroli, From Politics to 
Reason of State, 243–244, and Paolo Carta, “Magistrature repubblicane e comparazione 
giuridica nell’opera di Francesco Sansovino,” Il pensiero politico 40 (2007), 283–300.
38 Politike Weeg-schaal II.IV.13, p. 427: “…in vryheid, en weelde.” Ibidem III.I.IV, p. 535: “… 
kleine Lucca, een Lant-stad, door een goede regeering, en Fortificatie sijn vryheit, heb-
bende behouden, overvloeit in menschen, konsten, en Manufacturen.” See also Welvaren 
58, p. 134–135. Cf. the comparison between the mercantile republics of Ragusa, Lucca, and 
seventeenth-century Boston in Sergio Bertelli, Trittico. Lucca, Ragusa, Boston. Tre città 
mercantili tra Cinque e Seicento (Rome: Donzelli, 2004). on the development of a republi-
can rhetoric in Ragusa, see Lovro Kuncevic, “on Ragusan Libertas in the Middle ages,” 
Dubrovnik Annals 14 (2010), 25–69.
39 [John Streater], Government Described … Together With a Brief Model of the Govern-
ment of the Common-Wealth, or, Free-State of Ragouse (London, 1659), 8. The phrasing of 
Streater’s description of Ragusa is comparable to the Politike Weeg-schaal, and equally 
stems from Sansovino. on Streater, see Nigel Smith, “Popular Republicanism in the 
1650s: John Streater’s ‘Heroick Mechanicks’,” in David armitage et al. (eds.), Milton and 
Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1995).
of statecraft. In their depiction of Leiden’s arcadia amidst which industry 
and learning thrive in liberty and diversity, the brothers De la Court too 
referred to such paragons of republican splendour. Haitsma Mulier has 
shown in detail how the De la Courts appropriated in particular the com-
mercial republics of the early-modern Mediterranean, which by the end 
of the 1650s were a common point of reference for both sides of the Dutch 
debate on ‘True Liberty’. The brothers paid ample attention to Venice and 
Genoa, outstanding examples of prosperous and powerful, yet conserva-
tive aristocracies,36 and, less extensively, to the small cities of Lucca 
and Ragusa (modern-day Dubrovnik), which shared Leiden’s perspective 
and geographical hardship. adopting the typical reason of state descrip-
tion of various countries by the sixteenth-century Venetian polygraph 
Francesco Sansovino,37 the De la Courts praised these commercial city-
states for preserving their independence and wealth in a hostile world: 
the inland town of Lucca “has by good government and Fortification 
maintained its liberty and abounds in men, arts, and Industries”, while 
Ragusa, though surrounded by infertile land and mighty neighbours, has 
thrived “in freedom and wealth”.38 This praise for Ragusa is especially 
significant, for it reveals a striking parallel with the way in which the con-
temporary English republican John Streater propagated Ragusa’s repub-
lican government as the “true Embleme of a Free-State”.39
Yet the primary source of inspiration for the De la Courts’ ideal of 
industry and learning continued to be antiquity. In particular, they 
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40 See anthony Grafton, Athenae Batavae: The Research Imperative at Leiden, 1575–1650. 
Scaliger Lectures 1 (Leiden: Primavera, 2003).
41 Jacob Lescaille, “Lof van Leiden,” in Toonneel der steden van de Vereenighde 
Nederlanden, met hare beschrijvingen (amsterdam, 1652), vol. I, fol. ii D4 d: “o moedig 
Leiden! … o voedster van de deugd/En alle wetenschap! Toneel der wijste lieden,/apollo’s 
tempel, hof van Pallas, wier gebieden/Gij loffelijk bestuurt! Sieraad van ’t vrije land,/Der 
muzen woonplaats en voortteelster van verstand,/Voorspreekster van het recht, geneesv-
rouw der gebreken,/Die alle volken doet van uwe wijsheid spreken./Bataafs athene! Leef 
door voorzicht, trouw en raad/En vreê en voorspoed, als de zuilen van uw staat.”
42 Joost van den Vondel, “op de geluckige regeeringe van Leiden” (1664), in De werken 
van Vondel, ed. J.F.M Sterck et al., 11 vols. (amsterdam: Maatschappij voor goede en goed-
kope lectuur, 1927–1940), vol. X, 176: “Het nieuwe athene groeit, nu ’t oude in d’assche leit.”
43 [Marchamont Nedham], The Excellencie of a Free-State: or, The Right Constitution of a 
Common-wealth (London, 1656), 8. on Nedham’s description of athens, see Jennifer 
Tolbert Roberts, Athens on Trial. The Antidemocratic Tradition in Western Thought 
(Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1994), 145–147.
44 Cf. Pincus, “Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism,” 724.
45 ubbo Emmius, Vetus Graecia illustrata (Leiden, 1626), and Idem, Graecorum respub-
licae (Leiden, 1632). See the analysis in Conti, Consociatio civitatum, 86–104.
 followed the prevalent comparison between Leiden and classical athens, 
the foremost historical example of a republic that accommodated both 
the agora and the academy. In 1625, Joannes Meursius, professor of Greek 
history at Leiden university, had published a remarkable eulogy of the 
first decades of his alma mater under the title Athenae Batavae.40 Similarly, 
the poet Jacob Lescaille praised Leiden as a “Batavian athens”, the site of 
both apollo’s temple and Pallas’ court,41 while Vondel too heralded Leiden 
as “The new athens”.42 This scholarly and literary identification with 
athens was elaborated further by the De la Courts. Their fascination was 
shared by English political pamphleteers such as Marchamont Nedham, 
who described athens as “the onely Patern of a Free-state fit for all the 
world to follow”.43 While Harrington, like Machiavelli, focused primarily 
on militant Sparta and Rome, his more commercially-minded contempo-
raries on either side of the North Sea turned to other republican role mod-
els in the classical and contemporary Mediterranean.44
Not unlike Nedham, the brothers De la Court presented athens as a 
paradigmatic popular government, a truly commercial city-state that 
could serve as a model for Leiden. apart from obvious sources such as 
Herodotus and Thucydides, this interpretation of athens owed a  particular 
debt to the overview of the history of Greek city-states by the Frisian his-
torian ubbo Emmius, a work included in the ‘Republics’ series of Elzevier. 
Emmius had characterized all Greek republics as status popolares, which 
principally implied that the citizenry enjoyed the right to elect the repub-
lic’s magistrates.45 This usage of the term ‘popular government’ is adopted 
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46 Politike Weeg-schaal III.II.1–III.II.4. The entire passage is already included in the first 
edition, with small revisions added to the later editions of the work. Cf. also the analysis in 
Haitsma Mulier, Myth of Venice, 143–144.
47 Ibidem III.II.1, p. 591: “… eenparige Vryheid.” III.II.2, p. 604, 614: “alle Burgers hadden 
regt te verschijnen in haare groote Vergaderinge … zeer weinig andere, als rijke, en dienvol-
gende wel-opgevoede Burgers in Magistrature wierden gebruikt.” III.II.4, p. 620: “Van 
octroyen, Privilegien, off Gildens en Hallen werd naar my voorstaat, in geen Historien van 
Atheenen gewag gemaakt.”
48 Ibidem III.II.2, p. 603: “Een yder stond vry te Athenen te komen woonen, en daar alle 
Vryheid en Regten nevens de Burgers te genieten.” III.II.4, p. 627: “… een zeer groot mis-
noegen onder zoo veele duisenden vremde Inwoonders … een zeer groote dispositie ten 
oproer.”
in the extensive description of ancient Greek history in the Politike 
Weeg-schaal. Following Emmius, this crucial passage, most certainly 
written by Johan de la Court with small revisions by Pieter, implicitly 
compares the republican fate of athens with Leiden and Holland at 
large.46 To begin with, the brothers De la Court highlight the geographical 
situation of athens, a maritime city amidst barren lands and therefore 
forced to make a living by fishing and trade. The similarity with Leiden 
and Holland is obvious, and the De la Courts argue that athens’ com-
merce on the Black Sea, like the Dutch trade in the Baltic, had made it 
into the staple market of Europe. They stress that such commerce could 
thrive in athens because of the city’s prime characteristic, its “uniform 
Liberty”: citizens as well as foreigners were allowed to trade and partici-
pate in all industries without the obstruction of “Patents, Privileges, or 
Guilds and Halls”. Moreover, in athens “all Citizens had the right to appear 
in its great Assembly”, while mostly “rich and therefore well-educated 
Citizens were used in the Magistracy” – a practice of which the De la Courts 
clearly approve.47
However, athens also had flaws. First, the De la Courts criticize its 
restrictions on the acquisition of citizenship, and insist that these restric-
tions created “a very large discontent among so many thousands foreign 
Inhabitants” and hence “a very large disposition to upheaval”.48 In short, a 
policy of restrictive citizenship threatens the stability of the common-
wealth, again a clear allusion to the situation in Leiden. Secondly, the De 
la Courts criticize the belligerent politics of athens, “for nothing more 
detrimental to a State built on artisanship, trade and sciences can be 
thought of than all-destroying and commerce-impeding War”. In contrast, 
amongst the “principal causes of athenian greatness” was its defensive 
alliance with other Greek states against the Persians, the attic league so 
often upheld in the Dutch debate as a noteworthy example for the united 
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49 Ibidem III.II.1, p. 590–591: “… een onderling verbond tot gemeene bescherminge … een 
van de voorneemste oorsaaken der atheniensen grootheid.” III.II.4, p. 624: “… want 
nietwes schadeliker voor een Staat, die op konst, koopman- en weetenschappen geboud is, 
bedagt kan werden, als de alles vernielende en commercie belettende Oorlog.”
50 Ibidem III.II.2, p. 615: “… boven maaten in alle weelde, konst, kennisse, en rijkdom is 
toegenoomen.” III.II.4, p. 619, 621: “onder een volkome Populaare Regeering zonder eenig 
Hoofd, of blijvende Raads- en Magistraats-persoonen … alle Weetenschappen en Konsten 
wierden hier zoodanig aangequeekt.”
51 Welvaren 9, p. 20: “Want die Roomsche Republijk t’eenemael op geweld van wapenen 
gefondeerd sijnde geweest tot ruine van alle geleerdheid, ende koopmanschappen … die 
alles moordende, plonderende, en wereld verwoestende Republijck viandin der koop-
manschappen moste sijn.”
52 See the extensive discussion of Roman history in Politike Weeg-schaal II.VI.2–4, and 
cf. Haitsma Mulier, Myth of Venice, 137–138.
53 See Martin van Gelderen, “The Low Countries,” in Howel a. Lloyd et al. (eds.), 
European Political Thought 1450–1700. Religion, Law and Philosophy (New Haven and 
London: Yale university Press, 2007), 376–415, esp. 381.
Provinces.49 Finally, this suggestive comparison between athens and 
Holland becomes all but outspoken when the De la Courts insist that 
athens flourished in “Sciences and arts” and “increased exceedingly in 
all luxury, art, knowledge, and wealth” when it was “under an entirely 
Popular Government without any Head, or permanent Councillors and 
Magistrates”.50 The history of ancient athens thus serves as a critical mir-
ror to seventeenth-century Leiden and Holland at large. It reveals that a 
policy of open citizenship, entrepreneurial liberty and peaceful and 
defensive alliances under a government of the rich who rotate offices 
without any single ruler such as a Stadholder, fosters commerce, learning 
and social stability, and hence the preservation and increase of the 
commonwealth.
This praise of athens engenders a critique of the other classical polity 
most frequently heralded as a time-honoured source of inspiration and 
emulation: ancient Rome. For the brothers De la Court, the Roman 
Republic, “utterly founded on the violence of arms to the ruin of all learn-
ing and commerce”, is the ultimate antithesis of good republican rule. 
With its belligerent spirit and its distaste for trade, Rome, “that all mur-
dering, plundering and the world destroying Republic, had to be an enemy 
of commerce” – as proved the case when Rome conquered the great trad-
ing republics of athens and Carthage.51 Eventually, the absence of mer-
chants and the excess of empire made Rome relapse into the tyranny of its 
own military commanders.52
This disapproval of the example of Rome was a common theme in the 
early-modern Netherlands, going back as far as Erasmus’s criticism of 
Roman expansionism.53 Boxhorn, for instance, paid considerable  attention 
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54 Boxhorn, Emblemata politica. Accedunt dissertationes politicae de Romanorum 
Imperio (amsterdam, 1651), esp. dissertation XIV: “De mutatione Reip. & initiis Monarchiae 
Caesarum sive C. Julius Caesar,” p. 310–327.
55 antonius Thysius, Memorabilia celebriorum veterum rerumpublicarum (Leiden, 
1646). Pieter de la Court van der Voort owned a copy of this treatise: Library, fol. 31. See also 
Haitsma Mulier, Myth of Venice, 59–60.
56 Politike Weeg-schaal II.VI.4, p. 507, 511: “… passie en geneegentheid tot oorlogen … 
een doodelike Pest voor den aardbodem.”
57 Ibidem I.III.1, p. 231: “Want niet alleen Griekenland en alle de Eylanden der Mid-
delandse Zee, maar ook geheel Italien, Vrankrijk en Spanjen, jaa ook geheel Duitsland, in 
ongeloovelik veel Republiken verdeelt was; tot dat die (Non erat is populus quem pax tran-
quilla juvaret, quem sua libertas immotis pasceret armis. Lucanus) krijgs-lievende, en alles 
vernielende Roomse Republik alle de zelven, d’eene voor d’ander na, door hare wapenen 
hebbende doen bukken, en verwoest.” The quote is from Lucan, Pharsalia I, vs. 171–172.
58 Ibidem II.VI.4, p. 513: “… dat deeze moort-kuil, dit Wolve-nest, deeze verfoeyelikste 
en grouwelikste Republik, die ooit op den aardbodem is geweest, by veelen zeer werd 
gepreezen.”
59 Cf. Machiavelli, Discorsi, esp. I.6, II.3–4, II.19, II.30, III.24. See the analysis in David 
armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 2000), 125–132; and Idem, “Empire and Liberty: a Republican Dilemma,” in Van 
Gelderen and Skinner (eds.), Republicanism, vol. II: 29–46.
to the demise of the Roman Republic in his classes from the 1640s,54 while 
another Leiden academic, antonius Thysius, similarly refuted belligerent 
Rome in an expansive overview of the history of various republics pub-
lished in 1646.55 Yet the explicit way in which the De la Courts rebuke the 
Roman Republic is beyond compare. The aristocratic Roman Senate, so 
the brothers insist with numerous quotes from Lucan, Livy and Tacitus, 
was enslaved by “the passion and lust to wage war”, which condemned 
the common citizenry to drudge under unbearable imposts and turned 
the city into “a deadly Pest for the earth”.56 Indeed, the territorial expan-
sionism of Rome destroyed all the other classical republics and thereby 
eradicated the ancient European legacy of liberty:
For not only Greece and all the Islands in the Mediterranean, but also all of 
Italy, France, and Spain and all of Germany was divided among incredibly 
many Republics, until that … war-loving and all-destroying Roman Republic 
had subdued and destroyed them with her weapons, one by one.57
By way of conclusion to this flamboyant condemnation of Rome, the 
brothers De la Court express their wonder “that this murderers’ den, this 
wolf’s nest, this most detestable and horrible Republic that has ever been 
on this earth, is praised so much by many”.58 The implicit reference to 
Machiavelli’s Discorsi must have been obvious to most contemporary 
readers, and it serves as a warning to modern historians not to overem-
phasize Machiavelli’s influence on the De la Courts.59 Moreover, their 
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harsh criticism of Rome’s territorial expansion entails a crucial difference 
from many English republicans, including Streater, Nedham, and most 
importantly Harrington and Sidney, who praised the Roman Republic 
precisely for its glorious conquests.60 Where Machiavelli’s beleaguered 
Florence or Cromwell’s expanding England looked back to the military 
greatness of Rome, the commercial commonwealth of the brothers De la 
Court followed another model of republican splendour.
A Commonwealth of Cats
unlike Rome, the republic of the De la Courts is not a commonwealth 
for the increase of territory, but for the increase of trade. The brothers’ 
argument for such commercial expansionism relies on a seeming para-
dox: on the one hand, it proposes a non-offensive foreign policy, because 
commerce thrives in peace, on the other it propagates the establishment 
of a colonial empire of trading posts to foster global trade. Yet for the 
brothers De la Court peace and imperialism do not entail a contradic-
tion  in terms. appropriating the experience of ancient athens and the 
contemporary city-states of the Mediterranean, they maintain that a 
republic of trade should refrain from all territorial conquests and remain 
utterly self-reliant in order that overseas trade can expand without 
impediment.
This argument follows from several claims. First, the enduring inde-
pendence of small cities like Lucca and Ragusa reveals that a good defence 
is the key for maintaining republican liberty. The De la Courts therefore 
insist repeatedly that the main duty of the magistrate of Leiden and the 
other towns of Holland is to arm the rich citizens and uphold strong 
protective fortifications against any external threat.61 Moreover, the 
demise of Rome and the commercial lustre of the contrary republican 
paradigm, Venice, show that mercantile republics should opt for defen-
sive peace instead of offensive war. a similar claim had been brought 
forward before by the Venetian author Paolo Paruta, one of the main 
propagators of the Myth of Venice in the sixteenth century. In a clear 
repudiation of Machiavelli’s celebration of Rome’s military expansionism, 
Paruta argued that the Venetians “employed other means to defend 
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62 Paolo Paruta, Discorsi politici (Venice, 1599) II.1, p. 367, 385: “… si’impiegarono in altri 
studii, per difendere la libertà, & accrescere le ricchezze loro, usando in quella cosa la 
militia del mare, & in questa i trafichi, & le mercantie … il conservare la pace, & tenere il 
commercio aperto, & libero con tutti.” Pieter de la Court van der Voort owned a copy of 
this work: Library, fol. 19. on Paruta, see Haitsma Mulier, Myth of Venice, 29–31; Viroli, 
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aangrijpende oorlog schaadelik, en Guerre offensive altijds Guerre consumtive.”
65 Ibidem, 254–255: “Voorwaar een Kat past vlytig op om sijnen kost te soeken, ende 
draagd groote sorg om sijne eigene jongen te bewaaren: bast nog smaald noit teegen 
iemand die hem tergd ofte lasterd … Sulks hy aangeransd en vervolgd zijnde, terstond 
vlugt naar eenig gat ofte natuurelike sterkte, alwaar hy sig stille houd tot dat die nood over 
gaa … sulks door deese roemwaardige kosnten, de katten overal veel meer rust genieten, 
langer leeven, alsmeede aangenaamer en in veel grooter getaale zijn, als de verslindende 
Dieren, Leewen … ofte de bedriegende Vossen.” Cf. Machiavelli, Principe XVIII.
 liberty and to increase their riches, using for the former the navy, and for 
the latter traffic and merchandizing”. Such commercial growth, Paruta 
continued, followed from the maxims of “preserving peace and keeping 
open and free commerce with all”.62 The De la Courts adopt this Venetian 
example to the case of Holland in general and with regard to Leiden in 
particular, for Leiden, “living of the academy and the Industries, is not 
founded on arms, but on peace”.63
Leiden’s reason of state must necessarily be pacifist since warfare 
obstructs international trade and requires large financial resources. 
Hence, “in Republics that live of commerce … a Guerre offensive is always 
a Guerre consumtive”.64 offensive warfare is simply too costly for a precari-
ous city like Leiden. With a metaphor that again implicitly refutes 
Machiavelli, De la Court concludes that a truly commercial common-
wealth should not wrap itself up in a lion’s skin or a fox’s pelt, but rather 
follow the commendable example of another species:
a Cat, who pays diligent attention to provide for food and takes great care to 
preserve its own young ones, and never barks or snarls at someone who pro-
vokes or abuses it … When assaulted and pursued, it immediately flees into 
some hole or natural stronghold, where it remains silent until the emer-
gency is over … So that by these praiseworthy arts, the cats enjoy more quiet 
everywhere, live longer, are more pleasant and in much greater number 
than the devouring Beasts, Lions … or cheating Foxes.65
In short, the best strategy to survive in the aggressive animal realm of 
international politics is to adopt the self-satisfied stoicism of cats.
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Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650–1668 (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 
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70 on the development of Dutch colonial ideology in the seventeenth century, see 
Martine van Ittersum, Profit and Principle. Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the 
Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies (1595–1615) (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006); and my 
“Republican Empire. Colonialism, Commerce and Corruption in the Dutch Golden age,” 
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This imaginative plea for a peaceful, defensive and autarchic foreign 
policy involved a clear move in the debate on Dutch foreign policy in the 
wake of the Peace of Westphalia. In line with the claim of the Duke of 
Rohan that the interest of the united Provinces was to make war,66 many 
Dutch pamphleteers during the 1650s and 1660s favoured the resumption 
of the glorious earlier conquests of the Stadholder’s troops against Spain. 
“War is an exercise of the highest justice”, as one pamphleteer argued 
against the Peace treaty with England in 1654.67 another pamphlet insisted 
in 1661 that the Dutch should follow the example of the Roman Republic 
and again take up arms against Spain to safeguard their commercial inter-
ests overseas: “if it isn’t done for the reputation of our Country, let it then 
be done for the sake of profit.”68 To counter such claims, the brothers De 
la Court asserted emphatically that the interest of Leiden and Holland as 
a whole could not possibly consist in war and conquests precisely because 
the general interest was based on international trade. Employing the lan-
guage of a commercial reason of state, they thus substantiated the posi-
tion of the Holland mercantile elite, which generally favoured peace and 
a strong navy over a costly land war and a standing army that was chiefly 
to be paid for by the province of Holland.69
Yet there is a clear limit to the pacifism of the brothers De la Court, for 
their rejection of territorial conquests does not entail a rejection of colo-
nial expansion.70 In the reason of state tradition, the establishment of 
colonies was often characterized as a peaceful alternative to military con-
quests for achieving republican grandezza. Botero, in particular, stressed 
the utility of colonization as a profitable way to pursuit expansion  without 
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ment for commercial colonization, see andrew Fitzmaurice, “The Ideology of Early 
Modern Colonisation,” History Compass 2 (2004), 1–14.
72 Politike Discoursen II.V.6, p. 121: “… de Conquesten van andere Steeden, buiten haare 
Republijk te doen, dat is kennelijk de ondergang van meest alle Vrye-Staaten … Maar 
aangaande Conquesten die de Koopmanschap verbeteren, en doen bloejen, gelijk die van 
Europa op de Indiaanen gedaan hebben, die zijn goed.”
73 Aanwysing I.26.
resorting to violence.71 The brothers De la Court readily adopted this com-
mercial ideology of colonization. While “the Conquests of other Cities” 
might lead to “the demise of nearly all Free-States”, they argued that there 
is also a positive form of expansion, namely “Conquests that improve 
Commerce … like the Europeans obtained from the Indians”.72 Elaborating 
on this claim, De la Court insisted that the settlement of overseas colonies 
should be a central policy of a commercial commonwealth like Holland. 
one of the characteristics of a republic based on immigration and trade, 
so De la Court argued, is a large number of unhappy and restless inhabit-
ants. The capriciousness of commerce causes a continuous threat of 
instant poverty, and hence there will always be discontented people who 
prefer to try their luck elsewhere. Moreover, the constant rotation in gov-
ernment and the meritocracy typical of a true republic result in similar 
dissatisfaction among the sons of the establishment who are not elected 
to the ranks of the administration. They too will therefore long for another 
territory where they can give full rein to their ambition and where they 
will be honoured for their deeds. The powers in being should try to get rid 
of these young men who, driven by self-love, might easily endeavour to 
rebel against the government. With these arguments, De la Court tried to 
convince the Dutch political establishment of the necessity of erecting 
satellite states overseas, in which Dutch expatriates would enjoy new 
opportunities whilst remaining subject to the political supervision of the 
metropolis. To alleviate internal pressure and to pursue external great-
ness, a commercial commonwealth should follow the example of classical 
commercial republics like athens and establish such a network of colo-
nial trading posts that enhance commercial increase.73
at first sight, this mercantile colonialist ideology, which clearly 
intended to legitimize the seventeenth-century practice of Dutch  overseas 
expansionism, might be characterized as a distinctly modern justification 
of colonization, typical to the rise of the imperialist state in the West. 
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that the logic behind the De la 
Courts’ commercial imperialism remains largely within the classical 
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framework of the single metropolis and its dependent colonies. Their 
model of a colonizing republic is not the territorial state of the Dutch 
Republic at large, but the independent, self-contained city of Leiden – 
and by extrapolation the amalgam of cities that constituted the States of 
Holland. De la Court categorically stressed that each city in Holland could 
easily subsist independently, and that Holland at large, “observing its own 
Interest, could establish here in Europe a State without depending on any 
other”.74 While arguing for overseas colonization, De la Court fervently 
spurned a closer union of the united Provinces beyond a mere alliance 
for mutual defence. This rejection of federalisation even entailed the radi-
cal proposal of digging a large trench to separate Holland once and for 
all from the other provinces and hence turn it into an isle of splendid 
isolation.75
Like their assessment of the Roman expansionist model, this particu-
larist core of the republican politics of the brothers De la Court involves a 
crucial distinction of contemporary English republicanism. In spite of 
their widespread admiration of Dutch prosperity, English republicans 
generally maintained that the Dutch Republic suffered from one funda-
mental shortcoming: its lack of a strong centralized government. Milton, 
for example, asserted with characteristic bravura that the English Com-
monwealth would “far exceed the united Provinces by having, not as 
they … many Sovranties united in one Commonwealth, but many Com-
monwealths under one united and entrusted Sovrantie”.76 a few years 
later Sidney similarly rejected the Dutch model by arguing that “their con-
stitutions seem to have a more particular regard to the preservation of the 
liberties and privileges of each town and province than to the welfare of 
the whole … Their commonwealth seems to be a vast building of loose 
stones, which not well cemented, threatens ruin”.77 In clear contrast, the 
fragmentation of the Dutch Republic was no issue at all for the De la 
Courts, whose republican model, unlike Milton’s or Sidney’s, continued to 
focus on the self-contained city instead of the centralized national state. 
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a revealing passage in the Politike Weeg-schaal stresses the advantage of 
such an urban republic which, precisely because it is confined to the lim-
its of a single city, must practice a peaceful foreign policy that promotes 
trade. When rewriting this passage De la Court added a short side note 
to the effect that republics can very well consist of a federation of differ-
ent cities, hastily referring the reader to the source of this claim: “all of 
which has been very well demonstrated in detail by J. Harrington in his 
Commonwealth of Oceana. So it is unnecessary to talk about it further.”78
This manuscript reference to Harrington – the sole mention of any 
English republican in the entire œuvre of the brothers De la Court – is 
particularly significant because it shows how De la Court appropriated an 
argument wholly secondary to Harrington’s thought for his own Dutch 
republican agenda.79 Ironically, this appropriation thus reveals how little 
the English republican experience of the 1650s could offer to the frag-
mented federation of cities and provinces across the North Sea. Clearly, 
the role model for the De la Courts, as for all their republican compatriots, 
was not the centralized, expansionist monarchical republic of England but 
the self-contained city-states of the classical and the contemporary Medi-
terranean, the colonizing, commercial cities of athens and Venice. Just 
like these shining examples of haughty and stoic self-rule, the republic of 
the brothers De la Court proudly maintained its distance from the hectic 
pursuits of the centralized state: it was, after all, a commonwealth of cats.
 The Politics of Free Trade
Liberty as the Highest Law
Leiden’s prospects, modelled on ancient athens, form the inductive 
foundation of a general theory of commercial reason of state that the 
brothers De la Court apply to the case of Holland at large. The core of this 
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theory lies in the Ciceronian maxim salus populi suprema lex, a powerful 
and widespread early-modern commonplace that, like the connected 
adage ‘necessity has no law’, could be mobilized for various political pur-
poses, both monarchical and republican.80 The De la Courts comment on 
this diverse usage of the axiom by contending that the phrase is like “a 
nice doll praised by all outwardly, but by only a few valued and cared for 
inwardly”.81 For the brothers, the true significance of the maxim is revealed 
by the case of Leiden, which shows that the health of the people in a 
mercantile republic consists of two intrinsically connected elements: the 
greatness of the commonwealth and the advancement of liberty. Since a 
republic of trade should forsake territorial conquests, commerce itself 
must be the means to achieve the preservation and increase of the polity, 
and commerce, as the example of athens demonstrates, thrives in lib-
erty.  Hence, freedom of trade, which includes freedom of immigration, 
occupation and enterprise, is the supreme law that leads to commercial 
greatness.
This fundamental claim that free trade forms the essence of commer-
cial reason of state is based on several premises. The argument of the De 
la Courts starts with the assertion that human natural liberty should be 
maintained as much as possible within the boundaries of the law in order 
to promote common prosperity and the growth of society. as the brothers 
boldly assert, “all Political thinkers generally admit that the highest per-
fection of Politics and human society consists in this single point, namely, 
that the Subjects are left as much natural liberty as is in any way doable”.82 
a commonwealth where all inhabitants enjoy such liberty will improve 
its competitiveness with the surrounding polities and therefore fulfil its 
chief goal, the increase of its population. Indeed, a city like Leiden “will 
only be able to subsist by giving its inhabitants much more freedom than 
they can find in any nearby or better situated Cities or places”.83 The De la 
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84 Ibidem 2, p. 8: “… hoe kraghtigen middel om vremde inwoonders aentelokken … 
de absolute eenparige vrijheid voor alle inwoonders, eenparige lasten dragende, 
intevoeren.”
85 Aanwysing I.15, p. 69: “… alle haare kennise en goederen te besteeden, om nieuwe 
visserien, handwerken, koopmanschap, ende navigatien te bedenken, en te formeeren.”
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87 Welvaren 80, p. 171: “… door vrijheid in Religien, Studien, koopmanschappen, manu-
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Courts therefore stress the need to grant all immigrants citizenship 
rights and the same opportunities to make a living as the indigenous 
 population, for “absolute uniform freedom for all inhabitants, bearing 
uniform burdens” is apart from a natural right a “powerful means to 
attract foreigners”.84
Such freedom of immigration and occupation is all the more important 
since immigrants will also bring “knowledge and goods” from outside. 
Newcomers do not own any fixed property and therefore they will have to 
invest their foreign experience and capital “to invent and create new fish-
eries, manufactures, trade, and navigations”. Hence, a constant influx of 
immigrants will guarantee the constant renewal and improvement of 
trade and industry.85 Commercial increase and liberty are thus mutually 
dependent:
Trade is a very powerful means to employ and feed many people. … Yet 
Trade is not fixed to one place only. Where Merchants are burdened least 
and where they are given more freedom to make and keep profits, there 
they will remain. But where, on the contrary, the freedom to make profits is 
restricted, or where the rich Merchants are harshly charged, there they are 
chased away or extinguished.86
In short, in an emerging era of international commercial competition, a 
commercial commonwealth like Leiden or Holland at large can only 
endure by conceding all inhabitants a range of liberties: “freedom in 
Religion, Study, trade, manufactures, arts, citizenship and Government”.87
In the course of the later seventeenth century, at the threshold of 
modernity, this idea that commercial success is the key to compete with 
other polities became an important element of political thinking all over 
Europe. Istvan Hont has analyzed this intellectual development in con-
siderable detail, convincingly arguing that such ‘jealousy of trade’ “was an 
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extrapolation of Machiavellianism to the modern trading economy”, and 
“the application of reason of state to international trade”.88 Yet surpris-
ingly, Hont has paid very little attention to Dutch theorizing about such 
commercial reason of state, although the Netherlands were the principal 
object of much of the jealousy in question.89 To mention just one exam-
ple, Josiah Child stressed in 1668 that the “prodigious increase of the 
Netherlands in their domestick and foreign Trade, Riches, and multitude 
of Shipping, is the envy of the present, and may be the wonder of all future 
Generations”.90 This assumption was shared by the Dutch themselves, 
such as a pamphleteer who argued in 1661 that Dutch primacy in world 
trade had caused that “several Nations have become jealous, especially 
the English, who cannot bear the prosperity of the Dutch”.91
The brothers De la Court similarly realized that Holland’s commercial 
success lead to the envy of other polities: even though “all Republics that 
are founded on peace and commerce share the same Interest with 
Holland”, they would still try to obstruct “our main design, namely the 
increase of commerce”.92 Therefore, all competitors, and in particular 
England, should be outplayed by a policy of insuperable freedom of trade. 
Drawing such a connection between liberty and commerce was, of course, 
hardly exceptional in the mercantile world on either side of the North 
Sea. already in 1568, at the start of the Dutch Revolt, a pamphlet explicitly 
stressed that “Marchandise, Manufacture et Negotiations” should be seen 
as the sisters of “Liberté”.93 The issue of free trade continued to dominate 
much of the political and economic debate – and warfare – between 
England and the Dutch Republic throughout the seventeenth century, 
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in Joyce appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1978), 73–98.
97 Speculatien over den innerlijcken toestant van regeringe in de Vereenigde Provintien 
(Heusden, 1660), 7: “… een geluckige voortganck van den Koophandel vereyschet 
vryheyt.”
98 Cf. the references in Aanwysing I.6 and I.9 to Gerard de Malynes, Consuetudo vel Lex 
Mercatoria, or the Ancient Law-Merchant (Londen, 1622). on the importance of merchant 
manuals such as the Lex Mercatoria, see Jochen Hoock, “Professional Ethics and 
Commercial Rationality at the Beginning of the Modern Era,” in Jacob and Secretan (eds.), 
Self-Perception of Early Modern Capitalists, 147–159.
99 For a lucid analysis of seventeenth-century Dutch views on free trade, see Hans-
Jürgen Wagener, “Free Seas, Free Trade, Free People: Early Dutch Institutionalism,”History 
of Political Economy 26, 3 (1994), 395–422. For the period following the De la Courts, see Ida 
from Grotius’s famous treatise Mare liberum and its repudiation by John 
Selden,94 to the writings of Dutch-English merchants like Gerard de 
Malynes and Edward Misselden.95 In particular from the 1640s and 1650s 
onwards, many English pamphleteers expressed their envious admira-
tion of the mercantile model of the Dutch, who, as the merchant Henry 
Robinson proclaimed, “may be thought one of the happiest [peoples] 
throughout the knowne world” since they “finde the advancing of Trade 
to be the onely true State Interest and Policy”.96 By the early 1660s, the 
claim that “a happy continuation of Commerce requires freedom” had 
become all but commonplace among the propagators of Dutch commerce 
vis-à-vis such English jealousy of trade.97
The argument for free trade of the brothers De la Court is clearly rooted 
in this anglo-Dutch commercial and intellectual exchange.98 Their contri-
bution to the debate on Dutch commerce is particularly significant 
because of the comprehensiveness of their claim what exactly commer-
cial liberty entails. Merging a Grotian notion of free property with mer-
cantile reason of state, the thought of the De la Courts amounts to an 
extensive discussion of several concrete policy measures to promote free 
trade and thus enhance Holland’s commercial greatness.99
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Nijenhuis, “De ontwikkeling van het politiek-economische vrijheidsbegrip in de 
Republiek,” in Haitsma Mulier and Velema (eds.), Vrijheid, 233–252; and Karel Davids, 
“From De la Court to Vreede. Regulation and Self-Regulation in Dutch Economic Discourse 
from c. 1660 to the Napoleonic Era,” The Journal of European Economic History 30, 2 (2001), 
245–289.
100 Aanwysing I.3–5, p. 21, 27: “… voor den menschen ongesond weeder … dat het in 
allen manieren sijn voedsel buiten ‘s Lands moet soeken, ende geduurig niewe Ingesetenen 
uit vreemde Landen tot zig trekken moet.”
101 Ibidem I.6, p. 27: “En om sijn voedsel uit der Zee, die een ieder gemeen is, te haalen; 
legd Holland seer wel.”
102 Ibidem I.7, p. 31: “In Europa is geen Land tot de Negotie bequaamer als Holland.” 
Ibidem I.13, p. 58: “… dat de Hollanders by naast alle Natien, soo uit den grooten oceaan, 
Middelandse, Indise, als Belt-Zee, gevaaren hebbende.”
103 Cf. Welvaren 44 with Aanwysing I.17, 20–21.
This discussion forms the core of De la Court’s reworking of the manu-
script on Leiden’s welfare to the Interest van Holland and the Aanwysing. 
De la Court maintains that like Leiden, Holland is plagued by numerous 
natural burdens, not only the “for people unhealthy weather” but espe-
cially the small size and scarcity of the country’s soil. as a result, Holland’s 
population “should by all means search its food abroad and continu-
ously attract new Inhabitants from foreign Countries”.100 Commerce and 
immigration are necessary for survival, and here Holland has an obvious 
advantage, for it is “very well situated to procure its food from the Sea, 
which is common to all” – the allusion to Grotius is implicit but clear.101 
This favourable maritime position has led to the growth of Dutch fishery, 
soon followed by trade, industry, and seafaring, all essential sources of 
welfare. De la Court asserts self-assuredly that “in Europe no Country is 
more capable for Trade than Holland”. In spite of war, international com-
petition and jealousy of trade, “the Hollanders have navigated almost all 
Nations out of the great ocean, the Mediterranean, the Indian ocean, and 
the Baltic”.102
For De la Court, the continuation of this commercial success depended 
on a range of liberties that would lure foreigners to Holland and promote 
the growth of trade. apart from the freedom of immigration and occupa-
tion, these liberties include the freedom of enterprise and the freedom 
from taxation. Following the plea for entrepreneurial liberty against the 
control and levies of the halls in Leiden, De la Court contended that com-
mercial enterprise in Holland at large should not be obstructed by the 
imposition of too heavy a tax burden.103 In his treatise on the grandezza of 
cities, Botero already argued that the towns of the Netherlands were “the 
most mercantile” because of “the frankness of taxes”, which made that 
“the merchandise that entered there and left (and entered and left infi-
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104 Botero, Cause della grandezza delle città, 343–4: “Le Città di Fiandra sono state le più 
mercantili, e le più frequentate Città d’Europa: Se tu ne ricercherai la cagione, troverai 
essere stata tra l’altra, la franchezza dalle gabelle: perché la mercantia, che vi entrava, e n’ 
usciva, (e ve ne’ entrava, e n’ usciva infinita) non pagava quasi nulla.”
105 Aanwysing I.19–21, p. 84, 91: “De Vryheid van Visseryen en Negotie aangaande is nog 
grooter als ergens’; ‘… soo hoog gereesen, dat nooit diergelijke in eenige Republijke ter 
Weereld, veel min in eenen Lande op koopmanschap, en nergens anders op bestaande, is 
gehoord of gesien geweest.”
106 See the comparison in Jan Luiten van Zanden and Maarten Prak, “Towards 
an Economic Interpretation of Citizenship: The Dutch Republic Between Medieval 
Communes and Modern Nation-States,” European Review of Economic History 10 (2006), 
111–145: 130.
107 Aanwysing I.21, p. 90: “Dat de swaare ende eenigvuldige imposten, ‘s Lands welvaaren 
endelik sullen verjaagen.”
108 Politike Discoursen I.I.5, p. 54: “… dat de mensch van nature meester en waardeerder 
van sijn eigen goed en arbeid zijnde, dien-volgende vermag daar meede te leeven, en ’t 
selven soo hoog te agten, als hy wil, sulks de natuur hem privativelik het oordeel over het 
sijnen geeft.” Cf. Grotius, Rights of War and Peace II.II.2, p. 78–80, and see the analysis in 
Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property. Grotius to Hume (oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), 10–14, 35–44.
109 Sinryke Fabulen, 534: “… soo vremd van der menscheliker aard.” See Plato, Republic, 
416d–417b, 462b–c, and Thomas More, Utopia, trans. Clarence H. Miller (New Haven and 
nitely) paid almost nothing”.104 De la Court adopted this assertion, claim-
ing that by the 1660s Holland had deviated from this admirable policy. 
although the “Freedom of Fishery and Trade is still greater than else-
where”, he argued, the tax burden was far too heavy. De la Court forcefully 
maintained that taxes “have risen now that high, that the like has never 
been seen or heard of in any Republic in the World, much less in a Country 
only subsisting of commerce”.105 This assertion involved only a little hyper-
bole, for per capita taxation in seventeenth-century Holland was indeed 
considerably higher than in other countries.106 Facing this reality, De la 
Court insisted that such “heavy and numerous imposts” threatened to 
divert Holland’s commerce and would thus “eventually chase away the 
Country’s welfare”.107
This argument for free enterprise and moderate taxation is loosely 
based on a conventional defence of undiluted property rights. Echoing 
Grotius’ discussion of the creation of individual property, the De la Courts 
stress “that man is by nature the master and appreciator of his own goods 
and labour … for nature gives him privately the judgement over his prop-
erty”.108 In other words, private ownership is a natural right that predates 
the establishment of the commonwealth. This claim involves an explicit 
repudiation of the classical arguments in Plato and Thomas More’s Utopia 
for the collectivisation of property, which De la Court classifies as “so alien 
to human nature”.109 In his mercantile logic, collective property can only 
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London: Yale university Press, 2001), 46–48. Pieter de la Court van der Voort owned two 
editions of Plato’s Opera omnia (one with the commentary of Marsilio Ficino), a French 
edition of La République (Paris, 1600), and the amsterdam 1631 edition of Respublica Th. 
Mori Eutopiae. See Library, fols. 10, 11, 31.
110 Sinryke Fabulen, 535: “… dat wy uit der aard menschen, ende niet dan by toevalle 
leeden eener Maatschappie ofte Republike zijn; sulks wy ook eer goederen souden hebben, 
eer de wet soude konnen de selve gemeen maken; soo is niet wel te begrijpen, dat de 
naarstige en spaarsaame souden konnen werden bewoogen haaren eigen rijkdom, met de 
arremoede der leuje ende quistige Menschen vrywillig gemeen te maken.”
111 See Nelson, Greek Tradition.
112 Politike Discoursen I.I.1, p. 18: “Sonder lasten, is een Staat niet te beschermen.”
113 Aanwysing I.24, p. 115: “… dat men nogtans minst beswaren mag dat middel van sub-
sistentie waar an ons meest gelegen is, en welk wy allerligst verliesen, en verloren zijnde 
niet ligtelik wederom bekomen.”
114 Politike Discoursen I.I.1, p. 19: “ … want alle deesen van buiten winst in ’t Land bren-
gende, zeer noodsaakelik voor den Staat zijnde, nogtans zeer gemakkelik door haare cor-
respondentie ende koopmanschap, haare personen, goederen en konsten in andere 
Landen konnen brengen.”
be established by civil law, but it is utterly unthinkable that a law that col-
lectivises property could arise out of general consent:
We are humans by nature, and only by coincidence are we members of a 
Society or Republic, so we should have property before the law could make it 
collective. It is therefore not easily understood how the diligent and thrifty 
could have been moved to share their own riches voluntarily with the pov-
erty of the lazy and the wasteful People.110
It is claims like these that put the De la Courts squarely outside of the 
‘Greek republican tradition’, which according to Eric Nelson championed 
the redistribution of wealth and collective property from Plato to the 
american Revolution.111 The republican model of the De la Courts is clearly 
a Greek model, but instead of the philospher’s republic of Plato, their 
model is the merchant’s republic of ancient athens.
In such a commercial commonwealth, the taxation of private property 
can only be justified if it enhances the general interest of the state, for 
“without taxes, a State cannot be protected”.112 De la Court concludes that 
Holland’s commercial reason of state requires a protectionist policy of 
taxation that “burdens least the means of subsistence which matters us 
most, which we lose the soonest and which, once lost, we cannot easily 
recover”.113 The pillars of Holland’s economy, the fishermen, artisans, and 
especially the international merchants, should therefore be exempted 
from taxation. “Bringing profit from abroad into the Country, they are very 
necessary for the State, yet they can, because of their commerce and cor-
respondence, divert themselves, their goods, and their arts very easily into 
other Countries.”114 Facing international competition, Holland should 
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115 See Ibidem I.II.29–30, and the more regulative elaboration in Aanwysing I.21–24. Cf. 
also the mercantilist ‘speculations’ by De la Court’s brother-in-law Van der Voort, pub-
lished as appendix I in Kernkamp (ed.), “Brieven (1667–1685),” 90–95.
116 Aanwysing II.15, p. 382: “… e mercaturae bono, meer naar het Interest der Koopluiden.”
favour those who make profits abroad: the entire community depends on 
their wealth, and if they would be taxed excessively they would leave the 
country. accordingly, the manufacturing of goods should not be taxed, 
nor should any tariffs be raised on the export of these goods or on the 
import of raw materials needed for the industry. Yet taxation of consump-
tion and landed property is an easy and necessary means to secure the 
state’s revenue, and foreign goods that compete with Holland’s trade and 
industry are to be levied as much as possible. International trade is a zero-
sum game, and Holland must take it all.115
Circumventing Monopoly
This combined argument for free enterprise within the commonwealth 
and a protectionist policy vis-à-vis foreign competitors amounts to the 
further claim that chartered monopolies in international trade, such as 
the Dutch East India Company (VoC), go against true commercial reason 
of state. This claim is still absent from the De la Courts’ discussion of 
Leiden’s welfare, but it takes centre stage in the Interest van Holland and 
the Aanwysing, reflecting a significant development in the brothers’ eco-
nomic thought. While their treatise on Leiden focused on unrestricted 
entrepreneurial freedom in the domestic sphere of an urban economy, 
from the start of the 1660s De la Court’s concerns gradually moved from 
domestic industry towards global trade. This results in a more regulative 
approach that emphasizes protectionist economic legislation “e mercatu-
rae bono, more to the Interest of Merchants” in order to promote Holland’s 
trade in the expanding arena of international competition overseas.116
arguably, this change of emphasis from a domestic to a global econ-
omy is related to De la Court’s growing involvement in international com-
merce and state policy in the wake of his marriage to Catharina Van der 
Voort in 1661. The relationship with the Van der Voorts significantly 
expanded De la Court’s mercantile horizons, particularly after he left his 
native Leiden to settle with his family-in-law in amsterdam in 1665. There, 
at the centre of global commerce, De la Court developed his business fur-
ther in close collaboration with the successful firm of his family-in-law. 
Towards the end of the decade, he travelled as an agent for the Van der 
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117 See RaL, Fa De la Court, inv. nr. 8: The “Libro de Belanci” (1657–1670) of the brothers 
Van der Voort, which refers on fols. 20–22 to De la Court’s stay in Messina, Naples and 
London in December 1669.
118 See the letters of Nicolaas de la Court to Pieter de la Court from 1672–1673 in 
Kernkamp (ed.), “Brieven (1667–1685),” 51–63. on De la Court’s commercial activities later 
in his life, see also the documents concerning his inheritance, dated 19 May 1691, in RaL, 
Fa De la Court, inv. nr. 17.
119 The relevant documents are published as appendices IIa and IIb in Kernkamp (ed.), 
“Brieven (1667–1685),” 95–136.
120 See Stadsarchief amsterdam, Family archive Backer, inv. nr. 465: letters from Johan 
de Wit to the brothers Van der Voort (1667–1671), and inv. nr. 466: undated documents on 
international affairs addressed to Giovanni Van der Voort.
121 Kernkamp (ed.), “Brieven (1667–1683),” 43, note 2; and Frijhoff, “Reisjournaal,” 17–18, 
note 19.
122 Parker, Of a Free Trade.
123 See e.g. Vertoogh by een lief-hebber des vaderlants vertoont. Teghen het ongefondeerde 
ende schadelijck sluyten der vryen handel in Brazil (s.l., 1637); Deductie, waer by 
Voorts to London and Italy.117 Eventually his trading network reached as 
far as the Caribbean, where his cousin Nicolaas, based in the Dutch settle-
ment on Curaçao, worked on behalf of his family.118 The bond with the Van 
der Voorts also brought De la Court closer to Holland’s political establish-
ment. In the course of the Second anglo-Dutch war, the firm of the Van 
der Voorts became directly involved in governmental policy by delivering 
over 900.000 guilders worth of artillery and provisions for the States of 
Holland and the Dutch fleet.119 This lucrative deal was mediated by Johan 
de Wit, a namesake and cousin of Holland’s Grand Pensionary, who was 
also related to the Van der Voorts. as a representative of the  States-General, 
De Wit kept the amsterdam merchants informed of the latest news from 
The Hague and the operations of the fleet.120 This growing connection to 
the establishment in The Hague was ultimately sealed in 1670 when De la 
Court and his brother-in-law Guglielmo obtained a doctorate in law at the 
university of orléans, a formality required to become a lawyer of the 
Court of Holland for which both took the oath in February 1671.121
De la Court’s increasing experience in international trade and govern-
ment affairs is reflected in his forceful repudiation of the widely shared 
conviction that colonial trade in the East and West Indies should be regu-
lated by chartered companies like the VoC. Both in the Dutch Republic 
and beyond, for example in Henry Parker’s 1647 treatise Of a Free Trade, 
numerous mercantile theorists argued that the commercial interests of a 
state could best be served by establishing such companies to administer 
overseas trade.122 This was the dominant view, yet there were also a few 
dissonant voices. In the 1630s and 1640s, a couple of Dutch pamphleteers 
and private merchants strongly advocated free trade in Dutch Brazil.123 
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onpartijdelijck over-wogen ende bewesen wort, wat het beste voor de Compagnie van West-
Indien zy: de handel te sluyten of open te laten (The Hague, 1638); Consideratien als dat de 
negotie op Brasil behoort open gestalt te worden (s.l., 1638); Consideratie over de tegenwoor-
dige ghelegentheydt van Brasil (amsterdam, 1644).
124 “W Walwins Conceptions; For a Free Trade,” in The Writings of William Walwyn, ed. 
Jack R. McMichael and Barbara Taft (athens and London: university of Georgia Press, 
1989), 446–452.
125 [Manuel Fernandez de Villareal], Le politique tres-chrestien ou discours politiques 
(‘Paris’ [Leiden], 1645), 146: “C’est obliger tout le monde à vivre dans les desordres de 
l’avarice, & non dans la liberté de l’abondance.” Pieter de la Court van der Voort owned a 
copy of this treatise: see Library, fol. 19.
126 Aanwysing I.7, p. 32: “… vrijen handel der gemeene Ingeseetenen.” Ibidem I.16, p. 71: 
“… haare naturelike vryheid van ‘s leevens middelen in haar vaderland soekende, te bes-
noejen met geoctroyeerde ofte geslootene Compagnien en Gildens.”
In England, the Leveller and merchant William Walwyn denounced in his 
1652 Conceptions for a Free Trade “the restriction and Government of 
Forraine Trade by Companyes”, arguing that chartered monopolies con-
flict with the “Native Right” of merchants and the “publique good” of soci-
ety.124 The Portuguese ambassador to Paris, Manuel Fernandez de Villareal, 
had a similar view. In his Le politique tres-chrestien ou discours politiques, 
a eulogy of Cardinal Richelieu published in 1645 by Elzevier in Leiden, he 
maintained that trading companies will only search for their own interest 
without regard for the common good. Fernandez de Villareal insisted that 
the establishment of such companies would therefore “oblige everyone to 
live in the disorders of avarice and not in the freedom of abundance”. 
Tellingly, he mentioned the Dutch chartered companies as the prime 
example of this gruesome fate.125
as one of the most outspoken critics in the Dutch Republic itself, De la 
Court developped this condemnation of chartered companies further 
with the claim that freedom of trade should also entail free competition 
on the colonial market, and hence the abolition of the monopoly of trad-
ing companies like the VoC. The roots of this claim lie in the strong con-
demnation of the economic monopolisation by Leiden’s guilds. Like 
guilds, De la Court insists, the Dutch trading companies curtail the “free 
trade of the common inhabitants” and “their natural liberty of seeking a 
livelihood in their fatherland”.126 Moreover, facing a globalizing economy 
and growing international rivalry, it is necessary that all Holland’s mer-
chants are able to trade with the vast territories outside of Europe so that 
commerce and foreign consumption can continue to increase. In line 
with Walwyn and Fernandez de Villareal, De la Court insists that these 
opportunities for worldwide commerce are discarded because the  private 
interests of the trading companies necessarily conflict with the public 
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127 Ibidem I.19, p. 85–86: “… het waarhaftige Interest soodaniger Compagnien bestaat, in 
het meesten voordeel der gemeene Participanten te souken … ende in het kort gesegt met 
de allerminste negotie ende navigatie, de meeste winsten te doen.” Cf. the diametrically 
opposed view in Parker, Free Trade, 21–23.
128 Aanwysing I.16, p. 72: “… soo maaken haar de seekere profijten dom en traag. Daar 
aan de andere zijde waarhaftig is, dat de nood een oud wijf doed draaven; ende de honger 
raawe boonen soet maakt; alsmede dat de armoede list soekt.” See the similar passages in 
e.g. Welvaren 50, p. 113 and Politike Discoursen I.I.1, p. 7–8. Cf. also Walwyn, “Conceptions,” 
5: “The numerousness of Merchants will occasion a strife & emulation among them, who 
shall produce the best ordered goods … whereas Merchants in Companyes have noe need 
of such diligence.”
129 Aanwysing I.16, p. 76. The same fable is told in Sinryke Fabulen, 169–174. Cf. as well 
the comparable fables in Ibidem, 261–266, 347–354.
130 all the documents concerning the project are published in overvoorde (ed.), 
“Noord-oostelijke doorvaart.”
interest of society at large. Whereas the general welfare lies in the increase 
of industry and trade, the “true Interest of such companies consists in 
seeking the most benefit for its common Participants … and, in short, in 
making the most profits with the least trade and navigation”.127 Their 
monopolistic position means that trading companies are not encouraged 
to open up new markets. “Certain profits make them stupid and slow”, as 
De la Court asserts repeatedly. Trade will only prosper when there is com-
petition, “for necessity makes an old wife trot, hunger makes raw beans 
sweet, and poverty begets ingenuity”.128 De la Court imaginatively summa-
rizes his criticism with the claim that the establishment of chartered 
monopolies attests to the same stupidity as aesop’s cat who, while licking 
the oil of a file, does not realize that he drills through his tongue and ends 
up sucking his own blood.129
This criticism of the Dutch trading companies was not confined to pure 
theory. In the summer of 1664, De la Court and his brothers-in-law asked 
the States-General for permission to search for a northern passage towards 
China along the shores of Siberia, thus circumventing the monopoly on 
asian trade enjoyed by the VoC. assisted in The Hague by their relative 
and informant Johan de Wit and by the jurist and anti-Stadholder publi-
cist Johan uytenhage de Mist, De la Court and the Van der Voorts thus 
endeavoured to challenge the vested colonial interests.130 a first request 
was turned down by the States-General after it heard the objections of the 
directors of the VoC. Yet De la Court cum suis did not give in and they sent 
a subsequent request to the States of Holland. Following De la Court’s 
argumentation in the Interest van Holland, their petition insisted that the 
general interest would be greatly enhanced if all Dutch merchants were 
allowed to trade in asia, while “the particular interest of the Chartered 
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131 Ibidem, 285: “… het particulier interest der Geoctroyeerde oostindische Compagnie 
ter contrarie is … Gemeene ingeseetenen van alle kennisse, navigatie en negotie der opge-
melde asiatische landen te vervremden en te secluderen in der eewigheid.”
132 Ibidem, 299: “… blijckt hieruuijt de quaedaerdigheijt van de compagnie, die liever 
heft dat andere natien de possessie van soo consideraebelen passage (bijaldien het te vin-
den waere) soude becomen dan onse eijgene natie.”
133 See Grotius, Free Sea, and cf. Den vryen handel ter zee, voor de Vereenighde 
Nederlanden (The Hague, 1666).
134 Aanwysing II.1, p. 161: “Dat de vrye Zeevaart teegen alle Roovers en Vyanden sorgvul-
diglik beschermd behoorde te werden.”
East Indian Company is, on the contrary … to alienate and exclude for 
eternity the common inhabitants of all knowledge, navigation and com-
merce of those asian countries”.131 In spite of these arguments, the second 
request was also rejected and the VoC maintained its monopoly. For the 
petitioners this clearly proved “the perniciousness of the company, which 
prefers that other nations come into the possession of such a considerable 
passage (if it could be found) instead of our own nation”.132
De la Court’s enterprise against the VoC is not only significant because 
it amounts to the most comprehensive criticism of the Dutch trading 
companies in the seventeenth century, but also because it differs in an 
important way from the dominant Grotian approach to freedom of trade. 
For Grotius and his followers, the crucial issue was the jurisdictional ques-
tion of the dominion over the seas and hence the extent of the rights of 
navigation, fishery and trade.133 Yet De la Court’s approach implies that 
free trade is not primarily a matter of right but of interest. This different 
emphasis is particularly clear in the largest chapter of the Aanwysing, 
which extensively discusses the need to rid the seas of pirates so as to 
safeguard “free Navigation”, yet without a word on universal ownership or 
the law of nations.134 In the thought of the brothers De la Court, freedom 
of trade means not the collective freedom of the seas, but the freedom of 
individual merchants in a realm dominated by international rivalry and 
the premises of reason of state.
From Natural to True Liberty
De la Court’s critical assessment of Holland’s interest pivots on the claim 
that liberty, which should lead the way to commercial greatness, is in 
practice too much restrained in its many different facets – from the free-
dom of immigration to the freedom of enterprise. But what then does ‘lib-
erty’ mean exactly? To answer this question I will show how the concept 
of liberty in the thought of the De la Courts merges a notion of individual 
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135 For general notions of liberty in early-modern Europe, see esp. Werner Conze, 
“Freiheit,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe vol. II: 425–542. For the Dutch background, see 
E.H. Kossmann, “Het probleem van de vrijheid in de zeventiende-eeuwse Nederlandse 
Republiek,” in Idem, Vergankelijkheid en continuïteit. Opstellen over geschiedenis 
(amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1995), 63–86; and the various contributions to Haitsma Mulier 
and Velema (eds.), Vrijheid.
136 See e.g. Aanwysing III.8, p. 518–519; Sinryke Fabulen, 97.
137 Welvaren 17, p. 45: “… een volkoomen vrijheid, om alles te doen, ’t geene tegen de 
Policie, en menschelijcke societeit niet strijdich is, ’t sij om God te dienen, ’t sij om sonder 
bekroon van ijmand, hier den kost te mogen winnen, met hoedanige konst, koopmansc-
hap, of arbeid het soude mogen wesen.” Cf. Digestae I.5.4 pr: “Libertas est naturalis facultas 
eius quod cuique facere libet, nisi si quid vi aut iure prohibetur.” on seventeenth-century 
Dutch conceptualisations of natural liberty, see the useful article by Hans Blom, “Vrijheid 
in de natuurrechtelijke politieke theorie in de zeventiende-eeuw,” in Haitsma Mulier and 
Velema (eds.), Vrijheid, 133–155.
freedom as non-interference with a strong plea for republican ‘True 
Liberty’ in the sense of independence from any arbitrary domination.135
The different facets of freedom that the brothers De la Court propagate 
in their description of Leiden and Holland’s commercial interest are 
based on the fundamental assertion that individuals do not relinquish 
their natural liberty when they agree to leave the state of nature for civil 
society. The establishment of sovereignty limits the freedom of all citizens 
through the rule of law, but the exercise of such freedom within the 
boundaries of civil law still involves a natural right that cannot be 
entirely  alienated.136 In a vocabulary that echoes the Digests of Roman 
law, the De la Courts define this natural right as “the full freedom to do 
everything that is not conflicting with Politics and human society, either 
the freedom to serve God or to gain a living here [in Leiden] without the 
impediment by anyone and with whatever art, trade, or labour it may 
be”.137 In other words, the natural liberty that is preserved in civil society 
entails the freedom from any obstruction of personal choices as long as 
these do not undermine society’s raison d’être by bringing back the state 
of nature.
at first sight, this conceptualisation of liberty appears to be strictly 
negative: it emphasizes freedom from interference in religious and eco-
nomic affairs, for example through persecution or the establishment of 
exclusivist monopolies. Yet this is not the whole picture, for the brothers 
De la Court maintain that human freedom involves more than merely the 
absence of interference. Following a long discussion of monarchical rule, 
a key section in the Politike Weeg-schaal under the general heading “On 
Liberty” draws a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, “the neces-
sity to obey one man, called Servitude”, and, on the other,
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138 Politike Weeg-schaal II.I.1, p. 309–313: “Van de vryheid … die noodzaakelikheid, om 
aan een mensch te gehoorsaamen hebben genoemd Slavernye … zoodanigen Staat daar 
geen Mensch gebieden mag, maar daar het oppersten is te mogen verschijnen in zeekere 
vergaderinge, om aldaar zijn stemme te geeven, op dat, naar meerderheid der zelven 
werde gemaakt een conclusie … Welke Staat de Grieken en Latinen hebben genoemd vry-
heid: alsoo niemand aldaar verbonden is, te leeven naar den wil en zin van een mensch, (daar 
zeer wel op te letten staat,) maar naar de zin van de ordre en Wet, aan welke alle 
Ingezeetenen van dien Staat, gelijk als aan de Reeden, eenpariglik onderworpen zijn … en 
dienvolgende, is niemand in zoodanige Staat een Heer, ook niemand een Slaaf; ja naweliks 
mag men in zodanige landen, iemant der ingezeetenen een onderdaan noemen, dewijl zy 
aan geen mensch onderworpen zijn.”
139 Ibidem, 313: “ … de Regulen der Roomse Regten.”
140 Quoted in Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, 41. Simon van Leeuwen, a prolific 
Leiden jurist and acquaintance of De la Court, edited the Corpus juris civilis for the pub-
lishers Blaeu and Elzevier in 1663. on Van Leeuwen’s political views and his relation to De 
la Court, see Robert Fruin, “over Simon van Leeuwen en zijn bedenckingen over de stad-
houderlijcke magt,” in Idem, Verspreide geschriften, ed. P.J. Blok, P.L. Muller and S. Müller 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1903), vol. VIII: 95–113.
141 Politike Weeg-schaal II.I.2, 318: “dierbare vryheid.” Sinryke Fabulen, 84: “De Hond daar 
en teegen is gewoon, sig een Slaaf der Menschen te maaken, ende dienvolgende soo met 
quispelstaarten als met opsitten, een stukjen broods van de selven te beedelen.”
a State where no Man can dictate, but where the utmost is to appear in a 
certain assembly to cast one’s vote so that a conclusion is reached with the 
majority of votes … This State the Greeks and Romans have called liberty: 
because no one there is bound to live according to the will and desire of one 
man … but to the spirit of order and Law, to which all Inhabitants of that 
State are uniformly subjected, as they are to Reason … Therefore, no one in 
such a State is a Lord, and no one a Slave. Indeed, one can hardly call one of 
the residents in such a country a subject, since they are subjected to no one 
at all.138
Liberty, then, entails not only the absence of interference, but also the 
condition of self-government under the rule of law without being domi-
nated by the arbitrary will of any other – a status diametrically opposed to 
that of a slave.
The brothers De la Court state explicitly that the vocabulary that 
underlies this passage stems from “the Rules of Roman Law’”139 the classical 
language of libertas codified in the Digests, which stress the dichotomy 
between those who are free and independent and those who are, as slaves, 
“within the power of someone else”.140 The De la Courts imaginatively 
explain this glaring contrast between liberty and servitude in a number of 
fables. one fable tells of a hungry wolf who prefers his precarious but 
“precious liberty” in the forest above the opulent life of a dog who “is used 
to make himself a Slave to Humans and thus, by wagging his tail and 
sitting up, to beg them for a piece of bread”.141 another fable praises 
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142 Politike Weeg-schaal II.I.2, p. 318: “… dat ik naar mijn eige zin niet mogte leeven, en dat 
alle mijn geluk, ofte ongeluk geduurig van uwe zorg, ofte zorgloosheid dependeerde.” The 
fable is also told in Sinryke Fabulen, 95–98.
143 Politike Weeg-schaal II.I.1, p. 312: “Deeze Staaten en Landen werden nu genaamd 
Republiken.”
144 Cf. Ibidem I.III.11, p. 268–273 (not yet in the first edition), with Boccalini, Ragguagli 
I.21, p. 63–65.
145 Ibidem II.I.1, p. 310–311 (not yet in the first edition): “… dat Piero de Medici, (in de 
Republike van Florencen soo grooten magt niet hebbende, al seen Stad-houder in de 
Vereenigde Neederlanden) als een Tiran en Verkragter der vryheid.” The predica-
tion  partly  translated by De la Court is of December 13, 1496, printed in Savonarola, 
Prediche sopra Ezechiele, ed. Roberto Ridolfi, 2 vols. (Rome: angelo Berlardetti, 1955), 
vol. I: 69–102: 79.
the determination of a goldfinch who happily escapes his birdcage, 
confronting his former owner with the statement “that I could not live 
according to my own will, and that all my happiness or unhappiness 
depended continuously on your care or carelessness”.142 Illustrated with 
these fables, the account of the De la Courts advances the fundamental 
argument that such liberty from arbitrary domination is only attainable in 
a free state where the citizens govern themselves. as the brothers insist, 
those countries where no one is a lord and no one a slave “are called 
Republics”.143
This phrase obviously raises the question what this term ‘republic’ then 
exactly refers to – a question that I address in more detail below. a first 
glimpse of what the brothers De la Court meant by ‘republic’ becomes 
clear by their appropriation of the Roman language of libertas and its 
resurgence in Renaissance Italy. Boccalini was a first important source. In 
his revision of the Politike Weeg-schaal, De la Court included a ragguaglio 
on monarchical rule in which he translated Boccalini’s libertà into the 
Dutch vryheid. He also turned Boccalini’s distinction between patrie libere 
and altra spezie di governi into an explicit opposition of “Republics” versus 
“Monarchical Government”.144 a second important source was the work of 
the infamous Florentine priest Girolamo Savonarola. In another revised 
passage, De la Court praised Savonarola for having revealed the hardships 
of servitude under the rule of the De Medici, translating one of Savonarola’s 
powerful predications with vryheid for libertà. Revealingly, De la Court 
added that Savonarola’s “Tyrant and Violator of liberty”, Piero de Medici, 
“did not have such a great power in the Republic of Florence as a Stad-
holder does in the united Provinces”.145 Finally, a passage on the demise of 
the Roman Republic, interspersed with quotes from Tacitus, puts vryheid 
explicitly in opposition to augustus who “has violated the liberty of the 
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146 Politike Weeg-schaal II.VI.3, p. 501–503: “… voor de Vryheid ofte teegen Augustus … dat 
hy de vryheid der Republiek had verkragt … de Kapitain Generaal, of Stadhouder der 
Roomse Republike, Augustus.”
147 Aanwysing I.1, p. 7: “… de reeden waarom men gemeenelik, quippe ubi libertas ibi & 
populus & divitiae, alle Republijken in konst-, koop-, volkrijkheid, ende sterkte, merkelik 
meer als de Monarchale Landen en Steden, sie bloejen.” The quote is from Nicolas de 
Bourgogne, Historia Belgica (antwerp, 1629), 5.
Republic”. augustus is then suggestively described as “the Captain General 
or Stadholder of the Roman Republic”.146
In this way, the work of the De la Courts unequivocally connects the 
language of libertas to the political situation in the Dutch Republic: lib-
erty in the sense of non-domination cannot subsist under a monarchical 
figure such as a Stadholder. In the early 1660s, this comparison between 
Piero de Medici and augustus to the Dutch Stadholders was clearly 
invoked to warn the contemporary audience to refrain from ever appoint-
ing a Stadholder. at the same time, the fact that Savonarola had been 
burnt at the stake, that the De Medici dynasty eventually suppressed the 
Florentine Republic, and that Roman liberty gave way to augustus’ impe-
rial domination, suggested something else too: that Holland, no longer 
subdued by a Stadholder, had surpassed the role models of Classical and 
Renaissance republicanism. While Machiavelli fashioned his ideal repub-
lic after victorious Rome, the De la Courts eschewed emulation and 
implicitly pretended that the libertas of Rome and the libertà of Florence 
were outshone by the beacon of Holland’s ‘True Liberty’.
To summarize, the concept of liberty in the work of the brothers De la 
Court moves from a negative notion of freedom from interference to a 
republican notion of freedom from monarchical domination. These two 
notions are not systematically distinguished in the brothers’ work, and 
they prove to be far from mutually exclusive. The core of the De la Courts’ 
thought, the common ground where the notions of non-interference 
and non-domination come together, is the contention that only true 
republics where the citizens govern themselves will safeguard freedom 
of movement and occupation and protect property rights and free trade. 
This blessed correlation “is the reason why usually, quippe ubi libertas 
ibi & populus & divitiae, all Republics are seen to flourish remarkably 
more in arts, commerce, population, and strength than Monarchical 
countries and Cities”.147 In short, only republican liberty as opposed 
to monarchical domination can ensure the prosperity of a commercial 
commonwealth:
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148 Aanwysing I.8, p. 37: “Ende vermits de Ingeseetenen, onder deese vrije Regeeringe 
eenige schatten ende rijkdommen wettelik komende te winnen; de selve aldaar gerustelik 
besitten, ende naar hunne eigene sinnelikheid allesins gebruiken mogen; sonder te vresen 
dat eenig veel behouftig en quistend Opper-heer ofte sijne Hovelingen ende Edellieden, 
die gemeenelik alle ook eeven quistig, behouftig, en gierig zijn, gemelde schatten der 
onderdanen onder den eenen ofte den anderen op geraapten dekmantel naar sig trekken 
sullen: soo zijn alle Inwoonders hier ook seer geneegen, om door gemelde ende andere 
leevensmiddelen te subsisteren, ende voor hare lieve kinderen rijkdommen te winnen, te 
sparen, ende te vergaderen.”
149 See Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, and Idem, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, esp. 
ix–xiii, 64–72, 144–148. For critical discussion, see esp. Sullivan, Machiavelli, Hobbes, 23–27, 
and Sommerville, “English and Roman Liberty.”
150 Cf. the comparable claim as regards English republicanism in Pincus, “Neither 
Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism” and Sullivan, Machiavelli, Hobbes.
For the Inhabitants under this free Government, when they legitimately gain 
some treasures and riches, will possess these peacefully and they will be 
able to use them fully in line with their own perception, without fearing that 
a very needy and wasteful Lord or his Courtiers and Nobles, who are usually 
all just as wasteful, needy, and avaricious, will seize under any picked up 
cloak these treasures of the Subjects. Therefore, all Inhabitants here are 
much inclined to subsist through [various] means, and to win, save, and 
gather riches for their dear children.148
and thus the freedom from interference coincides with the freedom from 
domination as the foundation of the mercantile ethics of industrious 
frugality.
The thought of the De la Courts offers a clear example of the concept 
of republican liberty that Quentin Skinner has highlighted in his influen-
tial work on seventeenth-century English republicanism.149 The brothers’ 
use of the concept, explicitly based on the Roman legal language of lib-
erty as opposed to servitude that was revived in Renaissance Italy, reveals 
that they consciously positioned themselves in a long-standing tradi-
tion of republican liberty which originated in antiquity. Yet their fierce 
criticism of the Roman example and their emphasis on individual eco-
nomic freedom also suggest that the De la Courts moved in a more ‘lib-
eral’ direction which supposed a break with the classical past. Their case 
therefore shows that it can be difficult to draw a sharp opposition between 
republican and liberal notions of liberty: in the work of the De la Courts 
these two notions simply reinforce each other, for freedom from interfer-
ence is only attainable when freedom from arbitrary domination is 
ensured.150 overall, the De la Courts’ ‘liberal’ argument for free enterprise 
and free trade neatly fits into a ‘republican’ criticism of monarchical rule 
in all its guises.
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151 See Skinner, “State of Princes to the Person of the State,” 398–399.
152 Aanwysing I.2, p. 20: “… dat verscheidentheid van Regeerders, onderdaanen, Landen, 
en situatie, ook noodsaakelik verscheidentheid van interesten veroorsaakende … soo 
veele alle sijne Steeden ofte Landen in eene saake, ofte interest overeenkomen.” Cf. the less 
reassuring phrasing of the opening chapter of Interest I, p. 1: “Holland is geen een Land, en 
heeft niet allesins een interest.”
153 Ibidem I.9, p. 38: “Dat alle Ingesetenen van Holland, in vryheid zijnde, door een gemeen 
wel en qualik-vaaren, wonderlik aan een zijn gekoppeld.”
 Monarchy Dethroned
Good Government: The Harmony between Private & Public Interests
How should the government of a commercial commonwealth be organ-
ized? The answer of the De la Courts to this question largely derives from 
their commercial reasoning. Contrary to the institutional focus that dom-
inates the few existing studies of their thought, I contend that the broth-
ers’ central argument against monarchy is based on their embrace of 
commerce as the mainstay of republican politics. For the De la Courts, 
commerce needs liberty, and such liberty can only be furthered by a broad 
representative assembly that establishes a harmony between private and 
public interests. In contrast, all forms of monarchical rule, including the 
Dutch Stadholderate, essentially amount to tyranny.
at the basis of the De la Courts’ assessment of good government lies 
their implicit claim that the essence of politics is not the issue of sover-
eignty, but of interest. at odds with the dominant view of Bodin, Grotius, 
and Hobbes,151 the brothers De la Court suggest that the citizens and cities 
of Holland are not primarily connected through the institution of a unify-
ing sovereign, but rather (if at all) by sharing a similar general interest. 
While Holland is characterized by a “variety of Rulers, Subjects, Lands, 
and situation” which “necessarily causes variety of interests”, still “all its 
Cities and Lands concur in one thing or interest”.152 Through a meticulous 
calculation of Holland’s entire population and the rates of employment in 
all its different economic sectors, De la Court concludes that “all 
Inhabitants of Holland, living in freedom, are by a common well- and ill-
being wonderfully linked together”. This common ground is the all-embrac-
ing interest of commerce.153
In the preceding chapter I have discussed the tension between this 
notion of a general interest and the self-loving human condition that 
is central to the thought of the De la Courts. Following their claim that 
this tension can only be solved by the cultivation of well-understood 
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154 Politike Weeg-schaal I.I.5, p. 34–35: “En dienvolgende zoo is klaar, dat Een goede 
regeering is, niet daar het wel ofte qualik varen der onderdanen, hangt van de deugd of 
ondeugd der Regeerders, maar, dat zeer aanmerkens-waardig is, daar het wel en qualik 
varen der Regeerders, noodwendig hangt van, en volgt op het wle en qualik varen der 
Onderdanen. Want vermits men geloven moet, dat eygen altijts voorgaat, zal in het eersten 
geval, eigen voordeel ook tot naadeel der gemeene ingezetenen werden gesogt. Maar ver-
mits in het tweeden geval, eigen voordeel niet dan door het Gemeen kan werden verkree-
gen, zal het zelven door de Regeerders altijts werden betragt.”
155 Aanwysing I.1, p. 2, 6: “Namentlik, vermits aller Landen waarhaftig Interest, bestaat in 
het welvaaren der Regeerderen en onderdaanen gesaamentlik … dat het Gemeen niet dan 
om eigen welvaren betragt werd: ende dat het dienvolgende de beste Reegering is, alwaar de 
Opper-Regeerders haar eigen welvaren best en meest door het Gemeen verkrijgen konnen.” 
See the similar passage in Ibidem III.1, p. 387–388.
156 Cicero, De officiis III.VI.26, trans. Miller, p. 293.
 self-interest, civic virtue in the sense of subordinating personal advantage 
to the common good looses its classical prominence as the basis of 
politics. Consequently, the brothers De la Court insist repeatedly that 
good government can only be established upon the self-interested nature 
of rulers and rule alike. The common good will only be furthered if the 
rulers have something to gain personally from promoting the interests 
of all:
and therefore it is clear that A good government is not that where the well- or 
ill-being of the subjects depends on the virtue or vice of the Rulers, but, which 
is worthy of observation, that where the well- and ill-being of the Rulers neces-
sarily depends on and follows from the well- and ill-being of the Subjects. For 
since one should assume that self is always preferred, so in the first case one’s 
own advantage will be sought after even to the detriment of the common 
inhabitants. Yet because in the second case one’s own advantage can only be 
obtained through the Common good, therefore the latter will always be 
aimed at by the Rulers.154
To put it more succinctly, the “true Interest of all Countries consists in the 
joint welfare of Rulers and Subjects.” and given that “the Common good is 
not aimed at but for the sake of personal welfare, therefore the best 
Government is that where the Supreme Rulers can obtain their own welfare 
best and mostly by the Common good”.155
at first sight, this correspondence between private and public interests 
does not appear to be particularly unconventional. In De officiis, Cicero 
similarly stressed that “the chief end of all men [ought to be] to make 
the interest [utilitas] of each individual and of the whole body politic 
identical.” This influential phrase reverberated through early-modern 
political thought.156 Machiavelli insisted empathically that such a coinci-
dence between private advantage and the common good is only possible 
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157 See Machiavelli, Discorsi II.2, p. 138: “E sanza dubbio questo bene comune non è 
osservato se non nelle repubbliche … al contrario interviene quando vi è uno principe: 
dove il più delle volte quello che fa per lui offende la città, e quello che fa per la città 
offende lui.”
158 Hobbes, Leviathan XIX, p. 241.
159 Aanwysing II.10, p. 305: “… de Een-hoofdige Regeerders selden soo veel verstands 
ende kennisse hebben, dat haar eigen Interest wel begrijpen konnen.”
160 Quoted e.g. in Politike Weeg-schaal III.II.4, p. 633, and Sinryke Fabulen, 285.
in republics.157 Hobbes argued “that where the publique and private inter-
est are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced”, which 
brought him to the diametrically opposite assertion that only “in Monarchy 
the private interest is the same with the publique”.158 The brothers De la 
Court adopt this time-honoured concern of how to reconcile personal 
advantage with the common good, yet their approach entails a crucially 
different emphasis: the foundation of their analysis is not the public, but 
the private interest, the self-love that characterizes every human being. 
The common good can only be based on the pursuit of personal advan-
tage, never vice versa. accordingly, the De la Courts employ a Hobbesian 
view of mankind to reach a Machiavellian conclusion that only in repub-
lics the essential harmony between public and private interests will be 
sustained.
This claim follows from two connected assumptions. First, the educa-
tion of princes and the sheer absence of discipline at a monarchical court 
determine that “Single Rulers rarely have that much judgment and knowl-
edge that they can understand their own Interest well”.159 Since a monarch 
is not able to identify his own interest correctly, he will be equally unable 
to make it coincide with the general interest of society at large. a monar-
chy that intentionally furthers the common good is therefore a mere chi-
mera. Secondly, monarchs are not only unable to establish a harmonious 
connection between their self-interest and the welfare of the community, 
they deliberately oppose the general interest because of their characteris-
tic lust for domination. Enslaved to their passions, they desire to enslave 
others and have their arbitrary power rule over the precepts of reason, 
thus proving the truth of the Italian saying La forza caca sopra la rag-
gione.160 The eventual results are disastrous, in particular in a commercial 
commonwealth where the public interest consists of the increase of pop-
ulation and trade. as De la Court emphatically warns his Dutch readers, 
Holland’s “laudable harmony and concurrence could be broken to the 
ruin of all Inhabitants … by one single mistake: namely, by choosing a 
Supreme head over all these Inhabitants and their arms”. Should this 
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161 Aanwysing I.9, p. 45: “… deese loffelike harmonie en overeenstemming soude konnen 
werden gebrooken, tot ruine van alle Ingesetenen … met eene eenige misslag; naamen-
tlijk, met te kiesen een Opper-hooft over alle de selve Ingeseetenen ofte der selver wap-
enen … ende dat de Heeren, Hoovelingen, en Soldaaten, alle hem toe gedaan zijnde, ende 
van hem dependerende, noodwendig op de arbeidende Ingeseetenen aasen, soo schijnd, 
dat sy alle haare magt souden gebruiken tot eigen voordeel, en tot nadeel van ’t gemeen … 
dat zy kennelik alle Steeden klein, ende de Ingeseten arm maaken souden, om zig sonder 
teegenspreeken te konnen doen gehoorsaamen. ’t Welk indien waarhaftig is, soo is ken-
nelik, dat men hier te regt altijds God behoorde te bidden, a furore Monarcharum libera 
nos Domine. o God: bewaard dog Holland voor een Monarch, Prins, en Hoofd.” See 
Welvaren, 143, and Politike Weeg-schaal I.III.11, p. 273, for the same prayer, following a fable 
taken from Boccalini.
162 Politike Weeg-schaal II.I.1, p. 309: “… Monarchie, daar een enkeld mensch gebieden 
mag, welke Regeering de Grieken en Latinen van ouds hebben genoemd Tirannie.” For the 
aristotelian distinction between monarchy and tyranny, see aristotle, Politics V.10 (1310b). 
Cf. also Boxhorn, Institutiones I.IV.3–4.
occur, the existing harmony of interests would collapse under the domi-
nation of this monarchical figure and his followers:
and since the Lords, Courtiers, and Soldiers, who are devoted to him and 
depend on him, necessarily prey upon the industrious Inhabitants, there-
fore it appears that they would use all their power to their own advantage 
and at the expense of the common good … and make all cities small and the 
Inhabitants poor, so that they can be obeyed without any opposition. If this 
is true, then it is clear that we should truly always pray to God a furore 
Monarcharum libera nos Domine: oh God, please save Holland from a 
Monarch, Prince, and Head.161
Turning Monarchy into Tyranny
The principal intention that underlies the entire œuvre of the brothers De 
la Court is to reveal, like a modern actaeon or the Dutchman in the 
Kingdom of apes, the dangers and detriments of such monarchical furore. 
Their mercantile frankness aims to dethrone monarchy in general and the 
monarchical principle in the Dutch Republic in particular with the gen-
eral assertion that all modes of single rule are incompatible with the lib-
erty that represents the highest law of a commercial commonwealth. 
Essentially, this endeavour collapses the aristotelian distinction between 
monarchy and tyranny: as the De la Courts contend, “Monarchy, where 
one man may command, is the Government that the Greeks and Romans 
of old have called Tyranny”.162
This crucial statement arises from a general rhetorical strategy of 
extensive prolepsis and paradiastole, directed against the conventional 
aristotelian wisdom that monarchical government as opposed to tyranny 
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163 This strategy dominates the entire first book of Politike Weeg-schaal, esp. I.I.8–11, and 
is repeated throughout the entire œuvre of the De la Courts, esp. in the third part of the 
Aanwysing.
164 Politike Discoursen II.V.4, p. 109: “… de waarheid bedekter is: sulks de daaden der 
Monarchen altijd booven de waarheid werden verheft.” Cf. Machiavelli, Discorsi I.58, p. 
128: “… de’ principi si parla sempre con mille paure e mille rispetti.”
165 Aanwysing, ‘Voor-reeden’, sig. ****2v.: “… dat de groote ambitie ofte heersugtigheid in 
Koningen ende Princen seer pleeg gepreesen te werden.”
166 Sinryke Fabulen, 463: “… die schrikkelijke Gedrogten als nog by de meeste Historie-
schrijvers gepreesen, als of het seer vroome Helden waaren geweest.” Cf. Politike Weeg-
schaal I.I.12, p. 65, for a similar passage.
167 Aanwyisng, “Voor-reeden,” sig. ****2 v.: “Ende dienvolgende, soo schijnd iemand te 
sullen seggen, datmen de Princen van Oranjen over haare vermeerderinge ofte aanwas-
sende authoriteit ende kragt in het bedienen ofte Regeeren der Vereenigde Neederlanden 
ende der veroverde Steeden, alsoo seer behoorde te prijsen, alsmen te agten ende te 
looven pleeg een vlytig eerlik Koopman, die sijne goederen door Neeringe ende Negotie 
weet te vermeerderen; want in die vermeerderinge van Magt kennelik alle der Princen 
hanteering ende Negotiatie bestaat.”
is conducive to the common good.163 according to the brothers De la 
Court, the duplicitous speech that proliferates under monarchical rule is 
responsible for this widespread mistake. The flattery of courtiers and 
political writers who live under a monarchical yoke implies that in such a 
regime, “the truth is more concealed, so that the deeds of Monarchs are 
always elevated above the truth”.164 Such dissimulation means that the 
vices of kings are commonly heralded as virtues and that their “ambition 
and desire to rule” are lauded.165 The consequence is that rulers like Caesar 
and augustus, “those horrible Monsters, are still praised by most Historians 
as if they had been very pious Heroes”.166 Even in the Dutch Republic such 
admiration of kings remains influential, with the result that many think 
that the monarchical incivility embodied by the House of orange deserves 
the same esteem as the exemplary civic behaviour of the wise merchant:
and therefore one will say that the Prince of Orange should be praised for 
his expansion and growing authority and power in serving or Governing the 
united Netherlands as much … as a diligent and honest Merchant, who 
knows how to accumulate his goods by Industry and Trade, is commonly 
esteemed and lauded. For apparently, all Prince’s business and Commerce 
consist in that accumulation of Power.167
In short, courtly hypocrisy obscures the vital distinction between honour-
able mercantile ambition and the disastrous monarchical desire to 
dominate.
The brothers De la Court contend that thus far in history there has 
been only one author who dared to speak his mind to a monarch: George 
Buchanan, whose work “can serve as a brightly shining beacon to all 
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168 Politike Weeg-schaal I.I.33, p. 161: “En dienvolgende soo kan gemelde Buchananus, tot 
een hel-schijnent baken strekken, voor alle hedendaagse Historie-schrijvers, die geneegen 
souden mogen wesen van Monarchen aanstotelike waarheeden te schrijven.”
169 George Buchanan, De jure regni apud Scotos. Or a Dialogue, Concerning the Due 
Priviledge of Government in the Kingdom of Scotland (s.l., 1680), sig. a5. Pieter de la Court 
van der Voort owned the 1643 Edinburgh edition of Buchanan’s Rerum Scoticarum histo-
ria, published together with De jure regni apud Scotos: Library, fol. 28. on Buchanan, see 
Skinner, Foundations, vol. II: 339–348, and J.H. Burns, “George Buchanan and the anti-
Monarchomachs,” in Phillipson and Skinner (eds.), Political Discourse, 3–22.
170 Politike Weeg-schaal I.I.11, p. 52: “… de magt, eere, en goederen hunner onderdanen 
zoo zeer tragten te verminderen als doenelik is.”
171 Aanwysing I.1, p. 3–4: “… soo mak ende magteloos blijven, dat sy niet souden konnen 
breidel ende toom ofte schatting ende gehoorsaamheid weigeren.” The passage on the 
erection of citadels refers to aristotle, Politics V.11, VII.11, and also evidently follows 
Machiavelli, especially Discorsi II.24. Cf. also Aanwsying III.2, which refers directly to the 
Politike Weeg-schaal, esp. I.I.13 and I.I.28.
172 Politike Discoursen II.V.9, p. 133: “Ende om de selfde reden haten de Vorsten de 
studien, en geleerdheid; want Sy gevaarlik agten, dat veele booven Haar in verstand uits-
teeken; ende siende dat een verstandige Gemeente, sig soo vreedsaam niet laat tiranniseren, 
of regeren als een onverstandiger, soo blussen deese Vorsten alle geleertheid soo veel uit, als 
sy konnen.”
contemporary Historians who would like to write scandalous truths about 
Monarchs”.168 With this praise of Buchanan’s repudiation of “flattery, 
which is the nurse of Tyranny, and a most grievous plague of a Kingdome”, 
the De la Courts clearly position themselves in the Monarchomach tradi-
tion.169 Yet unlike Buchanan, they do not maintain that kings are bound to 
uphold the social contract and that resistance is lawful if they forsake this 
duty. Instead, the brothers make a decisively more radical move by insist-
ing that monarchy is by its very nature unconducive to the salus populi. 
Even when checked by the rule of law or balanced in a mixed regime, 
monarchy is and remains tyrannical.
The De la Courts insist that monarchs consider the population over 
which they rule as enemies and therefore “try to decrease the power, hon-
our, and goods of their subjects as much as possible”.170 a monarch aims to 
subdue the people as “tame and powerless” horses, “so that they cannot 
refuse the bit and bridle or imposts and obedience”; he restrains their cit-
ies through garrisons and citadels instead of protecting them with defen-
sive fortifications, and he imposes all kinds of taxes to finance his wasteful 
pleasures and his expensive royal household.171 Moreover,
Monarchs hate studies and knowledge, since they consider it dangerous 
when many people tower above Them in intellect. and because they realize 
that an intelligent Community is not tyrannized or ruled as peacefully as one 
that is less intelligent, therefore these Monarchs extinguish all knowledge as 
much as they can.172
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173 See Politike Weeg-schaal, esp. I.I.11–27, and cf. the similar passages in Aanwysing I.1 
and III.2, and e.g. in Sinryke Fabulen, 277–278.
174 Politike Weeg-schaal I.I.27, p. 126: “…dat alle ordre en wetten zullen strekken privative-
lik, ten voordeele des Konings en zijner Hovelingen.”
175 Aanwysing III.2, p. 423: “… sijne onderhoud door een onseeker gewin, met perikel 
van alles te verliesen, in de altijds arbeidsame ende bekommerlike Koopmanschap te 
soeken.”
176 Ibidem, 434: “Sulks dan waarhaftig zijnde, dat onder de Een-hoofdige Regeeringe, de 
Heeren en haare Hovelingen … de gelukkigste Reeders in Vragt-scheepen, als ook 
Koopluiden en Negotianten benijden, ende doodelik haaten, om dat sy door hunne wette-
lik verkregene Rijkdommen, ende het gebruik van dien, den Hoofsen ende Adeliken praal 
ende glans verduisteren.”
The overall result is that a commonwealth under monarchical rule will 
never be able to prosper in liberty. Instead, monarchies only promote 
licentiousness. Kings spend their days among their concubines, and thus 
often leave daily administration to their favourites or, at best, they sell 
state offices to the highest bidder. Indecisiveness, nepotism, and corrup-
tion are the inevitable consequences.173 The rule of law is all but absent in 
a monarchy, for “all orders and laws will conduce privatively to the advan-
tage of the King and his Courtiers”.174 In sum, the private interest of the 
sovereign is not harmoniously connected to the general interest, but pur-
sued at the expense of the common good.
This gruesome fate is especially catastrophic for a society based on 
commerce. Since monarchs and courtiers can enrich themselves effort-
lessly by imposing taxes and selling offices, it is unthinkable that they 
would “seek their maintenance by an uncertain gain with the danger 
of losing all in that ever laborious and anxious Commerce”.175 The domi-
nant ethics of a courtly society, based on laziness, easy gains and squan-
dering, are fundamentally incompatible with the mercantile ethics of 
a commercial commonwealth. Kings and courtiers will therefore do 
their  best to frustrate all trading activity. “under a Single-headed 
Government”, De la Court warns, “the Lords and their Courtiers envy and 
deadly hate the most fortunate owners of Freight-ships, as well as the 
Merchants and Traders, because with their legally obtained Riches and 
the use thereof they obscure the lustre and pomp of the Court and Gentry”.176 
This monarchical jealousy of trade in turn leads to even more excessive 
taxes and the establishment of monopolies to line the courtiers’ purses, 
which constrain economic freedom. accordingly, the rule by a king 
and his corrupting court fundamentally thwarts the preservation and 
increase of the polity, the prime principle of reason of state. Monarchs 
forsake the necessary defence of the country, and instead of establishing 
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177 Ibidem, 437–439, and Politike Weeg-schaal I.I.28–29.
178 Politike Discoursen V.II.9, p. 134–135: “alle het welk te weege brengd, dat het volk 
onder de lasten van haar Vorst, onder de onregtvaradigheid, en plondering van haare 
Gouverneurs sugtende, en leevende in geduurige onseekerheid van haar leeven, en goederen; 
geen naarstigheid gebruikt, om goederen te vergaaderen, nog lust heeft om te trouwen, en 
kinderen aan te queeken, die als slaaven van den Vorst in de oorlogen ten slagtbanken werden 
gevoerd.”
179 Politike Weeg-schaal I.I.13, p. 72: “… de Koopluiden, van zoodanige regeeringe niet 
min schuw zijn, en vlieden moeten, als van een doodelike Pest.”
180 Aanwysing III.3, p. 443–444. De la Court refers to Blaeu’s Atlas and to a Dutch trans-
lation of José de acosta, Historia natural y moral de las Indias (1590).
181 Welvaren 37, p. 82: “… in ’t generael verloopt de negotie altijds uijt ende van die 
landen en steden, daer een eenigh mens een Negotiant na sijn gelieven, van sijn goederen 
kan berooven, dat is met eenen woorde geseght van alle monarchale regeringe.”
profitable colonies overseas, they wage offensive wars to conquer new 
territories.177
all of which brings about that the people, sighing under the burdens of their 
Monarch, under the injustice and pillaging of their Governors, and living in 
continuous insecurity about their lives and goods, do not employ diligence to 
accumulate goods, nor do they have desire to marry and to breed children, 
who will be led to the slaughters of war as slaves of the Monarch.178
Thus a commonwealth based on commerce and learning will necessarily 
disintegrate when it is enslaved to such domination, for merchants “shun 
and should flee from such a government like from a deadly Plague”.179 De 
la Court stresses that worldwide historical experience shows that this has 
been exactly the case, from the imperial Pre-Columbian courts of Cuzco, 
Quito, and Mexico to the large cities of Japan, China, Persia and India, and 
from Fez and Cairo to Nineveh and Jerusalem.180 all these instances reveal 
that if a people lives under domination by the arbitrary will of one man, 
commerce will collapse: because “in general, commerce always disap-
pears from those countries and cities where one single man can rob a 
Merchant at his pleasure of his goods; that is, in short, from all monarchi-
cal government”.181
Paradigms of Tyranny
an important part of the Politike Weeg-schaal discusses at length various 
instances of such monarchical rule and its ruinous consequences. The 
first and most prominent of these paradigms of tyranny is the ottoman 
Empire – a commonplace element of comparison in early-modern 
European political thought from Bodin to Harrington. In line with the 
prevailing ‘orientalist’ depiction of Eastern despotism which can be traced 
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182 See Patricia Springborg, Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1992), and Joan-Pau Rubiés, “oriental Despotism and European orientalism: Botero 
to Montesquieu,” Journal of Early Modern History 9, 1–2 (2005), 109–180.
183 See Politike Weeg-schaal I.II.2–22. This overview is largely based on the massive work 
of Francesco Sansovino, Historia universale dell’origine et imperio de’ Turchi (Venice, 1561) 
and on the Voyage du Levant by the French envoy Louis Deshayes, baron of Courmenin, a 
travel account first published in 1624.
184 Politike Weeg-schaal I.III.1, p. 230: “… die van Asien zijn altijt kleynhertig, verwijft, en 
kinderlijk, die van Afriken dom, en slaafs geweest … Maar die van Europen zijn t’allen tijden 
stouter, manneliker, arbeydzaamer en vernuftiger geweest.”
185 Ibidem I.II.22, p. 227–228: “… dat die Landen, onder een Christelike Religie, nog veel 
meer verwoest zouden weesen.”
186 Ibidem I.I.34, p. 168–169: “… onder de Christelike Europise Monarchen, de geleerd-
heydt, koopmanschap, rijkdom, konsten en deugden niet uitgebluscht … Sulks die quade 
effecten der Monarchale regeeringe, nu voorneementlik, met der tijdt te verwagten staan.”
back to aristotle,182 the De la Courts’ overview abhors the ignorance and 
devastation among the Turkish lands and the decadence and cruelty of 
the Sultan.183 In particular, the De la Courts insist that “those of Asia have 
always been fainthearted, feminine, and childish, those of Africa dumb and 
slavish … but those of Europe have always been more courageous, manly, 
diligent and rational”.184 Yet in spite of this conventional defence of 
European superiority, the De la Courts do not consider the ottoman case 
as an example of fundamental otherness, typical to the particular culture 
and mores of the orient or to Islam. Instead, the brothers list approvingly 
the Islamic rules of life and they insist that “under a Christian Religion 
those Lands would have been still much more destroyed”.185 The ottoman 
Empire offers therefore a universally valid warning that monarchy 
degrades humanity.
The only reason that Western Europe has for the most part not yet 
become prey to this fate, and that “under the Christian European 
Monarchs science, commerce, wealth, arts and virtues are not yet extin-
guished”, is because of the republican legacy of antiquity and the result-
ing decentralization and fragmentation of power. But the De la Courts 
feared this tide was changing. Just fairly recently in history, they argued, 
the European kings had started to reveal their truly tyrannical face. “The 
evil effects of Monarchical government are therefore, essentially, to be 
expected in due time.”186 In 1685, the year when Louis XIV crowned his 
absolutist rule with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, De la Court saw 
these earlier fears justified. In the preface to the Sinryke Fabulen, he wrote:
Especially in our Century, Single-headed Rule, both in Church and State and 
suppressing so many Free Republics, has come to the fore to such an extent, 
that if it would continue among the Tyrants with the same pace for 
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187 Sinryke Fabulen, “Voorreeden,” **4v.: “… dat bysonderlik in deese onse Eewe de 
Eenhoofdige Regeering, soo in Kerke als in Staat, ter onderdrukkinge veeler Vrye Republiken, 
soodaanig is doorgedrongen, dat indien geduurende nog eene volgende Eewe, met die-
selfde treeden by den Dwingelanden werd voortgevaaren, ook door geheel Europa alle 
heilsaame Kennissen, Weetenschappen, goede Konsten, Deugden ende Rijkdommen der 
Menschen, jaa de Mensche selfs in getaale, verminderd staan te werden; Eeven gelijk wy 
dat nu in Moscovien, Griekenland, Turkien, Persien, Indien, &c. zien; ten zy God almagtig 
sulks wonderlik verhoede.”
188 See Machiavelli, Discorsi I.10, p. 34–35.
189 Milton, Defence of the People of England and Second Defence, in Idem, Areopagitica 
and Other Political Writings, 148, 324. Cf. on absolutist theories that equally emphasized 
the difference between monarchy and tyranny Wolfgang Weber, “ ‘What a Good Ruler 
Should Not Do’: Theoretical Limits of Royal Power in European Theories of absolutism, 
1500–1700,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 26, 4 (1995), 897–915.
190 Politike Discoursen II.V.10, p.145: “… dat sy nog beeter zijn, als daar een Monarch abso-
lutelik, en sonder eenige vreese, regeerd.”
191 Politike Weeg-schaal I.III.2–7, based on De Perefixe and Fajardo, and on the survey in 
Jean Pinson de La Martinière, Estat et gouvernement de France, of which numerous edi-
tions were published throughout the 1650s.
yet another Century, then also in the whole of Europe all salutary 
Knowledge, Sciences, good Arts, Virtues and Riches of the People, indeed the 
People itself in number, will be diminished, just like we see it now in 
Muscovy, Greece, Turkey, Persia, India, &c., unless God almighty would for-
bid it miraculously.187
De la Court’s pessimism stems from the crucial claim that there is in due 
course no fundamental difference between an overtly despotic monarchy 
such as the ottoman Sultanate and a monarchy that is checked by laws 
and constitutional contract. This assertion involves a significant depar-
ture from the conventional republican credo that a king who respects the 
law is not the same as a tyrant. For Machiavelli, the Roman emperors who 
lived sotto le leggi deserved at least a bit of praise,188 while Milton made 
sure to deny “that all kings are tyrants”. “as much as a good man differs 
from a bad”, Milton insisted, “so much, do I maintain, that a king differs 
from a tyrant”.189 Yet for the brothers De la Court, this distinction between 
monarchy and tyranny fails because it does not take into account the 
baseness of human nature. They acknowledge that monarchical govern-
ment under the law may be slightly better than a state “where a Monarch 
rules absolutely and without fear”, but it is still a government based on the 
principle of a single ruler, who is human and who will therefore necessar-
ily try to free himself from the reins of the law.190 The recent history of 
France, Spain, and England – the standard examples of pure monarchy in 
the academic politica – was for the De la Courts a case in point of this 
predictable fate.191
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192 See P.G. Hoftijzer, “The English Book in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Republic,” 
in Hellinga et al. (eds.), Bookshop of the World, 89–107, and cf. Marika Keblusek, “The Exile 
Experience: Royalist and anglican Book Culture in the Low Countries (1640–1660),” in 
Ibidem, 151–158.
193 Joannis Miltons Engelsmans verdedigingh des gemeene volcks van Engelandt, tegens 
Claudius sonder naem alias Salmasius Konicklijke Verdedigingh [1651]. The library of Pieter 
de la Court van der Voort held this edition: Library, fol. 32.
194 See Milton, Defence of the People of England, esp. 105. For Milton’s intentions to con-
vince the Dutch, cf. Worden, Literature and Politics, 202–203.
195 Quoted in H. Scherpbier, Milton in Holland. A Study in the Literary Relations of 
England and Holland before 1730 (PhD dissertation university of amsterdam, 1933), 6, 13.
196 See e.g. Vondel’s poem “op den Vader-moort in Groot-Britanie,” in Werken, vol. V: 
476. on Dutch public opinion about Cromwell, see Daniël Grosheide, Cromwell naar het 
oordeel van zijn Nederlandse tijdgenoten (amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche uitgevers 
Maatschappij, 1951).
England is thus unequivocally classified as a monarchy, which may 
seem surprising given the English republican experiment of the 1650s. 
Revealingly, the brothers De la Court remained largely silent about 
the fate of the English Commonwealth. apart from De la Court’s letter 
to Harrington of New Year’s Eve 1672 and the manuscript reference to 
Harrington’s Oceana, there is no direct evidence that the brothers were 
familiar with English republican thought. This can be explained by the 
fact that few English publications were available on the Dutch market, 
while Dutch enthusiasm for the English republican experiment was from 
the outset rather meagre.192 of all contemporary English republican writ-
ings, only Milton’s Defensio pro populo Anglicano, published in 1651 in 
reply to the Leiden academic Claudius Salmasius, was disseminated 
widely in the Dutch Republic, both in its Latin version and in French and 
Dutch translations.193 Milton indeed wrote this treatise with an interna-
tional audience in mind, and he frequently addressed the Dutch directly.194 
Nevertheless, his Dutch audience remained rather reserved about Milton’s 
endeavour to justify the establishment of the English Commonwealth. 
While Isaac Vossius, the son of the rhetorical theorist, stressed that he 
“had expected nothing of such quality from an Englishman”, another 
scholar, Nicolaas Heinsius (the former schoolmate of De la Court) aptly 
summarized the general Dutch sentiment by arguing “not so much that a 
bad cause has been well pleaded by Milton as that Scribonius [i.e. 
Salmasius] has pleaded most abominably the cause of the unfortunate 
King”.195 The execution of Charles I had met with widespread condemna-
tion in the Dutch Republic – the Dutch, after all, had abjured but never 
decapitated their king in the days of the Revolt – and for all his zeal, 
Milton could not significantly change that attitude.196 other important 
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197 Revealingly, the only work of Nedham translated into Dutch was his anti-French 
pamphlet Christianissimus christianandus (amsterdam, 1678).
198 Politike Weeg-schaal I.I.32, p. 157–158.
199 Nedham, Excellencie, 155: “… onely the name King was expelled, but not the thing” 
(referring to the Tarquins).
200 Politike Weeg-schaal I.II.7, p. 256: “Zulks dit gezeegende, vrugtbare landt, ook met 
hondert jaaren vreede, en zoo veel oorlogs onder alle de nabuuren, moet werden gelooft, zoo 
laag gebleeven te zijn, alleen door de Monarchaale regeering.” See also the remarks on 
England in Politike Discoursen I.II.9, I.II.26, and Sinryke Fabulen, 725, which refers to 
Thomas Smith, De republica anglorum, published in the ‘Republics’ series of Elzevier.
201 Aanwysing I.22, p. 99, and see De la Court’s letter to Harrington discussed in the 
Introduction above.
writings in defence of the republican regime in England, from the news-
books and treatises of Nedham to Harrington’s Oceana, were never pub-
lished in the Netherlands, let alone translated into Dutch.197
This absence of English sources partly explains why the De la Courts 
had so little to say about the English Commonwealth. Yet perhaps a more 
important reason for their relative silence is that the English revolution 
and Cromwell’s eventual supremacy offered the brothers an example of 
“mutatio tyranni, non tyrannidis ablatio”. as they insisted when discussing 
monarchical rule: “We must not take away the name King, but the thing 
King.”198 This phrase, which vaguely echoes a comparable saying of 
Nedham,199 reveals that the supremacy of Cromwell and the eventual 
Restoration were for the De la Courts a sign that the English common-
wealth was no true republic, but rather the same monarchy in different 
guise. The brothers maintained that England’s violent past proves that 
even when a monarch is balanced by a powerful parliament, political 
upheaval is all too common. Therefore, “this blessed, fertile country”, even 
though it never experienced similar warfare as continental Europe, “has 
still remained so lowly only because of the Monarchical government”.200 It 
was clear to the De la Courts that the English, though doing their best to 
compete with the Dutch, would never be able to accomplish the same 
mercantile success as a truly free commercial commonwealth.201
Having thus disposed of England as yet another paradigm of tyranny, 
the brothers De la Court continue to discuss the distinct type of polity 
that is not subjected by a hereditary monarchy but by a ruler who is cho-
sen ad vitam. The subjects in such a state probably fare better than those 
living under the yoke of absolutism, yet they are still dependent on the 
passionate whims of one man. Following a commonplace in Florentine 
political thought from Machiavelli to Guicciardini, the De la Courts dis-
cuss two examples of such “Monarchs in fieri”: the Papal States, which 
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202 Politike Weeg-schaal I.IV.4–6, p. 307–308: “… minder Slavernye en Monarchen in Fieri 
… in allen manieren behoorde te verfoejen en te verdelgen … die Sarrasinise Republik, sy 
was soo monstrueus, dat men die behoorde te smooren.” Cf. Machiavelli, Principe XIX, p. 
136–137, and the description of the demise of the Mamluk Sultanate in Francesco 
Guicciardini, La historia d’Italia (Venice, 1567) XIII, p. 647–648.
203 For a modern edition of Joos van Ghistele’s travel account, see ambrosius Zeebout, 
Tvoyage van Mher Joos van Ghsitele, ed. R.J.G.a.a. Gaspar (Hilversum: Verloren, 1998).
204 Politike Weeg-schaal I.IV.6, p. 308: “… dat de Republiken voorsien met een Hooft, ad 
vitam, eenige magt in den Oorlog hebbende, waarlik Monarchien zijn, ofte werden.”
205 Ibidem I.IV.1–2.
“should be loathed and eradicated”, and the Mamluk Sultanate in medie-
val Egypt and Syria, in their words “the Saracen Republic that was so mon-
strous that it should be smothered”.202 The De la Courts’ version of the 
history of the Mamluks, based in particular on the fifteenth-century travel 
account of the Flemish nobleman Joos van Ghistele, discusses in detail 
the procedures of the election of the sultan, and it stresses that the regime 
was exceptionally beneficial for Mediterranean trade.203 But in spite of 
these positive qualities, the Mamluks remained under the domination of 
one ruler. Therefore they merely exemplified “lesser Slavery”, for “Republics 
provided with a Head ad vitam who has any Military power, are truly 
Monarchies, or become so”.204 overall, then, the extended discussion of all 
various guises of monarchical rule, from the ottoman Empire to the 
Mamluk Sultanate, involves a clear rhetorical strategy: to assert that any 
form of monarchy, no matter how moderate or balanced, necessarily 
involves servitude. The purpose of this strategy is of course obvious, and 
indeed, the Politike Weeg-schaal explicitly classifies Holland under the 
Stadholders as one of the monarchies in fieri.205
The Dutch Republic: Lion or Ass?
The precise intention of this move becomes clear in the context of the 
Dutch political debate on the position of the Stadholder in the years fol-
lowing the failed coup d’état by William II and the subsequent establish-
ment of the regime of ‘True Liberty’. Towards the end of the 1650s the 
debate between the supporters of the House of orange and those who 
defended the status quo remained fundamentally undecided. on one 
side, the miscellaneous front of orangists propagated the mixed republi-
can regime balanced by a Stadholder, while De Witt and his allies main-
tained in reply that the principle of non-hereditary offices prolonged the 
time-honoured Batavian model. The brothers De la Court attempted to 
move beyond this stalemate by arguing that any form of single rule within 
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206 For a comprehensive overview of the orangist ideology that the De la Courts argued 
against, see Stern, Orangism.
207 Politike Weeg-schaal I.III.9, p. 261–263: “Vervloekt zy des Menschen naam in der eeu-
wigheit die willens en weetens in zijn vry Vaderlant, na de Monarchaale regeering de eerste 
treede geeft, want alle anderen moeten noodzakelik volgen; (primas dominandi spes in 
arduo, ubi sis ingressus adesse studia & ministros. C. Tacitus.)” The suggestive quote is from 
Tacitus’ description of Sejanus, confidant of Tiberius, in Annals IV.7.
208 Ibidem, 261–263 (not yet in the first edition): “Dog indien eenige Liefhebber der 
Vryheit, van meeninge zijn … dat de weg ter Slavernie en Monarchale regeeringe zo steil 
niet is, of dat men in de selve wel eenige treeden geven, en dan nog blijven staan kan; zo 
gelieven de selven te gedenken, dat iemant die op den eersten trap is om sig Heer der 
a republican constitution, hereditary or not, undermines the harmony 
within the body politic and ultimately brings about its demise. Thus 
emerges their radical assertion that, no matter how moderate or bal-
anced, any monarchical figure is essentially a tyrant. In order to vindicate 
this claim, the brothers departed from both the conventional aristotelian 
emphasis on the tripartite mixed regime and from the Batavian model of 
Grotius and instead turned to the binary opposition of liberty versus ser-
vitude. Heavily equipped with this republican language of liberty, the De 
la Courts entered the Dutch rhetorical battlefield to assail the orangist 
positions and thus win over the middle ground in the debate.206
This verbose attack starts in the first edition of the Politike Weeg-schaal 
with a decided yet still relatively cautious attempt to persuade those who 
doubt the risks involved in appointing a Stadholder. Following the 
detailed survey of all the examples of monarchical tyranny, this attempt 
centres on the message that if one man is appointed as a Stadholder, 
Holland sets foot on a stairway to servitude. as the De la Courts insist: 
“Damned for eternity be the name of the Man who knowingly gives in his free 
Fatherland the first step to the Monarchical government, for all other steps 
will follow necessarily”.207 In his later revision, De la Court then adds more 
force to this statement with a warning to those “Lovers of Liberty” who 
think “that the road to Servitude and Monarchical government is steep 
enough to give away some steps”. Directly addressing these middle groups 
who had not been convinced by the anti-orangist argument of De Witt, 
De la Court stresses that “someone who is on the first step to make himself 
Lord of the Republic” will easily obtain the favour of the military and the 
“ignorant Rabble”, and thus eventually command an indomitable alliance 
of anti-establishment sentiments. “and therefore”, De la Court concludes, 
“it is the truth that the liberty of a Republic can only remain intact by cau-
tiously taking care not to put anyone, under whatever lovely name or cover, 
on the lowest first step of exceptional power”.208
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Republike te konnen maken … het onwetende Graaw … En dienvolgende zo is waaragtig, 
dat de vryheid eener Republike niet kan werden staande gehouden, dan met sig sorgvuldiglik 
te wagten, iemand onder wat lieffelike naam en dekmantel het zy, te setten op de minste 
eerste trede van uitsteekende magt.”
209 Ibidem, “Inleyding,” p. 2: “ … die wreede Capitain Generaal der Roomse republike 
Tiberius.” Similar references to Caesar, augustus and Tiberius e.g. in Ibidem I.IV.1, p. 280; 
I.IV.2, p. 293; II.VI.3, p. 503; and Sinryke Fabulen, 655. Aanwsying II.1, p. 211, compares 
Stadholder Frederik Hendrik to augustus through a telling quote from the opening lines of 
Tacitus, Annals I.2.
210 See esp. Politike Weeg-schaal I.III.10–11, and Politike Discoursen I.III.11. Cf. Machiavelli, 
Discorsi I.40, III. 28.
211 Aanwysing II.12, p. 338–341.
212 Ibidem, “Voor-reeden,” sig. **2v.: “… dat noit eenig Land in soo groote slavernye, als 
Holland gedurende, ofte onder de Dienst ende de regeeringe der welgemelde Princen van 
oranjen, geweest zy.” References to the salvation of liberty by the premature death of 
William II e.g. in Ibidem, sig. *****v.; I.25, p. 130; III.1, p. 417; III.4, p. 474.
one of these ‘lovely names’ that De la Court had in mind was the title 
of Captain-General, the office of commander-in-chief over the Republic’s 
armed forces which traditionally belonged to the Stadholder. The military 
command was one of the crucial issues in the Dutch political debate since 
many, and not only the committed orangists, claimed the necessity to 
appoint a single supreme military leader to protect the country. The De la 
Courts suggestively undermine this claim. again and again, they subtly 
hint to the implications of appointing a Captain-General by calling 
respectively Caesar, augustus and Tiberius “the Captain-General of the 
Roman Republic”.209 other passages and fables, drawing largely on 
Machiavelli and Boccalini, insist with similar meaningful obliqueness 
that the reputation and authority granted to a military leader open up the 
gates to tyranny.210
These passionate but still implicit references to the dangers of appoint-
ing a Stadholder or a Captain-General become much more overt in the 
Interest van Holland and especially in the revised version of the work, the 
Aanwysing, published two years after the signing of the Perpetual Edict 
that formally abolished the office of the Stadholder. In this new context, 
De la Court markedly increases the bluntness of his anti-orangist assault, 
extensively quoting from the text of the Edict to substantiate his views.211 
First, he maintains with much hyperbole “that never any Country has been 
in such great servitude as Holland during or under the Service and Rule of 
the Princes of orange”. This assertion is further elaborated throughout 
the work. until 1650, De la Court repeatedly insists, Holland suffered under 
the monarchical yoke of the Stadholders, and only God’s intervention 
prevented a life in eternal slavery with the sudden death of William II.212 
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213 Aanwysing II.12, p. 342: “… sonder sig als voordeesen genoodsaakt te vinden, naar 
eenes Mans sin en voorpijpen, te moeten spreeken, singen, en dansen.”
214 See Politike Weeg-schaal I.IV.2, Aanwsying I.25, and the entirety of Historie der grave-
like reeegering.
215 See e.g. Onwederleggelycke bewys-redenen daer door betoont wort, dat de Vereenighde 
Nederlanden, alleen door Godts voorsieninge ende der Princen van Orangien beleyt, van 
Spaensche jock, ende slavernije vrij gemaeckt zijn (Willemstad, 1663).
216 Politike Weeg-schaal I.IV.2, p. 289–290: “… een veel onverdraageliker Slavernie,” fol-
lowing a quote from Fajardo, Idea, symb. 78.
217 Aanwysing II.11, p. 323: “… of deese Landen onder den Dienst der Nassowsen, 
ofte onder de Heerschappye der oostenrijkers, in hardere slavernye waren geweest?” 
The question is based on a verse in Latin, borrowed from aitzema, Saken van Staet 
en Oorlogh, vol. VII, 809: “Servivi auriacis famulis, dominisque Philippis: dic mihi condi-
tio  durior utra fuit?” – to which aitzema tellingly adds that the difference between 
‘auriacis’ (i.e. the Princes of orange) and ‘austriacis’ (the Habsburgs) consists merely of 
the letters ‘st’.
Thus began the period of True Liberty, which De la Court, unlike De Witt, 
does not characterize as the absence of hereditary power but as the inex-
istence of any arbitrary domination – the possibility to lead a peaceful life 
in accordance with the law “without being forced, like before, to speak, 
sing, and dance to the piping and will of one Man”.213
a number of rhetorical moves substantiate this assertion that Holland 
under the rule of the Stadholders was not a true republic but merely a 
monarchy in disguise. a first move intends to show that the Princes of 
orange inherited a long tradition of monarchical imperiousness of the 
Counts of Holland – a direct confutation of the orangist claim that the 
Stadholders upheld a time-honoured Batavian heritage of well-balanced 
government.214 a second move then involves a refutation of another 
standard element of the orangist republican credo: the view that the 
Dutch Republic had gained its independence thanks to the prudence and 
guidance of the various Stadholders in the war against Spain.215 The De la 
Courts daringly turn this conventional image upside down through a rhe-
torical redescription of the role of William the Silent, the pater patriae. 
First, they hint with a quote from the Spanish diplomat Fajardo (that is, 
from the side of the former enemy), that William the Silent only pre-
tended to fight for liberty but in fact deliberately caused upheaval and 
thus established a “much more unbearable Servitude” than before.216 Then, 
in the Aanwysing, De la Court intensifies this move with the rhetorical 
question whether “these Countries have been in harsher slavery under 
the Service of the Princes of Nassau, or under the Domination of the 
Habsburgs?” of course, no answer follows, yet the suggestion that there is 
no fundamental difference speaks for itself.217
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218 Ibidem III.1, p. 391–392: “… Souverain, Monarch van dien Staat … ende dat men dien-
volgende soodanige Regeringe niet meer eene Republike, maar eene Monarchye te weesen 
in practik ende inder daad, behoorde te seggen.” The quotes from Lucan that illustrate this 
passage are from Pharsalia III.145–147, and X.407.
219 Ibidem III.7, p. 517–518: “… door het maaken van een Stadhouder ofte een Capitein 
Generaal, ad vitam … de naam ende de schijn eener Vrye Republike in seer korte Jaaren 
soude verliesen, ende veranderen in eene baarblijkelijke Monarchale ofte Eenhoofdige 
Regeeringe … waarelik een Land sonder Inwoonders, een Lighaam sonder Ziele, ende 
eene beklaaglijke waaterpoel van onuitspreekelike ellenden, soude weesen.”
220 Politike Weeg-schaal I.IV.2, p. 294: “… dat zy meer als eenige volkeren des werelds schi-
jnen verweezen te zijn, gelijk als Eezels te arbeiden, en distelen te eeten, om te mogen leeven.”
In this way, De la Court boldly depicts the Dutch Stadholderate as 
merely a rippling reflection of the Habsburg monarchy. In a next move, he 
then openly argues that the appointment of a Captain-General is no lesser 
evil than to empower a Stadholder. With a telling quote from Lucan’s 
Pharsalia, De la Court asserts that a man who commands the military has 
all the means and reputation to overrule any opposition. This military 
commander should therefore be considered noting but a “Sovereign, a 
Monarch of that State … and accordingly, such a Government should no 
longer to be called a Republic, but a Monarchy in practice and in fact”. The 
fate of the Roman Republic, again illustrated by a quote from Lucan, 
proves that only the shadow of liberty remains when men bow to such 
military might.218 under a Stadholder or a Captain-General Holland would 
equally “lose the name and the appearance of a Free Republic in a very 
short time, and change into an evident Monarchical or Single-headed 
Government”. Merchants and commerce would then inevitably flee the 
country, and the deplorable result would be “truly a Country without 
Inhabitants, a Body without a Soul, and a lamentable fountain of unspeak-
able misery”.219
all the different threads of the argumentation of the De la Courts come 
together in the final and most important rhetorical move against the 
orangists: the overarching claim that the particular interest of the 
Stadholder cannot possibly coincide with the general interest of Holland 
at large. Holland, based on trade, needs liberty, yet a Stadholder will only 
enhance servitude. Like any monarch, he will enforce large taxes to 
weaken his subjects and to finance his decadent court. This is what the 
Princes of orange have done in the past, as a result of which the Dutch 
“more than any people in the world seem to be sentenced to labour like Asses 
and to eat thistles in order to subsist”.220 Such hyperbole serves the obvious 
purpose of contradicting the orangist argument that Dutch commerce 
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221 Aanwysing III.IV, p. 476: “…dat de koopmanschap en schipvaart, &c. hier deselve 
ondergang, als in alle andere Monarchale Landen, onderworpen zijn geweest.” The chap-
ter builds heavily on passages from De Witt’s Deductie. Cf. as well Ibidem, “Voor-reeden,” 
sig. *****, and II.1, p. 236–237.
222 Welvaren 64, p. 143–144: “… van alle vrije Staeten, insonderheid die op Geleerdheid 
en Koopmanschap sijn gefondeerd, dat voor deselve grooter rampsalicheid niet kan 
werden bedaght, als van eene vrije Stad ofte Republijck te vervallen tot een Monarchale 
Regeeringh, daer gemeenelick alle geleerdheid, konsten, deughden, Rijkdom ende koop-
manschap vernietight, ja de ingesetenen verslonden werden als brood.”
223 Aanwsying III.3, p. 444–449: “… wiens Inwooners leefden in volkome rust en seeker-
heid, onder eene Vrye Republike, sonder Opper-hoofd ofte Koning over sig te hebben … 
alsoo de Ingeseetenen onder deese Monarchale ofte Princelike Regeeringe haare rijkdom-
men en wetenschappen niet souden konnen gerustelik besitten … En dus siet men, dat 
deese twee Republiken haare schipvaart ende koopmanschap, door geene oorlogen ofte 
aard-beevingen … hebben verlooren; maar dat sy deselve alleen door het verlies van haare 
Vrye Regeeringe zijn quijt geworden.”
had prospered under the rule of the Stadholders. De la Court develops this 
argument further with a meticulous overview of the economic policies of 
all Stadholders from William the Silent to William II, concluding that had 
the last Prince of orange not died so suddenly, “commerce and navigation 
would have been subjected here to the same demise as in all other 
Monarchical Countries”.221 In short,
for all free States, and especially for those founded on Knowledge and 
Commerce, no greater disaster can be thought of than to fall from a free City 
or Republic to a Monarchical Government, where commonly all knowledge, 
arts, virtues, Wealth and commerce are destroyed, and the Inhabitants 
devoured like bread.222
To substantiate this assertion that a commercial commonwealth cannot 
persist under monarchical domination, De la Court enumerates a range of 
illustrious trading cities of the past that lost their prosperity along with 
their liberty, such as the Phoenician cities of Sidon and Tyre. ancient 
Sidon, “whose Inhabitants lived in complete peace and certainty under a 
Free Republic without having a Supreme Head or King over them”, is now 
deprived of its former wealth under ottoman domination, “since the 
Inhabitants cannot peacefully possess their riches and sciences under this 
Monarchical or Princely Government”. Tyre was struck by a similar fate, 
and thus “these two Republics lost their navigation and commerce not by 
Wars or Earthquakes … but by the loss of their Free Government”.223 
Further examples of this essential link between liberty and commerce 
abound: Carthage, athens, Rhodes, exemplary republics which all lost 
their trade and liberty to the Romans; the republics of the Italian 
Renaissance, like Pisa, Florence and Milan, which “when they obtained 
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224 Ibidem, 458: “… de Hof-houding des Monarchs ofte sijns Stadhouders bekoomen 
hebbende, seer in koopmanschap afgenoomen zijn, geduurende de Monarchale 
Regeeringe.”
225 Ibidem III.7, p. 517: “… gelijk als Adams eerste sonde.”
226 Politike Weeg-schaal I.III.8, p. 258: “… is het een bespottelike dwaas- en een vervloekte 
dolligheyd, ofte een verfoeijelijke landverraderij, in zijn vry Vaderland eenig Hooft, hoedanig 
het zy, over de Politie, Justitie, ofte Militie in te voeren.” Cf. Ibidem I.IV.1, p. 282, for the same 
charge of high treason against the orangists.
227 Ibidem I.IV.2, p. 298 (not yet in the first edition): “Gy bastaart-kinderen uit den 
Stamme Juda! die zoo langen tijd een Leew in uwen schild hebd derven voeren, wisch uit, 
wisch uit, dien ouden bloedverwigen Leew, wiens gy in aller manieren onwaardig zijt. En als 
waaragtige kinderen van Issaschar, soo voer in teegendeel tot u welvoegend wapen, een sterk 
gebeende Eezel neder-gedrukt onder eenen dubbelden last.”
228 Sinryke Fabulen, 160: “… dat een Eezel sig niet meer dan eens stoot aan den selfden 
steene.” For a similar rhetorical move, see Ibidem, 98.
the Court of a Monarch or his Stadholder much decreased in commerce 
during the Monarchical Government”; and finally, at the end of the list, 
the Dutch Republic itself, which had a narrow escape yet faces an inse-
cure future.224
all these examples issue an unmistakable warning to those who argue 
in favour of a Stadholder. Their crime, De la Court stresses daringly, is 
“similar to Adam’s first sin”, with the same everlasting catastrophic conse-
quences for posterity.225 The orangists who boast that they are the true 
patriots are in fact traitors to their country, because “it is a ridiculous stu-
pidity and a damned folly, or detestable treason against the state, to install 
in one’s free Fatherland any Head, however it be, over Politics, Justice, or the 
Military”.226 In a final rhetorical move, De la Court addresses the support-
ers of the Stadholder directly in a potent exclamation that merges biblical 
imagery with biting wit:
You bastards from the Tribe of Judah! You who have dared to carry for so long 
a Lion in your escutcheon, erase, erase that old blood-coloured Lion, whom you 
are unworthy in every way. And as true children of Issachar, carry instead in 
your decorous escutcheon a strongly boned ass oppressed under a double 
burden.227
In 1672, the Dutch lion was indeed to show its true nature. Some thirteen 
years later, in his swansong the Sinryke Fabulen, De la Court lamented its 
fate in the implicit yet well-understood terms of the proverb “wherever an 
ass falls, there will he never fall again”: in spite of the fact that God’s inter-
vention in 1650 had freed Holland from a tyrant, the Dutch appointed a 
new one in 1672.228 once more, De la Court repeated his anti-Stadholder 
mantra, stressing “how great Servitude or miserable condition it is to live 
in a Country where the well or ill-being, yes the Life or Death of all 
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229 Ibidem, 361: “… hoe groote Slaavernie ofte ellendige stand het is, te woonen in eenen 
Lande, daar het wel- ofte quaalik-vaaren, jaa Leeven ofte Dood aller Ingeseetenen eenes 
Lands, hangd van de gonsten ofte afgonsten eenes eenigen Mensche.” Cf. also Ibidem, 46, 
143–144.
230 Ibidem, 315, 585: “… eene plegtiglik afgekondigde Vergeetelheid”; “Want die wonden 
te vers zijn om oopen gekrabt te mogen werden.”
231 Ibidem, 185: “… dat het waarelik de beste Regeeringe is, daar de Regenten ende de 
meeste Ingeseetenen, haar Eigen-Interest ende Welvaaren niet vinden konnen, dan met 
het Welvaaren van het Gemeen, te besorgen.”
232 Cicero, De re publica, ed. and trans. Clinton Walker Keyes (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard university Press, 1928) I.XXV–XXVI.39–42, p. 64–66.
Inhabitants of the Country, depends on the favours or disfavours of 
one single Man”.229 He could not say more, he insisted, for under the 
new regime of William III, “a solemnly proclaimed Oblivion” forbade the 
remembrance of the near past, “since those wounds are too fresh to be 
scratched open”.230 Now was no time for parrhèsia, De la Court realized, 
yet his message remained obvious. The Dutch commercial common-
wealth had stood at crossroads, one way leading to prosperity-in-liberty, 
the other to decadence-in-servitude. It had chosen the latter.
 Towards a Merchant Democracy
Republic: A Sovereign Assembly in Name & in Fact
To summarize, the fundamental principle that underlies the political 
thought of the brothers De la Court is the statement that “it is truly the 
best Government where the Rulers and most of the Inhabitants cannot 
find their Self-Interest and Welfare but with furthering the welfare of the 
Community”.231 This harmony between private and public interests can 
never be sustained under monarchical domination, for any form of single 
rule necessarily undermines the common good. The De la Courts’ alterna-
tive is a republican government that fosters liberty instead of servitude, 
but the question remains what kind of republic exactly meets this crite-
rion. In short: what is a true republic according to the De la Courts?
In early-modern political thought, the term ‘republic’ was character-
ized by an elementary ambiguity. originally, following Cicero, the words 
res publica stood for any kind of legitimate government, monarchical or 
not, as opposed to tyranny.232 This use of the term remained widespread 
throughout the seventeenth century, when ‘republic’ was often employed 
in the same neutral terms as its literal translation ‘commonwealth’, devoid 
of any non-monarchical connotation. In the academic politics as taught 
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233 Boxhorn, Institutiones I.II.1, p. 8: “Respublica est corpus multorum ad agnoscendam 
ejusdem Imperii Majestatem, iisdem legibus, omnium & singulorum utilitatis causa, 
imbutum.”
234 Cf. arnisaeus, De republica II.I.1, and Werdenhagen, Politica generalis II.I.5.
235 Boxhorn, Institutiones I.II Exp., p. 10: “Respublica quam hic definimus pro quovis 
imperio usurpatur, etiam pro eo, cui unus praeest, si modo ille saluti obedientum consu-
lat. at quia saepe is aut publica privatis postponit, aut illecebris voluptatum rapitur, aut ad 
tyrannidem inclinans tanto plus infer damni, quanto potentior est, obtinuit, ut Respubl. 
Monarchiae fere opponatur.”
236 Machiavelli, Principe I, p. 1: “Tutti li stati, tutti e dominii che hanno avuto et hanno 
imperio sopra li uomini, sono stati e sono o republiche o principati.”
237 See the painstaking but rather unstructured overview in Wolfgang Mager, “Republik,” 
in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. V: 549–651, and cf. the more concise and more useful 
discussion in Hankins, “Exclusivist Republicanism.”
at Leiden, a res publica stood for the political order in which a body of 
individuals obtains the status of subjects under a single overarching cen-
tral authority. Boxhorn, for example, defined a ‘republic’ very generically 
as “a body of many established for the advantage of all and every individ-
ual to acknowledge the authority of the government over that body by 
certain laws”.233 other representatives of academic politica, from arnisaeus 
to Werdenhagen, defined ‘republic’ in largely comparable terms.234
Yet significantly, Boxhorn added an explanation to his definition of 
‘republic’ indicating that the term had obtained a further gradation of 
meaning. Boxhorn stressed that his definition applied to every sort of gov-
ernment, including that of a single ruler, but because such a ruler “often 
puts public after private, or is ensnared by the temptations of lust, or 
when inclining to tyranny inflicts the more damage the more powerful he 
is, therefore it occurs that res publica is contrasted with Monarchy”.235 
With these words, Boxhorn neatly captured a second meaning of the term 
‘republic’ that had crept slowly but steadily into the political discourse of 
the various European languages. The roots of this altered meaning lay in 
Renaissance Italy, particularly in Florence, which, as a free city-state ruled 
not by one but by many, claimed to embody the true res publica in opposi-
tion to a polity governed by a monarch. a crucial text in the establishment 
of this opposition was Machiavelli’s Principe, which in the opening lines 
famously subdivides all states as either republiche or principati.236 In the 
course of the sixteenth-century, this non-monarchical meaning of the 
term ‘republic’ became common in Italian, and throughout the next cen-
tury it spread over the rest of Europe, challenging the dominance of the 
established Ciceronian understanding.237
This second definition of ‘republic’ as a polity that is opposed to a mon-
archy clearly dominates the work of the brothers De la Court. Two crucial 
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238 Politike Discoursen II.V.4, p. 105: “Dat een Republijk beeter is als een Monarchie.” 
Ibidem II.V.9, p. 131: “De beste Monarchale Regeering, is den Onderdaanen soo goed niet, als 
de geringste Republikse Regeering.”
239 Aanwysing III.1, p. 388: “Naamentlik, met den woorde Republike en Republikse 
Regeerders versta ik, niet alleen soodanige Staat, waar in seekere Souveraine Vergadering 
alle Regt ende Kragt heeft, om alle resolutien, ordren en wetten te nemen, te maaken, ofte 
te breeken … maar ik verstaa daar meede ook soodanige Staat, waar in eenige 
Vergaaderinge, schoongenomen sonder eenig Regt, de Kragt heeft alle haare resolutien, 
ordren en wetten te doen gehoorsamen.”
240 Ibidem, 389: “… Regt dat sonder kragt gansch ydel is, ende daar geweld komt altijd 
ophouden moet.”
chapters in the Politike Discoursen unequivocally claim “That a Republic is 
better than a Monarchy”, even that “The best Monarchical Government is 
not as good to the Subjects as the worst Republican Government”.238 Thus 
the brothers move beyond the cautious remark of their teacher Boxhorn, 
and they explicitly equate monarchy with tyranny and republic with lib-
erty. using the same Ciceronian language that opposes legitimate to 
tyrannical government, the De la Courts radically undermine the classical 
connotations of res publica by insisting that a monarchy is necessarily 
tyrannical and only a republic is truly legitimate.
a republic, then, is essentially “a State where no Man can dictate” – a 
state where the sovereignty is vested in an assembly of many, where 
the law governs all and where arbitrary domination by a single man is 
impossible. Yet this generic definition does not encompass the De la 
Courts’ concept of a republic in its entirety. as De la Court argues, a defi-
nition solely in terms of sovereign right is bound to be insufficient in a 
realm of de facto politics. He therefore insists that a republic not only 
entails “such a State, where a certain Sovereign Assembly has all the Right 
and Power to take, make or break resolutions, orders and laws … [but] 
also such as State, where a certain Assembly, even though without any 
Right, has the Power to have all its resolutions, orders and laws being 
obeyed”.239 In short, a true republic means the government by an assem-
bly that is not only sovereign in name, but also in fact. This contention 
stems from De la Court’s assertion that a state where a single man can 
usurp power without any right is effectively a monarchy. “Right is totally 
idle without force, and where violence comes it must always cease”, De la 
Court insists.240 The theoretical issue of the location and administration of 
sovereignty does not establish the main distinction between republics 
and monarchies – an important move away from the conventional 
Grotian defence of the States of Holland vis-à-vis the Stadholder. all that 
264 chapter four
241 Sinryke Fabulen, 107: “… in soodaanige Vergaaderinge, waarin, om het groot getal, 
ende de verscheidenheid der Leeden, eigen Interest ten naadeele des gemeenen welvaarens, 
niet konnende bejaagd ende verkreegen werden.”
242 Politike Weeg-schaal I.I.4, p. 33: “…in een vergaaderinge van eenige menschen in de 
Aristokratia of in een vergaaderinge aller menschen des bequaam zijnde in een Demokratia.” 
Cf. Boxhorn, Institutiones II.I.1, p. 257: “Inde Monarchia, in qua singuli; Aristocratia, in qua 
pauci; Democratia, in qua omnes praesunt.”
matters in reason of state politics is the actual ability to enforce one’s 
interest. a republic, consequently, is a polity where the government is in 
the hands of an assembly that has sufficient coercive power to ensure that 
the harmony of interests is not jeopardized by the ascendancy of one 
man; in short, “such an assembly where, for the large amount and 
the diversity of Members, self-Interest cannot be pursued and obtained at 
the expense of the common welfare”.241
Aristocracy & the Pitfalls of Paucity
What sort of assembly is best equipped for this task? In line with the 
conventions of academic politica, the brothers De la Court discuss two 
variations of republican government as alternatives to tyrannical monar-
chy: either aristocracy, basically defined as “an assembly of some people”, 
or democracy, “an assembly of all people capable”.242 In a clear rhetorical 
move to uphold the ethos of the objective, impartial guide through the 
labyrinth of politics, the Politike Weeg-schaal lists all the advantages and 
disadvantages of both aristocracy and democracy, and then continues to 
balance the particular merits of each specific form of government. Largely 
written by Johan and later modified and extended by Pieter de la Court, 
this overview clearly reveals the intricate and at times conflicting collabo-
ration between the two brothers.
Following a central claim advanced by Machiavelli, the De la Courts 
insist that in general, the advantage of a republican assembly lies in the 
plurality of its members. Mastering the art of speech, “many people can 
always hear, see, and know more than one”, while the competition 
between all members of an assembly will create “diligence and sincerity” 
as well as cautiousness. In a direct echo of Machiavelli’s dictum that “a 
people is more prudent, more stable and of better judgment than a 
prince”, the De la Courts conclude that
in an assembly of equally powerful Members, there is always a large variety of 
passions, which keep each other in check without insight of own benefit. 
Thus, when it comes to political matters, reason finds always more place in 
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243 Politike Weeg-schaal II.I.3, p. 320–321: “… dat veele menschen altijd meer hooren, 
zien en weeten konnen, als een … naarstigheid en opregtigheid … dat sig in een vergader-
inge van eevenmagtige Leeden, altijd een groote verscheidentheid van passien oopenbaard, 
die ook, zonder inzigt van eigen baat, malkanderen in den toom houden; zulks de reeden, 
in wettige vergaaderingen, omtrent politike zaaken, altijds meer plaatse vind als by een 
mensch, wiens verstand door de passien veeltijds verdoofd werd.” Cf. Machiavelli, Discorsi 
I.58, p. 126: “… un popolo è più prudente, piu stabile e di migliore giudizio che un principe 
… molte volte erra ancora un principe nelle sue proprie passoni, le quali sono molte più 
che quelle de’ popoli.”
244 Politike Weeg-schaal II.I.4, p. 327: “… niet alleen verscheidenheid van interest, maar 
ook van oordeel.”
245 Ibidem I.I.6, p. 35: “… een vergaadering van menschen, daar toe gebooren ofte 
verkooren, heeft te gebieden, en alle anderen buiten die vergaaderinge weezende te 
gehoorzaamen.” Cf. Burgersdijk, Idea oeconomicae et politicae II.XXII.1, p. 118: “aristocratia 
est status in quo excellentioribus aliquot, jus majestatis, & imperium in caeteris conces-
sum est.”
246 Politike Weeg-schaal II.II.2, p. 335: “… dat het regte Interest en welvaaren des Lands, 
door gemelde Leeden zeer wel kan worden begrepen, en dat een yder, die in ’t gemeen zijn 
eigen voordeel betragten kan, zoo veel in hem is, niet zal toelaaten, dat het Gemeen, en hy 
te gelijk schade lijde.”
legitimate assemblies than in one man, whose judgment is frequently 
stunned by the passions.243
In theory, therefore, the larger the assembly is, the better, because the 
plurality of members enhances competition between their passions, 
which eventually keeps a check on individual wrongdoing. Yet in  practice, 
such plurality may result in long deliberations and lack of decisiveness. 
Since the members of an assembly have “not only variety of interest but 
also of judgment”, the sovereign power might fall apart through intrigues 
and discord.244 Therefore, the crucial issue is of the optimum dimensions 
the governing assembly should assume in order to benefit from the advan-
tages of plurality without suffering under its disadvantages.
The first possibility is aristocracy, described in conventional aristotelian 
terms as a government “where an assembly of people, being born or cho-
sen thereto, has to command and all others outside of that assembly are 
to obey”.245 The fundamental advantage of this aristocratic ruling body lies 
in the eminence of its members, who can be expected to have enjoyed a 
good education and therefore will understand how to connect their self-
interest to “the right Interest and welfare of the Country”.246 Yet an aristoc-
racy also has numerous flaws, of which the De la Courts stress three in 
particular. First, if the members of an aristocratic assembly vote openly, 
they are liable to be manipulated by the strongest among them, who 
will then get hold of the “power and act of Government”. Thus, such aris-
tocracies, though “Republics in name”, will become “close to Monarchies 
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247 Ibidem II.II.3–5, p. 339, 344: “Maar dat de kragt en daad van Regeering, meest is by dat 
uitsteekend Lid … Republiken met naame; bij naast Monarchien in der daad.”
248 Ibidem II.II.6, p. 348: “Het derde grootste gebrek der Arsitokratike Regeeringe, bestaat 
in oligarchie, Dominatio Paucorum, stato da pochi … als de Leeden der souveraine verga-
deringe zoo weinig zijn.” Ibidem II.VI.5, p. 514: “… zoo zal in zoodanige Regeeringe altijd het 
interest der Regeerders voortgaan, ook tot nadeel van het gemeen.”
249 Machiavelli, Discorsi I.2, p. 11: “… gli ottimati con facilità diventano stato di pochi.”
250 Boxhorn, Institutiones I.3 Exp., p. 21, quotinq Tacitus, Annals VI.42.2. See also Ibidem 
II.V.11, II.VII.3.
251 See Politike Weeg-schaal II.V.1–11, and the analysis in Haitsma Mulier, Myth of Venice, 
147–157.
in fact”.247 Secondly, aristocratic assemblies are likely to fall into discord 
and factions. This happens particularly when guild masters are granted 
membership, for they can mobilize their entire profession to put pressure 
on the rest of the assembly. Finally, the third flaw of an aristocracy is that, 
since “the Members of the sovereign assembly are so few”, it runs the risk of 
becoming an “oligarchy, Dominatio Paucorum, stato da pochi [sic]”. The 
ultimate consequence is that “in such a Government the interest of the 
Rulers will always precede, also at the detriment of the common good”.248
With this assertion that an aristocracy is likely to lapse into either mon-
archy or oligarchy, the brothers De la Court adopt a standard refutation of 
a closed government of the few, echoing Machiavelli, who argued that a 
government of ottimati easily becomes a stato di pochi,249 and Boxhorn, 
who equally insisted that an aristocracy often changes into monarchy or 
into Tacitus’s paucorum dominatio.250 The De la Courts continue to dis-
cuss extensively how the advantages and disadvantages of aristocracy are 
revealed in the constitutions and republican practices of contemporary 
and historical examples of aristocratic government, from Venice and 
Genoa to Sparta and Rome. as Haitsma Mulier has shown in detail, when 
revising the Politike Weeg-schaal De la Court gave particular praise and 
attention to the republic of Genoa. In Genoa, according to De la Court, 
the large ruling councils and the constant rotation of office prevented the 
demise of true republican government.251 Yet Haitsma Mulier does not 
highlight that the reference to this international model clearly served to 
criticize the Dutch status quo, the oligarchic governing bodies in Leiden 
and Holland at large.
This criticism specifically involved a strong repudiation of the size of 
Leiden’s ruling council of forty, the veertigraad. In line with their general 
discussion of aristocratic government, the De la Courts argued that so 
small an assembly will not be able to resist the preponderance of one 
imperious member or the external pressure of guilds. as they insisted, it is 
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252 Welvaren 71, p. 153: “… dat oijt een Republijk hare Vrije Regeeringh heeft konnen 
staende houden tegen de gevallen des werelds soo van binnen, als van buijten met soo 
weinich leden als veertich.” This chapter refers explicitly to the examples of Sparta, Genoa 
and Lucca.
253 Ibidem 79, p. 170: “… dat de Regeeringh in soo een ongelijke heerschingh van soo 
weinigh menschen niet bestaen kan, menschelijcker wijse gesproocken.”
254 Politike Weeg-schaal II.II.6, p. 350: “… zoo is die disproportie, tussen Regeerders, en 
onderdaanen veel grooter geworden; en is te verzen dat die (Paucorum Dominatio) 
Heersching van weinig menschen, by verminderinge van neering, en welvaaren, by leedige 
en ongemakkelike onderdaanen, niet zal konnen werden lang gedragen.”
255 For a lucid overview of the oligarchic character of Dutch government and the formal 
and informal limits to civic participation in politics, see Henk van Nierop, “Popular 
Participation in Politics in the Dutch Republic,” in Peter Blickle, Resistance, Representation, 
and Community (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 272–290.
very improbable “that ever a Republic has been able to uphold its Free 
Government against the world’s incidents, both from the inside and from 
the outside, with as few members as forty”.252 In other words, a republican 
assembly that excludes a large part of the citizenry will easily fall prey to 
nepotism or succumb to one leader, who will then destroy republican lib-
erty. Therefore, the De la Courts concluded, it is “humanly impossible” 
that Leiden’s government would “subsist in such an unequal rule by so 
few people”.253 This same risk loomed large in most Dutch cities, for while 
the urban population had increased drastically in the seventeenth cen-
tury, the size of the ruling town councils had remained the same. all over 
Holland the “disproportion between Rulers and Subjects has become 
much larger” and consequently “that Rule by a few people (Paucorum 
Dominatio) will not be tolerated for a long time by the idle and uncom-
fortable Subjects in case the industry and the welfare decline”.254
The brothers De la Court thus argued that the closed urban aristocra-
cies of Holland ought to open up their ranks to comply with the changing 
demography and to preserve the lawful government vis-à-vis an insecure 
future. This contention involved a fundamental criticism of the political 
status quo in Holland under the De Witt regime.255 The De la Courts con-
tended that the Dutch aristocratic republican government in power was 
on the brink of lapsing into oligarchy and, sooner or later, into the monar-
chical domination by a Stadholder, because it did not represent the gen-
eral citizenry at large. This critical deviation from the dominant ideology 
of the establishment clashed openly with the views of De Witt himself in 
the months prior to the publication of the Interest van Holland. In the 
manuscript version of this treatise, De la Court argued that none of 
Holland’s citizens ought to be excluded from the government by laws: 
citizens from foreign descent should be granted the right to be elected to 
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256 The passage is published in Veegens, “Johan de Witt,” 45: “… een ijdele wind … soo 
weinig regeerders altijds wel sullen accordeeren om de vreemdelingen metter daad buiten 
te sluiten, ende dat voordeel aan hare familien liever als aan vreemden te laten.”
257 Ibidem, 54–56: “… soo en weet ik niet wat een oligarchie is, indien men die hier 
niet ziet.”
258 Aanwysing III.5, p. 494: “… de cordate directie van de vroome Regeerders in Holland.” 
The chapters based on De Witt’s concept are Interest, 29–30; Aanwysing III.5–6.
the urban councils. In a cynical mode, he then added that such a right, 
though beneficial in theory, would in practice only be “an idle wind”, 
since the “few rulers would always agree on excluding the foreigners in 
fact, and prefer to leave that privilege to their families instead of to stran-
gers”. This sarcastic remark, which clearly alluded to the nepotistic prac-
tices of the ruling regent families, was smothered by the censorious 
interference of De Witt himself, who erased it from the text with a fervent 
stroke of his aristocratic pen.256
In another passage, De la Court voiced his criticism of the powers-in-
being still more openly. Discussing the reasons why the Dutch Republic 
had not profited much more from its recently gained liberty, he argued 
that the existing government was, although much better than the rule by 
a Stadholder, still far from perfect, given that many judiciary offices were 
exercised for life by members of the elite families. as De la Court cried 
out: “I do not know what an oligarchy is if it cannot be seen here.” He then 
continued with a strong rebuttal of De Witt’s foreign policy, too bellicose 
in his eyes and only conducive to high taxes instead of commercial dili-
gence.257 on reading these lines, De Witt deleted the entire passage and 
replaced it with two large chapters which, on the basis of a concept writ-
ten by himself, justified in a densely informed prose the “resolute man-
agement by the pious Rulers in Holland”.258 Clearly, then, a simplistic 
classification of the brothers De la Court as mere propagandists of the De 
Witt regime is untenable. although the Interest van Holland was deployed 
as propaganda by De Witt cum suis, the De la Courts directed their criti-
cism not only against the Stadholderate but also against the closed ruling 
circles that maintained power among themselves through nepotism and 
patronage. What they did approve in the regime of De Witt was its new 
republican élan, yet their goal was not as much to support this regime as 
to transform it into a genuine government of True Liberty.
Democracy & the Pitfalls of Public Speech
The arguments that the De la Courts put forward against aristocracy 
spring from their assessment of the specific economic and political 
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259 Tacitus, Annals VI.42.2, quoted in this form (the original is vice versa) in Politike 
Weeg-schaal III.I.4, p. 530. The phrase is also quoted in Boxhorn, Institutiones I.3 Exp., p. 21.
260 Politike Weeg-schaal I.I.6, p. 35–36: “… daar alle menschen, die van nature wegen 
onder een anders voogdye niet zijn, als Vrouwen en Kinderen, magt hebben, om in een 
vergaadering te verschijnen, en aldaar met de meeste stemmen, wetten en Executeurs der 
zelven te maaken, aan de welken yeder mensch gehoorsaamheit schuldig is, by de ouden 
Demokratia genaamt.” Cf. Burgersdijk, Idea oeconomicae et politicae II.XXIII.1, p. 120–121: 
“Democratia est status, in quo civium vel omnium, vel magnae partis nomine, quidam ad 
tempus caeteris omnibus in universum & singulis imperant, & jus majestatis, summamque 
potestatem exercent.”
 situation in Holland at large and Leiden in particular, where the govern-
ing boards of the industrial halls, the university’s senate, and the city’s 
ruling council revealed the detriments of a closed oligarchy. The republi-
can examples of the classical past and the Italian present, from Rome to 
Genoa, provided an interpretative framework to grasp the significance 
of this Dutch reality. The example of ancient athens underlies the broth-
ers’ discussion of the second alternative of republican rule: democracy, or 
to use its more common early-modern phrasing, ‘popular government’. 
accord ing to the De la Courts, the contrast between aristocracy and 
democracy is best epitomized in a phrase from Tacitus that constantly 
recurs in their works: Dominatio paucorum regiae libidini propior, populi 
imperium juxta libertatem est, “while the rule of the few approaches 
closely to a king’s wantonness, a popular government stands near to 
liberty”.259
For the De la Courts, a true civil society that is established when people 
leave the state of nature must be such an imperium populi, based on the 
equality of all adult male contractors. They define this democracy, again 
in largely aristotelian terms, as the government
where all people who are by nature not under someone else’s custody, like 
Women and Children, have the power to appear in an assembly, and to 
issue laws there with the majority of votes, and to appoint the executives of 
those laws to whom every human has to pay obedience.260
or, more succinctly, a democracy is a “Popular State or Government where 
every Citizen has his share in the Government, so that these citizens, being 
assembled, together constitute the sovereign Government”. as I have 
argued in detail in the preceding chapter, the rationale of this popular 
government follows from the brothers’ depiction of the human condition. 
Democracy is the most natural form of government because “all people, 
loving their own welfare, also believe to be wise enough to know in what it 
consists”, and therefore they will never be satisfied with someone else 
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261 Politike Weeg-schaal III.I.1, p. 518–519: “… de Populare Staat ofte Regeering, daar yder 
Burger sijn deel sulks aan de Regeering heeft, dat de zelve, vergadert zijnde, met malkan-
deren de souveraine Regeering uit maken … dat alle menschen, haar eigen welvaaren 
beminnende, ook wjs genoeg meenen te zijn, om te weeten waar in het zelven bestaat.”
262 Ibidem III.I.4, p. 530: “… dat deese Populare Regeering op geen gewelt gefondeert, 
maar naturelik, redelik, en in zig zelven billik is.” De la Court’s addition is in the annotated 
edition in amsterdam university Library, Ms. XXV C41: “… dat alleen in de Democratie de 
perfecte regeering kan gevonden werden.”
263 Ibidem, 531–534: “… zulks niemants bequaamheit, of eergierigheit in deze Populare 
Regeering wert vrugteloos gemaakt … dat alle Burgers, die in kennisse, deugt, en rijkdom 
uitsteeken, daar door alleen eer tot Magistraats-persoonen zullen werden gekooren, 
zonder dat zy … door die uitsteekentheit hier gehaat en vervolgt, gelijk als in de aristokratike; 
of wel gedoot werden, gelijk als in Monarchale Regeeringen. Zulks een yder hier zijn uiter-
ste vlijt aanwend, om weetenschappen en goederen by een te vergaaderen.”
deciding on their wellbeing.261 at the same time, democratic rule is con-
fined to independent citizens only, and only male householders have the 
power to speak for themselves and thus fulfil the prime criterion of 
citizenship.
Does such a popular government maintain the advantages of plurality 
without suffering under its disadvantages? To answer this question, the 
Politike Weeg-schaal continues, after the extensive review of aristocratic 
government, to list all democracy’s merits and flaws. This analysis starts 
with the contention that many of the characteristics of popular rule speak 
clearly in its favour. To begin with, a popular government is the original 
form of any polity. unlike both monarchy and aristocracy, it is “not 
founded upon any violence, but natural, rational, and in itself fair”. In his 
later revision, De la Court even maintained “that only in Democracy the 
perfect government can be found”.262 The list of advantages continues with 
the contention that the Ciceronian maxim salus populi suprema lex will 
only be truly materialized in a popular government, for the majority of all 
citizens will by necessity agree on those issues that advance the wellbeing 
of the largest part of the community. Moreover, a popular government 
employs all human potential fully “so that nobody’s capability or desire 
for honour … is made fruitless”. Since democratic magistrates are 
appointed for their quality and not for their ancestry,
all Citizens who excel in knowledge, virtue and wealth will therefore be all the 
sooner chosen as Magistrates, without being … because of that excellence, 
hated and persecuted, as in aristocratic, or rather killed, as in Monarchical 
Governments. Thus everyone here applies his utmost diligence to assemble 
sciences and goods.263
In short, a democracy cultivates and profits from the true self-love that 
defines human behaviour in a well-ordered civil society.
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264 See John Dunn, Setting the People Free. The Story of Democracy (London: atlantic, 
2005), 55–59.
265 Burgersdijk, Idea oeconomicae et politicae II.XXIII.11, p. 121: “Democratia est status 
natura sua imperfectissimus.” Cf. Boxhorn, Institutiones I.V Exp., p. 56; II.X.2, p. 356.
266 Petrus Baardt, Democratia Corporis Humani; dat is, Leden-Stemminghe des 
Menschelijcken Lichaems; gevoegt op een Democratike Regieringe sommiger Republijken 
(Leeuwarden, 1640), adapted from [adriaan Stikke], Leeden strydt (The Hague, 1630), 
14: “Immer hebben niet minder onse Lichamen by sich een on-uyt-spreeckelijcke 
wel-gestelde Democratia, in de welcke het gemeene Volck over een comende in stem-
minge accordeert; wie doch ter Wereldt soude beter gestelde Republijck connen ordi-
neren als nae welcke dien so Hoogmogenden Schepper alle dusdanige bestellinge heeft 
geordineert?”
This clear praise of popular government is highly remarkable, since the 
term democracy was used for centuries in an overtly negative way as 
the pejorative denominator of the disastrous rule by the multitude.264 
Indeed, the De la Courts’ appropriation of the term deviates significantly 
from the overtly disparaging remarks on democratic government in the 
traditional politica. Burgersdijk, for example, described democracy as “by 
its nature the most imperfect state”, while Boxhorn similarly disclaimed 
the anarchic licentiousness when all share in the government.265 In the 
seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, only a few marginal authors proved 
to be more sympathetic to the idea of democratic government, and their 
arguments often involved mere carnavelesque casuistry. a good example 
of this stance is the curious little book Democratia Corporis Humani, pub-
lished in 1640 by the Dutch medical doctor Petrus Baardt. adopting the 
time-honoured metaphor of the body politic, Baardt argued that all parts 
of the human body are equally important for our physical well-being, 
including the ‘lower’ parts that we conceal and prefer not to speak about. 
Human beings thus have democratic bodies, Baardt concluded, and the 
same is true for the body politic: all members of society should participate 
in decision-making to maintain a healthy political structure. For Baardt, 
our bodies function like “an unspeakable well-ordered Democracy, in 
which the common People accords by agreement of votes. Who in the 
world could ordain a better established Republic than the one thus estab-
lished by our High and Mighty Creator?”266
With similar wit and imagination but also with much more theoretical 
sophistication, the De la Courts develop this defence of democracy into 
an elaborate justification of popular rule, clearly departing from the con-
ventions of the established politica. The importance of this move can 
hardly be overemphasized: it amounts to the first outspoken theoretical 
defence of democracy in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, and as 
such it forms an important steppingstone for Spinoza’s argumentation on 
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267 See Israel, “Intellectual origins,” and cf. the Conclusion below.
268 Politike Weeg-schaal III.I.5, p. 542–544: “Dat een Populare Staat, werdende geregeert 
van het meestendeel, ook waarelik geregeert werd van domme en onweetende menschen, 
nog oogen, nog ooren hebbende … met heftige welspreekentheit.”
269 Ibidem III.II.4, p. 627–628: “… die passien brengen nergens min schadeliker vrugten 
voort, als in een Populare Regeering: in het geheel die weg te neemen, is onmogelik, en 
soude ook gansch ondienstig zijn, also gemelde passien oneindelik meer goeds als quaads 
in de wereld veroorsaken.”
democracy in the 1670s.267 Yet while the brothers’ argument for democ-
racy stands out for breaking new terrain, a strong residue of the age-old 
criticism remains in their claim that democracies suffer from one funda-
mental drawback: human ignorance. Whereas an aristocracy enjoys the 
benefit of well-educated rulers, a “Popular State, being ruled by the major-
ity, is also truly ruled by stupid and ignorant people who have neither eyes 
nor ears”. The most likely results are hasty and labile judgments, incom-
plete and extremist resolutions, while the “fervent eloquence” of a dema-
gogue can easily convince the ruling assembly with populist sophistry.268 
The main challenge that confronts popular government is therefore the 
issue of public deliberation. When everyone has a say, liable and truthful 
speech can easily be undermined by dangerous rhetoric that blurs the dis-
tinction between virtue and vice.
This centrality of the role of speech and the passions in democratic deci- 
sion-making forms the core of the hesitant and somewhat  inconclusive 
embrace of popular government in the work of the De la Courts. This 
embrace follows from the assertion that the passions of both true and 
false self-love “produce nowhere less detrimental fruits than in a Popular 
Government. Eliminating them completely is impossible and would also be 
entirely useless, since these passions cause endlessly more good than evil 
within the world”.269 This crucial contention, close to the augustinian 
acknowl edgement of the benefit of the passions, is fully taken to heart in 
the grand finale of the first edition of the Politike Weeg-schaal – a passage 
most probably written by Johan de la Court. Having carefully balanced the 
pros and cons of the three aristotelian forms of government as an impartial 
seeker for truth, he eventually deploys all his rhetorical skills to elicit the 
readers’ agreement by mobilizing their passions: first through a number 
of colourful fables that illustrate the argument, and then by turning directly 
to the audience with a powerful interrogative anaphora that enhances the 
inevitability of his conclusion. The passage is worth quoting at length 
since it clearly reveals how the authorial ethos of rationality merges with 
a passionate rhetoric that directly addresses the reader with the question:
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270 Ibidem III.III.1, p. 639–640: “of niet in Monarchaale Regeeringen de Heer … (het welk 
het schaadeliksten van alle Regeeringen soude weesen) selfs regeerende, gemeenelik 
regeeren wil, tot nadeel zijner Onderdaanen, volgens de Monarchale maxim? Divide, 
impera. Pour faire un grand Roy, il faut diviser le peuple … of niet in Aristokratike 
Regeeringen de Regeerders … altijds alle hare kennisse, en magt der Regeeringe konnen, 
willen, en sullen gebruiken … om haar zelven te bewaaren en te vergrooten, ook met, en 
door den ondergang, en vermindering der gemeene Onderdaanen. of niet alleen, in Populare 
Regeeringe, de Regeerders (namentlik, niet de Magistraats-persoonen, Dienaars van den 
Staat; maar het Volk, by wien aldaar de Souverainiteit is) soeken (Salus Populi suprema 
Lex,) haar eigen, der gemeene Ingesetenen welvaren? … En of dienvolgende de Monarchaale 
Regeeringe niet behoorde te wezen zeer weinig geagt? of niet de aristokratike Regeering 
verre boven de Monarchaale behoorde te werden gesteld? of niet de Populare Regeering, 
kennelik, den Ingesetenen voordeeliger, en dienvolgende beeter is als de aristokratike.”
Whether it isn’t true that in Monarchical Governments the Lord … ruling 
on his own (which would be the most detrimental of all Governments), 
in  general wants to rule to the disadvantage of his Subjects, according to 
the Monarchical maxim: Divide, impera. Pour faire un grand Roy, il faut 
diviser le peuple? Whether it isn’t true that in Aristocratic Governments the 
Rulers … always can, will, and shall employ their knowledge and power of 
Government … to protect and enhance themselves, also with, and through 
the ruin and decline of the common Subjects? Whether it isn’t true that only 
in Popular Governments the Rulers (namely, not the Magistrates, Servers of 
the State; but the People, with whom Sovereignty is there) search (Salus 
Populi suprema Lex) their own welfare, the one of the common Inhabitants? 
[note the subtle change from ‘subjects’ to ‘inhabitants’] … and whether 
therefore the Monarchical Government should not be esteemed very little? 
Whether the aristocratic Government should not be placed far above the 
Monarchical? Whether the Popular Government is not evidently more 
advantageous to the Inhabitants and therefore better than the aristocratic?270
Thus finishes the first edition of the Politike Weeg-schaal, with a rhetorical 
move that, in engaging the audience to decide for itself, underscores the 
work’s eventual conclusion: if guided by the trustworthy speech of the 
wise merchant, the common people should be considered judicious 
enough to make their own decisions.
Yet when preparing a new edition of the work after Johan died, Pieter 
de la Court did not seem to be entirely confident about the form as well as 
the contents of his bother’s conclusion. Is the independent judgment of 
the general public really to be trusted? De la Court doubted it, as he 
equally doubted whether his brother’s open plea for democracy could 
persuade the powers-in-being as a feasible alternative for the established 
oligarchy in Holland. accordingly, De la Court attached a couple of addi-
tional chapters that modify Johan’s initial conclusion as well as his demo-
cratic rhetoric. In a striking change of tone, De la Court takes the reader 
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271 Ibidem III.III.3–5, p. 652, 661: “Reedenen waarom de Populare Regeering voor desen 
zo gunstig is voorgestelt geweest; hoewel die warelik de beste niet zy … Dat een Aristokratie, 
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272 Kossmann, Political Thought, 70, note 3.
273 Blom, Morality and Causality, 179, note 39. See also Haitsma Mulier, Myth of Venice, 
141–142, 145.
274 Politike Weeg-schaal III.I.6, p. 561–562: “… (inter populum & multitudinem differentia 
permagna est) dat men zeer groot onderscheid maaken moet tusschen een onwettige opro-
erige vergaderinge, des volks … en tusschen een wettige vergaaderinge der gemeene 
Burgerschap.” Cf. also Aanwysing I.2, p. 19: “… eene multitudo, meenigte buiten civili soci-
eteit en regeering leevende.”
firmly by the hand, adding a paternalist assertio to the text’s original 
reliance on the reader’s own judgment. First, De la Court explains the 
“Reasons why the Popular Government has been depicted so favourably 
until now, although it is truly not the best one”. Then he continues to 
insist that, although a popular assembly is obviously better than an oligar-
chy, it does suffer heavily from the ignorance of its members. Therefore, 
as he concludes resolutely, “an Aristocracy that is closest to the Popular 
Government is surely the best Government”.271
at first sight, this modification of the argument seems to entail a bla-
tant contradiction of the initial embrace of democracy. Indeed, Kossmann 
maintained that in revising the Politike Weeg-schaal, De la Court unjustifi-
ably and wilfully killed his brother’s democratic darlings.272 However, 
as both Haitsma Mulier and Blom have argued, such a portrayal of the 
development of the brothers’ thought is not very convincing. In Blom’s 
words, the “change is one of emphasis more than of principle”:273 De la 
Court’s additions mainly tried to resolve a tension that characterizes his 
brother’s use of the term popular government from the start. The first edi-
tion of the Politike Weeg-schaal overtly embraced democracy as the best 
form of government, but it also stressed that “one should make a very large 
distinction between an illegitimate rebellious assembly of the people … 
and a lawful assembly of the common Citizenry”. This distinction is 
clarified by a Latin saying, “inter populum & multitudinem differentia per-
magna est”, which reveals that a popular government (i.e. a govern-
ment  by the citizenry, the populus) should not be equated with a 
government of the unruly rabble, the multitudo.274 Hence, for both broth-
ers De la Court a popular government does not entail a government by all, 
but rather a government consisting of the select group of men who qualify 
as citizens. This definition is largely in line with the conventional seven-
teenth-century denotation of popular rule. althusius, for example, argued 
that a democraticus status requires a ratio gubernandi aristocratica, a 
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277 Politike Weeg-schaal III.III.3, p. 656: “… welspreekende oratien.”
278 amsterdam university Library, Ms XXV C41, addition to Politike Weeg-schaal III.I.6, 
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 government of optimi.275 Similarly, across the North Sea, a ‘popular’ repub-
lican like Nedham equally stressed that “when we mention the People, 
observe all along, that we do not mean the confused promiscuous Body of 
the People”.276
accordingly, De la Court’s additions to his brother’s initial conclusion 
did not involve a radical shift, but rather a clarification of the argument. 
The reason for this clarification stems in particular from his continuous 
rethinking of the importance of speech in politics – a process that is 
reflected in the change in rhetoric, from Johan’s initial interrogatio to 
Pieter’s eventual assertio. When revising the work, De la Court increas-
ingly stressed that the members of a truly popular assembly will be easily 
carried along “by eloquent orations”.277a republican government should 
therefore be established thus “that no Citizen is ever allowed to practice 
his eloquence by debating anything before the people”.278 This rising con-
cern about the possible abuse of public speech echoes a similar argument 
in Harrington, who equally warned that “any commonwealth where the 
people in their political capacity is talkative” will be “carried away by 
vainglorious men”.279 De la Court’s concern also resulted in the same claim 
as in Harrington’s Oceana that all voting should be secret and based on a 
system of blind balloting as in Venice, so that rhetorical manipulation and 
intimidation are impossible and “the common interest of the Republic will 
always be promoted”.280 Eventually, De la Court’s unease with the role of 
eloquence led him to a tentative plea for a bicameral solution, again like 
in Harrington, with a senate that debates and proposes its advice to a gen-
eral assembly. This assembly has no debating powers but only the ulti-
mate right of decision, “because the people are then not being misled by 
any eloquence of any eminent Citizen who tries to embellish his own par-
ticular advantage as if it were a common one”.281 Yet this gradual move 
276 chapter four
282 See Harrington, Oceana, esp. 78–80. on Harrington’s exceptional attention to con-
stitutional arrangements, see Scott, Commonwealth Principles, 141–143; and Idem, “Classical 
Republicanism,” 64–65.
283 Sinryke Fabulen, 78–79: “Soo maaken sy alsdan Maatschappien, ende bouwen 
die in het aangaan der selven altijds op deese Billikheid, dat yder der Maats … ook sijn 
aandeel der toekoomende Winsten ende Schaaden behoorde … ende onder de Maats 
soodaanige gelijkheid zy, dat geen der selven deese Billikheid ende Voorwaarden mooge 
veragten ende straffeloos breeken … Het welk, indien wel behertigd werd, soo soude men 
niet sien soo veele ongelijke Maatschappien, van gemeene Ingeseetenen met Groote 
Heeren, van Koopluiden, Borgers ende Boeren, met Koningen, Vorsten, eedelen, ende 
Krijgs-luiden.”
284 Cf. the elaborate statute drafted by De la Court for the establishment of a mercantile 
company as an alternative to the VoC in overvoorde (ed.), “De Noord-oostelijke door-
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towards a constitutional arrangement that avoids the pitfalls of public 
speech remained inconclusive. unlike Harrington, who extensively dis-
cussed the intricacies of the voting procedures in his model of Oceana,282 
the brothers De la Court did not enter into detail about the practical reali-
zation of their ideal republican government.
A Government of Merchants, by Merchants, for Merchants
The De la Courts’ vision of the ideal republican assembly does not so 
much follow from a well-defined constitutional design as from their gen-
eral argument that commerce must prosper in liberty. Their main goal is 
to make clear that the government should be in the hands of and for the 
sake of those who further the interest of trade. at the basis of this correla-
tion between politics and commerce lies the idea that the concerns of 
trade correspond to the concerns of the commonwealth as such. De la 
Court explicitly compares civil society to the establishment of a commer-
cial company, for both are founded on “this Fairness, that to every one of 
the Participants … belongs his share in the future Profits and Losses … and 
that there is such an equality among the Participants that none of them 
can disregard this Fairness and these conditions”. De la Court then con-
tinues to assert that were these criteria of fairness also to be met in poli-
tics, “there would not be seen so many unequal Societies of common 
Inhabitants with Great Lords, of Merchants, Citizens and Farmers with 
Kings, Monarchs, Noblemen, and Soldiers”.283 In other words, the organisa-
tional principles of a well-ordered commercial company, based on equal-
ity, reveal how to overcome a disproportionate distribution of power in 
the political realm.284
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This parallel between commercial equality and republican politics ulti-
mately implies that a republic of trade where wise merchants govern pre-
serves the fundamental harmony of private and public interests. For the 
brothers De la Court, the capricious nature of trade makes excessive 
wealth unattainable and thus guarantees a fairly equal distribution of 
power and property. In a commercial commonwealth like Holland, indi-
vidual riches are based on “Movable goods”, which means that possessions 
are so insecure that “in no other country on the whole surface of the Earth 
there have been as many cases of being Rich and becoming Poor”.285 The 
political consequences of this uncertainty are highly positive. Since it is 
impossible to attain excessive wealth, “there will be no room” in a com-
mercial commonwealth for “everything that makes a Monarch jealous”. 
Moreover, the contingency of commercial property implies that the “citi-
zens of the popular Government, noticing that they only become distin-
guished in government by their reason, virtue, and Wealth” will educate 
their children “in all knowledge, sciences, and virtues”.286 Thus commerce 
has an effect comparable to the agrarian law proposed by Harrington: it 
establishes a balance of dominion and enhances continuous competition 
on the basis of merit instead of covetousness.287 a large assembly of mer-
chants will therefore not succumb to monarchical greed, but instead ena-
ble all people “to search for their advantage in satisfactory freedom, and 
while they surely own what they have, everyone is diligent to gain still 
more”. The overall result is the increase of commerce and industry and 
the growth of the population, the true sources of grandezza of a republic 
of trade.288
accordingly, the governing assembly of a commercial commonwealth 
should consist of all citizens who can be expected to enhance this general 
interest of trade – those, that is, who would go against their own interests 
if they would impose exorbitant taxes or wage costly wars. The larger this 
assembly is, the better, “for if there are many in the Government and 
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 everyone follows his interest, the Community enjoys the advantage of all 
those interests, whereas otherwise they only enjoy the interest of the 
Monarch”.289 Yet there is a clear limit to the size of the assembly. as the De 
la Courts maintain, the private interests of the lower social strata and of 
guild masters in particular do not represent the general interest of society. 
Government must therefore be in the hands of “many of the eminent 
Citizens”,290 the independent male householders who know how to relate 
their private advantage wisely to the common good. Speaking freely for 
those who depend on them, these wise merchants will enhance by major-
ity of votes the welfare of all, for
the legislative Power is shared by so many and so diverse Men, who, repre-
senting or substituting the entire People not only with words but truly in 
fact, can only practise their own Welfare by promoting at the same time the 
Welfare of the entire People.291
Thus the harmony between private and public interests is preserved if the 
entire population is represented by a broad assembly. Such an assembly, 
as De la Court once more emphasized in the Sinryke Fabulen, is “truly the 
very best form of Government” the more it approaches democracy and 
the more it deviates from monarchy.292
The De la Courts’ plea for a merchant democracy – a government of 
merhants, by merchants, for merchants – involved a significant move 
towards opening up the Dutch oligarchy in power. Clearly alluding to the 
situation in Leiden and Holland at large, the De la Courts asserted that 
their model implied that the “number of sovereign Councillors ought in a 
moderate City be no less than two hundred” – at least five times the num-
ber of Leiden’s existing council.293 This criticism of the Dutch status quo, 
with its emphasis on popular sovereignty and gradual opening towards 
democracy, inaugurated a ‘popular turn’ in Dutch republicanism during 
the 1660s and 1670s, developed further in the work of Van den Enden and 
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Spinoza (see the conclusion below). arguably, the De la Courts thus stood 
at the roots of an important tradition in Western political thought which 
continued throughout the Enlightenment.
Yet we should be warned not to equate the brothers’ argument for a 
broad ruling assembly with the late eighteenth-century arguments for 
a representative democracy. The brothers De la Court still remained 
firmly within the athenian paradigm of the city-state where the inde-
pendent citizenry engages in direct decision-making. Their plea for a 
large ruling assembly did not depart radically from aristotle’s claim that 
the ideal politeia entails a perfect fusion of oligarchy and democracy, nor 
from Boxhorn’s claim that Holland should be ruled by an open and broad 
aristocracy of the rich.294 To a large extent, the De la Courts followed this 
line of reasoning, tentatively moving in a more democratic direction. 
Their originality lies mainly in the outspokennes with which they tried to 
free the term ‘democracy’ from its long-standing negative connotations. 
With the De la Courts, democracy started its slow but spectacular rise that 
changed it from a derogatory description of anarchy into the universal 
denominator of legitimate rule. Yet the brothers’ description of what a 
popular government exactly entails was not particularly innovative. after 
all, the most fundamental and pioneering aspect of their criticism of the 
Dutch status quo was their categorical rejection of the Stadholderate, 
which amounted to perhaps the most radical argument against monarchy 
in ancien Régime Europe.
 Conclusion: The Radical Republic
The republican thought of the brothers De la Court merges the idea that 
freedom of trade is the essence of commercial reason of state with a com-
prehensive criticism of monarchy in all its guises. Following the claim 
that all people are self-interested, good government must be based on a 
harmony between the private interest of those who rule and the public 
interest of society at large. Since monarchs are by necessity the enemies 
of commerce, such a harmony can only be preserved if the sovereignty 
remains in theory and in practice with a large assembly of eminent 
 citizens, who represent all the individual interests in society without giv-
ing in to any individual domination. only in such a broad aristocratic 
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republic commerce will thrive in liberty and thus increase the greatness 
of the commonwealth. Hence, the interest of trade lies at the basis of the 
two fundamental features of the De la Courts’ republic: its radical anti-
monarchism and its gradual opening to democracy.
The significance of the way in which the brothers De la Court connect 
an argument for commerce with an argument against monarchy is espe-
cially apparent in comparison with their contemporary republicans 
across the North Sea. as shown above, the English republican experiment 
of the 1650s did not play an important role in the thought of the De la 
Courts. There is no evidence that they were familiar with English republi-
can treatises apart from, most likely, Milton’s Defensio and, in a later stage, 
Harrington’s Oceana. Yet both Milton and Harrington had a strikingly dif-
ferent appreciation of commerce than the De la Courts. Milton  emphasized 
emphatically that trade could never be a reason “to prostitute religion 
and libertie”;295 Harrington claimed that although “in manufactures and 
merchandise the Hollander has gotten the start of us”, the English 
Commonwealth had “a far more sure and effectual foundation” because it 
was based on agriculture.296 other English republican theorists from the 
1650s and 1660s, most notably Marchamont Nedham and algernon 
Sidney, were much closer in their argumentation to the brothers De la 
Court. Nedham’s 1656 “Commonwealth-Principles” show many similari-
ties to the thought of the De la Courts – from the claim that republican 
magistrates will “have made the Publick Interest, and their own, all one”, 
to a rhetorical plea for a broad aristocratic government close to athenian 
democracy.297 In the following decade, Sidney’s Court Maxims continued 
to stress the republican harmony of private and public interests in similar 
terms, now with explicit attention to the importance of trade. as Jonathan 
Scott has shown in detail, Sidney’s adaptation of this language of com-
mercial interest was deeply informed by his exile in the Dutch Republic at 
the start of the 1660s.298 Sidney frequently praised the republican example 
of the Dutch, emphasizing that it is “the king’s interest to destroy trade” 
 the commercial commonwealth 281
299 Sidney, Court Maxims, 73, 161.
300 Scott, “Classical Republicanism,” 62, 69, 71. For the impact of the Dutch republican 
example in England, see esp. Idem, Commonwealth Principles, 353–357.
301 on exclusivist republicanism in the Renaissance, see Hankins, “Exclusivist 
Republicanism.” See also Nelson, Hebrew Republic, 23–56, which slightly overstates the 
anti-monarchism of English republicans like Milton.
while Holland’s prosperity and power were due to its “good government 
and liberty of traffic” – two crucial claims that also dominate the work of 
the brothers De la Court.299
There was therefore a significant congruence between the republican 
thought on either side of the North Sea, where the languages of liberty, 
interest and trade merged into a comparable republican interpretation of 
the gradual commercialization of society. Scott has argued compellingly 
that this common anglo-Dutch republican project “emerged from a con-
nected practical, as well as intellectual context”, from a shared late 
humanist culture and related political and economic developments. For 
Scott, the resulting anti-monarchism in England and the Dutch Republic 
“was almost identical”, but what separated Dutch and English republicans 
was their different assessment of the role of reason and the passions: 
while “Dutch republicanism focused on the constitutional management 
of the passions, for public prosperity and peace, English republicanism 
entailed a warlike championship of reason”.300
Yet Scott’s lucid comparison covers only a part of the story, because in 
spite of the similarities, the anti-monarchism of the De la Courts entails a 
decisively more radical, or ‘exclusivist’, twist than its contemporary 
English counterpart.301 First of all, it is important to stress that the domes-
tic backgrounds of Dutch and English republican thought, though related, 
differed significantly. The Dutch political debate between orangists and 
anti-orangists was not, as in England, a debate between monarchists and 
supporters of the commonwealth, but it was rather a contest between two 
different visions of republican liberty. The anti-monarchism of the broth-
ers De la Court did not emerge in response to royalist claims, as for exam-
ple Nedham’s, but instead to counter the equally republican argument 
that the Stadholder fulfilled the balance in the Dutch body politic. as a 
result, the De la Courts claimed on the basis of their analysis of commer-
cial reason of state that all sorts of single rule, even within a republican 
constitution, entail the establishment of tyranny and servitude. This is 
why they insisted that there was no fundamental difference between the 
Dutch Republic under a Stadholder or Captain-General and the ottoman 
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Empire under the Sultan, for even the looming threat of the desire to 
dominate brings about the demise of republican and commercial liberty.
This categorical rejection of any form of personal authority goes far 
beyond the republican claims of the De la Courts’ English contemporar-
ies. Milton took care not to equate monarchy with tyranny, stressing that 
“both the name and the power of a king are entirely consistent with a 
greater power in the people and the law”.302 In comparable vein, Harrington 
emphasized the pre-eminent role of a “Lord archon” as “the sole legislator 
of oceana”. Directly contradicting the anti-orangism of the De la Courts, 
he argued that “the Low Countries under a monarch were poor and incon-
siderable, but in bearing a prince, could grow unto a miraculous height”.303 
Even Nedham, who was arguably the fiercest (and most opportunistic) 
anti-monarchical activist in England, justified a form of elective monar-
chy. In his words, “if any Kingly Form be tolerable, it must be that which 
is by Election, chosen by the Peoples Representatives” – a government 
that the De la Courts would have characterized as merely tyranny in 
disguise.304 Finally, also Sidney stressed that he “dare[d] not say all monar-
chy is absolutely unlawful”, since legal kingship is just and virtuous, as 
opposed to the outright “despotical government that is exercised over 
slaves”.305 In short, all the main English republicans of the 1650s and 1660s 
targeted a corrupted monarchy, not monarchy as such. The categorical 
anti-monarchism of the brothers De la Court, which remained remarka-
bly consistent from 1660 to 1685, thus proves exceptionally far-reaching 
and exclusivist in comparison with their contemporaries across the 
North Sea.
Following their critical analysis of the economic policies of Leiden, the 
brothers De la Court constructed a commercial theory of reason of state 
that, modelled on ancient athens, pursues a republican empire of trade. 
The highest law of that empire is a comprehensive notion of liberty, which 
merges freedom from interference with freedom from arbitrary domina-
tion as the main characteristic of a true republic. Such liberty can only be 
maintained within a governmental framework where the rulers enhance 
the common good of society by searching for their private advantage. This 
harmony of interests is by definition unattainable in a state where 
one single man rules: monarchy in all its guises, including the Dutch 
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Stadholderate, necessarily amounts to tyranny. In contrast, a true repub-
lic entails a government of many, a government for trade that represents 
all individual interests in society, impervious to the tyranny of one as to 
the anarchy of all. How then is it possible to preserve such a harmonious 
model of republican rule in an open society characterized by pluralism 
and latent conflict? This question is addressed in the next and final chap-
ter, which turns to the central notions of social concord and religious tol-
eration in the political thought of the brothers De la Court.
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Vettori e a Francesco Guicciardini (1513–1537), ed. Giorgio Inglese (Milan: Rizzoli, 2002), 
192–196.
3 Cf. the cynical comments in Sinryke Fabulen, 16, where De la Court covertly apolo-
gizes for his escape to Antwerp and blames his compatriots for not having listened to his 
warnings.
4 [Pieter de la Court van der Voort], Byzondere aanmerkingen over het aenleggen van 
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1737). On the mixed fate of the De la Court family in the eighteenth century, see Maarten 
Prak, Gezeten burgers. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Leiden 1700–1780 (Amsterdam etc.: 
De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1985).
CHAPTeR FIVe
COnCORD AnD TOLeRATIOn
In the hot summer of 1672, when the Dutch Republic fell prey to a climac-
tic combination of foreign assault and internal uproar, Pieter de la Court 
prepared for escape. The regime of ‘True Liberty’ had fallen apart, the 
enemy’s armies stood at the borders of Holland – only halted thanks to an 
improvised realization of De la Court’s plan to protect the province with a 
large trench – and De la Court himself packed his most valuable belong-
ings: jewellery, silver service, pocket-sized Latin books, and a copy of the 
new Testament with golden clasps, a pious indication of the wise mer-
chant’s wealth.1 Shortly thereafter, De la Court fled to Antwerp, where he 
would remain for more than a year, killing his time playing trick-track, 
that favourite pastime of republican exiles, with other refugees like Pieter 
de Groot.2 When De la Court eventually returned home at the end of 1673, 
he wisely, if also rather bitterly, decided not to interfere in the political 
debate again.3 Another pastime called for his attention: his garden at his 
country estate Meerburg, on the banks of a branch of the Rhine near 
Leiden. Legend has it that Meerburg was the site where the first european 
pineapple was cultivated; be that as it may, De la Court’s son, who never 
proved to be endowed with his father’s sharp political pen, inherited 
at least some of his enthusiasm, and decades later he would publish a lav-
ishly illustrated treatise on the art of horticulture.4
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Yet for De la Court, the days at Meerburg must have had a more 
profound significance. As Lipsius proclaimed almost a century before, 
a “delight in Gardens is Commendable; a Pleasure, to which … the 
Best, and most Ingenuous Men are inclin’d by Nature”. Writing at the 
height of the religious warfare that shattered his native netherlands in 
the late sixteenth century, Lipsius presented the private world of the 
secluded  garden as a heaven of constancy, a peaceful retreat where 
one could hide from the turmoil of the public realm and the violent 
passions of one’s soul. “May my time ever pass away amongst your 
Shades!” Lipsius addressed his stoic garden. “May it be lawful for me, being 
deliver’d from the Wild, endless Tumults of the People, with a free, satisfy’d 
eye, to wander among these Flowers, of the knowne, and unknown 
World!”5 De la Court, in the wake of his own turbulent experiences, 
must have found a similarly serene shelter at Meerburg, far away from 
the concerns of daily life and the turmoil of politics. But such a stoical 
retreat still involved a clear political stance: as a place for conversation 
and debate and as a symbol of both order and variety, Lipsius’s garden 
embodied a blooming civil society where the roots of dissension and 
upheaval are rigorously curtailed to cultivate the fruits of harmonious 
diversity.
This image of a stoic garden of concord and constancy represents the 
De la Courts’ account of how to establish stability and peace in a society 
characterised by religious conflict and political unrest. As I will argue in 
this fifth and final chapter, the brothers De la Court experienced an 
‘erasmian moment’ which involved a strong rejection of revolutionary 
change, a parallel attack at clerical interference in politics, and a commer-
cially inspired commitment to religious freedom. Adopting the Grotian 
claim that the civil sovereign holds supreme authority over all ecclesiasti-
cal affairs, the De la Courts pleaded for a broad public church overseen 
by the magistracy, which tolerates confessional dissent in private. This 
ideology of toleration, in particular for the sake of commercial prosperity, 
was fairly far-reaching since it also included Catholics. Yet the brothers’ 
tolerationist stance remained limited by their embrace of a single true 
faith, based on the purity of Scripture. The inviolability of Scripture also 
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delimited the De la Courts’ conception of free speech, which involved 
a dedicated yet altogether futile attempt to create consensus through 
outspokenness.
 The erasmian Moment
Curtailing the Roots of Discord
Since the days of erasmus, political thought in the netherlands was domi-
nated by the language of concord. As the official motto of the Dutch 
Republic, taken from Sallust, self-assuredly declared: concordia res parvae 
crescunt, discordia maximae dilabuntur, ‘in concord small affairs rise; in 
discord even the largest decline’.6 The brothers De la Court clearly adhered 
to this erasmian legacy that emphasized the values of consensus, resigna-
tion, and constancy over conflict, defiance, and agitation. They emphati-
cally stressed the civic duty of acquiescing to one’s political fate and 
forcefully rejected any attempt to rebel against the powers in being. This 
sceptical argument against revolutionary change was especially directed 
against those who, according to the De la Courts, threatened the delicate 
balance in the Dutch body politic: the supporters of the Stadholderate, 
organized economic factions such as guilds, and the orthodox clergy. 
Only if the rebellious designs of these pressure groups were utterly eradi-
cated, concord in society would be maintained so that the republic could 
endure the whims of fortune.
The spectre of civil disorder that haunted seventeenth-century europe 
clearly lies at the basis of the insistence with which the De la Courts 
argued against open rebellion. In the 1650s and 1660s, the memories of the 
Dutch Revolt were still fresh, while the more recent episodes of civil war 
and revolt in France and england served as an equally distressing reminder 
of the dangers of political and religious upheaval. Reflecting on these 
experiences, the Politike Weeg-schaal ends with a sceptical conclusion 
that reproves all desire for open rebellion: “For, rebelling against the 
Government in being (de facto), one immediately establishes the state of 
nature or War of all Inhabitants against all.”7
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  8 Stevin, Burgherlick leven, esp. 41–47. Stevin is quoted in Sinryke Fabulen, 453.
  9 Ibidem, 126: “eerlicke ghewelt.”
10 Welvaren 79, p. 170: “… altijds sal ick vervloecken een onderdaen, die veranderinge in 
der Regeeringe traght te brengen.” Aanwysing III.8, p. 523: “Boni Civis est liberum Reipublicae 
Statum tueri, nec eum mutatum velle.” The quote is from the preface to erasmus’s edition 
of Suetonius in the Historiae Augustae scriptores, published in erasmus, Opus epistolarum, 
ed. P.S. Allen et al., 12 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906–1958), vol. II: nr. 586, p. 585. This 
erasmian maxim was one of the main slogans of the advocates of ‘True Liberty’: see e.g. 
“een korte verhandelinge van de nootsakelijckheydt ofte den ondienst van een stadthouder 
in Hollandt ende West-Vrieslant, en dat in dese tijden,” in Uytenhage, De Stadhouderlijcke 
Regeeringe in Hollandt ende West-Vrieslant (Amsterdam, 1662).
This Hobbesian defence of de facto political power might come as a 
surprise given the inflammatory anti-Orangist rhetoric of the brothers’ 
work. Yet as I have argued above in chapter 3, the De la Courts appropri-
ated Hobbes to legitimize the establishment of the regime of ‘True Liberty’ 
after the death of William II. They employed the language of de facto rule 
and the state of nature to strengthen a fairly conventional argument 
against illegitimate rebellion. This argument was an essential element of 
the legacy of Lipsius and his followers. For example, in his 1590 treatise 
Vita politica, the famous engineer and mathematician Simon Stevin high-
lighted in a Lipsian vein the disasters that would be brought about by civil 
disobedience.8 The brothers De la Court, who read Stevin, radicalized this 
argument to justify the new political order of the Stadholderless era. 
While Stevin argued in line with the conventional justification of the 
Revolt against Philip II that “honest violence” should be allowed to over-
come tyranny,9 the De la Courts suggested that in principle every de facto 
government is to be obeyed.
On the one hand, this stance is an important element of the brothers’ 
establishment of authorial ethos: in order to please and pacify their read-
ers among the regent establishment, the De la Courts insist that they do 
not intend to overthrow the powers in being but rather instruct their 
fellow citizens to abide by the status quo. As Het welvaren van Leiden, 
dedicated to the Leiden patrician eleman, insists, “I will always curse a 
subject who tries to bring about change in the Government”. Similarly, 
the Aanwysing concludes with a resounding quote from erasmus that a 
good patriot should always defend the existing order.10 Yet on the other 
hand, apart from such rhetorical reassurance, the De la Courts’ abhor-
rence of revolt also involves a more fundamental move in its repudiation 
of resistance theory and Monarchomach thought. Unlike the resistance 
republicanism of their english contemporaries such as Milton (and later 
Locke), the De la Courts have a very sceptical outlook on the utility of 
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11 Politike Weeg-schaal III.III.6, p. 669, also quoted in Welvaren 79, p. 171. For the origi-
nal, see Montaigne, Essays III.9, p. 1002. The library of De la Court van der Voort had a 
sumptuous folio edition of the Essays (Paris, 1635): Library, fol. 17.
12 Politike Discoursen I.II.27, p. 172: “Maar veel ligter is een oproer in een quaalik gestelde 
Republijk uit te voeren, daar men de Leeden soo ongelijk laat groejen, dat een die lang over 
’t Krijgs-volk gebied, magt, en agtbaarheid genoeg krijgd, om alles te verkragten.” Cf. the 
comparable passage in Ibidem II.V.8, p. 128–130.
13 Aanwysing II.12, p. 333: “… het Trojaanse Paard op het binnen-Hof.”
sweeping political change. This attitude is in particular informed by the 
politique scepticism of Montaigne and exemplified by the verses of the 
Lord of Pibrac, which are quoted twice in the brothers’ work:
Aime l’estat tel que tu le vois estre,
S’il est Royal, aime la Royauté.
S’il est de Peu, ou bien Communauté,
Aime l’aussi, car Dieu t’y a fait naistre.11
These verses, clearly more than just figurative embellishment, reveal 
above all a deep-rooted conviction that the stability of the common-
wealth is always preferable to the incertitude of sudden regime change.
The brothers De la Court employ this argument in their general strat-
egy against the Orangist claim that the Dutch body politic requires an 
eminent head to maintain its concord and strength. The obvious message 
of the brothers is that the Dutch have to accept the existing republican 
government, whether legitimate or not, and that any attempt to reinstall 
the Stadholderate would imply an unacceptable alteration of the status 
quo. They repeatedly insist that violent upheaval is inevitable if a republic 
does not subdue the political pretensions of individuals. Their rebel-
lious aspirations will be easiest in “a badly established Republic” where 
unequal governmental representation can cause “that one man who com-
mands over the Military for a long time gets enough power and esteem to 
violate everything”.12 In short, the Stadholder does not represent the 
stronghold of the political order, but rather the personification of menac-
ing anarchy: the “Trojan Horse” that will destroy the commonwealth from 
within.13 The endemic civil unrest in all Italian republics with a powerful 
military leader serves as a proof of this claim, for their history reveals that 
the monarchical maxim divide & impera prevails if a single man obtains 
too much power. In contrast, the example of the German Imperial Cities 
and the Swiss Cantons shows that republics without such a leader never 
fall apart through civil war. As before, the De la Courts thus legitimize the 
situation in the Dutch Republic by referring to time-honoured republican 
models abroad: in the absence of a Stadholder the Dutch are not less but 
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14 Ibidem, 332, 342. Cf. Bentivoglio, Relatione, 128–129.
15 Politike Discoursen I.II.27, p. 172: “… dat een Republijk daar veele, en in gelijke waardig-
heid regeeren, niet in ’t kort bedorven, en in wan-ord’ren kan gebragt werden.”
16 Politike Weeg-schaal III.III.6, p. 669: “… Republiken met bedaarde zinnen, en zonder 
bloedvergieten weten te brengen tot een beeter ordre en forme van Regeeringe.”
17 Welvaren 66, p. 146: “Maer in groote Steden vervuld met vremdelingen ende ontbloot 
van Hallen en Gildens heeft men genoeghsaem noijt eenige oproeren sien ontstaen, dan 
die ontstoocken en gevoed wierden door eenigh aensienelijck Minister van den Staet, ofte 
aensienelijck Hooft.”
more likely to maintain political stability. De la Court develops this argu-
ment, in line with Boxhorn, to contradict the assertion of Cardinal 
Bentivoglio that the United Provinces would because of their mutual 
discord soon turn into an Orangist monarchy. Directly addressing 
Bentivoglio’s claim, De la Court insists that under its newly won liberty 
without a Stadholder, Holland will easily neutralize internal uproar.14
Such stability is further enhanced because “a Republic where many 
govern in equal dignity cannot be curtly ruined and brought into disor-
der”.15 To overcome possible revolt, the powers in being have to open up 
gradually towards a more representative government where no individual 
enjoys disproportionate powers, so that the motivation and opportunity 
to rebel are eradicated. With this rhetorical move, the De la Courts craftily 
turn a conservative argument against sweeping change into a progressive 
argument in favour of cautious gradual democratization, in praise of 
those regents who “know how to bring Republics in a calm mood and with-
out bloodshed into a better order and form of Government”.16 As I have 
argued in detail in the preceding chapter, this superior political order 
entails the establishment of a broad ruling assembly and a policy of inclu-
sive citizenship and economic freedom in order to attract foreigners and 
to challenge organized vested interests. Clearly alluding to the situation 
in Leiden, the De la Courts maintain that “in large cities filled with for-
eigners and stripped from Halls and Guilds, one has surely never seen 
arise any tumults than those that were ignited and fed by any prominent 
Minster of State or prominent Head”.17 An open and free society offsets 
the rebellious designs of economic pressure groups such as guilds, which, 
like the Stadholder, do not enhance but rather undermine the concord 
and strength of the commonwealth. This friction is vividly represented in 
a fable of various guildsmen who gather to fill a crack in the walls of their 
city (see fig. 12). In order to fill the gap, the guild of masons suggests using 
stone, the carpenters argue that it should be nailed up with planks, the 
glassblowers opt for windows while the blacksmiths insist they should be 
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18 Politike Weeg-schaal II.I.4, p. 326–327: “Wat schoone Wallen zoud gy ons verschaffen, 
die van de Zwijnen opge-eeten zouden werden?’. See also Sinryke Fabulen, 103–108.
strengthened with iron bars. Then the merchants suggest using just gar-
bage and mud in order to avoid new taxes, and they find support among 
the vintners and brewers who thus see an opportunity to get rid of their 
dregs. “What kind of nice Walls would you provide us with, which would be 
eaten by the Pigs?”, the other ask in reply. eventually, all guildsmen remain 
undecided as to how to repair the city’s walls.18 With this allegory, the De 
la Courts imaginatively warn that organized interest groups such as guilds 
will necessarily cause conflict and irresolution, threatening the stability 
and survival of the commonwealth.
A number of Italian exempla illustrate such a dreadful state of faction-
alism and discord, from a fable of Boccalini that ridicules the “art of war”, 
to a satirical story about the Guelphs and Ghibellines taken from the 
Fig. 12. ‘‘The guilds and a city,’’ from Pieter de la Court, Sinryke Fabulen, 1685. Amsterdam 
University Library, OTM: OK 63-2796.
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19 Politike Discoursen I.II.14, p. 128–130, including a Dutch translation of Boccalini, 
Ragguagli I.75, and of Poggio Bracciolini, Facetiae 149.
20 Ibidem I.II.13–28. For all the corresponding passages in Machiavelli, see Van Heck, “In 
het spoor van Machiavelli,” 288–291.
21 Cf. Machiavelli, Discorsi I.4.
22 Politike Weeg-schaal III.I.6, p. 573–575.
23 See Machiavelli, Discorsi I.12, II.2, and cf. Marcia L. Colish, “Republicanism, Religion, 
and Machiavelli’s Savonarolan Moment,” Journal of the History of Ideas 60, 4 (1999), 
597–616. For Machiavelli’s civil religion, see also Maurizio Viroli, Il Dio di Machiavelli e il 
problema morale dell’Italia (Bari: Laterza, 2005).
Facetiae of the Florentine humanist Poggio Bracciolini.19 But perhaps the 
most important reference in this context is to Machiavelli, whose shadow 
looms large over an extensive part of the Politike Discoursen that discusses 
the danger of conflicts and conspiracies.20 If the brothers De la Court ever 
experienced a ‘Machiavellian Moment’, facing the question of how to pre-
serve the republic vis-à-vis capricious fortune, then it is here. nevertheless, 
it is striking that the key Machiavellian notion of the utility of discord, the 
idea that the tumults between the nobili and the plebe strengthened 
the Roman body politic, is largely absent from the thought of the De la 
Courts.21 Whereas Machiavelli argued that conflict is to be preferred over 
consensus because it makes a republic dynamic and hence powerful and 
free, the De la Courts adhered to the more conventional attitude that sta-
bility and concord should always prevail. Although political strife is una-
voidable, in true republics tumults are never fatal but rather function like 
a strong medicine that eradicates the disease. However, in a badly ordered 
government – and here the De la Courts mention the last years of the 
Roman Republic as an example – conflict will eventually become endemic 
and lead to the deathblow of republican liberty.22 This repudiation of the 
Roman model makes clear that the brothers De la Court experienced less 
a Machiavellian than an erasmian Moment: their republic will persist by 
peaceful resignation and concord, not by the militant seizure of indomi-
table fortune.
On one important issue, however, the De la Courts followed both 
erasmus and Machiavelli. This issue is their virulent anti-clericalism. 
erasmus frequently ridiculed the corruption of the Catholic clergy and 
the degeneration of Christian doctrine, most famously in The Praise of 
Folly. Machiavelli in turn argued that the moral teachings of the Church 
were to blame for the downfall of Italian strength and independence.23 
The De la Courts’ criticism of the Calvinist clergy of their day adopts ele-
ments from both erasmus’s ridicule and Machiavelli’s outspokenness. 
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24 On the Further Reformation, see Israel, Dutch Republic, 474–477, 690–699.
25 Willem Teelinck, Den politycken Christen. Ofte instructie voor alle hooge en leege 
staets-persoonen … tot destructie van de hedendaeghsche Machiavelsche wijsheydt 
(Middelburg, 1650).
26 Maximiliaen Teelinck, Vrymoedige aenspraeck aen Sijn Hoogheyt, de Heere Prince van 
Oraengjen (Middelburg, 1650). Cf. also [Jacob Stermont], Lauweren-krans gevlochten voor 
Syn Hoocheyt Wilhelm, de Heer van Oranjen (s.l., 1650). For a short analysis, see Groenveld, 
Prins voor Amsterdam, 93–95, and Israel, Dutch Republic, 601–602.
27 Joost van den Vondel, “Op d’oproericheit van den Godtloosen Zeeuw, Maximiliaen 
Teeling,” in Werken, vol. V: 517: “maer dit oproerigh zaet/noch Vryheit laet in rust, noch 
Koningklijcken Staet./Kon Burgerlijcke Tucht die Monsters niet betemmen,/Al ’t lant zou 
tot de keel in bloet en tranen zwemmen.” Cf. also Het rechte derde deel van ’t Hollands 
Praatje, aangaande de wettige souverayniteyt van de Groot-Mogende Heeren Staten van 
The brothers argue in particular that the dissimulative teachings of the 
clergy undermine social harmony and adulterate the word of God, thus 
jeopardizing, like Stadholders and guilds, the fundamental preservation 
of republican concord.
Confronting Clerical Conceit
Throughout the seventeenth century, the position of the Dutch Calvinist 
clergy was profoundly linked to the debate on the political order of the 
Republic. This connection between religion and politics became espe-
cially clear during the pamphlet war of 1650, when a couple of orthodox 
ministers, such as the Zeeland minister Maximiliaen Teelinck, stood up as 
spokesmen of the Orangist camp. In 1650, at the height of the political 
storm, Teelinck republished the main work of his late father, who had 
been one of the key proponents of a ‘Further Reformation’ in Dutch 
Calvinism, a puritan movement that sought to strengthen the church’s 
grip on all facets of daily life and public morality.24 Teelinck dedicated 
his father’s work, a Christian mirror-for-princes suggestively titled Den 
politijcken Christen, ofte instructie … tot destructie vande hedendaegsche 
Machiavelsche wijsheydt [“The Political Christian, or Instruction to 
Destroy the Current Machiavellian Wisdom”], to William II.25 In unam-
biguous terms he praised the House of Orange’s support for Calvinist 
orthodoxy. When this dedication was published separately (and probably 
without authorization) as a pamphlet shortly afterwards, it provoked a 
furious reaction from those who opposed either the Further Reformation, 
or the Stadholder, or both.26 The poet Vondel did not hide his contempt 
of Teelinck’s “rebellious seed”, the “Monsters” which, if not tempered by 
“Civil Discipline”, would surely make the country “swim up to the throat 
in blood and tears”.27 This characterization of the clerical provocation 
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Hollandt (s.l., 1650), esp. 14–15. On Vondel’s anti-Stadholder engagement in this period, cf. 
Duits, Van Bartholomeusnacht to Bataafse opstand, 154–272; and Jill Stern, “A Playwright in 
His Time: Vondel’s Drama Faeton of 1663,” Dutch Crossing 23 (1999), 22–57.
28 Leids schuitpraatje: zijnde een t’zamenspraak tusschen verscheide personen: rakende 
de vrijheid van ons vaderland, der religie, en de macht der hooge overheid in kerkelijke zaken 
(s.l., 1668), sig. B v.: “… opgeswollen hoovaardigheid.”
29 See Jill Stern, “Religion and the Orangists, 1650–1672,” Dutch Crossing 30 (2006), 
181–196.
30 Sinryke Fabulen, 179: “… de Phariseeuse Kerkeliken, die alleen door het Mom-aansigt 
van Wijsheid ende Deugd, voor soodaanigen werden gehouden, daar sy waarelik onweet-
ende, dwaase, ende ondeugende Menschen zijn.”
31 Ibidem, 234–235: “… met haare voorbedagte sleepende woorden, ende gemaakte 
gebaaren … niet anders voor hebben, dan voor heilige Menschen geagt te werden, ende 
onder dien Mantel over de Siele ende Gedagten van andere Menschen te heerssen, ende 
middeler-wijle stillekens in alle wellusten ende overdaad te leven … Van den Schijn-
heiligen vinden wy dageliks ende ooveralle voorbeelden, onder alle Godsdiensten ofte 
Secten, het zy der Heidenen, Jooden, Christenen, ofte Mohametanen. ende insonderheid by 
den Priesteren, Moniken ende Leeraaren der selven, wanneer die welbespraakt zijn.”
of discord and tumult became one of the main commonplaces of anti-
clerical writing throughout the next decades. even in 1668, almost two 
decades later, Teelinck was still rebuked as a prime example of the “swol-
len arrogance” of the clergy.28 The Teelinck affair thus caused the clergy to 
become increasingly politicized, even though Orangism and Calvinist 
orthodoxy did not necessarily coincide.29
For the brothers De la Court, the designs of the supporters of the House 
of Orange and of the Calvinist clergy were clearly connected by their 
shared abuse of rhetoric. Duplicitous speech is fatal for a proper public 
debate, and the De la Courts insist that clerics, as much as courtiers, avail 
themselves of exactly this kind of language that blurs the distinction 
between virtue and vice. Clerics are therefore bad rhetoricians who do 
not dare to say the truth or even deliberately mislead their congregation. 
embodying hypocrisy, “the Pharisaic Ecclesiastics are only because of the 
Mask of Wisdom and Virtue considered to be wise and virtuous, for in 
reality they are ignorant, stupid and vicious People”.30 With their “pre-
meditated, dragging words and artificial gestures”, they teach Christian 
humility only because they “intend nothing else than to be regarded as 
devout People, and to rule under that guise over the Soul and the Thoughts 
of other Men, and to live in the meantime on the quiet in all lusts and 
extravagance”. examples of this behaviour are to be found “among all 
Religions or Sects, be it Heathens, Jews, Christians or Muslims” and among 
all those clerics who are “eloquent”.31 This important remark makes clear 
that for the De la Courts, the dangers involved in fanatical speech are 
not limited to the Calvinist world: clerical rhetoric, which is universally 
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32 Ibidem, 128: “… dat sy onder pretext van andere Menschen meer als haar selven te 
lieven … de Weereld ongevoelig plonderden.” Cf. also the comparable fable in Ibidem, 
115–120.
33 Ibidem, 252: “… door hare al te groote eigen-selfs liefde, die gemeenelik uit grooter 
onkunde ende kleinen oordeele spruit.”
34 Ibidem, 132: “… sal de Weereld nooit soo gelukkig zijn, van dit oolikste gespuis van 
Menschen ontslaagen te werden.”
35 Politike Discoursen II.IV.6, p. 44: “… de meeste oorsaaken van de corruptien in 
Politie … oorsaak van het verval in den Gods-dienst zijn … allerley Secten Preedik-stoelen … 
als der Monarchen Palleisen, of der Republiken Raads-huisen.”
artificial and deceitful, abuses the passions of the audience and hence 
fundamentally corrupts the public debate.
This hypocritical speech is intrinsically related to another clerical char-
acteristic that the brothers De la Court repudiate: the pretension that vir-
tue can possibly surpass self-interest. A fable in the Sinryke Fabulen 
describes how a diligent craftsman, the personification of civic probity, 
accuses a couple of mendicant friars, who “under the pretext of loving 
other People more than themselves … carelessly plundered the World”.32 
The craftsman thus reveals that clerical modesty and humility are merely 
a façade for the relentless pursuit of self-interest at the cost of others. Like 
guildsmen, kings, and courtiers, clerics are therefore guilty of the cardinal 
sin in the mercantile logic of the De la Courts: self-interest wrongly under-
stood. “Because of their all too large self-love, which commonly stems 
from larger ignorance and poor judgment”, clerics think that they are 
superior to their equals, indulging in heerszucht and haughtiness.33 This 
accusation against the political preponderance of the clergy was often 
raised in the Dutch debate, for example by Vondel. Yet it is important to 
note that the ranting anti-clericalism of the brothers De la Court stresses 
the worldwide consequences of this clerical lust for dominion. As the 
fable of the craftsman and the friars makes clear, hypocritical clerics are 
equally to be found among all religions, “and the World will never be so 
happy that it is relieved from this most rogue scum of People”.34
The De la Courts’ dismissal of clerical duplicity does not entail a 
commonplace Protestant attack on Catholic dissimulation, but rather 
a crucial feature of their republican criticism of two-faced rhetoric and of 
the contemptible ambition to rule. Indeed, the “causes of corruption in 
Politics”, namely the domination by one man, by a small oligarchy or by 
the ignorant masses, are also “the cause of the decay in Religion”, and the 
same evils are to be found on the “Pulpits of all kinds of Sects” as in 
“Monarchical Palaces or Republican Town halls”.35 Politics and religion 
are intrinsically connected. This message is perhaps clearest in a passage 
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36 Politike Weeg-schaal III.I.6, p. 565–566: “… de Politike Yveraars … en de heilige 
Broeders, die gedurig van de Conscientie, God, en zijn heilig Woord spreken … geen jonge 
Engelen, daar zy zig voor pleegen uit te geeven, maar oude Duivelen … het tot duisternisse 
veranderd ligt daar het evangelie van gewaagt.”
37 Sinryke Fabulen, 368: “… dat opgemelde ontrouwe Christen Leeraars, op dese duistere 
gronden hebben gebowd haar Rijk der Duisternissen.” Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan part IV (“Of 
the Kingdome of Darkness”), and see the analysis in Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 
398–399.
38 Politike Discoursen II.IV.4, p. 33–34: “… door haare Ambitie, Hovaardie, ende eigen 
voordeel, bewoogen.”
39 See Ibidem II.IV.5, which borrows from Machiavelli, Discorsi II.5.
40 Sinryke Fabulen, 113: “… onder den schijn van te yveren voor Goodes Glorie … den 
Satan oover-leeveren.”
41 Ibidem, 178: “… opregt ende oopenhertig … voor Vry-Geesten, Atheïsten, ende 
Menschen van een seer schandelik ofte aanstootelik leeven by de gemeene Menschen 
doorgaan.”
that refers approvingly to Boccalini’s satirical disclosure of deceit. 
elaborating on one of Boccalini’s Ragguagli, this passage sarcastically 
accuses the pretensions of both the “Political Zealots” and “the devout 
Friars who continuously speak of Conscience, God, and his holy Word”, 
although they are in fact no “young Angels, as they commonly claim to be, 
but old Devils”, the personification of “the light turned into darkness of 
which the Gospel reports”.36 This evocative imagery of the opposition 
between biblical light and clerical darkness is often repeated in the work 
of the De la Courts. Although of course a standard element of much anti-
clerical satire, it brings to mind the similar rhetorical disclosure of the 
ecclesiastical “Kingdom of Darkness” in Hobbes.37
The argument against clerical rhetoric, hypocrisy and imperiousness 
leads to the ensuing assertion, also reminiscent of Hobbes, that the main 
menace of the clergy lies in its demagogy. “Motivated by their Ambition, 
Haughtiness, and personal advantage”, clerics tend to slander the worldly 
powers in order to increase their own status.38 Hence, they encourage 
political insubordination for the sake of their personal benefit, while 
they endanger social concord still further by promoting bigotry and the 
persecution of all who disagree, especially men of learning. The conse-
quences are fatal: as Machiavelli had argued, art and science fall victim to 
clerical fanaticism,39 while, “under the cloak of devoting themselves 
to God’s Glory”, clerics slander all dissenters and eventually “hand them 
over to Satan”, thus fundamentally dishonouring their duties as pastors.40 
Moreover, those “honest and openhearted” people who endeavour to dis-
close this deceit are accused by the clergy of being “Libertarians” and 
“Atheists”.41 Clerical demagogy obstructs the parrhèsia that is indispensa-
ble for a truly republican political debate.
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42 Significantly, some of the Orangist critics of the De la Courts shared their religious 
views: see Stern, “Religion and the Orangists,” 188–192. Moreover, also the theologian 
Guiljelmus Saldenus, a prominent propagator of the Further Reformation, referred 
approvingly to their work in his Neerlands Interest, tot vrede der kercke, en wegh-neminge 
van alle opkomende misverstanden in de selve (Middelburg, 1664). On this work, see G. van 
den end, Guiljelmus Saldenus (1627–1694). Een praktisch en irenisch theoloog uit de Nadere 
Reformatie (Leiden: Groen, 1991), 176–188.
43 Politike Discoursen II.IV.6, p. 42: “… dat Gods Kerk, en ’t regte Geloof, vervallen is, tot 
bysonder oover geloof, afgoderie, en beuselingen.” Cf. Heinz Schilling, “Afkeer van domi-
neesheerschappij: ein neuzeitlicher Typus des Antiklerikalismus,” in Peter A. Dykema and 
Heiko A. Oberman (eds.), Anticlericalism in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe 
(Leiden: Brill, 1993), 655–668.
44 Welvaren 47, p. 107: “… met gansch ongeoeffende herssenen den Canzel betreden … 
met veel sinnelose woorden. en stighteloose disputatien.”
45 Onwederleggelycke bewys-redenen daer door betoont wort, dat de Vereenighde 
Nederlanden, alleen door Godts voorsieninge ende der Princen van Orangien beleyt, vant 
Spaensche jock, ende slavernye vry gemaeckt zijn (Willemstad, 1663), 12: “… de ware, 
inlantsche ruste en eendrachtigheydt.”
Unsurprisingly, the ecclesiastical authorities in Holland did not con-
done these remarks, and in 1662 the Leiden consistory duly punished De 
la Court by excluding him from the Lord’s Supper. Yet in spite of this open 
clash with the church, the passionate anti-clericalism of the brothers De 
la Courts should not be confused with a criticism of organized religion 
and the institution of the church as such.42 Rather, their thought attests to 
a distinctive erasmian critique of clerical degeneration and a related long-
ing for the age of apostolic purity before “God’s Church and the true Faith 
lapsed into exceptional superstition, idolatry and humbug”.43 In a passage 
that might as well be taken from The Praise of Folly, this critique entails a 
vivid denunciation of the teaching of theology at Leiden University, 
where, as the De la Courts knew from firsthand experience, students were 
educated that “they occupy the Pulpit with utterly inexperienced brains”, 
having learned how to dissect Holy Scripture “with many meaningless 
words and senseless disputations”.44 In short, the schooled clergy adulter-
ates instead of spreads the word of God.
The extent of this anti-clerical argument becomes especially clear from 
a letter that De la Court wrote to his brothers-in-law on account of the 
publication of an Orangist pamphlet in 1663 – a pamphlet that reminded 
De la Court of Teelinck’s dedication to William II back in 1650. Following 
Teelinck and armed with an arsenal of biblical references, the author of 
this pamphlet argued that the “true internal peace and Concord” in the 
Dutch Republic had been maintained by the divinely inspired policy of 
the Princes of Orange.45 For De la Court, this assertion was “a sign that 
among the Reformed Orangists there are such godless people, that they 
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46 Pieter de la Court to the brothers Van der Voort, 27 September 1663, in Kernkamp, 
Brieven, 131–132: “… een teeken dat onder de Gereformeerde Prinsgesinde ook soo god-
delose menschen zijn, dat God en alle de propheeten, Christus en alle sijne apostolen 
derven commediantskleederen aan trekken, ende op haar tonneel soodanige rolle doen 
speelen als ’t haar gelieft … Is dit de vrugt der Reformatie en van de H. Schrift het ligt op 
den kandelaar geset te hebben en doen dit onse leeraars? Behoorde men haar daar in naar 
te volgen? Wee deese goddelose menschen, slimmer veel as atheisten … Wat sal men de 
papen, die ’t ligt onder de korenmaat hadden, antowwrden, als sij ons dit aanwijsen? Wat 
misbruik is groter, ’t hare of ’t onse? Wat is beter blind, of dol of gek te zijn? De papen 
waren blind, dusdanige gereformeerde leeraars heilige dolle, en hare discipulen heilige 
gekken. Quaken was engels en is nu aldaar uitgespeeld; hier is de selve saak maar duivels 
en oneindelik swarter, God beware ons voor dusdanige swartrokken.” De la Court proba-
bly refers to the Quaker Act of 1662, by which the english Parliament outlawed the meet-
ings of the Quakers.
dare to dress God and all the prophets, and Christ and all his apostles, in 
the cloths of comedians to let them play in their theatre”. Utterly enraged, 
he continued to question the credentials of the Dutch clergy and their 
dubious exploitation of Calvin’s legacy:
Is this the fruit of the Reformation and of Holy Scripture, to have put the 
light on the candlestick, and is this what our ministers do? Should one fol-
low their example? Woe these godless people, much worse than atheists … 
What shall one answer to the papists, who had the light under the bushel, 
when they point us at this? Which abuse is bigger, theirs or ours? What is 
better, to be blind, or foolish, or mad? The papists were blind, these 
Reformed ministers are holy fools, their disciples holy madmen. Quaking 
was english and now it’s played out there; here, the matter is the same but 
devilish and infinitely blacker. God beware us of such blackcoats.46
De la Court reserved such inflammatory language for his private corre-
spondence, but his public criticism of the Calvinist clergy reflected much 
of this confidential outburst. With a similar dismissal of clerical conceit 
and a comparable rhetorical play with the opposition between light and 
darkness, the De la Courts persistently undermined the political preten-
sions of the clergy. Moreover, deftly returning the accusation of atheism, 
they argued that the clergy itself was to blame for the violation of true 
religion.
Clearly then, the anti-clericalism of the brothers De la Court involves 
primarily a defence rather than a censure of revealed religion. This 
endeavour to defend religion against the clergy involves a fundamental 
political move that, echoing Vondel, denounces the clergy for provoking 
sectarianism and thus undermining social concord. As the Politike 
Discoursen argues in language that infuriated the Leiden consistory, 
the “public Ministers or commentators of Scripture” deserve “the name of 
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47 Politike Discoursen II.IV.4, p. 31: “… publike Leeraars, ofte uitleggers der Goddelike 
Schriften … de naam van Oproermaakers, Enthusiasten, Gesst-dryvers, of Quakers … 
boosaardige, schynheilige, of wel onweetende, Melancholike, Medecyn-behoevende 
Menschen.”
48 See e.g. Welvaren 69, p. 151; Politike Discoursen II.V.9, p. 140; Overvoorde, “noord-
Oostelijke doorvaart,” 285–286; Aanwysing III.1, p. 411.
49 The best account of the intricate issues at stake is still Douglas nobbs, Theocracy and 
Toleration. A Study of the Disputes in Dutch Calvinism from 1600 to 1650 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1938). For a concise overview of the ‘Bestandstwisten’, see 
Israel, Dutch Republic, 421–449.
Ringleaders, Enthusiasts, Fanatics, or Quakers”, they are “wicked, hypocriti-
cal, or otherwise ignorant, Melancholic, Medicine-needing People”.47 If 
these rebellious clerics gain too much power over their followers, the con-
sequences are the same as when other self-interested pressure groups like 
guilds become too powerful: it sows the seeds for a “government within 
the government”, an imperium in imperio.48 This distinctive terminology 
reveals that the view of the De la Courts on the political role of the clergy 
stems directly from the Arminian position in the debate that dominated 
much of seventeenth-century Dutch politics, the debate on the relation 
between church and state and the sovereignty in ecclesiastical affairs.
 The Relation between Church and State
The Arminian Legacy
The so-called Arminian controversy of the 1610s, when rivalling theologi-
cal theories about divine predestination and the position of the church 
shook the foundations of the Dutch body politic, had a lasting impact on 
the religious-political debate in the Republic throughout the entire 
century.49 After a short analysis of the key points in this debate, I will show 
how the Arminian position informed the argument of the brothers De 
la Court for a broad public church overseen by the sovereign, an argu-
ment that involved a clear political statement in the heated theological-
political debate of the 1660s.
The tone of the controversy was set by a short treatise by the Arminian 
(or ‘Remonstrant’) spokesman Johannes Uytenbogaert, the Tractaet van ’t 
ampt ende authoriteyt eener hooger christelijcker overheydt, in kerckelijcke 
saecken [“Treatise on the Office and Authority of a Superior Chris-
tian  Government in ecclesiastical Affairs”], first published in 1610 and 
reissued several times in later decades. Uytenbogaert explicitly invoked 
the Defensor Pacis by Marsilius of Padua to highlight his time-honoured 
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50 Johannes Uytenbogaert, Tractaet van ’t ampt ende authoriteyt eener Hooger 
Christelijcker Overheydt, in kerckelijcke saecken, 3d. ed. (Rotterdam, 1647), 3–4, with an 
extensive quote of discourse II, chapter I of the Defensor pacis, a passage where Marsilius 
attacks the dangerous demagogy and despotism of the papacy: see Marsilius of Padua, The 
Defender of the Peace, ed. and trans. Annabel Brett (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 139–140.
51 See nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration, 1–24, for a comprehensive analysis of the 
Gomarist position.
52 Uytenbogaert, Tractaet, 19: “… Collateraliteyt, dat is, eene even hooge macht der 
Geestelijcker ende Wereltlijker Overheydt … alle Sielen, van wat qualiteydt ofte state sy 
mogen wesen, de macht der Overheyden moeten onderdanich sijn in ’t gene Burgerlijck is, 
ende het tijdtlijcke aengaet … dat nochtans de besorginge van de Religie ende Godsdienst, 
met alles wat daer aen-kleeft ende kerckelijck is, eygentlijck toe komt den Kerckelijcken 
persoonen ende vergaderingen.” Cf. nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration, 27–49.
53 Uyttenbogaert, Tractaet, 94–115, quote on 101: “… versorgen, dat het evangelium 
suyver en wel geleert.”
battle against the ‘papist’ political pretensions of the clergy.50 His main 
aim was to reinterpret Calvinist theology in such a way that the church 
became fully subordinated to temporal authority. Opposing the claims 
by the followers of the theologian Gomarus (thus ‘Gomarists’, or ‘Contra-
Remonstrants’), the Tractaet argued that the civil magistracy exercises 
supreme power over all ecclesiastical affairs. For the Gomarists church 
and state were essentially distinct yet interdependent institutions, and 
therefore the sovereignty of the church should be distinguished from the 
sovereignty of the state.51 Uytenbogaert insisted that such a view amounts 
to papist “collaterality”, to the establishment of two conflicting supreme 
authorities. Such an “equally supreme power of the ecclesiastical and 
the Secular Government”, whereby “the Care of Religion and Worship, 
with all that is ecclesiastical and attached to it, in fact belongs to the 
ecclesiastical persons and assemblies”, meant for Uytenbogaert an unjus-
tifiable infringement of Calvin’s teachings and of Scriptural Revelation.52
Uytenbogaert contended that the divine right of the sovereign extends 
over civil and ecclesiastical affairs alike. This indivisible sovereignty 
necessitates the civil control and coordination of the public profession of 
Christianity. The ministers of the church are to be appointed by the mag-
istracy, which thus “takes care that the Gospel is taught purely and well”. 
Moreover, the magistracy has the right to make ecclesiastical laws and 
ordinances, and to convoke, administer and preside over synods in order 
to settle theological disputes.53 All matters concerning the external wor-
ship of God fall under the responsibility of the secular authorities, who 
hence oversee the fundamental task of “bringing all erring Subjects 
through good teachings to the knowledge of the truth and the right 
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54 Ibidem, 127: “… doolende Onderdanen, met goede onderwijsinge, totte kennisse der 
waerheydt, ende der rechten Godsdienst te bewegen, al met het geestelijcke Swaert, ’t 
welcke is Gods woort.”
55 See nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration, 35. For the debate on freedom of conscience 
during the Dutch Revolt, see Van Gelderen, Political Thought, 213–259.
56 Hugo Grotius, De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra, ed. and trans. Harm-Jan 
van Dam, 2 vols. (Leiden etc.: Brill, 2001), vol. I, I.1, p. 157. On the role of Vossius, see Ibidem, 
“Introduction,” 14–15, 19, and nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration, 58.
Religion, all with the spiritual Sword, which is God’s word”. Uytenbogaert 
thus argued that there is one true interpretation of Christian faith, and 
that it is the responsibility of the civil powers to ensure that this interpre-
tation is universally taught.54 However, the sovereign’s powers do not go 
beyond the affairs of external worship. In line with the official sanctioning 
of freedom of conscience in the constitutional charter of the Dutch 
Republic, the Union of Utrecht, Uytenbogaert stressed that the internal 
conscience of every individual owes only obedience to God. All matters of 
public devotion are subjected to the state, but the private conscience 
remains free.55
In the years following the publication of the Tractaet, Uytenbogaert’s 
close friend Hugo Grotius developed this account of inalienable private 
conscience and a public church administered by the civil powers into a 
full-blown erastian theory. Taking sides with the Arminians, Grotius, then 
employed by the States of Holland, published in 1613 his Ordinum Pietas 
on behalf of the sovereign power of the provincial States over the church. 
He further specified this position in the treatise De imperio summarum 
potestatum circa sacra, written in the 1610s in cooperation with Gerard 
Vossius and published posthumously in 1647. De imperio focuses on a 
notion of a single, indivisible supreme power (or summa potestas). It aims 
to prove “that the authority possessed by the supreme power thus defined 
extends not only to secular, but also to religious matters”.56 Grotius 
stresses with a reference to Bodin and the Spanish scholastics that the 
supreme authority he has in mind is that of the provincial States. In a 
move that radicalizes Uytenbogaert’s position, he then openly denies that 
church and state are fundamentally distinct institutions. Since sacred and 
secular cannot be distinguished, the means and the aims of the church are 
the same as those of the civil society, namely “the outward peace of the 
community” and “the virtue of individuals”. As Grotius insists:
now if it is true that the objective which the supreme powers must set 
themselves is to make the people as religious as possible, and if all things 
which lead to that end are called religious, it follows that the competence 
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57 Grotius, De imperio I.5, p. 165. Cf. nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration, 62–90, and Tuck, 
Philosophy and Government, 179–190.
58 Grotius, De imperio VII.11, X.15, p. 355, 477.
59 Ibidem I.11–13, p. 173–179.
60 See esp. Grotius, Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfrisiae Pietas, ed. and trans. e. Rabbie 
(Leiden: Brill, 1995), 169–171. Cf. as well De imperio VI.9, p. 309–313, and see G.H.M. 
Posthumus Meyjes, “Hugo Grotius as an irenicist,” in The World of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) 
(Amsterdam and Maarssen: APA-Holland University Press, 1984), 43–63.
61 Grotius, De imperio VIII.3, p. 377: “It is the task of the supreme ruler, and of him alone, 
not only to grant the true religion official force, but also to remove or abolish by punish-
ment false beliefs.”
62 Cf. the qualifications of Grotius’ position in Jonathan Israel, “The Intellectual Debate 
about Toleration in the Dutch Republic,” in C. Berkvens-Stevelinck et al. (eds.), The 
Emergence of Tolerance in the Dutch Republic (Leiden etc.: Brill, 1997), 3–36: 11–13; and John 
Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture. Religious Intolerance and 
of the supreme power as such, that is its authority, encompasses 
religion too.57
The supreme powers (i.e. the States of Holland) therefore exercise an 
undiluted authority over all activities of the church, from the building of 
places of worship to the election of ministers.58 Moreover, religion is a 
necessary means to further the harmony and peace within society: it 
“makes people quiet, obedient, patriotic and adherents of justice and 
equity”. Apart from such moral instruction, “doctrines or ceremonies are 
also of great importance to morality and public happiness”. The supreme 
power cannot renounce its authority over matters that prove to be so 
essential.59
Grotius therefore pleads for the establishment of one all-inclusive pub-
lic church which, supervised by the civil magistracy, teaches the funda-
mentals of Christian belief, the self-evident articles of faith that are 
necessary for salvation and on which all denominations agree.60 This 
irenicist solution to contain religious diversity within the church, leaving 
the adiaphora or ‘indifferent matters’ of faith to the judgment of each 
individual, entails a defence of freedom of conscience and state supervi-
sion similar to that of Uytenbogaert’s Tractaet. In private, people are 
only accountable to God, yet in public, the secular powers have the 
authority and the duty to suppress forms of worship that exceed the limits 
of the public church.61 In line with this argument, Grotius suggested that 
Jews be granted admission to Holland and freedom of religion, yet only 
under the condition of very restricted rules regarding public worship. In 
his De veritate religionis christianae, he merely tried to convince Jews and 
Muslims alike to come together under the one true religious umbrella of 
Christianity.62 Grotius’ model, then, is a model of unity and consensus. 
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Arguments for Religious Toleration in Early Modern and ‘Early Enlightenment’ Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 345–350.
63 Grotius, De imperio, I.13, p. 179. Cf. nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration, 71: “The spectre 
of theocratic tyranny, direct or indirect, was laid only by taking refuge in the charity of the 
supreme power.”
64 See Israel, Dutch Republic, 460–463.
65 Grotius, Verantwoordingh van de wettelicke regiering van Hollant ende Westvrieslant 
(Paris, [1622]), esp. 14–29.
66 See esp. epsicopius’ public disputation “De jure magistratus circa sacra,” in 
episcopius, Opera Theologica, 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 1650–1655), vol. II: 409–411, and the 
analysis in nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration, 91–107. epsicopius was also the author of the 
De imperio hints that such concord is endangered by the political preten-
sions and demagogy of the clergy, for “the mass, victims of vain supersti-
tion, obeys the soothsayers better than it does its own leaders”. To counter 
such dangerous defiance, the clergy should be kept under close control by 
the magistracy, for only then can the stability of society and religion 
be maintained.63
With the defeat in 1618 of the political regime that championed 
this Grotian view on church and state, the Arminian cause collapsed. 
Following the intervention of Stadholder Maurice of Orange, Grotius was 
charged of treason and imprisoned, Uytenbogaert fled into exile, and 
their main political ally, Grand Pensionary Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, 
was executed on the scaffold. The famous national Synod of Dordrecht 
officially sanctioned the Contra-Remonstrant theology of grace and cleri-
cal independence as the orthodox dogma of the Dutch Reformed Church.64 
Before long, however, the debate flamed up again. In the course of the 
1620s the political dominance of the Contra-Remonstrants diminished, 
and after the death of Maurice of Orange, most Arminian leaders again 
openly engaged in the political and religious life of the Republic. Uyten-
bogaert returned from France in 1626, and although Grotius remained in 
exile, he continued to influence the Dutch debate, in particular with the 
publication of his Verantwoordingh [“Apology”] that reaffirmed his theory 
of the ecclesiastical sovereignty of the States of Holland.65 Yet the most 
important spokesman of the Arminians turned out to be the theologian 
Simon episcopius, who strove for the establishment of an independ-
ent  Remonstrant Church, which was eventually inaugurated, under 
episcopius’ own guidance, in Amsterdam in 1630. Radicalising the earlier 
stance of Uytenbogaert and Grotius, epsicopius maintained the need for 
civil control over the public church, but he also insisted that outside of 
this remit the magistracy has no right to prohibit or punish dissenting 
congregations.66 emphasizing not only freedom of conscience but also 
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influential declaration of the Arminian creed, the Confessio, sive declaratio, sententiae pas-
torum, qui in Foederato Belgio Remonstrantes vocantur (1622), translated into Dutch by 
Uytenbogaert in 1621 and republished several times throughout the century, also in 
england.
67 Grotius, De imperio, “Introduction,” 92.
68 [Johannes Uytenbogaert], De kerckelicke historie (s.l., 1646); Jacob Trigland, 
Kerckelijcke geschiedenissen (Leiden, 1650). The library of De la Court van der Voort had 
the authoritative folio editions of both works: Library, fol. 10. On the historical controversy 
between Uytenbogaert and Trigland, see Charles H. Parker, “To the Attentive, nonpartisan 
Reader: The Appeal to History and national Identity in the Religious Disputes of the 
Seventeenth-Century netherlands,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 28, 1 (1997), 57–78.
freedom of worship and expression, episcopius thus gave an essential 
tolerationist twist to Arminian theology.
none of the three main Arminian spokesmen of the first half of the 
century – Uytenbogaert, Grotius, and episcopius – would live to see the 
establishment of the regime of ‘True Liberty’ in 1650. However, their 
erastian theory of secular sovereignty over church affairs lost none of its 
relevance in the new political constellation. In 1647, on the threshold of 
the Stadholdership of William II, Uytenbogaert’s Tractaet went into its 
third edition, and the first edition of Grotius’ De imperio was published 
the same year in Paris. After the Stadholder’s death, Dutch editions of De 
imperio followed in 1652 and in 1661,67 while episcopius’ Opera Theologica 
were issued in two imposing folio editions between 1650 and 1655. 
Moreover, the Arminian version of the history of the Dutch Reformation, 
Uytenbogaert’s Kerckelicke Historie [“ecclesiastical History”], refuelled 
the controversy with the Contra-Remonstrants. First published in 1646, it 
was reissued several times over the next couple of years. Like the exten-
sive reply by the orthodox theologian Jacob Trigland, it enjoyed wide 
readership throughout the 1650s and 1660s.68 The Arminian legacy, in 
short, did not die with its main representatives.
It should therefore not come as a surprise that, during the years of ‘True 
Liberty’, the political debate on the position of the Dutch Reformed 
Church in society carried on along the path set out during the first dec-
ades of the century. One of the protagonists in this revived debate was the 
Utrecht regent Van Velthuysen, also the first continental european to 
comment publicly upon the political philosophy of Hobbes (see chapter 3 
above). With Hobbes’s notoriously anti-clerical views as support, Van 
Velthuysen invigorated the erastian theory of the Arminians in a number 
of manifest interventions in the public debate, most importantly in his 
1660 pamphlet Het predick-ampt en ’t recht der kercke … tegen het gevoelen 
van eenige Gereformeerde leeraers, die der selve macht verder uytbreyden 
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69 [Lambert van Velthuysen], Het Predick-Ampt en ’t Recht der Kercke … Tegen 
het gevoelen van eenige Gereformeerde Leeraers, die de selve macht verder uytbreyden als 
het behoort (Amsterdam, 1660), 87: “… dat de Kerck niet alleen in de Politie is … maer dat 
de Kerck mede een politijcke Societeyt is; ghelijck alle andere Collegien, Gilden, 
Broederschappen, &c.”
70 Ibidem, 100: “Gelijck hy besorgen moet, datter bequame Doctoors, en Chirurgijns zijn: 
bequame Schippers en Stier-luyden: bequame Richters en Rechts-geleerden.”
71 Ibidem, 69: “Men kan van dese Leer niet afwijcken, of men vervalt tot het Pausdom.”
72 [Lambert van Velthuysen], Ondersoeck of de Chritselijcke Overheydt eenigh quaadt in 
haar gebiedt mach toe lateen (Middelburg, 1660), esp. 98–141.
73 See Andreas J. Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676). Sein Theologieverständnis und 
seine Gotteslehre, (PhD dissertation Utrecht University, 2007).
als het behoort [“The Clerical Office and the Right of the Church … Against 
the Sentiment of Some Reformed Ministers who extend its Power more 
than Appropriate”]. As the title makes abundantly clear, this pamphlet 
aimed to undermine any notion of separate ecclesiastical sovereignty. In 
several ways that directly echo the Arminians, Van Velthuysen insisted 
that the civil authorities have the right and the duty to supervise the pub-
lic church in order to counter discord and strife. For Van Velthuysen, “the 
Church is not only part of Politics … but the Church is also a political Society, 
like all other Colleges, Guilds, Fraternities, &c”.69 Following the Grotian 
argument that there is no distinction between church and state, Van 
Velthuysen maintained that the magistracy has the obligation to take care 
of the true faith, “like it has to ensure that there are capable Doctors and 
Surgeons, capable Captains and Steersmen, capable Judges and Lawyers”.70 
Clerics, in short, are nothing but civil servants. The alternative is “to lapse 
into Papacy”, a powerful rhetorical argument against Contra-Remonstrant 
orthodoxy also employed by Uytenbogaert.71 In a second treatise pub-
lished in 1660, Van Velthuysen also stressed in line with the Arminians 
that its is both impossible and in contradiction of God’s law to control 
man’s private conscience.72
At the other side of the debate stood the towering figure of Gijsbert 
Voetius, professor of theology at the University of Utrecht since 1636 and 
one of the main protagonists of the Further Reformation. As the eminence 
grise of Contra-Remonstrant orthodoxy, Voetius played a pivotal role in 
the political and cultural life of the Dutch Republic around the middle of 
the century. The three massive parts of his Politica ecclesiastica, published 
in four volumes between 1663 and 1676, can be characterized as the ulti-
mate encyclopaedia of seventeenth-century Dutch Reformed theology.73 
In opposition to the Arminians, Voetius essentially defended the inde-
pendence and autonomy of the church as a self-sufficient institution 
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74 See esp. Voetius, Politicae ecclesiasticae partis primae, 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 1663–
1666), vol. 1: I.I.1, I.II.2, I.II.7, and cf. the analysis in nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration, 
144–176.
75 Voetius, Politicae ecclesiasticae pars secunda (Amsterdam, 1669) II.I.1, p. 221–222. See 
also Malcolm, “Hobbes and the european Republic of Letters,” 475–476.
76 See the notes added to the manuscript of Boxhorn’s 1643 lecture, Royal Library The 
Hague Ms 70 G12, which include many references to the Verantwoordingh in the hand of 
Pieter de la Court. These notes, touching especially on the issue of provincial sovereignty, 
probably stem from the period of the preparation of the Interest van Holland, because the 
last date mentioned is 1661 (fol. 37 v). References to Uytenbogaert’s Kerckelijcke Historie 
abound, especially in the Politike Discoursen and the Aanwysing.
based on the mutual consent of its members. The church is a community 
of the faithful who have voluntarily entered its ranks, and therefore it is of 
a fundamentally different nature than the state, pace Grotius and Van 
Velthuysen. ecclesiastical power and secular power should be distin-
guished, for the power of the state only concerns the outward wellbeing 
and safety of its citizens, while the power of the church concerns the 
internal, spiritual welfare of its members. That aim is utterly beyond 
the range of physical force, and hence beyond the might of the state.74 
The civil authorities are therefore to be excluded from any ecclesiastical 
office. Voetius explicitly mentioned Hobbes, Grotius and episcopius for 
undermining this principle, and thus he unequivocally equated Arminian 
theology with the erastianism of Hobbes.75
The Public Church & Private Conscience
This panorama of theological and political debate forms the background 
to the thought of the brothers De la Court on the relation between church 
and state. The De la Courts, keen readers of especially Grotius’s Verant-
woordingh and Uytenbogaert’s Kerckelijcke Historie,76 prove to be largely 
indebted to the Arminian tradition, albeit rather on political than theo-
logical grounds. In particular, they adopt the Arminian stance to plea for 
a broad, inclusive public church which, overseen by the magistracy, frees 
the republic of clerical bondage and demagogy and thus guarantees social 
concord, the purity of faith, and the freedom of private conscience.
In a number of key chapters of the Politike Discoursen, the brothers 
De la Court begin by highlighting the fundamental political importance of 
religion. Following a standard claim brought forward from Lipsius to 
Boxhorn, they argue that religion is essential for civil society, for it would 
be unlikely that the social contract could be maintained on the basis of 
only fear of punishment or sentiments of honour and gratitude. Indeed,
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77 Politike Discoursen II.IV.2, p. 12: “Maar deese straffen, beloften, Eer, en dankbaarheid, 
voor genoote protectie, soude sonder Gods-dienst, die oover ongehoorsaamheid na dit 
leeven, voor Gods straf doet vreesen, niet genoegsaam zijn om de menschen in gedurige 
pligten teegen haare Ooverheid, en haar eeven-naasten, te onderhouden.”
78 Ibidem, 14: “… kan bevinden dat er een God is … volgens onse eige goede reeden-kave-
linge en driften … de wetten der nature, die een yder met naa-soeken in sig selven kan 
vinden.”
79 Ibidem II.IV.3, p. 19: “Maar nogtans soudemen een Regeering konnen begrypen, die 
uit den status naturalis, aangebooren stand, soude groejen, sonder publike Gods-dienst. 
Sulks de Gods-dienst gemeenelik in een politike Regeering zijnde, nogtans seeker is, dat er 
seer goede Regeringen onder de Indianen, en Heidenen, geweest zijn, daar seer weinig, of 
seer verkeerde Gods-dienst was.”
80 Ibidem, 21: “… en dewijl die ruineus voor het menschelik geslagt soude zijn, so moet 
die noodsaakelik, door de Politie, weg-genoomen werden, om de menschen te behouden, 
en in ’t leeven te doen blyven.”
these punishments, promises, Honour, and gratitude for enjoyed protection 
would, without Religion, which as regards disobedience inflicts fear for 
God’s punishment after this life, not be sufficient to maintain people in con-
tinuous obligations to their Government and their fellow humans.77
Because of its transcending disciplinary power, religion thus has a funda-
mentally utilitarian value: it makes subjects as well as rulers aware of their 
duties to each other and of the need for charity, friendship and trust. God 
has endowed humankind with the means “to find out that there is a God”, 
and to realize “according to our own good reasoning and impulses” that 
people should behave in accordance with “the laws of nature, which eve-
ryone can find by examining himself”.78 In short, humanity is necessarily 
endowed with religion, for without religion it is impossible to conceive of 
natural law and the existence of civil society.
Yet while religious belief as such is necessary, institutionalized 
Christianity is not, for it remains possible to “presuppose a Government 
that would grow out of the status naturalis, the natural condition, without 
public Religion”. Indeed, “Indians and Pagans” are a living example that 
some societies subsist without knowing the true faith.79 Religious diver-
sity is therefore a natural fact. Given all the differences between human 
beings, a proliferation of various religious sects is unavoidable, and so 
is the ensuing conflict among these sects, for people are by their passion-
ate nature inclined to challenge those who disagree and to try to con-
vert them to their own particular creed. In a situation where there is no 
higher authority over religion, endless warfare would be the inevitable 
result, “and because that would be ruinous for humankind, its causes 
should necessarily be removed by Politics to maintain the people and 
keep them alive”.80 In short, the passage from the state of nature to civil 
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81 Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 45, referring to Politike Discoursen II.IV.3, p. 24.
82 Politike Discoursen II.IV.4, p. 32: “… dat in een land niet meer als eene supremo potes-
tas, Hoge Overigheid is, ofte behoord te weesen: ende dat geen Onderdaan eenige publike 
wettelike magt besit, dan die van deese Souveraine magt afdaald.”
83 Ibidem II.IV.2, p. 18: “… oproerige Geesteliken … tot haar eigen voordeel … met den 
gemeene Ingeseetenen te doen gelooven, dat door hare twist-schriften, en disputerende 
predicatien, ofte Conquesten op de ongeloovigen ofte dissenterenden, de ware Religie 
soude werden voortgeplant.”
84 Aanwysing III.1, p. 408: “… dat sy den Staat soo Regeeren, dat selfs de allerboos-aar-
digste ende hoovaardigste Predikers niet souden konnen de Republike omkeeren, ende ‘s 
Lands welvaaren vernietigen.”
society necessitates that the established sovereign oversees organized 
religion. Otherwise there would be no civil society, but only the continu-
ation of a war of all against all.
Accordingly, the De la Courts argue that the very essence of sovereignty 
implies secular control over the church. Religion is conducive to social 
concord because it teaches the love of one’s neighbours, yet it can only do 
so if supervised by one indivisible sovereign. noel Malcolm has argued 
that this claim draws “directly on Hobbes’s political theories”, in particu-
lar because of the resulting “peculiarly Hobbesian twist to this argument” 
that the public judgment of good and evil belongs to the sovereign.81 
Yet the influence of Hobbes on the De la Courts’ views on the relation 
between church and state should not be overstated. The brothers do not 
refer to Hobbes at all in this context, and in so far as they appropriate 
Hobbes for their argument, they merely, like Voetius, turn Hobbes into an 
Arminian. Their account of the secular control over the church remains 
largely within the Arminian framework of a single sovereign in both civil 
and ecclesiastical affairs. With a vocabulary that distantly echoes Grotius’s 
De imperio, the De la Courts assert “that in a Country there is or should be 
not more than one supremo [sic] potestas, High Government, and that no 
Subject possesses any public legitimate power than that which descends 
from this Sovereign power”.82 The alternative would be a plethora of “rebel-
lious clerics” who try to spark off tumults and discord “to their own advan-
tage”, making their followers believe “that by their querulous writings and 
disputing predications or Conquests of the unbelievers or dissenters, the 
true Religion would be propagated”.83 For the De la Courts, as for Grotius, 
the opposite is the case. In order to preserve religion and concord in soci-
ety, it is necessary that all clerics are restrained in their words and deeds 
by the civil magistrates, who should “Govern the State in such a way that 
even the most malicious and haughtiest Preachers would not be able to 
overturn the Republic and to destroy the Country’s welfare”.84
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85 Politike Discoursen II.IV.6, p. 43: “… om de dwaalingen te weren, en de suiverheid der 
Leere te behouden … nog deliberative, nog vonnissende stem.”
86 Ibidem, 45: “… gelijk een Land gelukkigst is dat door een meenigte verstandige, en 
voorneemste Inwoonders werd geregeerd, en geen twee-spald heeft, door Regeering, in 
Regeering, ofte de Souverainiteit in verscheide Collegien gedeeld te hebben: soo schynd 
ook in speculatie, dat het bestier oover den Gods-dienst, een seer considerabel gedeelte der 
Politie zijnde, in een Republijk, by ene meenigte der voorneemste Borgers, best soude stand 
houden.”
This secular government over ecclesiastical affairs to counterbalance 
the rebellious and demagogical clergy amounts to a public church that is 
overseen by the sovereign. Inspectors, appointed by the magistracy, 
administer the external affairs of this public church, while the magistracy 
(and only the magistracy) also has the authority to convene a synod “to 
suppress deviations and to maintain the purity of the Doctrine”. Such a 
synod, which settles doctrinal affairs, is made up by delegates of the sov-
ereign, and clerics have “neither a deliberative, nor a sentencing vote”.85 
All discussion and decision-making about doctrine is therefore left to 
laymen. Clerics are merely like soldiers who have to execute the orders of 
the sovereign without asking why. For the De la Courts, such a strict secu-
lar control over the church entails the only policy that corresponds to a 
true republic:
Like a Country is happiest when it is governed by a large number of pru-
dent  and most eminent Inhabitants, and when it has no discord 
because of a Government within Government or having the Sover-
eignty  divided amongst different Colleges; so it appears as well in 
speculation that the rule over the Religion, being a very considerable part of 
Politics, would in a Republic remain best with a large number of the most 
eminent Citizens.86
The ecclesiastical body of the public church mirrors the body politic of 
the state: like the commonwealth, the church should be one because it 
binds the many together into a unity, a communal framework that inte-
grates individual differences. In both civil and ecclesiastical affairs, this 
representative unity is best safeguarded by a broad government that will 
not succumb to anarchy or tyranny, be they political or religious.
The correlation between politics and religion means that the causes of 
as well as the antidotes against such anarchy and tyranny are largely com-
parable in both spheres. As the De la Courts argue, “the very same  passions 
of people spoil the Religion and install slavery or corruptions in Politics”. 
Hence, as liberty is maintained in a well-ordered republic, “the same rem-
edies should be employed to protect the Religion against decay” and to 
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87 Ibidem, 47: “en gelijk in een fraai gestelde Republijk, de Vryheid soo lange kan 
bewaard werden, tot dat sy door uitheems geweld haarer nabuuren werd verkragt: soo 
soudemen ook de Religie, ende ’t geen men voor Godes woord, of revelatie hield, onvervalst 
konnen bewaaren: want het zijn alle de selve passien der menschen, die den Godsdienst 
bederven, en de slavernie, of corruptien, in de Politie invoeren; sulks en ook alle de selve 
remedien behoorde aan te wenden, om den Gods-dienst voor verval te beschermen.”
88 Ibidem, 48: “…doen volgens den Politiken regul, om den Staat by sijn oude, vry- 
ende suiverheid te behouden, ad principia redeundum. namentlik, in alle geleegentheid 
tot de eerste beginselen, ende de suivere fonteine, Gods Woord, keeren.” Cf. Machiavelli, 
Discorsi III.1.
keep divine revelation “unadulterated”.87 Whereas republican liberty and 
concord are undermined if the monarchical desire to rule is allowed free 
rein, religion will likewise disintegrate under the domination of the clergy. 
This clerical ascendancy can be countered if the teachings of the public 
church are exclusively informed by Scripture and supervised by the sover-
eign. As the De la Courts maintain in a move that again merges erasmus 
with Machiavelli, this policy boils down to the application of one funda-
mental principle: the “Political rule to keep the State in its ancient liberty 
and purity, ad principia redeundum, namely to turn back on all occasions 
to the first principles and to the pure fountain of God’s word”.88
Significantly, the De la Courts then maintain utter silence about what 
these first religious principles might be. This silence reveals how little 
importance they attach to the contents of theological dogma, quite unlike 
for example Grotius. Yet they do clearly follow Grotius with the further 
claim that a broad public church, which preserves the purity of faith, nec-
essarily leaves room for individual dissent in private. Like the hypothesis 
of a civil society without institutionalized religion, this assertion is clari-
fied by a reference to the supposedly primordial state of America. Imagine, 
the De la Courts tell their readers, a sovereign power in America that dic-
tates its own faith to all its subjects. This sovereign may be allowed to 
punish all dissenters who publicly preach another creed. Yet “according 
to the laws of nature”, the sovereign still has to protect those dissenters 
who remain politically loyal, because the only alternative is to put them 
back “in statu naturali, outside of the Civil state”, whereby they would 
cease to be its subjects. Through this thought experiment, the De la Courts 
argue that “man, coming out of the natural into the Civil state, has not given 
up his right or power to believe that which appears him to be true”. 
In other words, the social contract does not and cannot imply that people 
have renounced their freedom of conscience. As a consequence, “the 
Government is bound, according to the laws of nature, to allow Freedom 
of conscience to all its Subjects who would be willing to obey him as far as 
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89 Ibidem II.IV.3, p. 21–22: “… volgens de wetten der nature, moeten beschermen, gelijk 
als vooren, of haar in statu naturali, buiten den Borgerliken stand, stellen … want de 
mensch uit den natuurlike stant, tot de Burgerlike komende, heeft niet overgegeeven, sijn 
regt ofte magt om te geloven ’t gunt hem waaragtig schynd te weesen; om dat het hem 
onmogelik was … Sulks hier uit soude volgen, dat de Ooverheid, volgens de wetten der 
nature, gehouden is, Vryheid voor de conscientie, en ’t gewissen te laaten, aan alle haare 
Onderdaanen, die haar, in ’t geene haare mogelik is, en daar sy toe gehouden zijn, soude wil-
len gehoorsamen.”
90 Ibidem, 23–24.
91 See Israel, Dutch Republic, 760–764.
92 ‘D.H.’ [Johan de Wit], Public Gebedt, ofte consideratien tegens het nominatim bidden in 
de publique kerken voor particulieren persoonen, en specialijken voor den jegenwoordigen 
Heere Prince van Orangien, 3 vols. (Amsterdam: ‘Cyprianus van der Gracht’, 1663–4), vol. I: 
esp. 26–37.
possible and as much as they are bound”.89 Following the legacy of the 
Dutch Revolt that was continued by the Arminians, the brothers De 
la Court thus insist that freedom of conscience is an inalienable natural 
right to which no sovereign power, let alone any clerical preachers, 
can lay a claim. The authority of the magistracy extends over all exter-
nal  affairs of the church and even over the contents of preaching and 
doctrine, yet it can never touch on the private conscience of every 
individual.90
The Debate over the Public Prayer
The extent to which this theory of secular supervision over the church 
and freedom of conscience entailed a direct intervention in the Dutch 
public debate, becomes clear in the controversy that arose shortly after 
the first works of the De la Courts were published. The immediate cause 
for this controversy was the ruling by the States of Holland, announced in 
1663, that all public preaching in the province should forsake prayers for 
the Prince of Orange. This ruling touched the sore spot of the political 
status quo, for it concerned the crucial issue of the degree of secular 
sovereignty over the church, as well as the antagonism between the 
advocates of ‘True Liberty’ and the Orangists.91 Revealingly, the States’ 
declaration was publicly legitimized by Johan de Wit, the cousin of 
his namesake the Grand Pensionary and also a relative of the Van der 
Voorts, and hence De la Court’s main intermediary with the The Hague 
establishment. In a large, three-volume treatise titled Public Gebedt 
[“Public Prayer”], De Wit followed Grotius in appropriating Bodin’s 
theory of sovereignty for the argument that the supreme authority in the 
Dutch Republic falls to the provincial States.92 The Prince of Orange might 
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93 De Wit, Public Gebedt, vol. I: 37–48, 52, and the entirety of vol. III.
94 Ibidem, vol. I, 45: “… in een Democratische by de Gemeente, als eertijts te Athenen, 
ende nu tot Zurich in Switserlant, ende in dezen Staat by de Staten van elke Provintie.”
95 Ibidem, vol. II: esp. ch. 5.
96 Pieter de la Court to the brothers Van der Voort, 24 november 1663, in Kernkamp 
(ed.), “Brieven (1661–1666),” 143: “Het Vervolg van ’t Publik Gebedd behaagd mij ongemeen 
seer, sulks ik hoope dat de goede ingeseetenen meer en meer sullen prijsen de proceduren 
van hare wettige overheid, en verfoeien de gedurige gepretendeerde dominatie en dwing-
landie der andere provintien omtrent Holland.”
 97 Den verresenen Barnevelt, betabbert met alle sijne politycke maximen (Zierikzee, 
1663), 13: “… eenen veraerden, ongeurigen en verrotten Waal, die … ’t fundament vande 
Regeringe deser Landen om verre werpende met sijne schriften, en schadelijcke maximen 
tegen Unie en Gereformeerde Religie.”
98 Ibidem, 37–38: “nademael de Kercke in haer selven wesentlijck aengemerckt, niet en 
is een deel van de Politie.”
enjoy sovereign authority in his own estates but he has never done so in 
the Republic at large, where he is but a private individual.93 As De Wit 
insisted, in a “Democratic” state the sovereignty “is with the Com munity, 
as formerly in Athens and now in Zurich in Switzerland, and in this State 
with the States of each Province”.94 Thus characterizing Holland as a dem-
ocratic republic, De Witt stressed that the right to decide the contents of 
public prayers belongs only to the sovereign, i.e. to the States of Holland.95 
De la Court, who by then had been silenced by the Leiden consistory, was 
delighted with the Public Gebedt, as he wrote to his brothers-in-law shortly 
after its publication. The book “pleases me unusually much”, he said, “so 
that I hope that the good inhabitants will more and more appreciate the 
procedures of their lawful government and loathe the incessant pre-
tended dominance and tyranny of the other provinces over Holland”.96
At the other side of the political spectrum, the Public Gebedt encoun-
tered much criticism. Moreover, Orangist pamphleteers immediately 
linked the work to De la Court, who in one particularly vitriolic pamphlet 
was hailed as “the resurrected Barnevelt”, as the incarnation of politicized 
Arminianism. De la Court, according to this pamphlet, was a “hell-dog” 
full of lies and slanders, “a degenerated, reeking and rotten Walloon 
who … overthrows the foundation of the Government of these Lands with 
his writings and pernicious maxims against the Union and the Reformed 
Religion”.97 Such qualifications had by then become a commonplace ele-
ment of anti-De la Courtism, and it is more revealing that the pamphlet 
explicitly equated De la Court’s Interest van Holland with Grotius, 
episcopius and the Public Gebedt. The pamphlet countered this Arminian 
tradition by arguing, in line with Voetius, that “the Church considered 
essentially in itself is not a part of Politics”.98 Therefore, ecclesiastical 
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 99 Ibidem, 45–46: “Om dat ’t geene Kerckelijck is, niet den Overheydt maer de Dienaren 
van de Kerck privatelick toekomt … Vryheydt van bidden, zijnde der Kercken machtighste 
wapenen, en die die Kercken noyt konnen ontnomen werden.”
100 Den Schotsen duyvel, betabbert in den verresenen Barnevelt … met alle sijne Jesuitsche 
maximen van ’t Presbyterisch convenant, en ’t Utrechtsch Presbytery. Uyt de gemeene lessen 
en legenden van Gisbertus Voetius, aerts-muyt-meester (Utrecht, 1663). See also Herstelden 
Barneveldt, ofte t’samenspraeck tusschen een Hollander, Seeu ende Vries (Leiden, 1663).
101 See esp. Der Remonstranten vocale letters (Schiedam, 1664), Consideratien op het pub-
lijck gebedt ofte gebede-formulier van Hollandt, tegen D.H. (Leeuwarden, 1663) and Nadere 
ofte tweede consideratien tegen het publijck gebedt (Leeuwarden, 1663).
102 ‘Vrederyck Waermont’ [Adriaen Koerbagh], De souverainiteyt van Holland ende 
West-Vriesland … Tot refutatie van den verresen Barnevelt (Middelburg, 1664): “Jesuytsche 
maximen en sustinuen … Voetiaensche Consistorianten.” On the authorship of this pam-
phlet, see Gerrit Jongeneelen, “An Unknown Pamphlet of Adriaan Koerbagh,” Studia 
Spinozana 3 (1987), 405–415.
authority cannot be subordinated to secular authority. Those who serve 
God have another duty than those who govern the commonwealth, and 
hence there is no question of a divided sovereignty or imperium in imperio 
should the clergy remain independent of the magistracy. Rather, church 
and state each operate in their own distinct spheres. Since “that which is 
ecclesiastical does not belong to the Government but privately to the 
Servants of the Church”, it is to the clergy to decide whom to pray for. In 
this way the pamphlet defended the “Freedom of praying” against the 
erastian usurpation of the church propagated by De la Court cum suis.99
The controversy over the public prayer continued to dominate the 
public debate throughout the 1660s. A subsequent pamphlet openly 
denounced Voetius as a “Scottish Devil” with “Jesuit maxims”, an “arch 
master of mutiny” who propagated a treacherous blend of Catholicism 
and Presbyterianism.100 In reply, the Voetians returned the accusation of 
sowing discord and endangering the social harmony.101 Both sides of the 
debate thus claimed to safeguard concord and peace against the rebel-
lious assaults of the adversary. eventually, the controversy also lured 
more radical freethinkers into the hazardous sphere of public disputa-
tion. Adriaen Koerbagh, a particularly non-conformist author who was 
close to Spinoza, clearly chose sides by championing the sovereignty of 
the States of Holland against the “Jesuit maxims” of the “Voetian consisto-
rians”.102 In 1665, the dispute was taken at a higher theoretical level 
with the publication of the treatise De jure ecclesiasticorum, issued in the 
fictional “Alethopolis” (“True-State”) under the pseudonym of ‘Lucius 
Antistius Constans’. Spinoza, Van Velthuysen and De la Court have all 
been suspected of hiding under this name, yet the least improbable 
candidate is Lodewijk Meijer, a graduate in philosophy and medicine 
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103 [Lodewijk Meijer], Philosophia sacrae scripturae interpres (‘eleutheropolis’ 
[=Amsterdam], 1666). The library of De la Court van der Voort had a copy of this work: 
Library, fol. 17. For Meijer, see Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 197–217, and Van Bunge, From 
Stevin to Spinoza, 94–96. On the authorship of De jure ecclesiasticorum, cf. Wildenberg, 
Bibliografie, 30, and Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 201.
104 ‘Lucius Antistius Constans’, De jure ecclesiasticorum (‘Alethopolis’, 1665), “Praefatio,” 
sig. A4 v.: “ea impia, inepta & perniciosa omnis aevi ecclesiastcorum Ambitio.” For a short 
analysis of the work, see nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration, 245–250. See also Hans Blom, 
“Le contexte historique du De jure ecclesiasticorum” and Christian Lazzeri, “L.A. Constans 
entre Hobbes et Spinoza,” in Du droit des ecclésiastiques, trans. V. Butori (Caen : Centre de 
philosophie politique et juridique, 1991), viii-xli.
105 ‘Constans’, De jure, 22–25.
106 Ibidem, 52: “Omnem Inaequalitatem ecclesiasticorum non minus aut aliter, 
quam caeterorum Civium a solis Prodiis procedere: nec ullum illorum & horum discrimen 
esse.”
107 Ibidem, 64–152.
from Leiden University and also a member of Spinoza’s circle. Meijer’s 
Philosophia sacrae scripturae interpres, published anonymously in 1666 in 
“eleutheropolis” (“Free-State”), caused a major uproar for its radical sub-
ordination of theological dogma to rational inquiry and its rejection of the 
doctrine of the Trinity.103
The De jure ecclesiasticorum does not entail such a radical stance, yet it 
intervenes directly in the public debate with a comparably provocative 
attitude and pushes the Arminian legacy to the extreme. Condemning the 
“impious, inept & pernicious Ambition of the ecclesiastics of all ages”, 
the treatise rejects any claim to ecclesiastical independence.104 It follows 
in the footsteps of Grotius and the brothers De la Court but radicalizes 
their theory of the establishment of the civil society. For the author of 
De jure, people leave the state of nature through a double pact, whereby 
all give up their right and power of judging and deciding how to lead their 
life. Accordingly, every single member of the civitas has agreed to “cease 
being Gods for themselves”. Citizens surrender their natural right and 
power entirely to the sovereign magistrates, the prodii, those who “take 
God’s place”.105 no member of society can possibly be exempted from this 
double pact. As a result, all forms of social hierarchy (such as a public 
ministry) issue from the prodii alone: “All Inequality of the ecclesiastics, 
which is not less or different than the inequality of other Citizens, pro-
ceeds only from the Prodii: There is no difference between them [i.e. the 
ecclesiastics] and others.”106 Rebutting every claim that the clergy enjoys 
distinctive privileges, De jure thus aims to prove that clerics are just ordi-
nary citizens who always remain dependent on the favour of the sover-




110 On Spinoza’s “‘theological-political’ intervention”, see etienne Balibar, Spinoza and 
Politics (London and new York: Verso, 2008), esp. 1–24. Pieter de la Court van der Voort 
owned copies of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (‘Hamburg, 1670’) and of the 
Opera Posthuma by ‘B.D.S.’, published in 1677. See Library, fol. 17. For the fascinating story 
behind the publication and distribution of Spinoza’s works, see Israel, Radical 
Enlightenment, 275–294.
111 See Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium III.II.9, discussed in Blom, “Le contexte 
historique,” xix-xx.
112 Aanwysing I.14, p. 61: “Want de Potestas coercendi, die dwingende magt niemande 
dan den Politiken is gegeeven; ende van de selve Politike magt, ook alle magt ende regt op 
den Kerkeliken, indien sy eenige hebben, moet neederdalen.” See also the qualifications of 
De jure as a “voortreffelik” and “onweederleggelik Boukjen” in Ibidem III.1–2, p. 407, 425.
This far-reaching erastian argument relies on two important concep-
tions of religion as such. First, clearly following the Arminian tradition, 
the treatise distinguishes between internal and external religion. The for-
mer concerns the individual soul and can only be overseen by God, but 
the latter concerns all the ‘corporal’ aspects of religion and is fully admin-
istered by the clergy on the authority of the sovereign. The author of 
De jure emphasizes that speech too is a corporal action. Therefore the 
contents of public prayers are always to be supervised by the secular 
powers – an obvious reference to the controversy on the Public Gebedt.108 
Secondly, De jure highlights the value of religion as a political tool. While 
Grotius and the De la Courts stressed the political importance of religion, 
the author of De jure pushes their argument further by maintaining that 
the utilitas of religion can in fact be of more importance than its veritas. In 
other words, the prodii do not necessarily take the place of the one and 
only true God: they might propagate a specific creed only for its utility.109 
The implications of this view would be developed further by Spinoza, 
whose Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, published in 1670, entails by far the 
most radical intervention in the Dutch debate on the relation between 
state and church and the political pretensions of the clergy.110
De jure was also read outside of the Republic, for example by Pufendorf, 
who referred to the treatise as support for his conception of the causes of 
inequality in civil society.111 Another keen reader of De jure was De la 
Court. In preparing the Aanwysing, De la Court saw his own ideas on the 
position of the clergy demonstrated by that “excellent” and “irrefutable 
book”. It made him insist once more that the “potestas coercendi”, the 
power of coercion, belongs only to the sovereign, “and from the same 
Political Power must descend all power and right of the Ecclesiastics, if 
they have any”.112 In the end, perhaps because of his manifestly popular 
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rhetoric, De la Court came to be seen as the principal spokesman of this 
Arminian theory of church and state. Years later, in 1674, many of the 
Voetian pamphlets concerning the controversy of the public prayer were 
republished as a general refutation of “the pernicious Maxims of La Court 
and others”.113 And even after De la Court’s death, a pro-Stadholder pam-
phlet of 1690 accused the “Main Article of the Arminian Faith, Build on 
the Foundations of Barnevelt, confirmed by so many lessons of Hugo 
Grotius … and finally completed by Pieter la Court”.114
Yet although his opponents overtly portrayed him as an Arminian, De 
la Court should not be characterized too hastily as a dedicated disciple of 
Remonstrant theology. Theological issues are all but absent from the writ-
ings of the De la Courts, and their adherence to the Arminian legacy is 
principally political: it is an intrinsic element of their republican account 
of civil society and their criticism of the monarchical desire to rule. This 
republican emphasis becomes clear in a number of passages  that com-
ment on the fate of religion in monarchies. The De la Courts assert that 
kings, easily misled by flattery and detrimental advice, “do not grasp the 
affairs of Religion at all” and “err from the truth or fear for God”. This lack 
of devoutness and understanding leads to religious instability, for mon-
archs “are easily brought that far that they change from Religion … and also 
remodel and embellish the entire public Religion according to their own or 
their Favourites’ interest”.115 The unadorned purity of Christianity, based 
on Scripture and the simplicity of the apostolic era, degenerates into arti-
ficial ornamentation when left to the whims of a monarchical court. 
Monarchs tend to support rebellious clerics in order to achieve their 
supremacy (with Henry IV, Cromwell, and William the Silent as revealing 
examples), and this clerical prominence poses an acute threat to the 
social concord and the stability of religion as such.116
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117 Politike Weeg-schaal I.I.25, p. 119: “… maar de Republiken, eenmaal het zware juk des 
Pausdoms afgeworpen hebbende, zijn al te saamen volstandig gebleeven tot huiden toe.”
118 Aanwysing III.1, p. 406–407.
119 Ibidem III.2, p. 427–428: “… een Kerken-Raad, ofte Republikse Kerkelike Bedieninge, 
waarmede de Vryheid der Republike beeter bewaard soude weesen.”
120 On the practice of early-modern Dutch toleration, see in particular the various 
essays in R. Po-Chia Hsia and H.F.K. van nierop (eds.), Calvinism and Religious Toleration 
in the Dutch Golden Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For a compara-
tive approach that puts Dutch toleration into international perspective, see Benjamin 
Kaplan, Divided by Faith. Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern 
Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). Cf. as well the revisionist 
essays on early-modern european toleration in Ole Peter Grell and Bob Scribner (eds.), 
In sharp contrast, “the Republics, once having thrown off the yoke of the 
Papacy, have all together remained constant until today”.117 A republican 
regime that utterly discards courtly or clerical demagogy is able to uphold 
a broad, consensus-based public church that keeps religion pure and sta-
ble. The sovereign control over the church, necessary to counter the pre-
tensions of the clergy, is only possible in republics where that sovereignty 
belongs to an assembly of many.118 Moreover, the maintenance of a public 
church is easiest when that church is governed in a republican way, freed 
from papal and bishopric usurpation, by “a Church council, or Republican 
ecclesiastical Office, with which the Liberty of the Republic would be bet-
ter preserved”.119 The political organization of the public church is more 
important than the particularities of its creed, the adiaphora of Christian 
faith. This fairly relativist attitude towards the contents of religious dogma 
becomes particularly clear in the remarkable plea of the brothers De la 
Court for the ultimate characteristic of a true commercial common-
wealth: the toleration of dissenters.
 Toleration: Pluralism for the Sake of Unity
Dutch Toleration between Practice & Theory
What did toleration entail in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic? 
This is an important question because the practice of religious co-existence 
in the Dutch Golden Age has often been heralded as an exceptional 
phenomenon that, though an anomaly in its own age, somehow prophe-
sied the problems and promises of modern-day societies. At the same 
time, revisionist historiography has maintained that the relatively toler-
ant practices of the Dutch urban world entailed merely a pragmatic 
modus vivendi that lacked any principled theoretical underpinning.120 
The rather paradoxical consensus on Dutch toleration in the seventeenth 
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Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), and Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (eds.), Toleration in Enlightenment Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
121 For some notable exceptions, see Israel, “Intellectual Debate”; Marshall, Locke, 
Toleration; and Joris van eijnatten, Mutua Christianorum Tolerantia. Irenicism and 
Toleration in the Netherlands: the Stinstra affair, 1740–1745 (Florence: Olschki, 1998). See 
also Willem Frijhoff, “The Threshold of Toleration. Interconfessional Conviviality in 
Holland During the early Modern Period,” in Idem, Embodied Belief. Ten Essays on Religious 
Culture in Dutch History (Hilversum: Verloren, 2002), 39–65. For the english case, see 
Alexandra Walsham, Charitable Hatred. Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500–1700 
(Manchester and new York: Manchester University Press, 2006)
century seems to be that the United Provinces were characterized by a 
far-reaching practice of toleration as compared to other european poli-
ties, while toleration as a theoretical ideal was mainly formulated outside 
of the netherlands – or at best by foreigners confronted with the realities 
of Dutch religious co-existence such as John Locke and Pierre Bayle. As a 
result, the varying degrees of toleration of seventeenth-century Dutchmen 
are often judged along a modern standard of what it means to be tolerant, 
yet what the concept of toleration meant to those Dutchmen themselves 
has thus far received little detailed analysis.121
For early-modern europeans, the Latin tolerantia had the obvious con-
notation of a burden that had to be borne for the sake of a lesser evil. In 
order to overcome the religious conflicts that shattered europe in the 
wake of the Reformation, such forbearance of difference and disagree-
ment was considered necessary for the maintenance of social peace. Yet 
importantly, it was not seen as a goal in itself. Thus, toleration (in Dutch 
tolerantie or verdraagzaamheid, the literal equivalent to forbearance) 
did not originally imply the unconditional acceptance of otherness as a 
virtue, but rather the provisional connivance with diversity as the only 
means to counter open conflict. Toleration therefore bore the suggestion 
of Biblical patience, the temporary endurance of evil so that eventually, 
unity and concord within society could be re-established. In short, the 
foundation and the ideal of toleration was not the celebration of plural-
ism but the search for common ground. Because of this communal con-
notation of the concept, toleration usually implied a collective permission 
to a dissenting group on the authority of the civil power. Contrary to its 
modern significance as an individual, moral quality actively pursued by 
one individual and open for another to claim as an innate right, in the 
seventeenth century toleration involved a revocable license granted by 
the magistracy for the sake of order and stability. Toleration therefore 
meant political interference, paradoxically as it may sound to modern 
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122 See the lucid discussion in Van eijnatten, Mutua Christianorum Tolerantia, 7–21, and 
cf. Kaplan, Divided by Faith. Van eijnatten insists on the conceptual distinction between 
‘tolerantie’, i.e. active non-discrimination, and ‘verdraagzaamheid’ in the sense of passive 
forbearance, yet I am not convinced that this distinction holds for the seventeenth cen-
tury: the brothers De la Court, for example, used both terms interchangeably.
123 See Israel, “Intellectual Debate,” 11, and Marshall, Locke, Toleration, 344–345.
124 Andrew Pettegree, “The Politics of Toleration in the Free netherlands, 1572–1620,” in 
Grell and Scribner (eds.), Tolerance and Intolerance, 182–198: 198.
125 [Simon episcopius], Vrye godes-dienst, of t’samen-spreeckinghe tusschen Remon-
strant en Contra-Remonstrant (s.l., 1627), 7: “… soo is onse gheloof een puere loutere gave 
Godts, die alleen van Godt komt, sonder eenighe onse toedoen. ’T Disputeeren, ’t krackee-
len helpt daer niet meer toe.”
ears: while its present-day meaning is intrinsically linked to the concep-
tion of a separation between church and state, early-modern toleration 
implied the active intervention of the state in matters of faith.122
Thus in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic the debate on tolera-
tion was intrinsically linked to the debate on the sovereignty in ecclesias-
tical affairs and the political role of the church. The Arminian plea for a 
public church supervised by the state left the private exercise of freedom 
of conscience as an inviolable asset beyond the coercive powers of the 
sovereign. However, this defence of freedom of conscience did not neces-
sarily entail a tolerationist attitude as regards religious dissenters. In its 
earliest stages, Arminianism in fact proved to be anything but tolerant 
towards religious diversity.123 Both Uytenbogaert and Grotius advocated 
severe measures against those forms of worship that exceeded the limits 
of the public church. It was only after 1618, when the Arminians them-
selves became the victims of persecution, that they started to plead openly 
for religious toleration. As Andrew Pettegree has remarked, early-modern 
toleration was “only ever likely to be the party cry of the disappointed, 
the dispossessed, or the seriously confused”, in short, “it was only ever a 
loser’s creed”.124
The main Arminian representative of this loser’s creed was episco pius. 
His 1627 pamphlet Vrye godes-dienst [“Free Worship”], different to his 
theological work published in the vernacular, entailed perhaps his most 
manifest intervention in the Dutch public debate. The pamphlet stages a 
dialogue between a Remonstrant and a Contra-Remonstrant on the issue 
of religious diversity. With this literary form episcopius rhetorically 
empha sizes the importance of open conversation to overcome confes-
sional disagreement. At the start of the dialogue the Contra-Remonstrant 
character insists on the necessity of force to punish dissenters. He negates 
the utility of discussion, because “our religion is a pure, sheer gift of God” 
which therefore transcends any form of debate or doubt.125 However, in 
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126 Cf. Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration, esp. 43–101. For a slightly differ-
ent interpretation, which stresses the polemical aspects of epsicopius’ dialogue, see 
Sierhuis, “A Babel Full of Confusion”, 322–324.
127 For episcopius’ theory of toleration, see Israel, “Intellectual Debate,” 18–20, Marshall, 
Locke, Toleration, 351–354, and nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration, 94–107.
128 epsicopius, Vrye godes-dienst, 16: “… dat een yeghelijck altijdt en overal, ‘t zy in een 
Coninghrijck, ‘t zy in een Republijcke, vry en gheoorloft is sijne ghevoelen van de Religie 
te verklaren en anderen mede te deelen.”
129 Cf. Kaplan, Divided by Faith, 172–197.
130 episcopius, Vrye godes-dienst, 44: “Want daer vryheydt van conscientie voorghes-
taen wordt, daer moet elck een die genieten, of het is geen rechte vryheyt: Dat vry is moet 
gemeen zijn, of het wort wederom dwangh.”
the course of the dialogue the Contra-Remonstrant gradually comes to 
perceive that matters are more complex. eventually the conversation 
challenges his earlier certainties and brings him closer to the position of 
his Remonstrant challenger. episcopius thus shows that dialogue is an 
essential means to solve differences of faith peacefully, and that the truth 
is not given a priori but that it must be found through a collective endeav-
our. The pamphlet both propagates and performs this erasmian, irenicist 
ideal.126
To persuade his opponent, the Remonstrant character in Vrye godes-
dienst stresses the Biblical virtue of loving one’s neighbour and continues 
with an exposition of the main principles of the Arminian theory of a pub-
lic church. Here episcopius crucially departs from his Arminian predeces-
sors by admitting room for religious dissent outside of that public church. 
In this way, he broadens freedom of conscience to freedom of worship 
and expression.127 The pamphlet emphasizes that “everyone is always and 
anywhere, be it in a Kingdom or in a Republic, free and permitted to 
declare his feeling about Religion and to let it know to others”.128 The only 
condition for such a public affirmation of faith is that it does not go against 
the civil law, even though there should always be opportunity for private 
congregations to convene in secret – a clear defence and rationalization 
of the practical connivance of schuilkerken, clandestine churches, in 
the Dutch Republic.129 In line with this judgment, episcopius also advo-
cates the toleration of Catholics, at least if they act in accordance with 
the law, for “where freedom of conscience is advocated, there anyone 
should enjoy it, or else it would not be true freedom. That which is free 
must be common, or else it becomes again coercion”.130
This significant, principled defence of a broad conception of religious 
freedom obviously entails much more than a deliberate but unconvinced 
pragmatist attitude, as seventeenth-century Dutch toleration has often 
been characterized. episcopius unequivocally stresses the value of a 
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131 episcopius, Vrye godes-dienst, 37: “… hoe meerder ghesintheden, hoe minder peri-
jckel en vreese. D’een houdt d’ander in ghewichte en balance, en de meeste overweghen 
altijdt licht eenen, die de Meester soude willen maken. De vryheyt selve is een remedie 
teghen alle onghelijck en onheyl.”
132 Ibidem, 54–55: “Sy noemen de deughden sonden, de sonden deughden, het goed 
quaedt, het quaedt goed, licht duysternisse, en duysternisse licht.”
133 Israel, “Intellectual Debate,” 19, states that episcopius advocated “a plurality of 
churches”, but I have only found evidence that episcopius argued in favour of a plurality 
of convictions (“ghesintheden”), which is something else. Cf. also Marshall, Locke, 
Toleration, 354.
134 [Johannes Uytenbogaert], Voorstant van de vryheyt der conscientie, teghen den con-
scientie-dwangh van Henricus Arnoldi vander Linden (s.l., 1630), 34 (marginal): “Men moet 
de verscheydenheyt op d’eenicheyt van ’t fondament verdraghen.”
135 Henricus Arnoldi vander Linde, Vande conscientie-dwangh (Delft, 1629). For a short 
analysis of this pamphlet, see Israel, “Intellectual Debate,” 17–18, and H.A. enno van 
Gelder, Getemperde vrijheid. Een verhandeling over de verhouding van Kerk en Staat in de 
diversity of religious beliefs, for “the more convictions, the less danger and 
fear. The one balances the other, and the majority always easily weighs 
more than one that would desire to take the upper hand. Freedom itself is 
a remedy against all inequality and disaster”.131 With this claim episcopius 
also advocates religious freedom as a political tool, as a means to counter 
instability and social discord by mutually attaching all citizens of differ-
ent creeds to the commonwealth. As the Remonstrant protagonist in 
the dialogue tells his opponent, those who undermine the concord of the 
Republic are in fact the intolerant Contra-Remonstrant ministers. They 
mislead their congregations with dangerous paradiastole, “calling the 
virtues sins, the sins virtues, good evil, evil good, light darkness, dark-
ness light”.132 A tolerationist policy counters such deceitful, demagogical 
speech, episcopius suggests. However, it is important to stress that his 
principled plea for the toleration of dissent does not involve a variety of 
public churches, but rather, true to erasmus’s irenicist ideal, one broad 
and inclusive public church that encompasses a variety of mutually 
accommodating opinions and beliefs.133 In short, for episcopius too, the 
goal is unity, not plurality per se.
Three years later, in 1630, Uytenbogaert expressed the very same desire 
for “variety on the unity of the foundation” in a pamphlet that defended 
epsicopius’s plea for toleration against its refutation by Henricus Arnoldi, 
a Contra-Remonstrant preacher and pamphleteer from Delft.134 Arnoldi 
basically argued that, following the spirit of the Dutch Revolt, freedom of 
conscience should be guaranteed, but that such freedom does not involve 
freedom of worship. Instead, further toleration of public congregations 
like the Remonstrants would, according to Arnoldi, endanger social con-
cord and sow chaos and conflict.135 In reply, Uytenbogaert recapitulated 
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Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden en de vrijheid van meningsuiting in zake godsdienst, 
drukpers en onderwijs, gedurende de 17e eeuw (Groningen, 1972), 238–240.
136 Uytenbogaert, Voorstant van de Vryheyt der Conscientie, 35: “… welcke verscheyden-
heyt als dan maeckt, niet verscheyden Christelijcke Kercken, maar verscheyden deelen 
(doch d’een suyverder of schurfter als ’t ander) van eene Alghemeyne Christelijcke 
Kercke.”
137 Israel, “Intellectual Debate,” 18, 20–21; and Idem, Dutch Republic, 637–638.
138 See Van eijnatten, Mutua Christianorum Tolerantia, 18–19, and esp. Aart de Groot, 
“Heterodoxie, Häresie und Toleranz in der Sicht von Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676),” in 
Henry Méchoulan et al. (eds.), La formazione storica della alterità. Studi di storia della tol-
leranza nell’età moderna offerti a Antonio Rotondò, 3 vols. (Florence: Olschki, 2001), vol. II: 
517–539. See also O.J. de Jong, “Voetius en de tolerantie,” in J. van Oort et al. (eds.), De 
onbekende Voetius (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1989), 109–116.
139 Voetius, Politicae ecclesiasticae partis primae, vol. II, esp. IV.I.2 (“De libertate consci-
entiae & permissione religionum in Republica”).
the main principles of the Arminian theory of church and state. He 
insisted that a variety of publicly propagated beliefs would not under-
mine the social stability, given that “such a variety does not create various 
Christian Churches, but various parts (though the one purer or scabbier 
than the other) of one General Christian Church”.136 This revealing state-
ment makes clear that for Uytenbogaert, toleration did not extend beyond 
the borders of Christianity, while within those borders as well, one ‘pure’ 
(read: Remonstrant) interpretation of Scripture should be preferred.
As Jonathan Israel has convincingly shown, “the great Dutch toleration 
debate” of the late 1620s eventually instigated a looser, more flexible polit-
ical climate in which the Remonstrants and other dissenting religious 
groups were, at least in some towns in the Republic, able to obtain per-
mission for the public practice of their beliefs.137 However, the limits to 
such toleration remained the object of dispute. Certain cities, most nota-
bly Leiden, continued a strong repressive policy of heterodox congrega-
tions. It might be argued that the overall result of the debate was a 
relatively lenient attitude as regards conventional diversity within 
Protestantism, for example towards Lutherans and Anabaptists, while 
more radical deviations from the norm fell victim to renewed repression. 
In the orthodox camp, Voetius insisted on the Christian duty of clemency 
and moderatio so as to reinstall peace and concord, a notion that opened 
the way to a certain degree of toleration within the Reformed church.138 
He stressed that individual conscience is only answerable to God and that 
compulsion cannot engender true faith, thus acknowledging that people 
should be allowed to worship as they want in private.139 Yet in public, 
the truth should remain triumphant. Therefore all ‘heretics’ who deny the 
fundamentals of faith ought to be banned from the church, and thus, from 
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140 nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration, 208, and De Groot, “Heterodoxie,” 533–536. Cf. on 
the justification of persecution in england: Mark Goldie, “The Theory of Religious 
Intolerance in Restoration england,” in Ole Peter Grell et al. (eds.), From Persecution to 
Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 331–368.
141 Israel, Dutch Republic, 911–912.
142 Voetius, Politicae ecclesiasticae partis primae, vol. 2, IV.I.9–10, p. 529–580. Cf. 
Marshall, Locke, Toleration, 368, and De Groot, “Heterodoxie,” 530–532.
143 [Adriaan Paets], Antwoord, van een Gereformeerdt Hollander, op een klaagbrief van 
N.N. Over zommige onrustige Rotterdamsche Predicanten, en voornamentlijk Iacobus 
Borstius (s.l., 1654); Idem, Sedig antwoord van N.N. Gereformeerd Hollander … Waar in bew-
esen werd dat de dwalende als soodanige niet strafbaar zijn door uyterlijk geweld (Leiden, 
[1655]); Idem, Fabula vetus actores novi. Dat is, de oude paep onder een nieuwe kap (s.l., 
1656): “… heersucht, oproerigheyt, precijsheyt, geltgierigheyt &c. … dese hervormde 
Papen.” On Paets, see enno van Gelder, Getemperde vrijheid, 245–249.
144 Van Velthuysen, Ondersoeck of de Christelijcke Overheydt eenigh quaedt in haer 
gebiedt mach toe laeten, 140: “Laat ons altijdt dencken dat Godt barmherticheydt en geen 
Offerande begeert.”
the official religious life. Given Voetius’s view on the relation between 
state and church, he left it to the civil authorities to decide whether these 
‘sects’ should be permitted in the civil sphere, but he also contended that 
the sovereign could not support the propagation of a false religion.140
In line with Voetius’s decrees, a gradual Catholic revival and the grow-
ing influence of Socinianism prompted a renewed offensive to counter 
the spread of heterodoxy over the course of the 1640s and 1650s. In 1653, 
the States of Holland issued a far-reaching decree against all forms of 
Socinianism, which set severe limits to toleration for decades to come.141 
Theologians such as Voetius insisted on the necessity to eradicate hidden 
anti-Trinitarian beliefs among Remonstrant circles, which thus remained 
the victim of repression.142 As a result, the main propagators of toleration 
in the second half of the century continued to come from the ranks of 
Arminianism. Adriaan Paets, a Rotterdam regent who was close to the 
free-thinking Collegiant movement, reacted against the persecution of 
Socinianism with a number of pamphlets that highlighted the peaceful-
ness of true faith and condemned the “heerszucht, rebelliousness, rigidity, 
and greediness” of the “reformed Papists”.143 Some years later, in 1660, Van 
Velthuysen published a comparable pamphlet in which he defended the 
right and duty of the state to tolerate religious dissent. He insisted repeat-
edly that such toleration follows from the maxim “God desires mercy and 
not offering”.144 In a direct confutation of Voetius, Van Velthuysen further 
asserted that political necessity and the unenforceability of conscience 
demand that certain “sins” be tolerated. The fundamental Christian com-
mandment of loving one’s neighbour asks for hospitality towards those 
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145 Ibidem, 296: “… die arme Joden te ontfangen, te herbergen, en verblijf te geven, als er 
geen hoop is, dat sy elders sullen ontfangen worden.”
146 Ibidem, 128–129: “Soo kanmen dan besluyten, dat een uyterlijck bedrijf van een 
valschen Gots-dienst, in voege voor-haalt, door de Regenten souden mogen geweert 
worden.”
147 See Joris van eijnatten, “Lodestars of Latitude. Gerard Brandt’s Peacable Christian, c. 
1664, Irenicism and Religious Dissent,” LIAS. Sources and Documents Relating to the Early 
Modern History of Ideas 26 (1999), 57–75: 62 (“een verslindster aller sekten”).
148 Ibidem, 71–72.
149 Gerard Brandt, Historie der Reformatie, en andre kerkelyke geschiedenissen, 4 vols. 
(Amsterdam, 1671–1704). See for this work Peter Burke, “The Politics of Reformation 
History: Burnet and Brandt,” in Alistair Duke and C.A. Tamse (eds.), Clio’s Mirror. 
Historiography in Britain and the Netherlands (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1985), 73–85. For 
some remarks on its reception, cf. Christine Berkvens-Stevelinck, “La reception de 
l’Historie der Reformatie de Gerard Brandt et son influence sur la conception de la tolé-
rance hollandaise,” in Idem et al. (eds.), Emergence of Tolerance, 131–140.
150 Philippus van Limborch, Korte wederlegginge van ’t boexken onlangs uytgegeven 
by Iacopus Sceperus … by vorme van ’t samen-sprekinge tusschen een Remonstrant 
en Contraremonstrant (Amsterdam, 1661), esp. 160–162, which directly quotes from 
epsicopius’ Vrye godes-dienst.
who flee from persecution, such as Jews, “if there is no hope that they will 
be received elsewhere”.145 nevertheless, Van Velthuysen also made clear, 
referring to Catholics, that the magistracy has the authority to ban “the 
external practice of a false Religion”.146
Another active Arminian champion of irenicism and secular interfer-
ence in religion was Gerard Brandt. His aptly titled didactic poem De 
vreedzame Christen [“The Peaceful Christian”] denounced clerical ambi-
tion and pride for creating discord. Brandt argued for apostolic simplicity, 
mutual forbearance and the agreement on the fundamentals of faith, 
which, so he hoped, established a broad public church supervised by the 
civil authorities that would be “a devourer of all sects”.147 He sent a copy of 
the poem to Van Velthuysen, and he dedicated the 1665 collection of 
poetry in which it was published to Pieter de Groot.148 In the 1670s, Brandt 
would gain fame for his historical overview of the Dutch Reformation, the 
Historie der Reformatie [“History of the Reformation”], a work in the vein 
of Uytenbogaert that involved a similar erasmian, anti-clerical and ireni-
cist plea for concord and toleration.149 Brandt’s colleague at the Remon-
strant Seminary of Amsterdam, Philippus van Limborch, proved to be at 
least as important for the continuation of the Arminian ideal of tolera-
tion. Van Limborch was related to episcopius, whose manuscripts he 
had inherited, and also by marriage to De Groot. In 1661, he published a 
tolerationist pamphlet in the form of a dialogue akin to episcopius’s rhe-
torical strategy of Vrye godes-dienst.150 Throughout the next decades, he 
324 chapter five
151 For Van Limborch, see P. J. Barnouw, Philippus van Limborch (The Hague: Mouton & 
Co., 1963) and cf. for his contacts with Locke: Marshall, Locke, Toleration, esp. 481–482. On 
the international resonance of Dutch notions of toleration, in particular at the end of the 
seventeenth and the start of the eighteenth century, see also Antonio Rotondò, Europe et 
Pays-Bas. Evolution, rééleboration et diffusion de la tolerance aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles 
(Florence: Università degli Studi, 1992).
152 Aanwysing I.14, 60, 63–64: “… soo soude grooteliks zijn te verwonderen, indien de 
Kerkelijken in Holland, den selven menschelijken trant ten verderve des Lands konnende, 
niet souden willen, involgen; soo wanneer die tot vermeerdinge van haare eigen profijt, 
eere, magt, ende grootheid zoude strekken.”
republished episcopius’s theological works. He recommended these 
works (as well a hiding place) to an english exile in Holland, who in reply 
honoured  Van Limborch as the addressee of his 1689 Epistola de Toler-
antia. John Locke’s famous intervention in the english debate on tolera-
tion was thus to a large extent also a part of the Dutch Arminian legacy.151
Cultivating Diversity
The theory of toleration of the brothers De la Court shares many of the 
arguments in favour of religious liberty that were raised from episcopius 
onwards. Yet their tolerationist stance also involves a more inclusive 
dimension in its explicit plea for the connivance of the public exercise of 
a variety of different religions, most importantly Catholicism. Combining 
a principled defence of the freedom of religion with a pragmatic claim 
of the utility of confessional diversity, this plea is an essential element of 
the brothers’ commercial republicanism. Moreover, it is one of the main 
features that set the De la Courts apart from many of their republican 
contemporaries across the north Sea.
The starting-point of the brothers’ conception of toleration is their 
analysis of the roots of intolerance, an analysis that stems directly from 
their reproof of clerical pedantry and imperiousness. Religious persecu-
tion, so the De la Courts argue, is primarily caused by the desire to rule 
over others. When left uncontrolled by the magistracy, clerics are particu-
larly cursed with this imperious desire, and hence they slander and perse-
cute those who disagree with them. A main perpetrator of such “odio 
Theologico” is of course the Catholic Inquisition. Yet “it would be greatly 
surprising when the Clerics in Holland, if they could, would not want to 
follow the same human conduct to the detriment of the Country, when-
ever that should conduce to the increase of their own profit, honour, 
power, and greatness”.152 For the De la Courts, there is ample evidence 
that every dominant creed starts to persecute others, even if it has itself 
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153 Politike Weeg-schaal III.I.3, p. 526: “… dit niet te spruiten uit de verkeertheit der 
Religien, maar uit de boosaardigheit der menschen.” Cf. also Politike Discoursen II.IV.5, 
Sinryke Fabulen, 330–331.
154 Aanwysing I.18, p. 83–84: “… de evangelisse Lesse en de Wet der natuure: Doe een 
andere niets, dan ’t gunt gy wild dat een ander u doe.” Cf. the title page of William Walwyn, 
The Compassionate Samaritane (s.l. [London], 1644).
155 Sinryke Fabulen, 329, 367: “… den regten weege des waaren Christendoms, bestaande 
in geweld te lijden, ende niet te doen van ende aan andere Menschen, maar te oover-
reeden die men bekeeren wilde, afgedwaald zijnde … eenen reedeliken Christeliken 
Godsdienst, die vremd van alle dwang is.” The last passage refers to Matth. 4:13, Rom. 12, 
and Genesis 10.
156 Aanwysing I.14, p. 61–62, 64: “… den menschen te Leeren ende te Raaden alle 
Christelijke Deugden … bestaande alleen in onse innerlike gedagten der Ziele … innerlik in 
Spiritu & Veritate … daar ook het evengelium ons leerd, dat sy geene Heeren over 
Menschen, maar der selver Dienaars des Goddeliken woords behoorden te zijn … dese 
quaade heersugtige maximen der Geesteliken … hoe onmogelik het is iemand door dwang 
te doen hoopen, het gunt hy niet kan vatten wel gefondeerd te weesen.”
been a victim of such persecution in the past. In short, intolerance 
does not “stem from the wrongness of Religion, but from the wickedness 
of men”.153
To counter this intrinsic human evil, the De la Courts firstly insist on 
the antidote offered by Christian revelation as such, unaffected by clerical 
abuse. With a biblical message often used by advocates of toleration, they 
stress that it is both an “evangelical Lesson and the Law of nature to do 
nothing unto another but what you want another to do unto you”.154 A quote 
from psalm 73 as well as numerous references to the Old and the new 
Testament serve as a further proof that “a reasonable Christian Religion is 
alien to all coercion”, for “the right path of true Christianity consists of 
enduring and not committing violence to other People”.155 Since the power 
of coercion is exclusively exercised by the civil authorities, Christian min-
isters have no right to use any force but only to teach and advise their 
flock “all the Christian virtues” – narrowly defined as the trust in God, the 
hope of a blessed afterlife, and the love of God and of one’s neighbour. 
These virtues are purely internal and voluntary and therefore only mould-
able by peaceful persuasion, for “it is impossible to make someone by 
compulsion hope for something he cannot apprehend to be well-founded”. 
Faith exists “internally in Spiritu & Veritate”, and though the “evil imperi-
ous maxims of the Clergy” infringe this inner Christian spirit and truth, 
“the Gospel teaches us that they ought not be Lords over the People, 
but its Servants, and the Servants of the Word of God”.156 Accordingly, the 
particular order of civil society, the teachings of the Bible and the law 
of nature necessitate that clerics and all other citizens refrain from 
persecution.
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157 Ibidem, 65: “… sulks de gepersecuteerden allesins door dwang vande waerheid des 
publiken Gods-dienst afkeerig, ende in haare eigene dwaalingen halsterrig gemaakt 
werden.” Cf. Politike Discoursen II.IV.3, p. 25.
158 Welvaren 65, p. 144: “Dat dwangh in Religie den Regeerderen seer schadelijck is … dat 
door de vervolgingen de auctoriteit der publijke leeraeren dapper werd gestijft.”
159 Politike Discoursen II.IV.8, p. 57.
160 Justus Lipsius, Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae libri sex (Amsterdam, 1632) IV.2, 
p. 107: “Unionis auctor illa una: & a confusa ea, semper turbae.” See also the short treatise 
De una religione adversus dialogistam liber, written by Lipsius in 1591 to clarify his views on 
persecution and added to most later editions of the Politica.
Apart from contradicting divine, natural, and civil law, religious perse-
cution also proves to be useless and even counterproductive, endangering 
the concord within society. Since individual conscience cannot possibly 
be compelled by humans, the only result of intolerance will be that “the 
persecuted are by compulsion completely made averse of the truth of the 
public Religion and stubborn in their own errors”.157 Civil and religious 
warfare is then the inevitable consequence. Therefore, the sovereign 
(which does possess the power of coercion, at least as regards the outward 
exercise of religion) should equally refrain from persecution. “Compulsion 
in Religion is very detrimental to the Rulers”, for persecution of dissenters 
will only “stiffen” the clerics in their zeal, who will then incite the masses, 
win over members from the government, and ultimately subvert all sta-
bility.158 If anything, “persecutio semen Ecclesiae”, persecution breeds sects: 
instead of engendering unity, it creates a plurality of heresies.159 Intolerance 
thus fundamentally undermines its own objective.
This argument that religious persecution is highly unadvisable from 
the perspective of reason of state makes clear how the brothers De la 
Court depart from the principles of Lipsius’s stoic garden. At the height of 
the confessional warfare during the Dutch Revolt, Lipsius advised politi-
cal rulers to rigorously curtail religious fanaticism in order to safeguard 
social concord. Political stability was essential to protect freedom of con-
science in private, Lipsius insisted, but for that purpose public manifesta-
tions of confessional diversity had to be punished ruthlessly. “One religion 
is the author of unity; and from a confused religion there always grows 
dissension”, as a famous passage in his 1589 Politica runs.160 For Lipsius the 
rational management of society required the forceful implementation of 
one single creed, not for the sake of truth, but for the sake of utility. This 
view provoked an important controversy when his contemporary, the 
polemicist Dirck Coornhert, reacted by stating that such a stance implied 
an unacceptable subordination of the true Word of God to mere political 
expediency. For Coornhert toleration was a moral, Christian imperative, 
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161 On the controversy between Lipsius and Coornhert, see Van Gelderen, Political 
Thought, 251–256. Cf. for the extent of Coornhert’s concept of toleration also Marshall, 
Locke, Toleration, 340.
162 Richard Tuck, “Scepticism and Toleration in the Seventeenth Century,” in Susan 
Mendus (ed.), Justifying Toleration. Conceptual and Historical Perspectives (Cambridge 
etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 21–35: 30.
and because persecution could impossibly compel the inner soul, tolera-
tion was also a necessary means to uphold harmony within society. The 
alternative would be turmoil and strife, and Coornhert maintained that if 
all worship was overseen by the magistracy, the purity of Scripture alone 
would guarantee social peace.161
Lipsius and Coornhert thus articulated diametrically opposed solu-
tions to what Richard Tuck has called “the central dilemma of the age: if 
religious strife and persecution were to be avoided, the power of the state 
in religious matters had to be upheld”.162 The brothers De la Court, 
confronted with the same dilemma, occupy a position that lies some-
where in between. They adopt Lipsius’s perspective of reason of state, but 
discard his plea for persecution as unfeasible and counterproductive. 
Thus they agree to Coornhert’s argument for toleration, yet with a decid-
edly less resounding spiritualist overtone. For the De la Courts the cultiva-
tion of concord implies the curtailment of religious fanaticism, and 
hence the strong supervision by the sovereign of the public religious life. 
At the same time, it also entails a pragmatic acceptance of confessional 
diversity.
The principled pragmatism that underscores the brothers’ tolerationist 
theory is most apparent in the reason of state argument that openness 
towards religious dissenters attracts foreigners and thus increases a state’s 
competitiveness with neighbouring polities. “Freedom or Toleration as 
regards the various external Religions is the most powerful means to 
maintain in Holland many Residents, and to attract foreign Inhabitants 
from the surrounding Countries hither to reside”, as the title of one of 
the key chapters of the Aanwysing announces. Referring to the fate of the 
cities of Lübeck, Cologne, and Aachen, this chapter emphasizes the detri-
ment of religious persecution for those polities that are dependent on 
trade. Commerce is highly volatile and therefore easily chased away; 
because of the importance of religion for every human being, mer-
chants who are persecuted for their beliefs will simply settle in another 
country where they can enjoy greater liberty. This is proven by the deso-
lateness of the German cities, which have since the Reformation lost 
all their former splendour and riches due to the “impiety” of their clergy, 
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163 Aanwysing I.14, p. 59, 65–66: “Dat vryheid ofte Tolerantie omtrent de vesrchillende 
uiterlike Gods-diensten, is het kragtigste middel, om in Holland veele Inwoonders te 
behouden, ende vremde Ingeseetenen uit de omleggende Landen herwaarts ter woone te trek-
ken … leeren, dat het beeter is eene suiver-geloovige ontvolkte, als eene seer vol-rijke, 
geloovige; dog met ketterie besmette Stad te hebben … allen Ingeseetenen in het stuk van 
exercitie der Religien toe te laaten eene grootere vryheid, als sy in andere landen 
genieten.”
164 See Van Gelderen, Political Thought, 255.
165 Brandt, Historie der Reformatie, vol. III: 756 (quoting the 1619 petition): “… dat door 
de vrijheit van conscientie en dulding van verscheide Christelijke gesintheden in de 
Religie, niet alleen dese Landen en insonderheit dese ons stadt Leyden, maer ook versc-
heide andre Landen en Steden, treffelijk sijn opgesteegen, gebloeit hebben, en als noch 
bloejen; ende dat de geenen, dier contrarie wegen ingingen, verloop van volken en aftrek-
king van vertier, neering en welvaeren hebben geleden.”
166 [Passchier de Fijne], Een broederlicke vermaninge: waer in vertoont wort d’ellende 
onses lieven Vaderlants (s.l., 1624).
167 Vondel, “Haec libertatis ergo, papieren geld geoffert op het auteaer van de 
Hollandsche Vryheyd,” in Werken, vol. III: 333: “Soo tast de koopman tot den elleboogh in 
’t goud.” For Vondel’s views on religious toleration, see Sierhuis, “A Babel Full of Confusion”, 
324–337.
who “teach that it is better to have a pure-religious depopulated Town 
than one that is very populous and religious, but infected with heresy”. 
For De la Court, of course, the opposite is the case. Therefore he insists on 
the usefulness “of granting all Inhabitants a larger freedom in the exercise 
of Religion than they enjoy in other countries”.163 Freedom of religion, in 
short, is an essential element of the liberty that defines a true commer cial 
commonwealth.
This explicit connection between religious liberty and commercial 
prosperity did not come out of a void. Coornhert already linked toleration 
to riches,164 and in 1619 the Remonstrant ministers of Leiden similarly 
defended “freedom of conscience and the connivance of several Christian 
convictions” as a means of increasing the population and promoting 
“industry and welfare”.165 Passchier de Fijne, a Leiden minister and one of 
the Remonstrant pamphleteers of the 1620s, also argued that persecution 
undermines prosperity.166 And so did Vondel, who unfavourably com-
pared the bleak fate of repressive Leiden to the more tolerant policy of 
Amsterdam, where “the merchant reaches to the elbow in gold”.167 In 
short, the argument that toleration stimulates prosperity was far from 
new, and importantly, it was raised frequently in Leiden, a city that 
depended heavily on foreign immigration, yet also practised one of the 
most strictly orthodox policies as regards religious dissent.
The brothers De la Court adopted this plea for toleration on commer-
cial grounds and turned it into a general rule, into a political principle of 
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168 Slingsby Bethel, The Present Interest of England Stated (London, 1671), 17. See also 
Idem, The World’s Mistake in Oliver Cromwell (London, 1668), 18–19, and Idem, The Interest 
of Princes and States (London, 1680), 111–113.
169 Locke, “Trade,” in Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 221–222. Goldie mentions that this particular essay draws upon 
Carew Reynal, The True English Interest (London, 1674), a treatise that often refers to the 
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gion. In his 1667 “An essay on Toleration,” in Essays, ed. Goldie, 134–159, Locke already 
announced “to show what influence toleration is like to have upon the number and indus-
try of your people, on which depends the power and riches of the kingdom.”
170 William Petty, Political Arithmetick (London, 1690), 23–27; Child, A New Discourse of 
Trade, 7, 187.
171 Quoted in Simone Zurbuchen, “Republicanism and Toleration,” in Van Gelderen and 
Skinner (eds.), Republicanism, vol. II: 47–71: 58. For a comparative overview of Dutch and 
english notions of toleration, see Jonathan Israel, “Toleration in Seventeenth-Century 
Dutch and english Thought,” in Simon Groenveld and Michael Wintle (eds.), The Exchange 
of Ideas: Religion, Scholarship and Art in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Seventeenth Century 
(Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1994), 13–30.
potentially universal applicability. As a result, this principle would also 
resonate outside of Holland, in particular across the north Sea. The 
english republican Slingsby Bethel, who had been exiled in the Dutch 
Republic and proved to be a keen reader of the De la Courts, took up the 
argument in an anti-Cromwell pamphlet of 1668 and subsequently in his 
1671 treatise The Present Interest of England Stated. Referring directly to 
the Interest van Holland, Bethel insisted that “Imposition upon Conscience, 
hinders the resort of Strangers, and so the encrease of people, [and it] 
drives the soberest, and most industrious sort of natives into corners, 
leaving trade into too few hands”.168 In a short essay of 1674, Locke too 
mentioned “freedom of religion” as one of the main “promoters of trade”.169 
Towards the end of century, the argument had become a commonplace 
element of political and economic thought in england. William Petty and 
Josiah Child, for example, praised liberty of conscience as one of the main 
causes of Dutch commercial greatness.170 John Toland continued in the 
same vein by stating that “where there is no Liberty of Conscience there 
can be no civil Liberty, no Incouragement of Industry, no proper means of 
rending the contry populous”.171
Yet there is one particular aspect that sets the De la Courts’ plea for 
toleration apart from many of their english contemporaries who advo-
cated religious freedom, from Milton and Harrington to Bethel and Locke: 
their unequivocal acceptance of Catholicism. In england, the Catholic 
minority was mistrusted to such a degree that most Protestant propaga-
tors of toleration insisted that Catholics should not be tolerated. For 
Milton, “Popery” was on a par with “open superstition, which as it  extirpats 
330 chapter five
172 Milton, Areopagitica, 47. For toleration in Milton in theory and literary practice, see 
the essays in Sharon Achinstein and elizabeth Sauer (eds.), Milton & Toleration (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007).
173 Harrington, Oceana, 81.
174 Bethel, Present Interest, 24.
175 Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Shapiro, 245: “That church can have no 
right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all 
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Locke, Toleration, 686–694.
176 Around 1656, roughly 15% of the population of Leiden was Catholic: see Jan Wim 
Buisman, “Kerk en samenleving,” in Groenveld et al. (eds.), Leiden, 127–147: 141. On the 
presence and persecution of Catholicism in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic at 
large, see Charles H. Parker, Faith on the Margins. Catholics and Catholicism in the Dutch 
Golden Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008).
177 Aanwysing I.14, p. 60, 66: “… de vryheid van allerley Religien vande Gereformeerde 
verscheelende.”
all religious and civill supremacies, so it self should be extirpat”.172 
Har rington too insisted that religious freedom was only to be granted to 
those “being not Popish, Jewish, nor idolatrous”.173 Bethel even contended 
that “there is a kind of natural unaptness in the Popish Religion to 
business”, and hence, Catholicism should be banned for the sake of com-
mon prosperity.174 Locke’s position was more ambiguous, yet his argu-
ment that certain citizens cannot possibly remain loyal to the civil 
government because of their allegiance to an external power, suggested 
that Catholics, being dependent on the Vatican, ought not to be tolerated 
by the magistracy.175
In sharp contrast, De la Court promotes “the freedom of all Religions 
differing from the Reformed”, explicitly referring to Catholicism. Reflecting 
on the substantial Catholic presence in Holland,176 De la Court acknowl-
edges the risk of Catholic commitment to Rome and to the King of Spain, 
the Dutch Republic’s former archenemy. Yet he refutes this oft-raised 
argument and continues to say that the war with Spain is over, and that 
persecution of Catholics would either imply that many wealthy inhabit-
ants are forced to leave the country, or that they become hostile to the 
government.177 It is therefore not toleration, but intolerance that endan-
gers the security and the prosperity of the commonwealth. As De la Court 
explains with a reference to the French historian Jacques-Auguste de 
Thou:
Good dissenting Residents who do well or possess any considerable goods, 
should not be suspected to lapse into such rebellious thoughts that ruin 
Themselves and our Country, as long as one does not make them leave and 
embittered through any persecution, but on the contrary commit them by 
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178 Ibidem III.1, p. 398: “… dat goede dissentierende Ingesetenen, die hier te Lande wel-
vaaren, ofte eenige merkelike goederen besitten, niet behoorden te werden vermoed te 
sullenn vervallen tot soodaanige oproerige, haar eigen- ende ons Land-verdervende ged-
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179 The reference is to the dedication to Henry IV in De Thou, Historia sui temporis, 
3 vols. (Genève, 1626), vol. I: sig. ¶¶ - ¶¶¶4. On De Thou, see Ingrid A.R. de Smet, Thuanus. 
The Making of Jacques-Auguste de Thou (1553–1617) (Genève: Droz, 2006).
180 Aanwysing III.1, p. 398: “… de Heersugtige, oproerige Ingeseetenen, souden werden 
ontbloot van allen aanhang, die sy andersins onder den dekmantel van Religie ligteliker 
souden konnen maaken.”
181 Welvaren 65, p. 145: “… indien sij ale dissentierende tegen ’t geweld der kerckelijcken 
beschermen … sullen alle deselve dapper aen den Regeerderen werden verplicht.”
182 Burgersdijk, Idea oeconomicae et politicae doctrinae II.20, p. 115: “et diversitas religio-
num inter subditos non evertit unitatem Politicae.” On Burgersdijk’s views on religion, see 
Blom, Morality and Causality, 92–94.
183 Aanwysing III.1, p. 406–407.
such Freedom and a soft and moderate Government to show gratitude to so 
good Rulers and Magistrates.178
The reference in this context to De Thou is important, not only because 
De Thou was a strong critic of religious persecution, but also because he 
embodied the irenicist settlement between Protestants and Catholics in 
France – a model that De la Court suggests is worth imitating.179
De la Court extends the argument in favour of toleration by insist-
ing that toleration would deprive “imperious, rebellious Residents” of all 
the followers that they could otherwise mobilize “under the cloak of 
Religion”.180 Toleration thus serves to enlarge the authority of the sover-
eign, for by “the protection of all dissenters against the violence of the 
ecclesiastics … all the former will be boldly committed to the Rulers”.181 As 
the Leiden professor Burgersdijk had already argued, “diversity of reli-
gions among subjects does not avert unity of Politics”,182 and De la Court 
even maintains that religious uniformity might undermine political unity, 
for the more people agree on matters of faith, the larger the power of the 
clergy.183 The cultivation of religious plurality is therefore an essential 
means of curbing the clerical desire to rule and to safeguard the stability 
and welfare of society.
In line with these judgments, De la Court deplores that the religious 
freedom of the days of the Dutch Revolt has, as he sees it, diminished in 
his age. He characterizes Holland as still much more tolerant than its 
neighbours, yet the “laudable maxim” of toleration has lost ground since 
1618, the year that Calvinist orthodoxy was firmly established. Since then, 
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184 Aanwysing I.18, p. 82–83: “… dat men seederd den Jaare 1618 van die loffelike maxime 
meer en meer heeft beginnen af te wijken … Het welk niet min onreedelik, als den Lande 
schaadelik is; Want indien wy de voordeelen van haare inwooning en koopmanschap niet 
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185 Politike Discoursen II.IV.8, p. 60–63, 66: “Sulks dit veinzen de seekerste ende waaragtige 
vrugt der wreede vervolgingen is.”
186 See Aanwsying I.14, p. 59 (“vryheid ofte Tolerantie omtrent de verschillende uiterlike 
Gods-diensten”), a passage changed by De la Court into “Verdraagsaamheid omtrent de 
verschillende uiterlike Godsdiensten” when rewriting this chapter (Royal Library The 
Remonstrants and Catholics have been persecuted and chased away, 
“which is not less unreasonable than it is detrimental to the Country. 
For if we cannot lack the advantages of their residence and commerce, 
why should we prohibit that which is not harmful to the State?”184 
Like episcopius and in clear contrast with many of his english contem-
poraries, De la Court thus unambiguously advocates the toleration of 
Catholicism on the basis of both reasonableness and expediency. 
Moreover, his explicit emphasis on “the freedom of all Religions differing 
from the Reformed” opens up a wider tolerationist horizon beyond the 
borders of Christianity. The brothers De la Court concentrate on the posi-
tion of Catholics and Remonstrants in the Dutch Republic, but some pas-
sages in their work also comment on the fate of Muslims and Jews in other 
polities, such as the expulsion of the moriscos from Spain and the inquisi-
torial persecution of the Jews in Portugal. The overt religious activity 
of Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam proves that the Inquisition utterly 
failed in its own objectives and only provoked migration and feigned 
conversion, “so that this pretence is the surest and true fruit of the cruel 
persecutions”.185 Intolerance of any creed forcefully breeds hypocrisy 
instead of honesty, it creates nothing but a bleak appearance of religious 
unity at the cost of true faith, concord and prosperity.
The Public Limits to Toleration
The theory of toleration of the brothers De la Court, then, is fairly 
extensive, as it opens up an inclusive model of religious plurality. 
nonetheless, their idea of toleration also remains strictly limited. These 
limits are imposed by the notion of a single public church. The brothers’ 
conception of toleration basically encompasses the principled recogni-
tion of religious liberty and the pragmatic connivance of various forms of 
worship. Using tolerantie (toleration), verdraagzaamheid (forbearance), 
moderatie (moderation), oogluiking (connivance) and vrijheid van religie 
(freedom of religion) more or less as synonyms,186 the De la Courts make 
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Hague, Ms 393 C22, insertion at p. 59). Cf. also e.g. Ibidem I.18, p. 82 (“Vryheid ofte Tolerantie 
en oogluiking”); Ibidem III.1, p. 398 (“Vryheid ofte Tolerantie van verschillende Gods-
dienstige Vergaderinge en Religien”); and Politike Discoursen I.I.1, p. 31 (“moderatie … 
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187 Welvaren 11, p. 30: “… vrijheid om sich te erneeren, te studeeren, te woonen, jae selvs 
om God te dienen, ende te bidden soo als sij meenen, sijner Goddelijker Majesteit aen-
genaemst te sullen weesen.”
188 Aanwysing III.2, p. 425: “De Vryheid van Religie ofte Tolerantie aangaande, is kenne-
lik, dat die in Holland onder eene Monarchale ofte een-hoofdelike Regeeringe niet behoo-
rde verwagt te werden.”
189 Pieter de la Court to the brothers Van der Voort, 20 December 1663, in Kernkamp, 
‘Brieven (1661–1666)’, 148–149: “… vrome eerelike en allesints gehoorsame borgers … te 
buigen en te krommen, inhalen en toegeeven, gelijk hier behoorde te geschieden.” On the 
repression of clandestine Remonstrant congregations in Leiden, see Buisman, “Kerk en 
samenleving,” 137–138. Cf. also the pamphlet Leydsche proceduuren, ofte oprecht ende een-
voudigh verhael, van de onverwachte vervolginge, gepleeght tegen der Remonstranten godts-
dienstige vergaderingen, binnen de stadt Leyden (s.l., 1664).
clear that toleration entails a political permission to worship that is 
granted by the sovereign on the basis of the inviolability of conscience. 
By providing  its citizens the freedom “to serve and to pray to God in 
the way that they think will be most agreeable to His Godly Majesty”, 
a government acknowledges that such freedom is an essential element 
of the natural liberty that all citizens maintain when the civil society 
is established.187 Freedom of worship is therefore an integral part of 
republican liberty, and it is “evident that the freedom of Religion or Tolera-
tion  is  not to be expected in Holland under a Monarchical or Single- 
Headed Government”.188 Toleration, in short, is a fundamentally republi-
can principle.
In the De la Courts’ republic, such toleration works on two different 
levels, both within and outside of the public church. First, the theologi-
cal  relativism of the brothers implies a broad, comprehensive public 
church that peacefully integrates all the different tenets of Reformed 
Calvinism without splitting hairs over the adiaphora of faith. This 
Grotian,  irenic program means principally that the Orthodox Calvinists 
and the Remonstrants should be able to find a common ground of shared 
fundamentals under the banner of a single public church. In a letter that 
refers to the clandestine position of the Remonstrant congregations in 
Holland, De la Court stresses that the Remonstrants are basically “pious, 
honest and in all respects obedient citizens”. There is therefore no need 
for repression; rather the aim should be one of “bending and flexing, 
drawing in and giving in”. In short, all law-abiding Calvinists should 
come together in one church based on compromise and harmony.189 
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190 Aanwysing I.14, p. 63: “… alsoo kennelik in alle Landen voor de gemeene rust 
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maar niet, dat sy bedektelik, ende in kleinen getale hun Gods-dienst oeffenen.”
This church, overseen by the magistracy, will enjoy uncontested primacy 
in the public realm. “It is in all Countries evidently necessary for the com-
mon tranquillity”, De la Court maintains, “that one Religion prevails 
above all others, and that it is therefore fully authorized, protected, 
favoured and propagated by the State, in such a way that nonetheless the 
practices of other Religions are meanwhile somewhat publicly tolerated, 
namely not persecuted”.190 This means that there is also room for tolera-
tion at the second level, outside of the limits of the public church, whereby 
dissenters can practice their faith in private without having to fear for 
persecution. Yet this second level of toleration does not imply the equal-
ity of all churches. Given that church and state are not separated, the sin-
gle public church always maintains its exceptional status above other 
private congregations.
This exceptional status requires that all members of the government 
adhere to the public church. As the De la Courts stress, “disagreement of 
Religion among Regents must be shunned above all”.191 Toleration does 
therefore not extend to the realm of politics – which in the Dutch context 
means that Catholics, Anabaptists, or Lutherans (let alone Jews) should 
not be permitted to participate in political decision-making. Moreover, 
the De la Courts argue that
while a Country is most peaceful and flourishes best when the practice of all 
Religions is permitted … the Government should permit these as much, as is 
undamaging to its Religion. Consequently, the Government should forbid 
those who err to mislead the true-believer or to come together in such a 
large number that they could damage Politics, but it should not forbid that 
they practice their Religion covertly and in small number.192
In other words, toleration does not imply that every creed can establish 
its own church in the public realm. Instead, it involves the claim that 
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there is one true religion, supported by the state, while all who dissent 
from that religion are allowed to assemble in private under the strict 
condition that they refrain from infringing the social order. This leads 
to the paradox that dissenting groups should be concealed, but also 
observable and controllable by the civil authorities. Accordingly, Cath-
olics  in Holland are to be permitted “in none but small assemblies, at 
the home of known Citizens with Priests agreeable to the Rulers”. In this 
situation the “vexations would end, and among the good Residents, 
peace and friendship, yes even the true Religion would augment more 
and more”.193
The freedom of worship that the De la Courts advocate thus offers the-
oretical support for the actual practice of confessional connivance in the 
Dutch Republic, the existence of schuilkerken in which dissenters were 
allowed to exercise their faith covertly but recognizably. The brothers’ 
plea for toleration can be characterized as a rationalization of this peace-
ful endurance of religious plurality for the sake of maintaining social con-
cord. The De la Courts argue that through such connivance, the civil 
authorities “will propagate the Reformed Religion among their good dis-
senting Residents, not through compulsion, but through moderate, soft 
means”.194 Toleration is supportive of the one true faith, and instead of 
provoking religious pluralism, it eventually facilitates the victory of truth. 
Locke famously esteemed “toleration to be the chief characteristical mark 
of the true church”;195 likewise, the De la Courts insist
that there could be no greater sign of a false Religion than to persecute 
those who dissent, for then one does not dare to rely on its truth. So it is 
clear that the freedom of Religion would not only be very beneficial to the 
Common Land, but especially for the Reformed Religion, which can and 
should lean on its evident truth.196
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Overall, then, the theory of toleration of the brothers De la Court 
stems neither from a sceptical, Pyrrhonist attitude that certainty and 
agreement  in religious matters are beyond human reach (the position 
later adopted by Pierre Bayle), nor from the universalistic claim, 
popular among Collegiant circles in the Dutch Republic, that a single 
true Christian church does not yet exist.197 Instead, their theory is based 
on the fundamental assumption that in due course, the Reformed church 
will be perceived as true by all on account of its moderation and 
leniency – that is, by virtue of its true interpretation of God’s Word. Unity, 
not diversity, is therefore the foundation of the brothers’ tolerationist 
zeal, even though they embrace religious pluralism more openly than 
many of their contemporaries, especially when it comes to the explicit 
acceptance of Catholicism. In this sense, their plea for religious freedom, 
though remarkably silent about any theological issues, remains thor-
oughly religious in inspiration. Israel has rightly observed that the repub-
lican toleration of the brothers De la Court is “markedly secular in 
character”,198 and indeed, the reason of state arguments that underpin 
their views on religious dissent involve a largely secular approach 
towards matters of faith. However, it should be stressed that this secular 
emphasis stems from a religious agenda. In the words of Mark Goldie: 
“It is not of course inapt to speak of the emergence of secular political 
theory: the mistake is to speak disjunctively. For secularization was 
an evangelical pursuit, it was the working out of a central idea in the 
thought of the Reformers, the ‘priesthood of all believers’.”199 Or, to quote 
Alexandra Walsham on the debate on toleration in seventeenth-century 
england: “It is generally impossible to draw a neat line between the 
‘religious’ and ‘secular’ elements of contemporary discourse on this con-
troversial issue: the prudential, no less than the philosophical points 
made by its advocates can rarely be abstracted from the Christian frame-
work within which they were enunciated.”200 The same should be said 
of the points made by the brothers De la Court: when he revised 
the Aanwysing for a new edition to clarify his views, De la Court emphati-
cally stressed that toleration “does neither go against Reason, nor against 
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Scripture”.201 In short, he stressed that his idea of toleration was both 
secular and evangelical.
 epilogue: From Freedom of Religion to Freedom of Speech?
The importance of the De la Courts’ plea for religious toleration lies in 
particular in their groundbreaking comprehensive combination of differ-
ent arguments that had previously been raised separately. Merging a prin-
cipled defence of religious freedom based on divine revelation and natural 
law with a pragmatic plea for toleration on behalf of civic harmony and 
economic prosperity, the brothers set the standard for a range of tolera-
tionist writings that would appear throughout the following decades.202 
At the same time, their characterization of the dangers of clerical dema-
gogy and their insistence on the triumphant purity of God’s Word reveal 
that their views on religious freedom and social concord cannot be sepa-
rated from the crucial notion of public communication. To what extent 
does the De la Courts’ conception of freedom of conscience also entail a 
committed defence of freedom of speech? This closing epilogue argues 
that the brothers’ idea of free speech stems from the rhetoric that they 
employ in reaction to censorship and repression in the Dutch Republic. 
Returning to the issue of mercantile parrhèsia, it shows how their rhetoric 
of free speech entails a paradoxical account of what it means to be toler-
ant in conversation, aiming for the erasmian goal of concord through 
decisively non-erasmian outspokenness. Overall, this paradox would seal 
the fate of the De la Courts’ participation in the public debate.
During the seventeenth century, there was relatively little preventive 
censorship in the Dutch Republic, while repressive measures after the 
publication of a work often proved to be unsuccessful. As a result, the 
Republic became a hotbed for the international publishing industry, 
lauded with the epithets of “the bookshop of the world” or, in Voltaire’s 
words, “le magasin de l’univers”.203 nevertheless, principled pleas in favour 
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of liberty of speech were, in spite of this flourishing practice of a free 
press, largely absent from the Dutch debate. There was no Dutch counter-
part of Milton’s Areopagitica, nor even a sign of any direct influence of 
this key treatise in the netherlands. By way of an explanation, it has been 
argued that the relative absence of censorship in the Dutch Republic ren-
dered any theoretical arguments in favour of free speech redundant.204 
A more perceptive interpretation highlights that the modern concept of 
liberty of speech and of the press as an inviolable human right only 
became common towards the end of the eighteenth century.205 Yet for all 
the insightfulness of such an assertion, little attention has been paid to 
the way in which seventeenth-century Dutch publicists, by the very act of 
writing, negotiated the extent of freedom of speech that an author could 
claim within the pubic debate. Instead of searching in vain for the roots of 
the modern conception of liberty of speech, it might therefore be more 
fruitful to look at how early-modern writers, through entering the politi-
cal debate, defined a domain of what could be expressed in public.
The brothers De la Court, writing in the vernacular and addressing 
large segments of society, evidently attempted to engage a broad, popular 
audience in issues of abstract politics. Thus far historians have main-
tained that the issue of freedom of speech is almost entirely absent from 
the republican thought of the De la Courts, but this attempt to appeal to a 
wide audience clearly aimed to extend the political debate beyond the 
erudite echelons of society.206 Indeed, in the prefaces to the Politike Weeg-
schaal and the Politike Discoursen, the brothers justify their literary 
endeavour by asserting explicitly that in a true republic, all tongues and 
printing presses should be free. “Those who are used to bow their necks 
under the yoke of european Kings” might follow the maxim of the popular 
satirist John Owen “that a tongue is free enough when licensed to be silent”. 
However, “the peoples in europe who were used to Liberty” teach the 
direct opposite: as even Tiberius acknowledged in Sallust’s account, “in a 
free Republic, also the tongue should be free”.207 With the inclusion of 
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these quotes at the very start of their works, the De la Courts suggested 
that freedom of speech is an integral element of republican liberty, and 
that the establishment of ‘True Liberty’ had facilitated the unhindered 
enjoyment of such freedom.
Yet in actual censorship policies, the regime of ‘True Liberty’ had 
proven to be anything but lenient. The anti-Socinian edict of 1653 and a 
comparable decree issued in 1656 to counter the spread of Cartesian phi-
losophy showed that the De la Courts’ eulogy of republican freedom of 
speech was hardly met by reality. The Politike Discoursen was officially 
banned by the Leiden consistory and the Aanwysing even outlawed by the 
States of Holland, albeit with limited success. Hence, the brothers’ accla-
mation of free speech should not only be seen as an appeal to increase 
popular participation in the debate, but also as a rhetorical request to the 
civil authorities to tolerate their writings under the banner of true repub-
lican liberty and in opposition to ecclesiastical interference. This request 
entailed more than mere rhetoric. When reprimanded by the Leiden con-
sistory for his publications, De la Court turned directly to Johan De Witt 
to ask for his political backing. In a letter to the Grand Pensionary, he 
denounced “those procedures of the clerics [that] do not only seem to 
conduce to extinguish the freedom of the common inhabitants … but 
[that] also, apparently, seem to serve to claim their machinated Imperium 
in imperio”.208 Yet this request for intervention was in vain. De Witt dis-
cussed “the case of monsr. De la Court” with their mediator Pieter de Groot, 
and his eventual reply was short and clear: “It is, to my opinion, a mistake 
to make and try to obtain glory from works that are not generally condi-
tioned according to the proclamations of the country.”209 The official ver-
sion of True Liberty, in short, did not involve unlimited freedom of speech.
De la Court therefore had to reconcile himself with the Leiden consis-
tory, which admonished him to “uphold the honour of the church in all 
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events”. He complied with this reprimand, but his comments in a subse-
quent letter to his brothers-in-law are revealing:
I do not think that they have meant that the honour of the ministers is the 
honour of the church, and that the former should be upheld by all means. 
Truly, this is the attitude of the papists, not mine, nor the one of our church, 
whose honour, in contrast, does not consist of its foundation on the lives or 
doctrine of the ministers, but of its foundation on the true Gospel, even 
when the Devil would preach it.210
With this powerful statement, De la Court clarified once more that his 
anti-clericalism did not concern the Reformed church as an institution 
but rather the conduct of its ministers. He claimed to defend the purity of 
Scripture as the only foundation of the true church against clerical con-
tamination. In line with this judgment, De la Court became more and 
more outspoken and explicit in his rhetorical assault on the clergy after 
his repeated clashes with the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Whereas the anti-
clerical language of the Interest van Holland was still relatively reserved, it 
became much more explicit in the Aanwysing and even more so in the 
rewritten version of this work, which categorically rebuked the “Coercive 
ecclesiastical Ministers” as “truly Imperious, Lazy, gourmet, careless, frisky, 
and only in sheer appearance holy people”.211 With such fervent criticism 
of the clergy the brothers De la Court evidently tried to claim a relatively 
large domain of freedom of speech in the public arena.
nonetheless, there are also clear boundaries to this domain of free 
speech. These boundaries are set by the inviolability of Scripture, as 
becomes clear from De la Court’s reaction to a crucial event in 1668. That 
year, Adriaen Koerbagh became the first real victim of the repression dur-
ing the ‘True Liberty’ era. Koerbagh was the author of a number of highly 
unconventional works, particularly Een bloemhof van allerley lieflijkheyd 
sonder verdriet [“A Garden of All Kinds of Loveliness without Sorrow”], 
a rationalist dictionary that intended to purify Dutch language from 
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obscure, dogmatic terminology.212 According to the church authorities, 
this work was full of “blasphemous remarks about God, our Saviour Jesus 
Christ, the Son of God, and the divine and perfect Word of the Lord”.213 
When Koerbagh tried to publish another work clandestinely, he was 
betrayed, arrested, and condemned to ten years in prison, where he died 
within a few months. De la Court must have known Koerbagh, at least 
indirectly, since both were friends of Van Berkel, the translator of Hobbes’ 
Leviathan. Moreover, a few years earlier, Koerbagh had clearly sided with 
De la Court in the debate over the public prayer and the sovereignty over 
church affairs. Yet this time, De la Court did not share Koerbagh’s stance, 
on the contrary. When he heard of Koerbagh’s arrest, he insisted that “all 
wise men should accuse him of large mindlessness and imprudence and 
also of evilness”. De la Court did not agree with the form of punishment, 
for as he said, a fine would have sufficed for this kind of intellectual 
offence. However, he unambiguously rejected Koerbagh’s public under-
mining of Christian dogma.214
This judgment reveals the distance that separates the De la Courts 
from two controversial intellectual currents that developed a different 
conception of free speech in this period. The first is the movement of the 
Collegiants, a group of “Christians without a church” who advocated 
an “assembly of believers” in which all were allowed to articulate their 
interpretation of Scripture. As Laurens Klinkhamer, a prominent Leiden 
spokesman of the Collegiants, argued, the freedom to publicly express 
one’s opinion about Scripture is “the only means to maintain true Peace 
and Unity among Christians and to reduce all sects and divisions”.215 
For the Collegiants, such a free debate on theological matters and the 
abolishment of any ecclesiastical hierarchy would eventually bring all 
Christians together in the spiritual contemplation of divine revelation. 
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For the De la Courts, instead, social concord and the truth of God’s Word 
can only be maintained if all issues of theological debate are left exclu-
sively to the judgment of the sovereign.
The second intellectual current from which the De la Courts differed 
was the more radical circle of freethinkers who gathered around Spinoza. 
Significantly, Koerbagh’s gruesome fate was one of the main reasons for 
Spinoza to include a principled defence of libertas philosopandi, the “lib-
erty to philosophize”, in the Tractactus Theologico-Politicus. Accord ing to 
Spinoza, the unenforceability of conscience implies that all individuals 
have the right to express their opinions in public, as long as they do so 
rationally and without contradicting the sovereign’s authority. Spinoza 
famously insists, following his teacher Van den enden, that such freedom 
of speech does not endanger the peace and stability of society, indeed 
that a commonwealth cannot maintain concord if citizens are not allowed 
to say what they think.216 This freedom of expression also applies to the 
contents of Scripture, and Spinoza’s Tractatus can be characterized as a 
radical exercise in such free biblical hermeneutics. In clear contrast, for 
the brothers De la Court divine revelation is utterly beyond public debate. 
In order to preserve the purity of Scripture, not only should clerics be 
thwarted in their political designs, but also writers such as Koerbagh who 
undermine the Christian articles of faith and thus create confusion, dis-
cord, and strife. Freedom of speech thus ends where God’s Word begins.
This fundamental difference between Spinoza and the De la Courts is 
well captured by their distinct use of the same phrase of Tacitus: rara tem-
porum felicitate, ubi sentire quae velis et quae sentias dicere licet, “rare is 
the happiness of times when it is allowed to think as you want and to say 
what you think”. Spinoza employs this saying prominently as the motto of 
his last, conclusive argument in the Tractatus that freedom of speech 
should be safeguarded by the sovereign.217 The De la Courts quote these 
words in a different context, namely in explicit relation to the dangers of 
speaking the truth at a monarchical court.218 Spinoza’s universal principle 
of freedom of thought and expression, in particular as regards biblical 
criticism, instead involves for the De la Courts an anti-monarchical 
message: it is kings who should be criticized, not Scripture. In other 
 concord and toleration 343
219 Cf. Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Tole ration, 43–101.
words, for the De la Courts the Tacitean maxim “to think as you want and 
to say what you think” signifies republican parrhèsia, the ability to tell 
the truth and to reveal, like Actaeon, the nakedness of the unconcealed 
desire to rule.
The De la Courts’ conception of free speech, then, amounts to the 
kind of rhetoric that the brothers themselves employ in their work. 
Freedom of speech does not mean that everything can be expressed in 
public, since certain statements, specifically those touching on religious 
dogma, endanger the public peace. Instead, freedom of speech means 
speaking frankly, independent of monarchical might. In this sense, it 
forms an integral part of republican liberty and it is in itself conducive to 
such liberty, for a republic can only prosper if criticism of monarchical 
pretensions is allowed. In writing and publishing their treatises and per-
forming exactly such criticism, the brothers De la Court aim to vindicate 
this conception of free speech. By being outspoken and candid in their 
disapproval of kings, courtiers and clerics, they attempt to prove that the 
magistracy should tolerate such frankness for the sake of the survival of 
the commonwealth.
The De la Courts hereby suggest that the connivance of an open debate 
eventually facilitates the public victory of truth. The underlying, implicit 
justification of their involvement in the Dutch debate is that outspoken-
ness in conversation, “calling a spade a spade”, leads to an environment in 
which the truth, their truth, can ultimately triumph. The rhetoric of tol-
eration that the De la Courts employ does therefore not adopt the human-
ist, erasmian ideal of entering a conversation with decorum and modesty, 
trying to argue on both sides of a case in order to find common ground 
between seemingly incompatible arguments.219 On the contrary, the broth-
ers De la Court envisage a public arena of debate in which opinions will 
prevail on account of their competitive value, that is, on account of their 
truth and outspokenness. Their model is based on the assumption that 
toleration is enhanced by frank speech, by clearly establishing one’s own 
position and using plain and vivid language to repudiate the adversary. 
Only when differences are explicitly pronounced is there room to find 
common ground. Toleration, in short, is a matter of monologue, not of 
dialogue.
The intrinsic contradiction of this rhetoric of toleration lies behind the 
ultimate failure of the De la Courts’ attempt to win the hearts and minds 
of the middle ground in the Dutch debate. This contradiction arises out of 
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their endeavour to adopt the erasmian agenda of concord, yet to achieve 
that agenda by employing a decisively non-erasmian rhetoric based on 
confrontation. Directly challenging clerical demagogy, the brothers 
engage in a similar form of populist speech as that which they deride, a 
rhetoric that is more akin to a Calvinist sermon than to a polite humanist 
exchange of ideas. eventually, this paradox proved fatal for the De la 
Courts’ engagement in the public debate: their works were banned by the 
church, the political establishment around De Witt soon withdrew its 
patronage, and among the general public they only met with opposition 
and contempt. Before long, the brothers De la Court did indeed end up 
like a modern Actaeon.
It was a fate that the De la Courts were prepared to bear. In the very last 
fable of the Sinryke Fabulen, written in the last years of his life, De la Court 
insisted that if one has lived in sincerity and for the sake of truth, regard-
less the disdain of others, there is no reason to fear death, following the 
brave example of the “Political Martyrs” of the recent Dutch past who had 
paid with their lives for defying the House of Orange.220 “Let him stand 
who will, in pride of power, on empire’s slippery height; let me be filled 
with sweet repose”, De la Court quoted from Seneca’s Thyestes. “On him 
does death lie heavily, who, but too well known to all, dies to himself 
unknown”.221 With this stoic message, De la Court delivered his swan-
song. Buried in the new Church at the heart of Amsterdam, an anony-
mous elegy recalled his achievements in teaching “civic duty” and 
unmasking the “Burden and Oppression of Tyranny”.222 In similar vein, 
another sympathetic mind praised how De la Court’s sharpened pen had 
attempted to overthrow “Agamemnon’s Mycenae” so that “Liberty would 
build itself a new home” – even though the groundwork of this republican 
stronghold still remained to be “polished and paved”.223
1 Books Sold by John Darby in Bartholomew-Close, London [1717], 10–11.
2 G.W. Leibniz, Essais de Théodicée III.375, in C.J. Gerhardt (ed.), Die philosophischen 
Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1875–1890), vol. VI: 339: “… comme 
si les pensées d’un particulier, qui étoit en effect du parti de de Witt, et habile, mais qui 
n’avoit pas assés de connoissance des affaires publiques, ny assés de capacité, pour ecrire 
comme auroit pu faire ce grand Ministre d’État, pouvoient passer pour des productions de 
l’un des premiers hommes de son temps.”
ConCLusIon
The BroThers De La CourT anD The CoMMerCIaL  
repuBLICan TraDITIon
history has not been generous to the brothers De la Court. In 1702, the 
London bookseller John Darby published an english translation of their 
work under the name “John de Witt, and other Great Men in Holland”, in 
which he praised how “many nice and curious subjects, as well religious 
as Civil and political, are accurately handled”.1 This erroneous attribution 
certainly made the work of the De la Courts appeal to a wider audience, 
yet it also caused the brothers themselves to fall into utter oblivion. new 
english editions of their work appeared in 1743 and 1746, again under the 
authorship of De Witt, while a 1709 French translation was issued under 
the resounding title Mémoires de Jean de Wit, Grand Pensionnaire de 
Hollande. among the last to remember the name of the true author was 
the famous German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz. In 1676, Leibniz paid 
De la Court a visit when he was on his way to meet spinoza in The hague, 
a visit he recalled in his Essais de Théodicée of 1710. referring to the recent 
French translation of De la Court’s work, Leibniz deplored that it had 
been attributed to De Witt, “as if the thoughts of an individual who was 
effectively of De Witt’s party, and habile, yet who did not have sufficient 
knowledge of public affairs, nor sufficient capacity to write like that great 
Minister of state, could pass for the production of one of the prime men of 
his age”.2 With this posthumous blow, the reputation of De la Court was 
sealed – and before long his name submerged entirely in the scrapheap 
of history.
This book does not intend to show that Leibniz was wrong (because 
perhaps, in the end, he was right), but rather that the political thought of 
the brothers De la Court is of fundamental significance for the history of 
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early-modern republicanism. True republics, so the De la Courts argued, 
are commercial republics, and truly commercial states must be republi-
can states. This intrinsic parallel between trade and republicanism that 
forms the core of the brothers’ œuvre substantially broadens and sharp-
ens our understanding of what early-modern republican thought was all 
about. In particular, it shows that the seventeenth-century development 
of republicanism as an ideology of active civic participation in politics, 
free of any form of arbitrary domination, was strongly connected to the 
rise of commercial society. The case of the brothers De la Court, arguably 
the most radical republican theorists in the most successful early-modern 
republic, reveals how the embrace of commercial enterprise led to a pow-
erful plea for comprehensive republican liberty and to a categorical rejec-
tion of monarchical rule in all its guises.
The commercial republican outlook that pervades the work of the De 
la Courts comprises three related claims: first, that a true citizen connects 
his self-interest to the common good by pursuing mercantile honour 
within the disciplinary limits of civil society. second, that the increase of 
trade as the essence of reason of state requires liberty (which includes 
freedom from interference and freedom from domination), and that such 
liberty can only be fostered by a broad representative government in 
which any form of single rule is impossible. and third, that social concord 
and prosperity in this commercial republic are fostered by secular control 
over the public church and toleration of private religious dissent. all three 
claims crucially combine an argument in favour of commerce with an 
argument against monarchy: the monarchical lust for domination is 
inherently incompatible with the civic ethics of mercantile moderation, 
with the liberties that foster commercial prosperity, and with the reli-
gious toleration characteristic to a society based on trade. In short, for the 
brothers De la Court commerce and republicanism go hand in hand.
The rationale behind this theory stems from the application of a range 
of internationally constituted political languages to the local context 
of the centre of seventeenth-century global trade, the Dutch republic. 
Combining natural law theory from Grotius to hobbes with reason of 
state literature from Botero to rohan, augustinian and Cartesian theories 
of the passions with the republicanism of Machiavelli and Boccalini, and 
classical historical writing with late humanist rhetoric and ethics, the 
De la Courts endeavoured to construct a novel theoretical framework to 
substantiate as well as criticize the existing Dutch republican model. 
The central tenets from their thought all follow from this attempt to give 
meaning to the Dutch experience within a broad amalgam of various 
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international political vocabularies. The brothers adopted and adapted 
the fashionable ideas of hobbes on the origin of the commonwealth and 
Cicero’s time-honoured ethics of ambition, to assess the practices of 
Dutch citizenship and mercantile enterprise, justifying the honourable 
pursuit of commercial wealth as the prime characteristic of a ‘wise 
merchant’. They employed the principles of reason of state and the 
republican language of liberty to insist that a commercial commonwealth 
can never subsist under the single rule of a stadholder, that peculiar 
monarchical element of the Dutch republican constitution, nor under a 
small oligarchic government such as the De Witt regime. In line with 
the erasmian model of concord, the Grotian plea for a broad public 
church and the practice of religious co-existence in Dutch cities, they 
maintained that dissenters like Catholics ought to be granted freedom of 
worship in private so that general peace and prosperity are secured. 
Finally, they employed the precepts of late humanist rhetoric to make 
their case within the pulsating arena of public debate during the Dutch 
Golden age.
This rhetorical engagement forms the thread that weaves together 
the various parts of this book. The frank speech that characterized the 
De la Courts’ rhetorical practices and self-presentation makes clear 
how the brothers departed from late humanist rhetorical conventions to 
arrive at a novel form of public speech: a mercantile rhetoric of outspo-
kenness which, adopting the classical figure of parrhèsia, contended that 
telling the truth is all that matters, regardless of the reins of decorum or 
censorship. This rhetoric of the market underlies the argument that 
true citizens embody the archetype of ‘wise merchants’ who engage in 
honourable trade and frankness. such a form of public speech is essential 
for assessing the common good, and therefore these wise merchants 
should form a broad representative assembly that governs the republic. 
Moreover, this rhetoric of outspokenness entails the best way to address 
political and confessional differences in the public realm, for social 
and religious concord can only be maintained if the truth progresses with-
out restraints in the marketplace of ideas. political debate and decision-
making, in short, should follow the rules of mercantile frankness – or so 
the brothers De la Court maintained. Their own passionate practice of 
such frankness reveals the extent to which their successful stirring of the 
Dutch debate eventually resulted in the utter failure to win over their 
readers.
rhetoric, then, is a crucial key to disclose the De la Courts’ ideas on the 
relationship between language and politics and to assess their fate in 
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seventeenth-century Dutch debates. Contrary to the institutional focus 
central to the few existing studies of the brothers’ thought, turning our 
attention toward rhetoric illuminates how the essence of their republi-
can  endeavour is not a passive reflection on governmental structures, 
but rather an active engagement in public debate, challenging existing 
notions of what Dutch republican politics were all about. This new 
approach to the thought of the brothers De la Court has important impli-
cations for the study of the political culture of the Dutch Golden age, 
which was clearly much more rhetorical and ridden by ideological con-
flict than is often assumed. Moreover, the case of the De la Courts points 
to the general importance of the study of rhetoric to assess ideas about 
public speech, citizenship and deliberative politics within early-modern 
republican thought at large.
armed with an extensive rhetorical arsenal, the brothers De la Court 
positioned the seventeenth-century Dutch experience within this inter-
national republican tradition. They strongly maintained that the Dutch 
republic was part of a long-standing republican heritage that originated 
in antiquity, evident from their use of ancient athens as a prime model of 
inspiration for a commercial commonwealth, their references to roman 
law and the Italian renaissance as the main source for their concept of 
liberty, and their discussions of various examples of republican practice 
in the classical and contemporary Mediterranean. Yet the brothers gave a 
distinctive twist to this shared international heritage by championing the 
cause of commerce. They applied the Ciceronian language of honour to 
the mercantile society of the seventeenth century, changing the classical 
focus on virtue to the commercial language of interest, whereby the wise 
merchant eclipsed the land-owning citizen as the embodiment of civic 
morality. similarly, they expanded the roman language of liberty to an 
inclusive notion that merged freedom as non-domination with free trade 
as the essence of commercial reason of state. Finally, in spite of this evi-
dent roman inspiration, they fervently rejected the roman republic as a 
belligerent state that destroyed all trade and was ultimately doomed to 
lapse into tyranny. The brothers De la Court claimed to be part of a repub-
lican tradition, but this was a tradition that originated in trading athens 
rather than militant rome: it was a commercial republican tradition with 
the Dutch republic as its vanguard.
This mercantile move of the De la Courts did not come out of a void. 
Their praise of honourable commercial enterprise as the essence of good 
citizenship reflects a similar claim already brought forward in fifteenth-
century Florence, in particular by alberti. Likewise, their emphasis on 
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free trade as the essence of republican politics was clearly informed by a 
general development in reason of state theory from Botero onwards and 
by anglo-Dutch commercial competition and debate. on a number of 
issues, especially their argument for a broad aristocratic government that 
furthers commercial increase, the De la Courts continued in the footsteps 
of the academic politica taught at Leiden, while their argument that tol-
eration causes prosperity adopted earlier claims raised in Dutch religious 
debate throughout the seventeenth century.
The commercial republicanism of the De la Courts also involved a num-
ber of significant parallels with contemporary english republican writing. 
The brothers developed their ideas largely independently of repub lican 
theory and practice in england, but this apparent absence of direct intel-
lectual exchange does not confirm a deep pocockian rift between both 
sides of the north sea. on the contrary: the thought of the brothers De la 
Court entails a powerful elaboration of many claims that are considered to 
be characteristic of seventeenth-century english republicanism. above 
all, the ideal of republican liberty that skinner maintains dominated 
republican writing in england can be similarly traced in the thought of the 
De la Courts. as in england, if we follow rahe and pincus, this ideal of 
liberty merged the combined legacy of Machiavelli and hobbes into a ‘lib-
eral’ ideology of self-interest, freedom of trade and commercial increase. 
The case of the De la Courts arguably offers the most comprehensive 
example of these general trends in seventeenth-century republicanism 
that have thus far only been analyzed from an english perspective.
nonetheless, certain aspects of the brothers’ thought remain peculiar 
to the Dutch context. In particular, the quintessentially Dutch debate on 
the position of the stadholder resulted in the brothers’ radical claim that 
all forms of monarchy are necessarily tyrannical – a claim hardly equalled 
by any other political thinker before the revolutionary era. Thus, while 
the brothers De la Court were evidently part of an international republi-
can tradition, the extent of their virulent anti-monarchism shows that its 
is important to stress that unlike most of their european contemporaries, 
they in fact lived in a real republic.
The international reception of the De la Courts throughout the late seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries precisely shows that the commercial 
dimension of their thought was readily adopted elsewhere, but without 
its sharp anti-monarchical edge. The first foreign translations of their 
work already appeared in the 1660s, in German: first, in 1665 the Interesse 
von Holland, oder Fondamenten von Hollands-Wohlfahrt, followed by 
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Leibniz-editionsstelle potsdam (Berlin: akademie Verlag, 1983–2008), vol. I: 133–141 
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und Abnehmens der Städt, Länder und Republicken (Frankfurt, 1673), 1271: “Dr Bechers 
politischer philosophischer stein in der indischen Colonie beruhend.”
7 Ibidem, 15, 256–257: “… die Republiquen ins gemeins besser floriren, als die Länder 
welche durch absolute herrn regirt werden … Dann eine republick hatt nur ein Interesse, 
aber ein Landt hat zwey, nemlich ihr eigenes, und ihres herren.” see the analysis in pamela 
h. smith, The Business of Alchemy. Science and Culture in the Holy Roman Empire 
(princeton: princeton university press, 1994), 123–126.
translations of the Politike Weeg-schaal in 1669 and the Aanwysing in 1671.3 
as a result, some important German scholars referred to the De la Courts 
in their political writings, from pufendorf, who read them primarily as 
republican antagonists of hobbes,4 to Leibniz, who adopted their interest- 
based politics to the situation in the holy roman empire.5 This German 
reception of the De la Courts’ work was exemplified by the versatile alche-
mist and mercantile theorist Johann Joachim Becher. having visited the 
Dutch republic during the 1660s on behalf of the elector of Bavaria, 
Becher explicitly acknowledged his debt to the De la Courts in the second, 
1673 edition of his Politischer Discurs, von den eigentlichen Ursachen deß 
Auf- und Abnehmens der Städt, Länder und Republicken. In particular, 
Becher sought to adapt their commercial reason of state to a territorial 
princedom like Bavaria. he extensively discussed a range of mercantile 
policies, often directly drawing on Dutch experience, and he heralded a 
commercial colony in the West-Indies as the ultimate “political philoso-
pher’s stone”.6 a successful society is a society for commercial expansion, 
Becher learned from his Dutch sources, and he directly echoed the De la 
Courts with the claim that “Republics generally flourish better than coun-
tries that are governed by absolute lords” since “a republic has only one 
Interest, but a territory has two, namely its own and its lord’s”. Yet in spite 
of this tentative republican move, Becher duly remained within the tradi-
tional confines of the German territorial states, conventionally claiming 
that the best form of state is a mixed regime where a prince overlooks 
commercial enterprise.7 This adoption of the De la Courts’ language of 
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commercial interest without its anti-monarchical dimension typified 
the general reception of the brothers’ thought throughout the German 
enlightenment.8
In France, the work of the De la Courts also started to raise interest dur-
ing the 1660s, when Jean-Baptiste Colbert and his fellow ministers heard 
that a volume titled Interest van Holland contained “the entire secret of 
commerce”.9 The work was not translated until 1709, when three French 
editions of the Aanwysing appeared under the authorship of De Witt, 
allegedly published in The hague and in regensburg. It is revealing that 
the translator warned her French audience not to be shocked by the 
strong language of the author, “who was a republican of the most zealous 
sort”.10 eighteenth-century French readers of the De la Courts, like their 
German contemporaries, thus rejected the brothers’ anti-monarchism 
but eagerly took up their commercial politics. In particular the circles 
around Vincent Gournay, intendant of commerce during the 1750s, and 
his disciple anne-robert Jacques Turgot, governmental administrator 
in the 1760s and 1770s, intended to appropriate the De la Courts’ commer-
cial model to the absolutist French monarchy.11 according to Turgot, 
Gournay closely studied the French translation of the Aanwysing, which 
he classified together with the work of Josiah Child as “the legislators 
of commerce”.12 Following this judgment, French economic theorists 
throughout the later eighteenth century employed De la Court to  promote 
Montesquieu’s esprit de commerce. one of Gournay’s disciples extensively 
quoted from De la Court’s argument against trading monopolies to 
contend that “a monarchy should render its commerce republican”,13 
while another referred approvingly to De la Court to claim that free-
dom  of enterprise entails “the most fecund principle and the most infal-
lible means to extend and augment our exportations”.14 In this way, the 
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on the development of laissez faire economics.
especially in Britain the work of the De la Courts enjoyed a lasting read-
ership as an insider’s account of the Dutch mercantile model. english 
republican exiles in holland during the 1660s, most importantly algernon 
sidney and slingsby Bethel, were the first to appropriate the brothers’ 
thought for an english audience. sidney’s Court Maxims clearly echo the 
De la Courts’ language of republican interest and trade, while Bethel 
directly reproduced the argumentation of Interest van Holland in his own 
writings, especially in the 1680 Interest of Princes and States. True interest, 
so Bethel insisted, is commercial interest, and commerce thrives through 
liberty, peace, and toleration. Bethel also adopted the De la Courts’ claim 
that the Dutch were better off without a stadholder, “as Trade is their 
grand Interest … and as liberty and freedom are the great increasers of it, 
and as an uncircumscribed standing head, in both Civil and Military 
affairs, is under temptation of obstructing their liberty for publick 
Interest, if contrary to his private”.15 This emphasis on commerce, liberty, 
and the harmony of private and public interests continued to dominate 
the political thought of another english refugee in the Dutch republic 
who also owned a copy of De la Court’s Interest van Holland, John Locke.16
The first english translation of the De la Courts’ work was not long in 
the making. samuel pepys, who probably had purchased a copy of the 
Aanwysing when he visited the Dutch republic in the summer of 1669, 
owned a manuscript english version of that work, translated by Toby 
Bonnel, a Dublin merchant with Dutch family connections.17 This particu-
lar translation would never be published, yet De la Court’s arguments, 
especially concerning Dutch foreign policy vis-à-vis england, were cer-
tainly known among english political circles.18 eventually, the Aanwysing 
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claims on trade, foreign policy and Dutch republican supremacy over the english 
monarchy.
19 The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and West-Friesland. 
Written by John de Witt, and Other Great Men in Holland (London, 1702).
20 e.G. hundert, The Enlightenment’s Fable. Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of 
Society (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1994), 29.
21 see annie Mitchell, “Character of an Independent Whig – ‘Cato’ and Bernard 
Mandeville,” History of European Ideas 29 (2003), 291–311: 297, note 21.
was published in english by John Darby in 1702 – not coincidentally, 
the year that William III died.19 one year later, Darby also published an 
english translation in two volumes of the Sinryke Fabulen under the title 
Fables, Moral and Political with Large Explications. Darby, who attributed 
both treatises to Johan de Witt, was acutely aware of their subversive 
anti-monarchical content. significantly, he was also the publisher of the 
radical tolerationist writings of pierre Bayle, Jean le Clerc, and philippus 
van Limborch, and of the main texts of english republican thought, 
sidney’s Discourses Concerning Government, the collected works of John 
Milton, and John Toland’s seminal edition of the writings of James 
harrington. In this way, Darby enabled his english customers to read the 
De la Courts as the Dutch representatives of a broad seventeenth-century 
republican legacy.
an important author in this anglo-Dutch exchange was Bernard 
Mandeville. Born in rotterdam in 1670 and a student at Leiden, Mandeville 
moved to england being strongly influenced by the rhetorical, commer-
cial and political culture of his home country. his intellectual endeavours, 
which merged the rhetorical figure of aesopian fables with concerns of 
how to connect private with public interests, was clearly indebted to the 
thought of the brothers De la Court. Yet Mandeville decisively departed 
from his Dutch predecessors: emphasizing the utility of private vice 
instead of disciplined self-love, Mandeville, in the words of e.G. hundert, 
“aimed to demolish the De la Courts’ assumption that the passions could 
only properly be harnessed in a republic and to ridicule the claim that 
a genuinely civil life could only be led under a republican government”.20 
a comparable claim can be made with regard to the Commonwealthman 
Thomas Gordon, who was a keen reader of both Mandeville and of the 
1702 english translation of De la Court.21 Together with John Trenchard, 
Gordon published the influential Cato’s Letters, which insisted that “Trade 
and naval power” are “the offspring of Civil Liberty only, and cannot sub-
sist without it” – a De la Courtian claim that particularly referred to the 
Dutch example of commercial success. Gordon defined such liberty as 
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the absence of “arbitrary government”, yet he continued to argue that a 
limited monarchy such as in england was actually less arbitrary than the 
government of its “neighbouring republick … vulgarly mistaken for a 
commonwealth”.22 Like the english republicans of the seventeenth cen-
tury, Gordon thus appropriated Dutch commercial politics yet rejected its 
republican model.
British readers of the brothers De la Court throughout the eighteenth 
century continued to employ their work likewise as a noteworthy exam-
ple of Dutch political economy, largely discarding its radical argument 
against monarchy. Two short extracts of Darby’s 1702 edition of the 
Aanwysing, one concerning holland’s foreign policy, the other joint-stock 
companies in overseas trade, were republished separately,23 and the entire 
work was again translated and reissued in two new editions in the 1740s.24 
These new editions were particularly influential among political econo-
mists of the scottish enlightenment, including adam smith, who owned 
a copy of the 1743 translation.25
Finally, the work of the De la Courts also crossed the atlantic. In 1732, 
the english Mp James oglethorpe published a compendium of Select 
Tracts Relating to Colonies to promote the establishment of the new col-
ony of Georgia. For this purpose, oglethorpe had selected a number of 
texts on the usefulness of colonization, including Machiavelli, Francis 
Bacon, and a chapter from the De la Courts on holland’s commercial col-
onies.26 apart from the colonization of north-america, the brothers’ 
shadow also coloured the constitutional debates in the emergent united 
states. In the summer of 1788, when the delegates of Virginia met to dis-
cuss the ratification of the american Constitution, James Madison tried to 
convince his audience that a modern commercial republic required a 
strong federal government. Loose confederacies amount to “anarchy and 
confusion”, he argued, and to validate this claim he referred in particular 
to the example of the united provinces, “a further confirmation of the 
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characteristic imbecility of such governments”. his source for this state-
ment was the De la Courts’ argument that the province of holland would 
be better off as an independent state – for Madison this was clear proof 
that in the absence of a strong federal government, dismemberment is 
unavoidable.27 In short, the commercial republicanism of the brothers De 
la Court enjoyed ongoing and widespread readership, yet it was the com-
mercial, instead of the republican dimension of their thought that was 
mainly adopted abroad.
and what about the reception of the brothers’ thought in the Dutch 
republic itself? By and large, most Dutch readers also turned their back 
on the De la Courts’ anti-monarchical agenda. among the first to appro-
priate their work was the group of radical freethinkers around spinoza. 
spinoza’s Latin teacher, Van den enden, decided to enter the public 
debate after having read the De la Courts, and his political treatises clearly 
followed in their footsteps. In particular, Van den enden engaged in a 
critical discussion of the inconclusive constitutional design of the broth-
ers De la Court. referring to the changes in the different editions of the 
Politike Weeg-schaal, he expressed his agreement with De la Court’s even-
tual definition of an aristocracy close to democracy as the best form of 
government. as Van den enden argued, this is “the essential and correct 
definition of a right Popular government, because it would be irrationality 
itself if poor and Indigent people … together with serving and other impo-
tent Folk, would have a right to government”. Thus, Van den enden agreed 
with the view that a popular government means a government of the 
independent citizenry. Yet he then continued to criticize the De la Courts 
for overlooking the practical unlikelihood of such a government where all 
concur in one general interest, given the many differences in opinion that 
will divide such a large body of people.28
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There is no convincing evidence that spinoza knew the De la Courts 
personally, even though he lived just a stone’s throw away from Leiden in 
the small village of rijnsburg in the years that De la Court gained fame 
and notoriety.29 nonetheless, as numerous scholars have highlighted, 
spinoza was clearly influenced by the De la Courts.30 he owned a copy of 
the Politike Discoursen and of the revised edition of the Politike Weeg-
schaal, and in his unfinished swan-song, the Tractatus Politicus, he 
approvingly referred to the “prudentissimus Belga V.H.” (De la Court’s 
pseudonym) as an important source – besides hobbes and Descartes 
the only contemporary author spinoza deigned to mention.31 Indeed, 
spinoza’s political thought revisits many of the central claims of the 
brothers De la Court. he similarly asserts that all government is in self-
interest, that good government must therefore consist of a harmony 
between private and public interests, and that such a harmony is only 
feasible if “nothing which concerns the common welfare is wholly 
entrusted to the good faith of any man”. spinoza also highlights that this 
form of government will harness individual ambition towards peace and 
the protection of property, and thus it particularly suits a mercantile 
republic like athens, where the “only means of gain will be to engage in 
trade”.32 Yet in spite of these similarities, spinoza’s republicanism devi-
ates from that of the De la Courts in two important ways. First, his argu-
ment against single rule does not involve the same radical assault of all 
things monarchical. Instead, spinoza asserts that it is conceivable that a 
people will freely establish a monarchy and transfer to a king “the power 
to settle disputes and to take rapid discussions”, because “a people can 
maintain a fair amount of freedom under a king” – a direct contradiction 
of the anti-monarchism of the brothers De la Court.33 secondly, spinoza 
moves beyond their hesitant argument for democracy towards a broader 
conception of the political significance of the masses. By collapsing the 
conventional distinction between populus and multitudo that is central to 
the thought of the De la Courts, spinoza suggests that the most powerful 
and most stable polity is a commonwealth that enhances the political 
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participation of all its inhabitants.34 While spinoza does not follow the 
radical anti-monarchism of the brothers De la Court, he turns their argu-
ment for a broad representative government into a more inclusive notion 
of popular rule.
after spinoza only a few Dutchmen openly sided with the De la 
Courts.35 In the eighteenth century they received most attention from the 
strongly pro-orangist polygraph elie Luzac, who praised their  commercial 
thought yet utterly rejected their republicanism.36 ultimately, the broth-
ers De la Court mainly encountered ridicule. In 1690, when a local politi-
cal conflict erupted in amsterdam, a number of pamphlets staged a 
satirical conference at the parnassus where renowned philosophers com-
mented on the situation.37 It was an eminent gathering that included 
plato and aristotle, Cicero and Tacitus, Machiavelli, Lipsius, hobbes, 
Descartes, and spinoza. Yet the most prominent speaker of all was De la 
Court. Thus, the brothers De la Court were finally admitted to the 
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